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Ever since my parents settled in the Netherlands, I grew up with the ‘name 
question’ of ‘my people’ hovering in the background. At a different level, this 
topic confronted me even more starkly during my study at the Free 
University of Amsterdam in the mid-1990s. This was also the period in 
which I began to have access to the Internet, of which I enjoyed making use 
with the greatest excitement, especially because it offered the opportunity to 
communicate with ‘community members’ elsewhere in the world, through 
both e-mail and Internet forums. Although this time my confrontation with 
the ‘name question’ was at virtual level, I experienced it more intensely. 
Perhaps because individuals from different parts of the world had something 
to say about this topic; the extent of the boundaries was therefore unlimited.
 The ‘name question’ was articulated in the symbolism and texts 
produced on Internet websites, in private e-mails but first and foremost in 
the Internet forums where the different discourses of individuals and 
institutions met and engaged in a burning debate, or so it seemed. It was in 
this period that I began to think actively about the ‘name question’ and to 
participate in the discussions taking place, especially at virtual level. 
Intellectually, I experienced it as a challenging question; the lively debate 
revealed the diverse dimensions and the difficulties in finding a clear cut 
solution for something which has been experienced as a central question in 
the life of Assyrians/Syriacs in the modern era. When my MA thesis 
supervisor, Joost van Loon, asked me why I was not pursuing a PhD, it was 
easy for me to choose the topic. Ever since I made that choice, I began to 
engage in this topic at a different level; I wrote a preliminary research 
proposal and tried to find funding but without success. In the mid-1990s, 
there were no universities in the Netherlands interested in this question and 
Assyrian/Syriac institutions did not have the financial means to fund such a 
project, although they expressed their moral support. This changed almost a 
decade later, when researchers at Leiden University planned two different 
projects in relation to this question. Heleen Murre-van den Berg contacted 
me about writing a research proposal and participating in a project based on 
this topic which she had planned but could not take place. It was through 
her that I got in touch with Bas ter Haar Romeny who had begun a broad 
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project with a more historical focus for the purpose of studying identity 
formation among the members of the Syriac Orthodox Church. He invited 
me to join in and add a modern component to the PIONIER research 
project ‘The formation of a communal identity among West Syrian 
Christians’ which has been directed by him and made possible by the Dutch 
Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). I would like to thank Ter Haar 
Romeny for the freedom with which he entrusted me in developing this 
research project. The fieldwork was made possible by a generous grant from 
the Leiden Institute for the Study of Religions (LISOR) and also a grant from the 
Leids Universiteits Fonds (LUF). I would like to express my gratitude to them 
for their financial support. The Amsterdam School for Social Science Research 
(ASSR, University of Amsterdam) provided an inspiring learning 
environment during the period in which I attended several courses there. In 
this context, I would also like to acknowledge the pleasant involvement of 
Ernestive van der Wal in the early period of my research. I am very thankful 
to Rosemary Robson who has put great efforts into the English correction 
of this work and I have valued her personal involvement and moral support. 
 Here I also would like to mention the late juffrouw Ida Kormelink 
(Enschede) who taught me in Dutch classes with great love and dedication 
during my first year in the Netherlands. Joost van Loon (Free University of 
Amsterdam) also gave his lectures with great dedication and inspired me 
wonderfully. And, was it not he who asked me the question: ‘Why don’t you 
pursue a PhD?’ Had he not done so, I would never have thought about such 
an opportunity. Thank you Joost! I should also like to remember a pleasant 
and talented colleague who passed away too early as the consequence of a 
tragedy, the sociologist Fuat Deniz (Örebro University). I enjoyed the short 
period we worked together. It was a bitter moment in my life when I heard 
the news that my colleague Fuat was no longer with us. Fuat, your memory 
will live on among us.  
 I wish to thank various individuals and organizations which have been 
supportive in the process of conducting my research and writing my thesis. I 
started off doing research in three countries: the Netherlands, Germany and 
Sweden. In the Netherlands, I wish to thank the Assyrische Mesopotamische 
Vereniging Enschede (AMVE) and Platform Aram for opening their doors to me 
when I wished to attend their activities. 
 In Germany, I would like to mention the organizations Aramäer 
Gutersloh, Mesopotamien-Verein Gutersloh, Tur Abdin Gutersloh, Föderation der 
Aramäer in Deutchland (FASD) and Zentralverband der Assyrischen Vereinigungen in 
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Deutschland (ZAVD). My deepest gratitude goes to Helga Anschütz and her 
husband Boulos Harb who welcomed me to study their visual archive. 
Furthermore, I am very thankful to my qarito Shmuni and her husband, 
Habib Gabriel, with whom I stayed during my fieldwork in Gütersloh. They 
offered me a warm home and their friendship: taudi sagi! I am also grateful to 
some other friends with whom I stayed during shorter visits. 
 I spent most of my fieldwork time in Sweden and owe much to the 
organizations and people there who have been supportive of my research in 
several ways. I wish to thank the following organizations for their co-
operation: Assyrian Democratic Organization, Assyrien Kulturcenter i Botkyrka, 
Assyriska föreningen i Södertälje, Assyriska fotboll föreningen, Assyriska 
kvinnoförbundet, Assyriska riksförbundet i Sverige, Assyriska ungdomsförbundet, 
Syrianska/Arameiska akademiker förbundet, Syrianska Assyriska akademiker i 
Sverige, Syrianska föreningen i Södertälje, Syrianska fotboll Club, Syrianska 
riksförbundet, Syrianska ungdomsförbundet, Syriac Universal Alliance, Suroyo TV and 
Suryoyo SAT. I would like to express my special gratitude to the Assyriska 
riksförbundet for the access it provided to its archive and Tomas Beth-Avdalla 
and Hanibal Romanos for their kind help in providing me with material from 
the Modern Assyrian Research Archive (MARA). Last but not least, I am deeply 
indebted to Jan Beth Sawoce (Mesopotamian Library, Södertörn University) 
who has been of immeasurable help throughout the period of my research. 
He has always been there whenever I needed any material from the 
Mesopotamian Library, which he set up with tireless efforts. I admire his 
dedication and hope that he can continue doing this work for future 
researchers. 
 In the Stockholm area, specifically in Södertälje, many people have been 
hospitable and helpful during the course of my research for which I am very 
grateful. I would like to mention some of them and thank them for their 
enormous effort and support. To start with, my cousin Saro and her 
husband, Esmer Aras (Tumba,) with whom I stayed during the whole of my 
fieldwork period and during shorter visits to Sweden afterwards. They 
offered me a warm home and a pleasant environment even in the coldest and 
darkest days of the year in Sweden: taudi sagie! I am much indebted to my 
friend Hanne dbe Yahqo (Södertälje) for his great help, inspiration and the 
humour with which he introduced me to the field and for reading some early 
writings. My colleague and dear friend Mariam Garis, with whom I stayed in 
Gotenburg, has been an important support in various ways. Taudi Mariam! 
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Two families whom I would like to thank for their hospitality in Jönköping 
are malfono Eliyo Dere and his wife, Fehima, and malfono Simon Barmano and 
his wife, Samira. In Örebro I would like to thank malfono Hanna dbe Asmar 
and his wife, Bercin, for the several times I was able to stay with them and 
for their support during my fieldwork in this city. Many thanks are also owed 
to malfono Hanna dbe Asmar and Bahcat Barsom who opened their archives 
to me. 
 This book could not have been accomplished without the help of all my 
respondents, whom I cannot mention by name for reasons of confidentiality. 
They know that I spoke to them and they know the value of the 
conversations we had, which I have enjoyed tremendously. Taudi sagie from 
the bottom of my heart for your kind co-operation. 
 The writing process has been the most challenging. Therefore I am 
enormously grateful to Abdulmesih Bar Abraham, Febroniya Atto, Jean 
Fathi, Hanibal Romanos and Soner who have read and commented on a 
concept of the whole manuscript. I also owe a debt of gratitude to several 
friends and colleagues who read earlier concepts of my chapters: Jan van 
Ginkel (Ch. 4 and Appendix 1), Francio Guadeloupe (Ch. 10), Chris 
Nierstrasz (Ch. 3 and 4), Basna Beth Yuhanon (Bethzero) (Ch. 3 and 4), 
Tycho Walaardt (Ch. 4), Mariam Garis (Ch. 4, 8-10), Han Vermeulen (Ch. 8), 
Nicolien Montessori (Ch. 1 and 2) and Ton Zwaan (Ch. 1 and 11). I am also 
very thankful to malfono Aziz Tezel with whom I have communicated about 
the meaning of specific words in Suryoyo (Surayt) and greatful to my brother 
Simon Atto who helped me with the translation of Suryoyo and Syriac texts 
whenever I needed greater clarification. Many thanks also to those friends in 
different parts of the world who read shorter pieces or who could answer 
questions of mine at whatever stage. 
 I would like to thank a few friends and colleagues more specifically. Jan 
van Ginkel with whom I have spent much time at Leiden University and 
who has been a great friend. Chris Nierstrasz, Ton Zwaan and Joop for 
making space in their diaries and offering me the support needed to continue 
my work with joy. 
 My deepest gratitude goes to the members of my family who have 
functioned as the essential, strong foundation for completion of this thesis. 
My father Barsaumo, who passed away in 1987, has not been able to witness 
the progress his eight children have made after they settled in the 
Netherlands. His absence threw the engagement and dedication of my 
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mother Seyde to the upbringing of her children in the context of the 
diaspora into even sharper relief. Although illiterate, they stimulated their 
children to complete their education and created a warm loving space with 
the straightened means they had at their disposal in their new country. Over 
time, my mother seems to have understood my research project. Many times 
I have had conversations with her about the life in Tur ‘Abdin. She has been 
able to give me new insights and I realized that indirectly, by asking my 
questions, I was teaching her the importance of historical material. Often she 
would say: ‘Our old people used to talk a lot in the old days, but we never 
paid much attention, because we did not realize its importance.’ With 
enormous pride, upon the completion of this thesis, I reflect on the process 
my mother has passed through in her development during the thirty years of 
her life in the Netherlands. Although she has taken little part in the broader 
social life, she has managed to learn from and develop herself by absorbing 
all the knowledge her children and grandchildren have brought back home, 
her base from where she has dedicated her life to them. I shall bear it with 
me as a great example for life. 
 My siblings have been a source of love, inspiration and dedication to 
life. They have encouraged me continuously, borne with me at the most 
intense moments and spoiled me in compensation for my work in isolation. I 
thank them for financing the visual equipment which I used during my 
research and for financing the several assistants I worked with for the 
translation of Swedish texts with me.  My nephews, Nisho and Yamo, and 
my nieces, Babel and Izla, were born during the time of my research. My 
phone calls with them and the short visits to Enschede have been an 
inspiration to continue writing with great pleasure. 
 In the last stage of writing, Soner came into my life. I am grateful to him 
for his unconditional, loving support which has brought me to where I am 
now. He has borne with me during the tensest period of writing, read the 
whole manuscript carefully and helped me technically with the layout. And 
above all he has kept reminding me what is most important in life. A few 
months after the completion of this work, our dearest son Yauno was born 
who has since then introduced me to a whole new dimension of a beautiful 
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SSNP   Syrian Social Nationalist Party 
SSV Edessa   Suryoye Studenten Vereniging Edessa 
SUF   Syrianska Ungdomsförbundet (Syriac Youth    
    Federation) 
SAUF   Syrianska-Arameiska Ungdomsförbundet 
Syrianska FC  Syrianska Fotboll Club  
TMS   Terraki Medresse Süryaniye (Progressive Suryoyo   
    School) 
UN    United Nations 
UNHCR           United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
UNPO   Unrepresented Nations and People Organization 
VPK   Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna (Swedish     
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The purpose of this report is to inform the reader of the alarming 
concerns/matters... Mor Gabriel Monastery is currently facing. The great 
injustice that may occur within the following weeks demands an 
immediate attention... 
                          Archbishop Timotheos Samuel Aktas, 2008 
 
We are all sons and daughters of Mor Gabriel. So let us join together in 
struggle...’ [Ahna kulan abne u bnotho d-Mor Gabrial na! So lass us gemainsam 
kämpfen...]... Our heritage, our culture, our religion, our history, [and] our 
language are at stake. Are we going to allow ourselves to be robbed of all 
these?... Come to the big demonstration in Berlin on 25 January 2009.  
Defend your people and your history! 
               From the rap song Mor Gabriel by Ninjos de Dios1 
        
We appeal to the Turkish government, to do all in its power to protect 
and preserve the monastery as well as do what is necessary for the Syriac 
Orthodox Christians. In consideration of Turkey’s own interest we request 
the enforcement of religious freedom, the protection of property and the 
guarantee of Minority Rights according the Treaty of Lausanne and the 
Copenhagen Criteria... Not least it is demanded that the undemocratic 
feudal structures and the by the authorities financed paramilitary system of 
the so-called village guards is abolished. 
               Memorandum Aktion Mor Gabriel, Berlin Demonstration 2009 
On 25 January 2009, about 19,000 Assyrians/Syriacs walked the 
demonstration from the Berliner Dom to the Branderburger Gate to show 
their solidarity with the Mor Gabriel Monastery in Tur ‘Abdin.2 At that 
                                                 
1 The original in German: ‘Es steht auf dem Spiel unser Erbe, unser Kulturgut unser Glaube, 
unsere Geschichte unsere Sprache unsere Existenz, all das lassen wir uns rauben?… Komm 
zur Großdemonstation in Berlin am 25-01-2009 in Berlin, Verteidige dein Volk und deine 
Geschichte.’ Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EJo_wgQrOCg. Ninjos de Dios 
consists of the artists: Salo, Christine, Svenji & Ben E. 
2 Tur ‘Abdin is a geographical area in South-East Turkey where many of the Assyrians/Syriacs 
who migrated to Europe have been living in the last century. Tur ‘Abdin means ‘mountain of 
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moment the monastery is being confronted with the occupation of its lands 
and being charged with serious allegations which could threaten its very 
existence. Responding to these threats, thousands of Assyrians/Syriacs raise 
their voices and make themselves heard: Peace for Mor Gabriel! Peace for Tur 
‘Abdin! Freedom for the Suryoye! Slogans in Suryoyo and German are shouted, 
punctuated by the ululation kililililililili by women. Different generations, 
many of them born and raised in Germany, joined by a great number of 
clergy bearing banners, carrying placards (most of them in German) with 
such texts as: ‘You have taken enough from us already! YESTERDAY Hagia 
Sophia, TODAY Mor Gabriel Monastery, TOMORROW Kölner Dom?’3 
Young people bear the Assyrian and Aramean flags high or wear them 
wrapped around their bodies. No matter what their ideological adherence, 
Assyrians/Syriacs from the ‘four corners of Europe’ but especially from 
Germany, have gathered in Berlin to make their voices heard on a matter 
which is dear to their hearts: the survival of Mor Gabriel Monastery in Tur 
‘Abdin. The discursive field of the demonstration has not been limited to 
Berlin. During the whole process of the organization of the demonstration 
Assyrians/Syriacs around the world have been informed and prepared 
through their media and local institutions. People who cannot join the 
demonstration had the opportunity to watch it live on the Assyrian/Syriac 
digital TV channel Suroyo TV.4 The phrase which has functioned as a red line 
and which was on everybody’s lips is ‘I am the daughter/son of Mor Gabriel’ 
in Suryoyo (Ono u abro/bartho d-Mor Gabriel no). It sums up and conveys the 
link between any Assyrian/Syriac individual and this monastery and 
therefore it has been assumed that it will inspire and mobilize them in the 
struggle for the defence of Mor Gabriel. 
                                                                                                               
the servants [of God]’, a reference to the monastic life in this region in the early centuries of 
Christianity. See further about this character of Tur ‘Abdin, Palmer 2010, 1999. 
3 Original in German: ‘Ihr habt uns schon genug weggenommen!’ and ‘GESTERN Hagia 
Sophia, HEUTE Kloster Mor Gabriel! MORGEN Kölner Dom?’ 
4 I was one of the people who could not make it to the demonstration because of other 
commitments abroad. Therefore I watched the demonstration on Suroyo TV and Suryoyo SAT, 
spoke with people who had participated in the demonstration, watched Youtube films of this 
event, examined uploaded picture galleries, and read articles which appeared on several 
websites. Perhaps more than 200 short videos of this event have been placed on the Internet 
website of Youtube by participants in the demonstration in the last few months, giving an 
overall idea of this mass gathering: the preparation for the demonstration, images of the 
demonstration and the reaction of people who were part of it. 
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 Although the main task of this study is not to explore this 
demonstration in depth as such, a closer examination at this discursive 
struggle around Mor Gabriel Monastery reveals that this event does indeed 
incorporate the different elements of which this study is composed. What 
exactly is at stake here? Why have Assyrians/Syriacs worldwide shown their 
support for the demonstration? How is it that Aktion Mor Gabriel5 managed 
to organize the biggest event in the history of Assyrians/Syriacs in Europe to 
fight for the survival of a fourth-century monastery with approximately 
seventy inhabitants in a remote region of Turkey? There are three main 
conspicuous points in the struggle for Mor Gabriel which are useful to 
provide a link with the presentation of my research problem for this study. 
These points are: the articulation of external threats engenders apprehension 
among the Assyrian/Syriac community and strengthens its internal ties; Mor 
Gabriel is an important nodal point for Assyrians/Syriacs as it plays a strong 
symbolic role in their collective identity. Nodal points, as will be discussed in 
the theoretical chapter, are the signifiers around which discourses are 
organized. The strong cohesion revealed in this demonstration contrasts with 
the situation prevalent during the last forty years of settlement in Europe 
when individuals and groups have been at loggerheads with each other 
competing for hegemony over the group. The discourse of the need for unity 
among Assyrians/Syriacs was indubitably one of the main driving forces 
behind the Berlin demonstration. 
Commencing with the first point, in 2008 Mor Gabriel Monastery 
was confronted with two challenges to its position (Aktas 2008): the 
occupation of its land by neighbouring villagers and the act of the Turkish 
State in laying claim to and acquiring forest land from the monastery which it 
proceeded to register in the name of the Treasury.6 Exacerbating the 
                                                 
5 Aktion Mor Gabriel was specifically founded for this aim on the initiative of the Syriac 
Orthodox diocese in Germany in co-operation with four secular Assyrian/Syriac 
organizations in Germany – symbolizing the inclusion of the broad and divergent ideas 
present in everyday life, but united in Aktion Mor Gabriel. This co-operation is the outcome of 
a gathering organized by Mor Julius Hanna Aydin, Archbishop of the Syriac Orthodox 
Church in Germany, 30 November 2008. It resulted in the foundation of Aktion Mor Gabriel; 
based on the co-operation between: the Archdiocese of the Syriac Orthodox Churches in 
Germany, Dachverband der Entwicklungsvereine Tur ‘Abdin (DETA), European Syriac Union (ESU), 
Föderation Suryoye Deutschland (HSA) and Zentralverband der Assyrischen Vereinigungen in Deutschland 
(ZAVD). 
6 The report discusses how the legal proceedings of surrounding villages against the cadastral 
survey of Mor Gabriel Monastery has resulted in: 
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situation, several allegations7 were imputed against the monastery, which led 
to court hearings. This external threat stirred up fear among the remaining 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Tur ‘Abdin (about 2500 individuals) and among those 
living in the diaspora. As a reaction to this the Archbishop of Tur ‘Abdin, 
Timotheos Samuel Aktas in his alarming report indicates the fear of 
Assyrians/Syriacs around the world, that, in the long run, this first land 
occupation will end in the expropriation of the monastery from the Syriac 
Orthodox Community.8 Highly conscious of the past, they base their fear on 
their historical experiences of similar cases. The deeper fear and distrust 
these allegations have aroused in the Archbishop are exuded by the language 
used throughout the report. In a nutshell, this external threat to the survival 
of Mor Gabriel Monastery has sent such shock waves through the 
community that the biggest event ever in the history of Assyrians/Syriacs in 
the last forty years in Europe was organized to catch the attention of an 
international audience and to attract attention to its plight. 
 The importance of Mor Gabriel is stressed by any Assyrian/Syriac who 
discusses the current threat with which it is faced. This raises the questions 
of why this monastery is considered to be so important and what meaning is 
attached to it. As a monastery replete with its own distinct history, Mor 
Gabriel is one of the last two main Syriac Orthodox monasteries which have 
continued to be inhabited in Tur ‘Abdin up to the present-day. People who 
have migrated from Tur ‘Abdin over the last few decades still think of Mor 
                                                                                                               
‘...the grossly erroneous decision made by Midyat Cadastre Directorate, the legal real estate of 
Mor Gabriel Monastery shall now unjustifiably and unfairly be registered under Eğlence and 
Yayvantepe village names thereafter. Consequently, the villagers of the Eğlence and 
Yayvantepe shall enjoy the right to dispose of Mor Gabriel Monastery’s real estate, which Mor 
Gabriel Monastery had legally and rightfully held for in excess of 1600 years. This illegal act 
blatantly violates the right to property of Mor Gabriel Monastery’s Community Foundation 
secured under both national law and European Convention on Human Rights and its 
protocols...’  
7 Submitted on 20 and 27 August 2008 to the Midyat Public Prosecution Office, Mor Gabriel 
Monastery Community Foundation has been accused of: occupying forest land without 
having permission to do so; conducting missionary activities through children of unknown 
identity between the ages of 10-12; The Mor Gabriel Monastery building owned by the 
Community Foundation is a historical museum and therefore required to have permission for 
prayer; children enjoy a religious education in the Monastery and anti-Turkish activities are 
carried out; the Community Foundation acts in contravention to Unity of Education Law; 
Monks and Archbishop of the monastery are trying to destroy national unity and incite people 
to insurgency; The Community Foundation receives funds from dubious sources; The bank 
accounts of the Community Foundation should be confiscated. 
8 On 26 January 2011 they faced this fear when the Turkish Supreme Court expropriated 24 
hectares of land from Mor Gabriel Monastery and appropriated it to the State. 
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Gabriel as one of their principal ‘collective homes’. The strong relationship 
with this monastery is aptly summed up in the slogan devised for the support 
campaign launched by Aktion Mor Gabriel: ‘I am a daughter/son of Mor 
Gabriel’. This link implies the closest link in a family relationship – the most 
central and important social network among Assyrians/Syriacs. 
 
 
   Illustration 1: A collage of images of the Berlin Demonstration (2009). 
   Source: Aktion Mor Gabriel. 
The importance of Mor Gabriel is stressed by any Assyrian/Syriac who 
discusses the current threat with which it is faced. This raises the questions 
of why this monastery is considered to be so important and what meaning is 
attached to it. As a monastery replete with its own distinct history, Mor 
Gabriel is one of the last two main Syriac Orthodox monasteries which have 
continued to be inhabited in Tur ‘Abdin up to the present-day. People who 
have migrated from Tur ‘Abdin over the last few decades still think of Mor 
Gabriel as one of their principal ‘collective homes’. The strong relationship 
with this monastery is aptly summed up in the slogan devised for the support 
campaign launched by Aktion Mor Gabriel: ‘I am a daughter/son of Mor 
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Gabriel’. This link implies the closest link in a family relationship – the most 
central and important social network among Assyrians/Syriacs. 
 What is feared if Mor Gabriel monastery were to be lost? Both in the 
memorandum of Aktion Mor Gabriel (which was presented at the 
demonstration) and in the speeches given by other people, a link was made 
between the disappearance of Mor Gabriel and the end of Christianity in 
Turkey. It stands to reason that Mor Gabriel is considered to represent an 
important symbolic centre for Christianity. At a different level, Mor Gabriel 
also embodies the roots of Assyrians/Syriacs in their homeland; the symbol 
of their rootedness. Among such groups of people as the Assyrians/Syriacs 
who have never ceased to express their wish to continue to survive as a 
people or to maintain their distinct collective identity – even in the diaspora 
– the connection to the homeland is of the utmost importance. Despite this, 
the older generation who grew up in Tur ‘Abdin, refer commonly to their 
position in the homeland as that of yasire (hostages).  
 It is common among Assyrians/Syriacs to refer to the European 
diaspora as a sea into which they will eventually be absorbed and disappear 
as a people. Consequently, in the threat to the Mor Gabriel monastery, they 
foresee their existence as a people being menaced: they are afraid that the last 
remaining Assyrians/Syriacs lingering in the homeland will also be forced to 
flee and seek refuge in the diaspora. Their overriding fear is that it will be 
easier for people to assimilate if they are deprived of their relationship with 
their historical artefacts in the homeland. In other words, Mor Gabriel 
Monastery functions as a symbol in the conscious development of a myth of 
survival. As I shall discuss later, the older generation refer to their current 
position in the diaspora (far removed from their homeland) using the 
metaphor of orphans (yatume).  If Mor Gabriel should be lost to the ‘others’, 
they fear they will be permanently cut off from Tur ‘Abdin (which is 
considered as the very heart and hearth of their homeland) as one of their 
main community centres will have been swallowed up. When that day dawns, 
the orphans will no longer be able to say who their parents were and where 
their roots lie. To illustrate the significance of the monastery to 
Assyrians/Syriacs, in a letter by the Solidarity Committee for Mor Gabriel 
(Sweden) which was sent to the Turkish authorities and Swedish political 
parties, this committee compared the function of Mor Gabriel for 
Assyrians/Syriacs with that of Jerusalem for the Jews and Christians and that 
of Mecca for the Muslims. The loss of Mor Gabriel would mean a 
unequivocal amputation from what they perceive to be their ancestral 
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homeland. Bereft of this relationship, Assyrians/Syriacs would lose hope, as 
it would lead to yet another great dislocation in their lives, bringing them closer 
to what they refer to in terms of ‘death throes’ (u nfoso da raghle). At that 
moment, the hope of the continuation of their existence as a distinct people 
will have been irrevocably snatched from them. In short, to be cut off from 
the athro (homeland) both physically (because of living in the diaspora) and 
symbolically (by ceding their ancient monastery to the ‘others’) will place 
them in a situation in which they feel that they will be staring extinction as a 
people in the face. 
 In the struggle for the survival of Mor Gabriel their aim is twofold: they 
want to remedy their condition as hostages (yasire) in Turkey and heal their 
condition of being orphans (yatume) in the diaspora, through their survival as a 
distinct people. Consequently, the battle for the existence of Mor Gabriel is 
the outward and visible sign of their struggle for their very existence as a 
people, which has also been galvanized in the field of discursivity through 
the ‘name debate’ – the central topic of this thesis. This dual struggle for 
survival in Tur ‘Abdin and in the diaspora culminated on 25 January 2009 in 
the attempt of Assyrians/Syriacs to organize a united event to combat the 
perceived threat to their existence. The Archbishop of Germany, Mor Julius 
Hanna Aydin, overwhelmed by the huge number of people who gathered in 
the Pariser Platz, said in his speech: ‘Today marks the birthday of the ‘amo 
Suryoyo (Assyrian/Syriac people)’ referring to and putting into words the 
strength of unity the audience felt that day. This drew loud cheers from the 
crowd. A commonly recurring word of appreciation for the unified 
organized event by Aktion Mor Gabriel has been continuously heard since that 
day in the Assyrian/Syriac media. Father Kenan who addresses people on 
Youtube is therefore by no means an exception:9 
…All our parties, for the first time ever in their history of Europe since 
we were scattered in the diaspora, have joined hands regardless of names 
and parties. They have demonstrated that the more we are torn by internal 
disagreements, the more the enemy lurking outside will deny us our rights 
and will have no pity on us. Therefore, I call once again on our people in 
these [various] parties: to unite the Suryoyo name and to reach an 
agreement to come together, to leave behind the names [name conflict], to 
leave behind the [personal] gains and chairs [positions]; to organize. This 
                                                 
9 My translation of the original in Suryoyo, available at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7zD70bcA-oA. 
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[disunity] will not lead us anywhere. For the sake of this people, for their 
rights, for the rights of Mor Gabriel monastery in Tur ‘Abdin, for our 
brothers in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and wherever they are oppressed in 
the world. Unite!  
To summarize, beginning with the last point, the unity achieved in the Berlin 
demonstration has not been common during the last forty years of 
settlement in the European diaspora. Instead of unity, elite members with 
particularistic political discourses have vied to gain hegemony and by their 
actions they have caused a division within this diaspora community. This 
study will try to provide an answer to the question of why they have not 
managed to unify these dichotomous voices in the discursive field. 
 As the case of Mor Gabriel monastery has revealed, there are central 
nodal points in the identification of the people. Even people who have never 
seen this monastery can imagine, express and experience this link very 
strongly. Words matter. To say ‘I am the daughter/son of Mor Gabriel’ is 
without doubt a discursive practice in terms of identification, representation 
and taking a stand in order to defend the monastery, for example, by 
engaging in the activities described. This is why I have used the concept nodal 
point to stress the role of Mor Gabriel monastery in the field of discursivity. 
By and large, diverse, even opposing Assyrian/Syriac groups share the 
sentiment of the important role and significance of Mor Gabriel. In other 
words, there is no disagreement about this. Instead, it is indeed a common 
point of departure. This is the reason the case of Mor Gabriel has been so 
widely embraced and why it has become a common demand. 
 Last but not least, the external threat posed by ‘others’ is an essential 
dimension in the definition and identification of ‘us’; when the chain of the 
‘others’ is blurred, the identification of the chain of ‘us’ also becomes 
ambiguous. In the context of this study, the emigration of Assyrians/Syriacs 
to Western countries has resulted in a split subject, a crisis in their 
identification. Although Assyrians/Syriacs left their homeland and 
established themselves in Western countries several decades ago, they have 
continued to perceive the majority populations in the Middle East as their 
main external threat, as if they are still living in their (historical) homeland.  
Given this situation, the threat to Mor Gabriel has recalled a historical fear 
for the ‘others’.  Consequently, this perception of threat caused a stronger 
need of ‘internal unity’.  
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Various central figures at the demonstration expressed their 
appreciation of the unity displayed in this discursive event in the Berlin 
demonstration. This raises the inevitable question of why there has been 
disunity and how this has emerged. These questions usher in the central topic 
of this study which will be elabourated below, after the research questions 
have been introduced. At the surface level, the identification crisis which 
Assyrians/Syriacs experienced after their emigration to Western countries 
has manifested itself in the ‘correct’ translation of their people’s name 
(Suryoye) into Western languages. In the first instance, the level of discussion 
seems to have been limited to this naming issue. However, a more 
discriminating examination of the matter demonstrates that it touches on 
different aspects of social reality. The ‘name debate’ resembles an iceberg; on 
the surface it has been represented by a discussion about the ‘correct name’ 
of their people. Nevertheless, below sea-level lies the main body of the 
iceberg. Likewise, the ‘name question’ incorporates anything related to the 
historical and socio-cultural formation of Assyrians/Syriacs. In this study, my 
purpose is to plumb the lower levels of the iceberg by deconstructing the 
discourses employed at the surface level. As an analogy, the iceberg should 
not be understood as a structural base which determines everything. As a 
metaphor, the iceberg is per definition ‘a large mass of ice floating in the sea’. It 
is not static; instead, it has a changeable and open character. In the same 
way, the deconstruction of identity discourses will provide a deeper 
understanding of their formation. 
  
1.1 Aims and Research Questions 
The purpose of this historical anthropological study has been to identify and 
analyse the present-day identity discourses among Assyrian/Syriac elites in 
the European diaspora in the hope of developing a deeper understanding of 
the ‘name debate’. My purpose is not to justify the claims of competing elite 
members nor do I attempt to apply a normative set of criteria to this debate. 
Instead, I want to arrive at an understanding, in the sense of verstehen, of how 
these political discourses have been shaped, what their contingent relations 
are and hence to explain the extent of antagonism between the two main 
competing discourses by contextualizing them from a socio-historical 
perspective. In order to reach this stage I shall deconstruct and contextualize 
the pre-given and taken-for-granted knowledge, assumptions, terminology 
and argumentations used in these political discourses.  
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 Identities are constituted in an antagonistic social field in which 
different discourses compete to fix meaning – and in doing this, they create 
space for changeable and negotiable identities to be. It is therefore important 
to illustrate the relationship between identity discourses and hegemony (see 
further the Chapters 2 and 7).  
 Theoretically, this study will supplement discourse theory with new 
understandings drawn from a strongly empirically based case study of an 
example of a minority and an immigrant group in a European context. 
Departing from the aforementioned aims of this study I have formulated the 
following inter-related questions: 
1) What are the discourses of identity among the Assyrian/Syriac elites in the diaspora?  
In order to deconstruct these discourses, I shall identify the logic of 
difference and the logic of equivalence, empty signifiers and nodal points within the 
parameters of discourse theory. I shall discuss this terminology explicitly 
in the theoretical chapter. 
2) How can we contextualize these discourses historically? More specifically, what is the 
relationship between the emigration of Assyrians/Syriacs to Europe and the 
articulation of identity discourses?  
Here, dislocation which occurred during the emigration and settlement 
process and the concept of the split subject will guide the answers to these 
questions. For an understanding of the articulation of discourses in the 
new diaspora context I shall make use of thick description.  
3) How can we explain the hegemonic struggle between Assyrian/Syriac elites? What 
are the discursive strategies which are used by elites? What are the roles of ideologies, 
myths and social imaginaries in the formation of identity discourses? 
The antagonistic character of the discursive field and hegemony are two 
essential and interrelated elements required for achieving a 
comprehensive understanding of the identity formation process. 
An analysis of the answers to the questions above shall provide further 
explanation to the interaction between political discourses, ideologies and 
discursive strategies – particularly in relation to the ‘name debate’. 
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1.2 Naming and Terminology 
It is perhaps no accident that the question of how to refer to my object of 
study has been among the most burning and difficult problems I have had to 
tackle, especially because I want to consider and remain close to the ideas of 
my research object in order to present their articulated discourses in my 
analysis. An inherent difficulty is that my presence as a researcher in this 
discursive field will always irrevocably influence the field whether I want to 
do so or not. Unfortunately, there seems to be no possibility of finding a 
neutral or fully detached position to write about my research object. Any 
name I choose to apply will inevitably be imbued with significance in this 
field. 
 Initially, when I began my research, I chose to use the emic term Suryoye, 
the name which Assyrians/Syriacs use in their mother tongue, Suryoyo, when 
they refer to themselves.10 I assumed that the emic approach (the research 
object’s point of view), instead of my point of view (etic), would allow me to 
distance myself more easily from the ‘name debate’ if I were to decide to do 
so. Moreover, methodologically the use of Suryoye would allow me to show 
that in their mother tongue my research object commonly uses one name. I 
have already mentioned above that disagreement and subsequently 
difficulties arise when a designation has to be used in Western languages.  
 As I shall discuss in Chapter 2, this specific preference for taking a 
distance in relation to the use of the name has proved to be impossible. 
Among both the Assyriska and the Syrianska elites in Sweden, there were 
individuals who have objected to my emic use of the term Suryoye for the 
English publication of my research. The main objection raised was that the 
term Suryoye (which they use when they communicate in their mother 
tongue) would be promoted to be used in the English language (and thus in 
the discursive field). They are convinced that it will only add more confusion 
                                                 
10 I even considered using the name Suroye (instead of Suryoye) – the name used in the spoken 
language when referring to themselves in Tur ‘Abdin – in order to depart from a time in which 
everybody agreed to the use of a certain name. In Europe the change from the use of Suroye to 
Suryoye in the spoken tongue has not raised any burning issues among the people. For the 
ordinary people, this process has even passed perhaps unconsciously. In the end I chose not 
to use Suroye because most of the people in the group I studied no longer use the name Suroye 
and those born in Europe have never ever begun to use it. Therefore I decided to use the 
designation most commonly used, Suryoye, when they talk in their mother tongue. 
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to the naming of their people. Instead of introducing a ‘new term’11 (as they 
see it) into English language, they opted for the compound name 
Assyrians/Syriacs (the equivalent of the Swedish version Assyrier/Syrianer 
which has become an acceptable term with a more neutral connotation in 
Swedish society since about the beginning of the 1980s).12 It is worth 
mentioning that elite members who were involved in this specific discussion 
have been engaged as activists (among their other roles). They presented 
their reaction as an attempt to deal with the ‘question of their people’. The 
fact that I experienced their very strong reaction to my use of the emic name 
Suryoye made me decide to use the name most acceptable to my research 
object as it covers both the Assyriska and the Syrianska activists. Hence, the 
compound designation ‘Assyrians/Syriacs’ has been introduced in this study 
as the common designation to refer to the people who refer to themselves as 
Suryoye in their mother tongue. 
 Although I find it problematic to apply this compound name 
retrospectively to the period before it was introduced and to areas in which it 
has never been used, as in the context of the Middle East where they 
emigrated from, I have nevertheless decided to do so for the reason that it 
makes my text accessible to the general reader. When I use the Swedish 
terms Assyrier and Syrianer separately, I employ them in terms of the 
ideologies of the social groups which adhere to the two different names. 
These social categories are both born of an ideology and express that 
ideology. Forty years ago these categories and ideologies did not exist in the 
Swedish context.13 Each term stands for a certain ideology which does 
change over time but is consistent enough to be recognized as such. Each 
ideology stands for a set of ideas, especially when they talk about themselves 
as a people. It is a discourse, rather than an amorphous substance which 
hovers somewhere out there. It is about meaning-making while talking about 
                                                 
11 In reality, I have not been the first to use the name Suryoye in a Western language. In the 
Netherlands it has been used as a neutral terminology by Dutch journalists in, for example, 
Enschede and Hengelo, two towns in which many Assyrians/Syriacs live. It has also been 
used by the anthropologists Jan Schukkink (2003) and Ulf Björklund (1981). 
12 See further Section 7.1.5 about the introduction of the compound name. 
13 The term Assyrier existed in Swedish and has been used especially in reference to ancient 
Assyrians. However, the term Syrianer is a new term which has been added to the Swedish 
vocabulary since it was created in the context of the ‘name debate’ among Assyrians/Syriacs. 
Before, the term Syrier was used both to refer to an inhabitant of Syria and to a Suryoyo or 
Assyrian/Syriac. 
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the same group of people. Therefore, in this thesis, an Assyrier14 in Sweden is 
a Suryoyo who assumes Assyrian ancestry or who chooses to use the 
designation Assyrian as a national name for his people. A Syrian15 is a Suryoyo 
who first rejects the designation Assyrier and by doing so any links to an 
Assyrian past. Among the Syrianer in Sweden, especially people who are 
active in secular organizations and many of the clergymen state that the ‘amo 
Suryoyo has Aramean roots. However, not all Syrianer identify with an 
Aramean past. Even when they assume they are of Aramean descent, the 
majority object to the use of the designation ‘Aramean’ to refer to 
themselves today. Instead, they use the designation Syrianer in Swedish as a 
translation of Suryoye and as its synonym. 
 
1.3 Emigration and the Identity Crisis 
In order to answer the questions mentioned above, I shall have to discuss 
the process through which Assyrians/Syriacs passed after they emigrated to 
Europe and the consequences of this experience in relation to their collective 
identity and the naming of their people by themselves and by the new 
‘others’. As an introduction to all chapters it is essential to emphasize some 
important elements which reveal how Assyrians/Syriacs categorized 
themselves and how others categorized them in the geographical area from 
which they migrated. The Assyrians/Syriacs and their neighbours in the 
Middle East knew who they were. In their (spoken) modern Aramaic 
language Surayt16 (hereafter I shall refer to this language as Suryoyo17), they 
                                                 
14 Assyrier and Syrianer are respectively the noun forms for ‘Assyrian’ and ‘Syriac’ in Swedish, 
Assyrisk and Syriansk are the singular adjective forms and Assyriska and Syrianska are the plural 
adjective forms. In Swedish language, adjectives are declined according to gender, number and 
definiteness of the noun. The use of Assyrier, Assyrisk, Assyriska, Syrianer, Syriansk and Syrianska 
in this thesis is according to the Swedish grammer rules. 
15 In Swedish, Syrian is the singular form of Syrianer. The Swedish Syrian is pronounced 
differently from the English word ‘Syrian’. In Swedish, there is an emphasis on the ‘a’. 
16 See further Tezel (2003: 24) for his ideas about the derivation of Surayt. See further 
Appendix 2 for the use of the terms Surayt, Turoyo and Suryoyo when referring to the spoken 
mother tongue. 
17 My choice to refer to the spoken mother tongue with Suryoyo is because hardly anybody in 
the context of the diaspora continues to refer to this language with Surayt. The majority have 
started to call it Suryoyo. Before this, Suryoyo was used to refer to their (written) language 
(Kthobonoyo), classical Syriac. 
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referred to themselves as Suroye and in classical Syriac as Suryoye.18 In Arabic 
and Kurdish19 they were referred to as Suryani and in Turkish as Süryaniler. 
What did these names mean in terms of a category of people? At the 
present-day, these names refer to those whom we know to be members of 
the Syriac Orthodox Church.20 It is the same category which was known as 
the Süryani Kadim21 Millet under the Ottoman Empire. Millet is the Ottoman 
Turkish term for a group of people defined by its confessional affiliation. 
Hence, under the Ottomans, the religious affiliation of the group was the 
basis on which it was categorized. This categorization was based on the 
Islamic concept of the Ummah, the Muslim community or nation (implying a 
definition transcending modern national boundaries). In the context of the 
modern Middle East, the former Süryani Kadim Millet continued to be 
organized along denominational lines (see further Chapter 3). Therefore, in 
practical terms the Assyrian/Syriac people (‘amo Suryoyo) were a group of 
Christians among a majority of Muslims – from their own perspective and 
from the perspective of the Muslim majority. 
 At this juncture, it is important to clarify the concept of ‘amo as a 
collective category among the Assyrians/Syriacs in the Middle East: the term 
‘amo in Suryoyo means ‘a people’; as u ‘amaydan means ‘our people’.22 In 
everyday life, it was not a category which was theoretically of any importance 
to the ordinary people among Assyrians/Syriacs. They did not pay much 
heed to it. There was an implicit notion of what ‘our people’ meant. 
Furthermore, the neighbouring ‘others’ knew who the Süryani or Süryaniler 
were in the geographies which formed their homes. What mattered more to 
all groups involved was that they were Christians, hence different from the 
majority population of Muslims. Their status and position in a Muslim 
                                                 
18 Sometimes, people in Tur ‘Abdin would also refer to themselves as Suryoye when speaking in 
Suryoyo (Surayt). This is probably attributable to the influence of classical Syriac on Surayt. In 
Europe people have mainly referred to themselves as Suryoye. I shall dedicate a future 
publication to this shift in use. 
19 The Kurds in Tur ‘Abdin also used Fellahi (in the sense of Christians) to refer to them, 
because they were the main group of Christians in the area. Consequently, Fellahi came to 
function as a synonym for Suryani. 
20 Depending on the context and discourse, these names may also refer to the Syriac Catholics 
and the Syriac Protestant churches. 
21 The Syriac Orthodox Church added Kadim (ancient, old) to its name in order to distinguish 
itself from those members who converted to the Catholic Church but who continued to use 
the name Süryani (Kiraz 2005: 2). 
22 ‘Amo can also be used with the meaning of ‘people’ or ‘crowd’ but here it is used with the 
meaning of ‘a people’. 
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majority society has depended heavily on that category. From the perspective 
of Assyrians/Syriacs, the Christian element in the category of ‘our people’ 
was therefore of huge importance in creating ‘us’ and the ‘others’. 
Nonetheless, at other, more specific levels, there was still a sense of being 
distinct from the other Christian groups.23  
 This traditional method of identification and categorization in the 
Middle East no longer seemed appropriate to their new context of settlement 
after their emigration to Western countries and, as a consequence, they have 
since then been confronted with conflicting concepts in their attempts to 
define themselves. In Western countries, for over a century people have 
usually been categorized according to their national citizenship. Conversely, 
national categories of peoples often seek their legitimacy in geographical 
states. It is important to note in this context that, before heading to Europe, 
Assyrians/Syriacs assumed that all Europeans were Christians and therefore 
already felt closeness with them. Implicitly they expected the same sense of 
closeness from Europeans, and therefore also a privileged treatment. For this 
reason, they thought it was even more important that they express and show 
that they were not Muslims. This was especially reinforced at times at which 
they discovered that the ordinary people in Europe had the idea that all 
people in the Middle East were Muslims. Nevertheless, since their settlement 
in Western countries, Assyrians/Syriacs have been categorized according to 
the national name of the state from which they migrated with the upshot that 
they were not recognized as a distinct ethno-national category, with the 
exception of being categorized as Christians within that same category (such 
as in ‘Christian Turks’). 
 In a nutshell, the way they were categorized in Europe did not set them 
apart from other national groups from the Middle East. Therefore, 
Assyrians/Syriacs regarded the names and categories applied to them by 
Westerners (the new ‘others’) as misnomers. Religion also lost its function as 
a boundary between the Assyrians/Syriacs and the new ‘others’ in the 
                                                 
23 To be Suryoye (here: Syriac Orthodox) also meant to be different from other Christians and 
had developed an unquestioned sense of collective identity and consciousness. For example, 
in Tur ‘Abdin, Syriac Orthodox individuals who had converted from the Syriac Orthodox 
Church to Protestantism or Roman Catholicism in Midyad were no longer referred to by the 
ordinary people as Suryoye but as Prut and Katholik or Kaldoye respectively. The ordinary people 
no longer considered them Suryoye because of their new denominational affiliation. Therefore, 
to be Suryoye meant more than being Christian; it announced that they were adherents of a 
specific form of Christianity which had consequences for the social category in the daily life of 
Tur ‘Abdin. 
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Western countries. To a certain extent, the ‘others’ have also become the 
Europeans whom they initially identified (from a traditional perspective) as 
Christians. The resultant paradox is that, if they were to include themselves 
in the same category as these Christians in Western countries, this step 
would mean their absorption into this group, with the consequence of the 
loss of their group distinctiveness, often expressed as a collective of ancient 
history, language and culture. On the horns of this dilemma, it was essential 
to find new ways of positioning or new ways of identification for 
Assyrians/Syriacs in their new host societies if they were to keep a distinct 
group identity. 
 At this juncture, an important characteristic of the new context in the 
host societies should be pointed out. Assyrians/Syriacs visibly began to enjoy 
the freedom to express their ideas about such topics as their collective 
identity and to negotiate this over time. They were no longer restricted to 
defining themselves within the narrow confines of the national ideology of 
the country in which they lived, as it had been the situation in the Middle 
East. This meant that they were no longer obliged to define themselves 
solely as a religious community. Besides the fact that emigration caused a 
change in identification among Assyrians/Syriacs, it also changed their 
internal subject positions. In this sense, the new context also allows space for 
the empowerment of secular elites, who are increasingly being well educated 
and who have gained access to new sources.24 Formally acquired knowledge 
has increased their influence in relation to the clergy who once represented 
the educated group. These secular elites put topics on the agenda of their 
people which would not have been thought of previously in the homeland. 
In this new context, they have been the ones who have made the first 
statements about a distinct identity of their people (in modern concepts) and 
who have used their new position as European nationals to speak out about 
the national rights of the Assyrians/Syriacs as a people in both the homeland 
and in Europe.  
 It was in this context that Assyrians/Syriacs began to problematize their 
categorization by the new ‘others’. In the beginning, among the ordinary 
people this categorization played a role only from a more traditional 
                                                 
24 In the homeland, it is possible to say that the clergy were still far more influential than the 
secular elites. The central power was vested in the clergy who represented their church 
members formally. It was mainly they who made the major decisions affecting the 
Assyrians/Syriacs. 
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perspective. To give an example, as far as the Assyrians/Syriacs are 
concerned, the majority groups in the Middle East are Islamic and they are 
not. Expanding this problematization, educated elite members added the 
claim that they are also ethnically distinct from other national groups in the 
Middle East. The term ethnicity refers to relationships between groups whose 
members consider themselves distinctive (Eriksen 1993: 6). As a matter of 
course, there is discrepancy between their self-identification and the 
categorization by others. This touches on the political element of positioning 
oneself among other people. The initial problematization of the 
categorization by others provided the foundation for one of the central 
elements of this study: the ‘name debate’ among Assyrians/Syriacs, of which 
the central theme is the ‘correct’ terminology by which to name themselves 
in Western languages. Internally, there has always been a common 
understanding that they are a distinct people (‘amo) and hence not of Turkish, 
Arab or Kurdish descent – the three main majority groups among whom 
they lived and whom they have continued to perceive as the ‘others’. These 
three national categories are only included in the discussion when elites 
discuss the collective identity of their people with outsiders. Among 
themselves, a question or, more aptly a disagreement, has developed about 
the ‘correct name’ of this people in the new context of the Western diaspora. 
In order to solve this problem, they began to search for a designation which 
would continue to distinguish Assyrians/Syriacs from the ‘others’ in the 
Middle East. 
 Traditionally, the name Suryoye has been translated by Western scholars 
with the term Syrians. Assyrian/Syriac elites have raised objections to this 
term because it fails to distinguish them from the citizens of Syria, who are 
commonly identified as Arabs.25 To avoid this confusion, a group of elites 
                                                 
25 In America, until 2000 they had to classify themselves according to the countries they left in 
the Middle East (Syrian, Lebanese, Turkish, Iranian and Iraqi) or as Arabs or Turks, categories 
which they did not identify with. Individual activists (such as Abgar Malul, John Michael and 
Abdulmesih Saadi) among the members of the Assyrian Church of the East, the Chaldean 
Church and the Syriac Orthodox Church took the initiative of protesting to the American 
census bureau that there was no distinct category for them to be classified as a distinct people. 
After a meeting with the census bureau it was agreed upon a new category with the compound 
name ‘Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriac’ for the American census of the year 2000. In addition, – 
specifically in relation to the use of Syriac – Archbishop Clemis Eugene Kaplan and 
Archbishop Cyril Aphrem Karim directed a letter to their community members in the USA, 
informing them to spell the name of their people as Syriac and not as Syrian at the same 
American census of 2000, in order to make their distinct identity specific. This usage of Syriac 
in the name of the Syriac Orthodox Church in the English language has been taken over in 
Europe too. 
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sought the solution by using the designation Assyrians, a name which had 
already been suggested by Assyrian/Syriac elites in the context of the 
Ottoman Empire and in the American context at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Naum Faik (1916) in his article Suryoye u Suroye advised his 
Assyrian/Syriac readers of the magazine Bethnahrin in America to follow the 
same concept of national identity represented by the designation ‘Assyrian’ 
(see Appendix 3). It draws attention that, basing himself on the English use 
of the name of his people, he is saying that he favours26 the use of Suroye 
over the use of Suryoye:27 
...Because we are also part of this nation [umtho] of whom others are 
jealous, it is necessary that we search for a name which suits this time and 
more specifically the American context. And if we are going to use the 
designation Suryoyo, it will be confused with the inhabitants of Syria,... who 
are for a greater part Arabs and Muslims,... And if we are going to use the 
designation Suroye, our name will be confused with the inhabitants of the 
town Sur. And we, if we are called Asuryoye... it would be good for our 
nation. And this name is equivalent to the English designation ‘Assyrians’. 
We think that this designation is more suitable than the designation Suryoye 
and Suroye. Or it is better if they [the people] use Asuroye (with one yuth) 
than Asuryoye... 
The option of using the name ‘Assyrian’ in the European context – as Naum 
Faik suggests for the American context – would kill two birds with one 
stone. First and foremost, they would no longer be confused with citizens of 
Syria and, as an added advantage, they could also point to a distinct national 
identity among other national minorities or immigrant groups worldwide. 
The young elites who were involved in the secular organizations took the 
lead in informing the new societies in which they lived about their distinct 
identity. This identification has subsequently engendered a new appeal: to be 
recognized internationally as a people, and therefore to be entitled to 
cultural, linguistic and religious rights so that they can survive among other 
emwotho (nations).28 Quite clearly, a distinct identity functions here as a nodal 
point and is linked to the survival as a people. 
                                                 
26 See for a possible explanation of this preference Section 8.1.1. 
27 My translation of the original in Syria. 
28 The Assyrian Universal Alliance (AUA) has been member to the UNPO (Unrepresented 
Nations and People Organization) since 1991. 
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 It transpires that the relatively small number of members of the elite has 
managed to set out the path for a renewed national consciousness among 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Europe. Many of the discussions and activities which 
are organized by their secular organizations are related to the distinct 
collective identity of their people and its need for survival as a distinct group 
in a worldwide diaspora. The dispersion of families worldwide has 
functioned as a transnational network within which the name debate has 
taken place. The acceleration in the exchange of information (through the 
use of the latest communications technology and improved international 
transportation) used by elites has influenced the central position of the topic 
of ‘identity’ and the way it has been constructed discursively. Furthermore, 
the topic of identity has become the point of departure for explaining any 
crisis they happen to experience. Therefore, it can be said that the topic of 
identity constitutes a central role in the socio-cognitive sphere of 
Assyrians/Syriacs. 
 Since the mid-1970s in Europe this debate about what the ‘correct 
name’ for the Assyrian/Syriac people is, has grown to such a degree that we 
can now speak of different contingent ideologies and adherents who have 
become alienated from each other. In a triangle of which the sides are 
composed of relationships, one religious and two secular elite groups have 
been competing for hegemony on this matter, endeavouring to influence the 
community with their ideology. I use the term ideology from the perspective of 
discourse theory, namely ideology as the objectivity of the social (see further 
Chapter 2). In speaking about the Swedish context, one can identify the 
Assyrier, who support the designation Assyrian and imply Assyrian ancestry, 
while the Syrianer assume Aramean descent. Both secular groups have 
established their secular organizations which function as platforms for 
members and sympathizers who have espoused their chosen ideology. As 
members or sympathizers of these organizations they once again study, re-
interpret and re-assess the history of the ‘amo Suryoyo. Depending on the 
judgments they reach, strategies are developed and propagated to preserve 
and develop the putative cultural and linguistic heritage of their people. The 
clergy as the third party in this triangle have had a central and ambiguous 
role in the discursive field. On the one hand they have struggled against the 
Assyrier and on the other hand, they have at times attempted to take a more 
neutral stand to calm down the ‘crisis’. 
 Although earlier studies about this group have touched on the aspect of 
identity (see in more detail the next section), they have not examined the 
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opposing discourses between Assyriska and Syrianska elites from a discourse 
analytical approach. Discourse theory (henceforth DT) is essential to 
problematizing, capturing and understanding complex social phenomena by 
applying the concept of deconstruction. In my attempt to analyse the 
construction of these discourses, I shall resort to central concepts in DT.  
The goal of my analysis is to understand and explain social phenomena in 
their socio-historical context in which they emerge and take effect (see 
further, Torfing 2005: 19). In DT, designations and identities are considered 
to be constructed and hence changeable. This ontological standpoint allows 
the questioning of ‘objective truth claims’ in society and therefore it permits 
a search to be made beyond the constructed level at the surface of everyday 
life. In order to understand their discursive identity formation process in the 
post-emigration period, it is therefore valuable to study identity discourses 
current among Assyrians/Syriacs from this perspective in order to 
deconstruct the pre-given ‘objective truth claims’ about the designations they 
use, their ideologies and their identifications. In an endeavour to reach an 
understanding of how and why the topic of identity has assumed such a 
central place among Assyrians/Syriacs in the diaspora, I shall look at the role 
of emigration in relation to the dislocation of their collective identity. 
Moreover, I shall deal with the contingent means for healing this dislocated 
identity by elites in the antagonistic field. My principal aim will be to analyse 
the way in which the antagonistic discourses have emerged among 
Assyrians/Syriacs and what the consequences of these antagonistic 
discourses have been in terms of their subsequent unity and disunity. 
 
1.4 Demarcation of This Study 
The Assyrians/Syriacs in this book are the topic of research in the Leiden 
University based PIONIER project Syriac Christianity. As this project has 
focused on ‘the formation of a communal identity among West Syrian (or 
Syrian Orthodox) Christians after the Council of Chalcedon in 451’, my 
focus has also been on the members of this religiously defined community. 
The Suryoye as the group to be studied in this thesis are therefore religiously 
usually known as the members of the Syriac Orthodox Church (see for the 
historical background of this church Appendix 1). How many people are 
counted so? This is a rather difficult question to answer, for several reasons. 
One of the principal problems is their non-recognized status; hardly 
anywhere are they registered as a distinct group(s). Another aspect of this is 
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the question of identification; they may be formal members of this church 
(after having been baptized into it) but do they also identify themselves with 
it? This question is especially pertinent to the group I study, which is not 
bound to a specific territory. Another difficulty is that people have begun to 
stress the use of the term Suryoye as a cross-denominational name again, in 
contrast to limiting it to the Syriac Orthodox Church, something what was 
common among the ordinary member of this church in the decades before. 
Consequently, when they talk of ‘our people’ they may include different 
Syriac church communities, depending on how they define ‘unity’. Therefore, 
the number of people whom they consider to belong to their people differs. 
Nevertheless, I shall attempt to estimate their numbers on the basis of the 
church registration and ‘common knowledge’. At a rough estimate the 
members of the Syriac Orthodox Church, the Assyrian Church of the East 
and the Chaldean Church (in all cases inclusive of the different branches) 
could be about 300,000 members in Europe and at about 3 million 
worldwide.29 
 Although the main aim is to present an analysis of present-day 
discourses, the historical element will be used at the contextual level (in time 
and space) so as to reach an understanding of the discourses in their 
relationship to socio-political aspects. Broadly speaking, the study concerns 
the time frame between 2003 and 2009. Although the main period of 
fieldwork was conducted in the years 2004 and 2005, I have kept in close 
touch with the field during the analysis and writing of the thesis. 
 For the purpose of selecting my respondents for the in-depth 
interviews, I have constructed the category elite.  This means that individuals 
may themselves not know that I have categorized them as such and I must 
stress that it is not a common concept used in the field of the group under 
study. In the context of this study, those categorized as elite members are 
university graduates, clergy, activists (often people in key positions in secular 
and religious organizations) and I also have not overlooked the elderly who 
exert a certain influence on their people from a more traditional perspective. 
                                                 
29 Often, my respondents do not include the members of these churches in India when they 
talk about ‘their people’ (see further Chapter 9); therefore, I have not included them in the 
context of this study. Besides, there are the Maronites and the Melkites who are theoretically 
also considered part of their people, but whom they hesitate to calculate in the number of 
their members because of the lack of transparency or lack of information about how 
individual members of these groups identify themselves. 
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The last group may fill informal positions or roles and as a consequence their 
influence may be felt at the informal level but may nevertheless be strong. 
This might result in a situation in which different generations, different 
educational levels and religious and secular elite members compete for 
hegemony in the same antagonistic field. Generational differences between 
elite members certainly play a contextual role in explaining their discourses. 
Elite members who have managed to acquire positions in Assyrian/Syriac 
organizations, on the church boards or those who try to play a central role 
from a different position have often been those who were among the first 
settlers in Sweden. The majority of my respondents have been 
Assyrians/Syriacs from Turkey (and to a lesser extent from Syria and 
Lebanon) because the first group has been relatively more involved both in 
the civic and religious institutions of their people in Sweden and the 
percentage of Assyrians/Syriacs who emigrated from Turkey is by far larger 
than from other Middle Eastern countries. One question which might be 
raised at this juncture is: ‘What about the role and discourses of the ordinary 
people in the name debate?’ They enter at the contextual level; the 
playground which elites use when they want to develop a framework for 
their ideas among the ordinary people.  
 Although the starting point of my study has been the European 
diaspora, this broad research field has merely been used at the contextual 
level. I have, for example, specifically discussed the emigration to Germany 
in relation to the emigration to Sweden. Pertinently, this relationship 
illustrates the interactive and flexible relationship of the character of the 
emigration of Assyrians/Syriacs in the context of their settlement in Europe. 
I have not delved much into the emigration to other European countries for 
the reason that this would have otherwise diverted the focus to additional 
questions. Processes occurring among Assyrians/Syriacs at transnational 
level have been considered and used at the contextual level of this study. 
Therefore, the discourses of elites are embedded against this broader 
background of events. 
 Initially I aimed to make a comparative case study among 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands. I based this 
selection on both the similarities and differences in these three countries. 
The research object in all three countries consists of Assyrians/Syriacs who 
had emigrated from the same geographical areas in the Middle East, during 
the same period, for similar reasons and who have family members in all 
these three countries – although some families may have a particular 
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concentration in one of these countries. Sweden and Germany are home to 
the biggest concentrations of Assyrians/Syriacs, each with about 100,000 
immigrants. Turning to the differences, in contrast to Sweden and Germany 
the Assyrians/Syriacs in the Netherlands are far fewer with about 25,000 
people. Another difference between the three countries has been the 
reception and accommodation policy of the authorities in the respective 
countries of the research object. One interesting question which has arisen in 
this respect is the relationship between this policy and the socio-political and 
economic development of the group under study in these countries. A third 
difference is the number of habitants in the three countries proportionate to 
their total populations.30 Cognizance of this aspect is important when their 
potential visibility in the context of the broader society is considered. 
 The farther I advanced with my fieldwork, the more I realized that my 
ethnographically acquired empirical data exceeded my capacity to handle 
their quantity in one thesis. As this realization dawned, I decided not to 
analyse my data concerning the Netherlands and Germany very specifically.31 
For this same reason, I have decided to publish two chapters already written 
which are also central to the topic of this thesis in a future publication 
separately, namely an analysis of discourses about the Seyfo (genocide during 
the First World War in Ottoman Turkey) and discourses about the athro 
(homeland). For the moment, my fieldwork in the Netherlands and Germany 
has been used for contextualizing the Swedish based fieldwork in the 
antagonistic field in Europe. I am highly aware that the discourses in Sweden 
should also be studied in relation to discourses of Assyrians/Syriacs 
worldwide; they do not exist in isolation. The use of the Internet as 
instrument of information and communication has enabled me to keep 
myself informed of discourses and their discursive character outside Sweden. 
 Therefore, in the final version of this thesis, the main focus of my study 
has shifted to the case study in Sweden, but still remains strongly embedded 
in a European context. Besides the fact that at the present time Sweden is 
home to perhaps the biggest Assyrian/Syriac community in Europe, the 
main reason to opt for the case study in Sweden is that Assyrians/Syriacs in 
Sweden have played a major initiating role in generating new questions and 
initiatives pertaining to the collective identity of their people and these have 
                                                 
30 The inhabitants of Sweden number 9,347,899, of Germany 82,757,595 and of the 
Netherlands 16,576,800 (Eurostat 2010). 
31 I shall publish these data in a future study. 
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come to dominate the discursive field at transnational level. As their role has 
grown, the activities between different elite groups in Sweden have become 
increasingly antagonistic. This characteristic has again stood out in 
comparison to other Assyrian/Syriac elite groups, especially in Europe but 
also on other continents. The fact that individuals who consider themselves 
to be members of the ‘amo Suryoyo live dispersed throughout different 
countries worldwide but who nevertheless feel the need to remain in contact 
makes it hard to study this subject in isolation and to limit it solely to the 
geography of Sweden or Europe. Consequently, the antagonistic field of this 
study assumes a transnational dimension; hence topics relating to the 
common past, present and future are discussed at this level. 
 
1.5 Previous Research 
Traditionally, Assyrians/Syriacs have been studied primarily from a 
theological, linguistic or historical perspective. The most recent socio-
political changes relating to their new forms of identification have been 
approached by Western scholars as rather odd and exotic occurrences. They 
are often perceived as non-legitimate processes which take place within a 
group of people which is not well acquainted with its own history. Despite 
the lack of attention paid to them as a group, since Assyrians/Syriacs have 
settled in Western countries, studies of them from new perspectives have 
caught the interest of Western scholars and also of scholars who are 
members of this group and have been educated in Western countries. The 
participation of the latter has developed new approaches to studying this 
group, especially in the social sciences. The programmes of the latest 
conferences such as the Symposium Syriacum show a considerable increase in 
topics which are relevant to their current political situation in the Middle 
East, their emigration, settlement and accommodation of life in Western 
countries. 
 For comparative reasons, before I discuss studies about 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden, I shall introduce some studies about this group 
in the Netherlands and Germany. It is clear that the interest, especially from 
academia, in this research object in Sweden is much higher than in either of 
the other two countries, even though the number of the Assyrians/Syriacs in 
Germany is about the same as those in Sweden. An important reason for this 
difference may be their visibility as a group in society. 
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 I shall commence with some studies published in the Netherlands. This 
reveals that the first two main publications about the Assyrians/Syriacs in 
the Netherlands were written by journalists. Albert Stol (1979) sums up the 
main line of his book Turkse Christenen vervolgd, verdreven, verspreid: opkomst en 
ondergang van de Jacobieten in his sub-title: ‘The rise and fall of the Jacobites’. 
Indicating the threat of extinction looming over this group, Stol attempted to 
describe their precarious position. In the same year, Harry van Mierlo wrote 
a book (Kerk-Turken zijn geen Turken, 1979) about this group after the 
attention Assyrians/Syriacs had attracted by their occupation of the 
Cathedral of St John in Den Bosch. The purpose of their action had been to 
highlight their plight as a threatened people in Turkey. Another early study 
was that of the scholar in Church History, Hans Roldanus (1984), who wrote 
about the Assyrians/Syriacs in Istanbul: De Syrisch Orthodoxen in Istanbul. 
Bearing in mind the specific behest of the Dutch authorities, the study 
sought to discover whether, instead of fleeing to the Netherlands, Istanbul 
might function as an alternative place of settlement for Assyrians/Syriacs. 
Heleen Murre-van den Berg (2000) wrote an article discussing specifically the 
identity of Assyrians/Syriacs in the Netherlands: Religieuze en etnische identiteit 
van Syrisch-Orthodoxen uit Turkije en Syrië in Nederland. The most recent study to 
have been published in the Netherlands is that by the anthropologist Jan 
Schukkink (2003): De Suryoye een verborgen gemeenschap: Een historisch-
antropologische studie van een Enschedese vluchtelingen gemeenschap afkomstig uit het 
Midden-Oosten. Employed by the municipality of Enschede (which is home to 
the biggest number of Assyrians/Syriacs in the Netherlands), he wrote a 
historical anthropological study of Assyrians/Syriacs who had settled in the 
city. Schukkink was seeking to understand the relationship between the 
changing conditions in society and the status of the Suryoye32. 
 The main studies which have been published in the last few decades in 
relation to my research object in Germany are the following.  As a 
consequence of personal contact with the group, the historian Gabriele 
Yonan was among the first to write about them. Three of her titles are: 
Assyrer heute: Kultur, Sprache, Nationalbewegung der aramaisch sprechenden Christen 
im Nahen Osten: Verfolgung und Exil (1978);  Journalismus bei den Assyrern: Ein 
Überblick von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (1985); and Ein vergessener 
                                                 
32 The anthropologist Jan Schukkink uses the emic term Suryoye to refer to the group he 
studied. In the local media in the region of Twente in the province of Overijssel, the use of 
this term has been quite common, in the search to find an acceptable name for the different 
ideologies among Assyrians/Syriacs. 
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Holocaust: Die Vernichtung der christlichen Assyrer in der Türkei (1989). While the 
first two works focus on aspects of modernism, her latest work is among the 
first main Western publications to discuss the Seyfo. As its title indicates, the 
author attempts to bring the genocide perpetrated during the First World 
War to the attention of her readers in order to dispel ignorance about it. This 
work is a source for contextualizing people’s stories of migration and their 
relation to the homeland – even though the Seyfo had taken place many years 
before they emigrated. 
 The historian Helga Anschütz (1985) focuses in her work, Die Syrischen 
Christen vom Tur ‘Abdin: Eine altchristliche Bevölkerungsgruppe zwischen Beharrung, 
Stagnation und Auflösung, on the situation of Assyrians/Syriacs33 in Tur ‘Abdin, 
covering the period between 1965 and 1982. It is an important background 
study as it is leading to an understanding of their threatened situation in this 
specific geography, which they consider to be part of the very heart of their 
homeland. Besides this work, she has directed many documentaries about 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Turkey and in Germany which will remain important 
historical sources for further research about the specific time period of 
emigration and the difficulties encountered by this group both in the 
homeland and upon arrival in Germany. For a further contextual 
understanding of the dangerous living conditions in Tur ‘Abdin in the 1990s, 
the translation of the narrative related by Father Melke Tok about his 
kidnapping in Tur ‘Abdin by the linguist Shabo Talay is also significant: 
Lebendig begraben: die Entführung der syrisch-orthodoxen Priesters Melke Tok von 
Miden in der Südost Türkei. 
 In his book Die syrisch-orthodoxen Christen in der Türkei und in Deutschland: 
Untersuchungen zu einer Wanderungsbewegung, Kai Merten (1997) describes the 
emigration process of Assyrians/Syriacs from the Middle East and especially 
from Turkey to Germany (1960-1996). 
 The activist Abboud Zeitoune has added to this list Music Pearls of Beth-
Nahrin: An Assyrian/Syriac Discography (2007). It is a collection of mainly the 
secular music produced in the last century. It is important to note explicitly 
that this publication is a very clear discursive act. Moreover, it is the product 
of a process of modernization and change.  
 A quick search in the Swedish National Library database results in a list 
of more than 200 titles of books and reports about Assyrians/Syriacs which 
                                                 
33 Helga Anschütz refers to them with syrischen Christen. 
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have been published in the last forty years. Interestingly, a few titles in 
Swedish are translations of important studies in English. A search at the 
university library of Stockholm University yields a growing number of MA 
and BA theses about Assyrians/Syriacs, written both by members of this 
community and by outsiders. The topics of the publications range over such 
subjects as sports, law, language, culture, history and economics. They are all 
somehow related to the topic of identity. Below I shall mention the main 
studies conducted which relate somehow to my research topic. 
 The interest of Swedish scholars in modern-day Assyrians/Syriacs began 
in the second half of 1970s when the Swedish authorities needed to know 
more about this new group of immigrants who had unexpectedly (for the 
authorities) settled in Sweden in high numbers. Among these first studies 
were North to Another Country: The Formation of a Suryoyo Community in Sweden by 
the social anthropologist Ulf Björklund (1981) and  Möte med välfärdens 
byråkrater Svenska myndigheters mottagande av en Kristen minoritetsgrupp från Mellersta 
Östern by the political scientist Birgitta Ornbrant. Both scholars executed 
their research on behalf of Expertgrupp för invandrarforskning inom 
Arbetsmarknadsdepartementet (EIFO, Swedish Expert Group on Immigration 
Research). In particular, Björklund’s ethnographic historical study gives an 
insight into the migration and settlement process and the first phase of 
adaptation of this group to Swedish society. Ornbrant focuses more 
specifically on the reception of Assyrians/Syriacs as asylum seekers and the 
organization of their needs as new immigrants. 
 The linguist Ben Knutsson (1982) wrote his report Assur eller Aram: 
språklig, religiös och nationell identifikation hos Sveriges assyrier och syrianer on behalf 
of the Immigration Office (Statens Invandrarverk) and the National Cultural 
Council (Statens Kulturråd). The goal was to investigate questions related to 
the Assyrian/Syriac ‘language and culture’ and, as a linguist, to make 
suggestions about what the language of this group should be called in 
Swedish language. To put this into context, it should be explained that 
Assyrians/Syriacs used different names when referring to their language in 
Swedish. Assyrian/Syriac teachers, who taught the mother tongue in primary 
schools, especially caused confusion and disagreement about what the 
language they were teaching should be called in Swedish language. In his 
study Knutsson gives his recommendations about several alternatives but 
acknowledges that not any of these will win the support of all the different 
groups involved and admits therefore that he does not have a solution to the 
‘problem’. Eventually, Knutsson (1982: 29) suggested three names for 
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official use and for the different dialects and languages spoken: Syriska for 
referring to classical Syriac, Turabdinska to refer to the (spoken) Suryoyo and 
Urmiska for the dialect which is traditionally spoken in the Urmia region 
(Iran). Although he did not want to ignore the name Assyriska (used by the 
Assyrier), he ascribed the use of this name to the rise of national 
consciousness among the people. For this reason, as a linguist he did not 
advise it for official use. After its publication, Knutsson’s report stirred up a 
polarized debate about the names he had suggested. This reveals the 
problematic nature of studies with an academic character attempting to find 
solutions to politically charged questions. Up to today, different versions 
have continued to be used to refer to the language. 
 The journalist Stefan Andersson (1983) offered a clear analysis of the 
socio-political developments among the Assyrian/Syriac settlers up to the 
publication of his book Assyrierna: En bok om präster, om politik och diplomati 
kring den assyriska invandringen till Sverige. Working for the local daily newspaper 
Länstidningen, it became one of his daily tasks to write about these people. In 
his work he gives a good illustration of the actors involved in the name 
debate and their ‘political ambitions’ (in terms of Andersson). 
 In her dissertation, Identitet och kulturmöte – syrianska kvinnors exempel: En 
diskussion om grounded theory, the sociologist M. Freyne-Lindhagen (1997) 
analyses the interviews she conducted with Assyrian/Syriac women from the 
perspective of grounded theory. Another interesting study is the dissertation 
of M. I. Parszyk (1999), En skola för andra. Minoritetselevers upplevelser av arbets- 
och livsvillkor i grundskolan (A school for others.  Experiences of work and 
living conditions of minority pupils at primary school). Parszyk has also 
published several articles more specifically on Assyrian/Syriac pupils’ school 
experiences from a pedagogical perspective.  
 In the 1990s, among the first main scholarly works about this group was 
one written by a member of the community who had arrived in Sweden as a 
young child. In his dissertation En minoritets odyssé: Upprätthållande och 
transformation av etnisk identitet i förhållande till moderniseringsprocesser – det assyriska 
exemplet (The odyssey of a minority: maintenance and transformation of 
ethnic identity in response to processes of modernization – the Assyrian 
case), the sociologist Fuat Deniz (1999) focused on the collective identity of 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden. In his study Deniz aims to construct a 
theoretical model containing internally related concepts brought together 
from different theoretical approaches about ethnic identity, and to apply this 
model to the study of the maintenance and transformation of ethnic identity 
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in the Assyrian34 community as a consequence of the migration from South-
East Turkey to Sweden. His main finding is that the ethno-religious identity 
in the original country was transformed to a more ethno-national based 
identity in Sweden. 
 The ethnologist Oscar Pripp (2001) wrote a dissertation: Företagande 
minoritet: Om etnicitet, strategier och resurser bland assyrier och syrianer i Södertälje, in 
which he focuses on the economic dimension among Assyrians/Syriacs.35 
He illustrates the strong dynamics in the entrepreneurial culture of this group 
in relation to their ethnic identity. Pripp has also produced similar studies 
based on field research among immigrant groups in Sweden. 
 Another work by a member of the community is that of the 
psychologist of religion Önver Cetrez (2005):  Meaning-Making Variations in 
Acculturation and Ritualization: A multi-generational study of Suroyo migrants in 
Sweden. In his study he researched the affects of the acculturation process on 
meaning–making among Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden. From an inter-
disciplinary perspective, Cetrez emphasizes that religious rituals and symbols 
play a central role in the culture of the research object. One important 
finding of this multi-generational study (particularly among the youth) is that 
the use of such various designations as Aramean, Assyrian, Suroyo, Syrian or 
Swedish is a strategic choice made for the purpose of differentiating 
themselves from others and to negotiate their identity. 
 In 2005 in a collection of articles edited by Göran Gunner and Sven 
Halvardsson, the identity of Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden was discussed by 
different scholars in the publication Jag behöver rötter och vingar – om assyrisk/ 
syriansk identitet i Sverige. 
 In his dissertation, Vems är historien? Historia som medvetande, kultur och 
handling i det mångkulturella Sverige, Kenneth Nordgren (2006) explores how 
different contemporary agents formulate their history in the case of 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden. His principal finding is that recreating one’s 
own past is a way of becoming part of society. In this context, storytelling 
functions as an essential instrument in the needs engendered by continuity 
and change in the inevitable process of identity formation and socialization. 
                                                 
34 Fuat Deniz used in this study the designation ‘Assyrian’ to refer to his research object. 
35 Pripp does not make use of the compound name. Instead, he uses Assyrier and Syrianer as 
two separate names.  
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 In her forthcoming study I förändringarnas spår: En studie av sociokulturell 
förändring och kontinuitet bland assyrier avseende synen på giftermål, släktskap och 
ungdom, the anthropologist Maryam Garis Guttman focuses on 
Assyrian/Syriac youth and in particular on young single women. Garis 
Guttman has studied her topic in the context of the changes taking place in 
the community after its settlement in Europe. She explores how the 
understanding of marriage, kinship and youth has changed among the 
Assyrian/Syriac community in Sweden and how this change has affected 
their sense of belonging. Her study cogently illustrates how the identity 
perceptions of the Assyrian/Syriac youth have been affected by the different 
environments they have encountered in the diaspora. 
 Another topic which has attracted a great deal of interest in the study of 
present-day Assyrian/Syriac identity is the Seyfo. Father Bertil Bengtsson 
(2004) wrote Svärdets år. Om folkmordet på de kristna i Turkiet 1894-1922. The 
historian Zeki Yalcin (2005) has devoted an article to the specific 
relationship between identity and the Seyfo: Folkmord och identitet –
Assyrier/Syrianer och folkmordet under forsta världskriget. The historian David 
Gaunt’s (2006) Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in 
Eastern Anatolia during the First World War is an important groundbreaking 
historical study in this field. The librarian and author Jan Beth Sawoce (2006) 
published his interviews with Seyfo survivors in Suryoyo: Seyfo bTur Abdin 1914-
1915.36 
 In relation to the above mentioned studies, this research has contributed 
to the insights into the processes of emigration, settlement and identification 
of Assyrians/Syriacs in the European diaspora, specifically in Sweden.  
Making use of the concepts of Discourse Theory, I have made a thorough 
analysis of and provided an explanation for the emergence and change in the 
identity discourses. The discourse theoretical approach has allowed me to 
illustrate and explain the contextual, relational and processual character of 
identities. From this perspective, I have approached ‘identity’ as an open 
space which can be imbued with different meanings and interpretations. 
Accordingly, I have shown how this open character has functioned as a 
condition for the emergence of the ‘name debate’ among Assyrians/Syriacs.
  
 
                                                 
36 The language used is Suryoyo but written in Latin characters. 
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1.6 Outline of the Study 
In Chapter 2, I discuss the theoretical and methodological foundation of this 
study. After a short introductory discussion of different approaches to the 
study of identities, I explain my choice to work with Post-structuralist 
discourse theory. As I mention in the methodological section at the end of 
this chapter, this study is predominantly empirically grounded and therefore, 
I limit myself to the main concepts which are of importance for the analyses 
and further understanding of this study. 
 Answers to the questions which I have posed in this thesis will be 
contextualized in the socio-historical situation of Assyrians/Syriacs. Had I 
not done this, I would run the risk of limiting the context of study which is 
needed in order to understand the broader antagonistic field. Therefore, the 
following three chapters – Chapter 3 (Position in the homeland), Chapter 4 
(Emigration) and Chapter 5 (Settlement) – serve as a background to all 
discussions raised in the rest of this dissertation. As for the collected data, 
besides interviews with respondents, I have made use of secondary sources. 
 In Chapter 3, in order to explain the identity discourses of 
Assyrians/Syriacs today, both contextually and thus relationally, I discuss 
their position in the homeland from a historical perspective. How do they 
perceive their position in the homeland? What were the main reasons for 
their emigration from Turkey? I relate to the socio-political position of 
Assyrians/Syriacs as a minority group in a Muslim majority society in order 
to clarify the boundaries between inside (the chain of difference)37 and outside 
(the chain of equivalence) in the homeland. I have illustrated how religion played 
a central nodal point in their identity discourses and how the boundaries of 
exclusion and inclusion were drawn along religious lines. 
 Firmly anchored in the stories of my interviewees, I have attempted to 
extrapolate and give an account of the emigration in Chapter 4. I have 
contextualized my respondents’ accounts which I obtained through in-depth 
interviews and informal conversations with secondary data sources produced 
in the academic world. In the latter I have aimed especially at contextualizing 
the primary data sources in the broader context. These two sources have 
therefore functioned complementarily. I noticed that respondents were often 
only dimly aware of developments at national and international level in 
                                                 
37 Discourse theoretical concepts such as chains of difference and equivalence, nodal points, 
floating signifiers and split subject will be explained in Chapter 2. 
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relation to the event discussed, apart from some details which had reached 
them and which they attempted to recount to me. Both the contents and the 
style in which their accounts are communicated illustrate this. In this chapter, 
I have shown how the myth of ‘Sweden as heaven’ played a role in the 
emigration process and the role which this myth played in their fast 
settlement in the new country. Here, emigration is analyzed as a dislocatory 
event which has caused the emergence of a split subject in the settlement of 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Western countries. This has resulted in different 
attempts by the split subject to heal itself during the settlement process 
(Chapter 5). For instance, by seeking new ways of identification in relation to 
the new others.  
 I then proceed in Chapter 5 – written in strong relation to the previous 
chapter – with discussing the settlement process in Sweden. It deals with 
how a first group of 205 people organized themselves in Swedish society 
more than forty years ago, how they have grown to be a group of about 
100,000 within that period, and what challenges they have encountered 
during that time.  
 In Chapter 6 the discourses of umthonoyutho (patriotism) are dealt with 
from a historical perspective. I have looked into the emergence of discourses 
of umthonoyutho (which resulted from an ethnic awareness) in the homeland in 
order to understand their identity discourses in the present-day. 
Furthermore, I have analyzed how the logic of umthonoyutho transformed its 
character in the diaspora and how this has constituted a new antagonistic 
discursive space which gave rise to the ‘name debate’ between competing 
discourses. 
 In Chapter 7 I have discussed the emergence of the ‘name debate’ in 
relation to the process of institutionalization of identity discourses. In this 
chapter I attempt to clarify how identity discourses are shaped in the field of 
discursivity, how they form chains of difference (Us) and equivalence (Others), 
how they are articulated, what the hegemonic struggle between discourses is 
and what the moments of discontinuity as a result of dislocation are about. 
 For the latter three chapters mentioned above, I have used a 
combination of sources: secondary sources, primary documents, interviews 
and participant observations. They describe the process of the 
institutionalization of the discourses which evolved in the diaspora and 
which have gained hegemony among different social groups. The main focus 
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of these chapters will be on the element of historicity of discourses which 
will function as a background (context) to the chapters to follow. 
 In the chapters 8, 9 and 10 I analyze individual discourses of elite 
members about a) discourses contending the ‘correct name’ of their people; 
b) how they delineate the boundaries of the Assyrian/Syriac people; c) who 
they identify as the leader in charge of their people. These three chapters are 
based solely on in-depth interviews. Secondary sources and my general 
knowledge about the discursive field are used to contextualize what is being 
said in the interviews. My aim in this context has been to illustrate the 
discourses of individuals articulated in the context of an interview with me 
(as a member of the community but also as a researcher) at that moment, 
replete with all their diversities, contingent relations and contradictions – 
only to be understood in context. In Chapter 8 I have elabourated on the 
discursive arguments around the ‘name debate’ in the discourses of the 
Assyriska and Syrianska elites. The study of elite discourses highlights the 
implicit internal diversity imbued in them. At the same time it illustrates the 
open, changeable and flexible character of floating signifiers in the competition 
for the hegemonization of discourses. Following this, Chapter 9 deals with 
discursive boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in the definition of the 
‘people’ through the chain of difference and equivalence. Whether the chain of 
difference and equivalence are defined in a broad or narrow sense depends on the 
discourse in relation to the question of who is included and excluded. In the 
last empirical chapter (10), I have mainly focused on the relationship 
between identity discourses and the myth about the ‘ideal leader’ from whom 
it is expected to heal the split subject. 
 Finally, in the concluding chapter, I come back to my research questions 







2 DISCOURSE THEORY & METHODOLOGY 
 
In the first year of my research I explored the different social science 
approaches to questions pertinent to identity and ethnicity. I filled my 
shelves with publications from a collection of the principal authors in this 
field with the idea that I would steep myself well in them before beginning 
my fieldwork. Meanwhile, I began to prepare myself for fieldwork in three 
European countries; an ambitious challenge which pulled me fully into the 
field, or to put it differently, I valued what was happening in the field greatly, 
believing it would lead me to a deeper understanding of my research 
questions. As I describe in my methodology at the end of this chapter, 
although I did not appear in the field as a tabula rasa in relation to theoretical 
ideas about identity, I did not limit myself to a specific theoretical 
perspective. Nor did I impose any pre-formulated concepts of grand theories 
on the empirical field. My goal was concentrated on reaching a greater 
understanding of the social field, while interacting with it and analysing my 
empirical data both during and after the fieldwork. On the basis of my 
empirical findings (as can be seen further in this thesis), I developed such 
empirically shaped concepts as athro (homeland) and ‘amo (people), the logic 
of umthonoyutho (patriotism, see further Chapter 6), ‘ashirto (extended family) 
and so forth. During the fieldwork and in the process of my analysis, I have 
moved continuously between explanations (theories or conceptual 
categories) about the research object and the empirical data. Nevertheless, 
when reviewing the research process through which I passed, I found I had 
remained loyal to my empirical data and continued to challenge my 
understanding of it. After I finished my analysis, for a fleeting moment I 
concluded that I could dispense with many theoretical concepts in my search 
to explain it in more detail. Then I began to study the discourse analytical 
approach in general and more specifically Poststructuralist Discourse Theory 
more thoroughly. Based on my research questions and conclusions already 
drawn from my empirical analyses, I soon realized that discourse theoretical 
concepts could enable me to lift my empirical analysis to a more abstract 
level and that it could also explain the empirical data more satisfactorily. This 
is when DT assumed a considerable role in the study.  
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 Before I continue with an introduction to DT and its key elements, it is 
necessary to explain why I have not chosen to work with other established 
theories. To explain their shortcomings for the study of the dynamics 
inherent in identities, I shall briefly discuss these theories in relation to an 
example from my case study below. 
 
2.1 The Study of Ethnic Identities 
Different classifications are used to distinguish between the approaches to 
the study of ethnic identities. Usually, these approaches are categorized as 
primordialist and instrumentalist. Others, such as Sokolovskii and Tishkov 
(1996), add to these classifications the constructivist approach.  There are 
also approaches which do not fit entirely into these categories. Because it is 
not the aim of this section to provide an in-depth review of the academic 
debate of the different theories of identity, I shall limit myself to a short 
discussion of these three categories and to Smith’s ethno-symbolism. It is 
perhaps not superfluous to remind ourselves that theories developed in 
relation to each other. 
 Primordialists approach ethnicity as the collective of primordial 
characteristics (such as culture, religion, language, bloodline and so forth) 
and their deep-rootedness in a given society. They reject the idea of the open 
character of identities and take them instead for granted. An example is 
Clifford Geertz’ (1963: 109-110) definition of ‘primordial attachment’. The 
starting point is that primordial ties and attachments are pre-given, ineffable 
and overpowering. Individuals who are born into such a group are assumed 
to be ‘determined’ by its characteristics. In present-day societies the ordinary 
people often assume primordialness as ‘given’ in group identities, as I have 
demonstrated in my case study (see further especially Chapter 8).38 I criticize 
primordialists because they take a ‘static’ and ‘naturalistic’ view of ethnicity. In 
addition, they do not provide answers for overlapping identities, changes in 
identities and consequences of migration and globalization. Most 
importantly, the power aspect in the formation of identities is a ‘black hole’ 
in the primordial approach. 
 An example from my case study illustrates part of my criticism and 
indicates that there must be more at stake here than ‘primordialness at work’. 
                                                 
38 See further for example Eller and Coughlan (1993), Robinson (1979), Brass (1991). 
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The debate among Assyrians/Syriacs about the ‘correct name’ of their 
people to be used in Western languages has resulted in different opinions 
even among family members. An example is that in Södertälje (Sweden) two 
brothers were each a board member of the two most antagonistic secular 
organizations of Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden: Assyriska riksförbundet and 
Syrianska riksförbundet. Today each of these institutions represents a distinct 
ideology and indubitably competes with the other. These brothers had been 
raised by the same parents, in the same community. Why did each of them 
begin to identify with a different name and consequently with a different 
ancestry? Although they have continued to state that they belong to the same 
people, they do blame each other for mistaken identification. This 
disagreement which developed between them has produced antagonistic 
discourses about their people’s ancestry and ethnicity. At certain moments, 
representatives of both secular organizations present themselves as a 
different group because they reject the identification with the other group. In 
this study, I illustrate the way this debate has resulted in two social groups 
with no final answer to their antagonistic relationship yet. In the above-
mentioned case the primordialist approach cannot explain why two brothers 
have chosen for ethnically different identities. This being so, is the 
instrumentalist approach any more effective? 
 Unlike the primordial approach, the instrumentalist approach deals with 
ethnicity as ‘a social, cultural and political resource for different interest- and 
status groups’39 (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 8-9). From this perspective, 
‘ethnicity’ is seen as a resource that elites can compete for. The assumption is 
that in order to realize their political goals these elites can manipulate 
symbols (such as a flag, myths and heroes). Within the instrumentalist view, the 
Rational Choice approach40 to identity studies ‘elite strategies of maximizing 
preferences in terms of individual “rational choices” in given situations’ 
(Ibid.). In this approach, elite groups are considered to be external to the 
structure. This is problematic, since they are part of the identity structure. 
Therefore it would be an oversimplification of the social reality to see 
‘ethnicity’ as merely a resource in the hands of elites. For instance, the 
Assyrian/Syriac identity encompasses more than what the Assyriska and 
Syrianska elites have on their political agenda. Identity can therefore not be 
explained as a matter of ‘cost-benefit’ calculations of individuals or 
                                                 
39 See for example the studies by Cohen (1974), Brass (1991). 
40 See for example, Banton (1983), Hechter (1986). 
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institutions. Although in many cases identification with a certain identity is 
not immediately or necessarily beneficial (such as belonging to a minority or 
immigrant group), people still continue to embrace those identities. In short, 
the weakness of the instrumentalist approach is that it does not provide a 
satisfactory explanation for the formation of ethnic identities and their 
durability. 
 An early constructivist, the anthropologist Frederick Barth (1969) sees 
ethnic groups as ‘categories of ascription and identification’, and as ‘a form 
of social organization’ of cultural difference, where the social boundaries 
enable the formation of ethnicity. According to Barth, ethnic identities are 
not discontinuous cultural phenomena which are isolated from each other, 
and neither categories to which people naturally belong. Rather, ethnicity is 
continuously negotiated and renegotiated by both external ascription and 
internal self-identification. In this sense, Barth’s approach differs radically 
from primordialists’ content-based approach to ethnicity. The most important 
cultural elements are those which are used as boundaries between ethnies in 
their contact with each other. This is why he argues that the focus of the 
anthropological study of ethnicity should shift from ‘internal constitution 
and history of separate groups to ethnic boundaries and boundary 
maintenance’ (Barth 1969: 10). An ethnic group exists and presents itself in 
relation to or in opposition to another group. For example, if 
Assyrians/Syriacs were to continue to identify themselves as a religious 
group it would mean that they would lag behind as a subjugated Christian 
community among other ethno-national groups. In this sense, the present-
day ethno-national discourses can be understood as an act of emancipation 
taken by Assyrians/Syriacs. In contrast to the situation in the Middle East, 
the ‘others’ in Europe have become European Christians. As I shall illustrate 
in this thesis, the identity discourses of the group have transformed from an 
ethno-religious to an ethno-national identification in the process of 
interaction with the new ‘others’. In both cases, their relationship to these 
groups developed the need for their in-group definition. Depending on the 
characteristic in each ‘multi-ethnic’ or ‘multi-cultural’ society, different 
boundary markers might be considered most important. On the long term, 
the changing interrelationship between the different boundary markers in a 
certain society might explain a great deal about changes in ethnic 
identifications. The relational understanding of ethnicity undermines the 
approach to ethnicity as an essential entity (as postulated in primordialist 
approaches).  
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 Smith’s ethno-symbolism opposes to the premises of constructivist and 
instrumentalist approaches (which principally stress the constructed nature 
of ethnicity). Smith’s main claim is that modernist theories fail ‘to accord any 
weight to the pre-existing cultures and the ethnic ties of the nations that 
emerged in the modern epoch’ (1999: 9). In contrast, he gives a vital role to 
myths and symbols in the unification of populations and in ensuring their 
continuity over many generations. Historically shaped traditions, symbols 
and myths are rediscovered and reinterpreted in each generation for the 
modern constitution of nations (Smith 1999: 9). And consequently, that 
nationalism draws on the ‘pre-existing’ history of the group and that ‘political 
mobilization is based on this legacy’ (Smith 1995: 71). For the study of 
identities, the role of the ethnic past(s) in shaping present cultural 
communities becomes therefore important (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 
10). As this approach aims to bring the role of ‘history’ and ‘ethnic pasts’ 
back into play, Smith’s definition of an ethnie (ethnic community), ascribes 
the durability of the ethnie to the forms and content of the myth-symbol 
complex. According to Smith (1986: 21-31) an ethnie exhibits six features: 1) a 
common proper name; 2) a myth of common ancestry; 3) shared historical 
memories or shared memories of a common past or pasts, including heroes, 
events and their commemoration; 4) one or more elements of common 
culture; 5) a link with a homeland; 6) a sense of solidarity on the part of at 
least some sections of the population of the ethnie.  
 Smith (2001: 77) argues that in the construction of identities, elites ‘need 
to select from pre-existing repertoires of ethnic symbols, myths and 
memories if they are to mobilize “the people”’. He (Ibid: 97) furthermore 
states ‘the source of national identities are to be sought in popular 
sentiments and culture, and not primarily in the imaginations and inventions 
of elites’. While ethno-symbolism does not deny change and transformation 
in identities, its main emphasis remains on the notion of durability and 
continuity. And although Smith’s ethno-symbolism is not totally blind to the 
reification of the sources of ethnic identities in modern times, it gives these 
pre-existing repertoires a fundamental explanatory level. Smith has been 
criticized as being essentialist in terms of conceiving of ethnicity as an 
objective and substantial quality of ethnic identities (Norval 1996: 61-62, Hall 
1998: 40), for overstressing the ethnic components of nations (Eriksen 2004) 
and for taking for granted the existence of ‘the people’, ‘collective memories’ 
and the ‘resonance’ which elites seek among the people for the mobilization 
of their ideas (Özkırımlı 2003: 348). 
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 The PIONIER project Syriac Christianity – of which this study has been 
part of – developed an interdisciplinary approach to the study of the 
formation of the ‘Syriac Orthodox identity’ (Romeny et al. 2009). In order to 
come to a further understanding of various dimensions of the studied 
identity, the project team made mainly use of Anthony Smith’s ethno-symbolism 
and the ethnogenesis theory of the Vienna School41. In addition, Gerd 
Baumann’s (1999: 91-2) attention for the reification of social reality was used 
to explain why identity, though constructed, is often seen as primordial. 
 In my study, I have aimed at studying the discourses of Assyrian/Syriac 
elite members about the collective identity of ‘their people’. With this aim in 
mind, I have chosen to work with Poststructuralist DT that offers more 
sophisticated concepts which are useful in reaching a deeper understanding 
of my case study. Although Post-structuralism and social constructivism 
have both similar epistemological assumptions (that reject concepts such as 
objectivity, reality and truth), DT has a more radical ontological orientation 
and a more comprehensive understanding of discourse. Central to my study 
is to analyze the antagonistic formation of the studied identity discourses. 
Discourse covers both the material and sentimental dimensions of identity. 
The understanding of discourse in the formation of identities transcends the 
dichotomized debate between the primordialist and instrumentalist approaches. 
As I shall discuss further in this chapter, Post-structuralist DT rejects the 
idea of pre-given structures for explaining the social reality and thus, the 
formation of identities. This is not the denial of the existence of material 
reality and thus history. But, DT focuses mainly on the construction of 
meaning and identities in and through the present-day discourses. 
Consequently, the focus of this study is on the reification, re-interpretation 
and the re-use of elements of identity.  
 It is important to elaborate in more detail on the relevance of DT as an 
analytical perspective for my study. First, through the deconstruction of 
unquestioned subject positions, identity ascriptions and argumentations – 
which are commonly taken as pre-given facts – discourse analysis has 
contributed to my understanding of the ongoing debate and antagonisms 
about the ‘correct name’ of the people, the antagonistic relationships among 
the people and their established institutions. Second, as a problem-driven 
approach DT provides an important way of looking at the construction of 
collective identities. Unlike the primordial (essentialist) approach to ethnicity, 
                                                 
41 See for instance Wenskus (1961) and his followers Pohl (1994, 1998) and Geary (1983). 
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DT draws attention to the relational and contingent formation of social 
phenomena and consequently to their changeable, open and negotiable 
character. This analytical perspective grasps both the concept of ‘continuity’ 
and ‘discontinuity’ in the formation of identities. Whereas discontinuity is 
seen as a result of dislocations, continuity is the temporal fixation of 
meanings and identities in terms of gaining hegemony and creating 
sedimented forms of objectivity. Third, DT strongly emphasizes the role of 
‘power’ and ‘power relations’ in the construction of identities. Understanding 
identity formations as an act of power and hegemony, it requires a focus on 
the role of politics and political discourses and the driving forces behind the 
formation and cohesion of political identities. 
 Before commencing, it is important to mention two additional points 
pertinent to this chapter. Unlike empiricist and positivist approaches, the 
goal of DT is not to provide a theoretical model or a ready made framework. 
Instead, the aim of discourse theorists is to ‘articulate their concepts in each 
particular enactment of concrete research’ (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 
7). In line with this, my theoretical chapter will not function as a ‘framework’ 
or an ‘operational tool’ in the strict sense. Instead, I have developed the 
discussion below in order to form an analytical perspective for the empirical 
analysis. Secondly, the aim of the theoretical chapter is not to add something 
new to DT in the first place. This, it must be admitted, is one of the main 
limitations of the study. Nevertheless, the fruitful discussion of the concepts 
of DT in relation to the empirical concepts of the research will add new 
insights to the understanding of the ‘identity formation’ of a diasporic 
community. Furthermore, this study will become available for future 
theorization.  
 
2.2 Discourse Theory42 
Discourse analysis emerged during the 1960s as a critical theory to contest 
the way of understanding the social in mainstream theories and pushed critical 
philosophers to find an alternative to break down the dogmatic notions in 
the study of the social. Initially, discourse was defined in the narrow linguistic 
                                                 
42 This chapter is based on my study of the seminal work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), Laclau’s other works (1990, 1993, 1994, 1996 
and 2005), and the works of other scholars of the Essex School of discourse theory (Torfing, 
Howarth, Stavrakakis and Norval). 
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sense of a textual unit with the focus on the semantic aspects of spoken or 
written text.43  This narrow definition of discourse was later broadened to a 
set of social practices and to the field of the social, within Critical Discourse 
Analysis (Weiss and Wodak 2005: 3-7, 123-4). From this view, discourse is 
considered ‘as part of social practice’. This point of departure has two 
implications. Whereas it recognizes the social constitutive character of 
discourse, it nevertheless builds a dialectical relationship between discourse 
and the social (Fairclough 2003: 124). A third approach, Poststructuralist DT 
can be considered as the most abstract and radical approach to discourse 
analysis. From this perspective, discourse covers all social phenomena; all 
social practices have a discursive character and their meaning depends on a 
decentred system of contingently constructed rules and differences. Hence, 
discourse is co-terminous with the social.  
 Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985) represents one 
of the most innovative and influential books in contemporary philosophy, 
which has contributed to the ‘discursive turn’ in the social sciences. It has 
resulted in a new set of ontological and epistemological assumptions which 
are based on premises of anti-essentialism and anti-foundationalism.44 
Ontologically, DT rejects the idea of pre-given structures. Its starting point is 
that there is no pre-given underlying essence which shapes the social world 
and social relations. Instead, the social world is constructed discursively. 
Epistemologically, DT rejects the idea of a fundamental principle as the basic 
foundation of inquiry and knowledge. It problematizes the positivist 
emphasis on ‘Truth’ and ‘Knowledge’. Rather, ‘truth’ is seen as flexible and 
shaped through and in discourses. That is why discourse analysis does not 
take knowledge for granted (Burr [1995] 1996). As a problem-driven theory, 
it constantly questions the production of knowledge in relation to power and 
hegemony from a Foucauldian perspective. 
 The main concepts and logics of DT are built on its criticism of classical 
Marxism and structural linguistics.45 Its criticism of Marxism is based on the 
                                                 
43 Examples of studies in this category are Downes (1984), Atkinson (1984) and Schegloff and 
Sacks (1993). 
44 See further Critchley and Marchart (2004: 4) for the impacts of this innovative approach on 
the studies of social identity. 
45 To support this criticism, Laclau and Mouffe have introduced a new set of concepts which 
are particularly important to the analysis of hegemony and political identity. In addition to the 
critical readings of Gramsci and Althusser, Laclau and Mouffe have aimed to employ the 
critiques of ‘analytical philosophy’ in Wittgenstein’s later work, phenomenology in the 
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deconstruction of two core assumptions of Marxist ontology. DT rejects the 
idea of ‘class reductionism’ and ‘economic determinism’. Social classes are 
not taken as pre-constituted groups with ‘pre-given’ interests. Rather, they 
are constituted through discourses and have a contingent character. And DT 
gives primacy to political discourses instead of economic determinism. 
 In relation to Ferdinand Saussure’s (1960) structural linguistics,46 DT 
has modified some of its concepts from a critical perspective. Although DT 
agrees with the idea that signs derive their meaning in relation to other signs, 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 113) criticize Sauserrian structuralism for forming 
a new kind of ‘essentialism’ and question two of its key assumptions.47 
Firstly, DT rejects Saussure’s formulation of language as a stable, 
unchangeable and totalizing structure, because DT affirms that the structure 
is created, reproduced and changed in the process of actual language use. 
Hence, meaning can no longer be perceived as fixed (see further Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985: 112-3, Laclau 1996a: 37). Secondly, DT draws attention to the 
polysemic character of signs. Instead of a fixed relationship between the signifier 
and the signified, DT emphasizes ‘the ambiguous character of the signifier’ 
and ‘its non-fixation to any signified’.  Based on these critiques, DT draws 
three conclusions: a) the subject can no longer be conceived as the source of 
meaning; b) a 'totalizing centre' is absent; and c) the rejection of underlying 
closed totalities. These conclusions have resulted in the idea of decentred 
                                                                                                               
existential analytic of Heidegger, and the writings of Derrida, Barthes, Kristeva and Lacan (see 
further Laclau 1993, 2001, Torfing 2005). 
46 Saussure’s theory of linguistics is based on the distinction between langue (the underlying 
structure of language, a social system of rules) and parole (the practice of language used by 
people in a specific context). Saussure (1960: 15, 66-67) approached language as a static, 
closed system, arguing that language is ‘a system of signs’ in which signs (signe) constitute the 
basic unit which combines a concept (signified) and a sound-image (signifier). Furthermore, 
he emphasizes that the bond between the two is arbitrary and that the meaning of individual 
signs is constituted in relation to other signs. On the basis of the binary distinction between 
the signifier and the signified, the linguistic system is structured along differences. Hence, 
meaning is not an inherent characteristic of the words, but a result of ‘both a social product of 
the faculty of speech and a collection of necessary conventions’ (Saussure 1960: 9). This is one 
of the ideas which Post-Structuralism has borrowed from Structuralism. 
47 In their post-structuralist criticism of the sign, Barthes, Derrida and Lacan in particular have 
had a fundamental impact on the development of discourse theory. Laclau and Mouffe have 
built on their theories using the following: a) the concept of multiple meanings and readings 
of texts (Barthes 1967, Derrida 1966); b) the assumption that a signifier cannot be permanently 
attached to a particular signified (Lacan [1977] 2001); and c) the impossibility of a closed totality 
(Derrida 1966). 
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discourses in which social identities are no longer fixed once and for all 
(Torfing 2005: 8). 
 
2.3 Key Concepts of Discourse Theory 
Before commencing with the key concepts of DT, it is necessary to define 
some central terms such as discourse, discursive and the field of discursivity. The 
core idea of DT is that, unlike other discourse analytical approaches, 
discourse covers all social phenomena and practices; hence all objects and 
social practices are seen as objects of discourse. Consequently, they can only 
acquire meaning and identity through discursive totalities. This is why 
discourse cannot be understood as something which consists of purely 
linguistic phenomena only. Rather, a discourse covers the ‘material density of 
the multifarious institutions, rituals and practices through which a discursive 
formation is structured’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 108-9). This means that 
there is no other source, no ‘ground’ or something ‘beyond’ this relational 
system, which gives meaning to social phenomena (Laclau 2005: 69). To 
clarify the comprehensive meaning of discourses, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 
108) write: 
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has 
nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the 
realism/idealism opposition… What is denied is not that such objects 
exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they 
could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of 
emergence. 
They give the example of an earthquake which is an event that certainly 
occurs ‘independently of our will’. But whether its meaning as an object is 
constructed in terms of a ‘natural phenomenon’ or as an ‘expression of the 
wrath of God’ depends on the employed discourse. Since DT rejects the 
distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices, social reality is 
understood in terms of discursive meanings and forms. From this 
ontological perspective, discourse is a relational ensemble of elements that 
constitutes a partial fixation of meaning in the field of discursivity, which is 
characterised by a surplus of meaning. Laclau (2005: 68) gives a vital role to 
‘relations’ in the definition of discourse: 
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Discourse is the primary terrain of the constitution of objectivity as such. 
By discourse... I do not mean something that is essentially restricted to the 
areas of speech and writing, but any complex of elements in which relations 
play a constitutive role. This means that elements do not pre-exist the 
relational complex but are constituted through it. Thus ‘relation’ and 
‘objectivity’ are synonymous. 
While Laclau put forward the strongly relational aspect of discourse in the 
construction of the social, his two students Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 5) 
focus on the political aspect intrinsic to discourse: 
Discourses are concrete systems of social relations and practices that are 
intrinsically political, as their formation is an act of radical institution, 
which involves the construction of antagonisms and the drawing of 
political frontiers between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. 
Having posited these two definitions, I shall proceed with a discussion of the 
discursive and the field of discursivity. Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000) define the 
discursive as a ‘theoretical horizon in which the being of objects is constituted’. 
As an open-ended analytical horizon which differs radically from unified and 
totalized forms of foundations, the field of discursivity is a formation without 
foundation; it is an empty locus (Laclau 1993b, 2005). This is the field in 
which all objects and practices acquire their ‘partial’ meanings. Throughout 
this thesis, I give examples of how the various Assyrian/Syriac competing 
elites give meaning to their historical and present-day artefacts. The meaning 
they ascribe to them and the way they position them in their present-day 
lives depends on the discourses which confer meaning to it. For example, the 
Assyriska Movement made efforts to raise the consciousness of an Assyrian 
past among their people. On the other hand, the Syrianska Movement has 
focussed on an Aramean past. Consequently, based on two antagonistic 
ideologies the history of the same people has been imbued with different 
meanings. Both ideologies have introduced different national days, heroes, 
symbols and rituals to express the collective identity of their people. 
 
2.3.1 The Logic of Articulation, Elements and Moments 
The theoretical framework of DT covers a set of concepts and logics. In 
order to reach a deeper understanding of the formation of discourse, I shall 
discuss three central terms around which Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 105) 
have built up their line of argumentation: articulation, elements and moments. 
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…we will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among 
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory 
practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we 
will call discourse. The differential positions, insofar as they appear 
articulated within a discourse, we will call moments. By contrast, we will call 
element any difference that is not discursively articulated. 
The category of articulation can be seen as the driving force behind all 
discursive formations. In the process of articulation, elements gain meaning 
in relation to each other, transform into moments and constitute discourses 
(as meaningful ensembles) (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 96). In this sense, 
discourse is the ‘structured totality’ which is constituted through the 
transformation of elements into moments by reducing their multiple 
meanings to a temporary fixed and partial meaning. Elements can also be 
understood as signs (or objects) with a polysemic character. This polysemic aspect 
in the field of discursivity constitutes a surplus of meaning and functions as a 
constant threat to the destabilization of the achieved discursive closure. This is 
what makes all closures contingent and flexible. The partiality of meaning is 
based on the idea of ‘the openness of the social’, the incomplete character of 
every totality, and the ‘partial’ fixity of every identity (Laclau and Mouffe 
1985: 113). Understanding the social as ‘impossible’ indicates the constant 
incompleteness of any structure, which is always a subject of change and 
threatened by its constitutive outside. Consequently, meaning can never be 
permanently fixed. 
 If everything changes continuously, and if all discursive formations have 
a radical openness, the question is what is then stable? As an answer to this, 
Laclau (1990: 27) explains the necessity of partial fixations in the field of 
discursivity. The objectivity48 is both partially constituted and partially threatened 
because of the constant change in the boundaries between the contingent and 
the necessary (Ibid.). The impossibility of a closed structure does not exclude the 
necessary and possible fixations. Instead, it shows how the discursive structures 
change over time and how they cannot fix the meaning once and for all. 
Therefore, while the final closure of a meaning is impossible, the partial 
fixation of meanings is possible and necessary. This ontological 
understanding provides a fruitful approach for studying ‘change’ in 
discursive structures, which is one of the aims in this thesis. I illustrate in 
                                                 
48 Objectivity can also be seen as the reification of social reality. See further Berger and 
Luckmann ([1966] 1991). 
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Chapter 8 that primordial arguments among Assyrian/Syriac elites are 
commonly used to defend their ideas about their collective identity. Both 
Assyrier and Syrianer return to the pre-Christian period and relate to an 
ancient heritage on which they base the present-day collective identity of 
their people. Primordialism rejects the idea of the openness of identities, as it 
takes them as granted. In contrast to this approach, DT emphasizes the 
openness of discursive formations. 
 
2.3.2 Nodal Points, Floating Signifiers and Empty 
Signifiers 
Nodal points are defined as ‘the privileged discursive points’ around which a 
discourse is partially fixed to constitute a temporary centre (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985: 112). In the field of discursivity, articulated signs or elements 
acquire their meaning in relation to this privileged point around which they 
are organized and are transformed into moments. The main aim of hegemonic 
projects is to institute and stabilize nodal points (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 109, 
Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 22). The formation of nodal points can 
therefore be seen as the result of ‘successful’ hegemonic articulations. In 
discourses of nationalism, the ‘nation’ is an example of a nodal point. Through 
the hegemonic articulation of discourses of ‘nationalism’ the concept of the 
‘people’ is transformed into the concept of the ‘nation’. Therefore, in a 
successful nationalist project, the terms ‘nation’ and ‘people’ begin to be used 
interchangeably. Other elements such as ‘culture’, ‘music’, ‘language’ and 
others are organized around the nodal point ‘nation’ and acquire ‘national’ as a 
prefix – as in ‘national music’, ‘national culture’ and ‘national language’. In 
the case of Assyrians/Syriacs, such a hegemonic articulation has not taken 
place yet and the concept of the ‘people’ has not turned into the nodal point of 
the ‘nation’. Consequently, within the discourses of the Assyrian/Syriac elites 
the ‘people’ can be seen as a floating signifier (see further Chapter 9). 
 Nodal points have also a temporary character. As soon as the hegemonic 
articulation of nodal points weakens, a proliferation of meanings occurs in the 
field of discursivity. The polysemic character of the field of discursivity disarticulates a 
discursive structure and gives space to the over-determination of every social 
identity (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 113). This is the moment at which the 
concept of floating signifiers comes into the play. In New Reflections on the 
Revolution of Our Time (1990), Laclau introduced the concept of the floating 
signifier in order to radicalize the concept of hegemony. Floating signifiers are 
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those elements which are open simultaneously to different ascriptions of 
meaning (Laclau 1990: 28, 1993b: 287). Different discourses seek to charge 
floating signifiers with meaning in their own particular way. In this sense, floating 
signifiers have a key role in comprehending the struggle between different 
discourses and subject positions. For example, during the 1970s the Assyriska 
Movement in Sweden exercised a hegemonic discourse. Nevertheless, the 
proliferation of other signifieds disarticulated the discursive chain of the 
Assyriska Movement and resulted in an over-determination of the collective 
identity of Assyrians/Syriacs. This over-determination has been expressed in 
the use of different designations for the same people (see further especially 
Chapter 7). 
 Laclau (1996a) developed in his later works the concept of empty signifiers 
for a deeper understanding of hegemonic articulations in the field of 
discursivity. Empty signifiers are those signifiers ‘without a particular signified’ 
(Laclau 1996a: 36). They do not have any meaning by themselves, until they 
gain meaning in relation to other signs. ‘[T]he filling function requires an 
empty place’ (Laclau and Zac 1994) and their necessary emptiness allows space 
for new hegemonic articulations (Laclau 2005: 105). For instance, – using 
Laclau’s example – in a dislocated structure, ‘order’ as such has no content. 
In the situation of ‘disorder’, ‘order’ becomes an empty signifier, as the signifier 
of that absence. At this moment ‘order’ can be filled or interpreted 
differently by different political discourses. Hence, this emptiness is ‘an 
essential quality of the nodal point, as an important condition of possibility for 
its hegemonic success’ (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 13). Through 
discourses successful hegemonic articulations transform some of the empty 
signifiers into nodal points. This is what Laclau (1990) calls ‘ideological 
totalization’. In the case of Assyrians/Syriacs, a central empty signifier is the 
unity of the ‘amo Suryoyo. Different political discourses try to hegemonize the 
meaning of unity by making statements about who should be included in 
order to realize the ‘unity of the people’ (hdoyutho du ‘amo). 
 The above-discussed concepts have been criticized for being 
undertheorized (Critchley and Marchart 2004, Chouliaraki and Fairclough 
1999, Howarth 2000b, 2004, Torfing 2005). As Howarth (2004) questions, it 
is not clear enough what the relationship is between empty signifiers and nodal 
points. In the same direction, Montessori (2009) criticizes the lack of a 
methodological tool and textual analysis in the definition of these concepts. 
She rightly asks: ‘... at what point does an “empty signifier” become a “nodal 
point”?’ While acknowledging these difficulties, one should also consider the 
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complexity of the discursive field and the relationship between these 
concepts and the notion of hegemony.  
 The existence of empty signifiers and floating signifiers is both the indication 
of a weakening hegemony (the periods of ‘organic crises’) and the very 
condition of a new hegemony (Laclau 1990: 28, 43). This is usually the 
moment of dislocation, at which the hegemonic signification systems can no 
longer produce meaning. Consequently, many signifiers are released from 
their previous ties. For instance, during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, 
its hegemonic signification system ceased functioning as the cement of the 
Empire. As a result of this, the ideology of Pan-Ottomanism no longer 
functioned as a nodal point. Under these circumstances, disorder and 
dissolution led to different hegemonic attempts from a diversity of subject 
positions.  The administration of the Ottoman Empire tried to regain order 
and unity through its attempt to fill the meaning of these empty signifiers. Unity 
as empty signifier was first hegemonically articulated by Ittihat ve Terakki 
(Committee for Union and Progress) in terms of Pan-Turanism – the idea of 
Turkish nationalism. Later, Kemalism limited the Pan-Turanist ideal to the 
boundaries of Misak-i Milli (the national borders of contemporary Turkey). 
 
2.4 A Theory of Identity 
In this section I shall introduce the central concepts and logics of DT which 
are useful to the study of identity specifically in relation to hegemony. They 
are of importance for deepening our understanding of this case study. I 
consider that the following logics and concepts play a crucial role in the 
study of identities: 
• Social antagonism and the logics of difference and equivalence; 
• Identity as an act of power; 
• The primacy of politics and sedimented discourses; 
• Historicity; 
• The subject and dislocation; 
• Myths and social imaginaries; 
• Universal and particular. 
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2.4.1 Social Antagonism and the Relational 
Understanding of ‘Identity’ 
DT understands the social as the relational system of signification. In the 
process of discursive formations, each element occupies a differential position in 
relation to another element and has therefore a relative value. Hence, the 
values of elements are the ‘values of opposition’ which are defined only by 
their difference. And a discursive formation is always threatened by the discursive 
formations which it excludes. To exemplify, as I illustrate in this thesis, 
Assyrians/Syriacs first made explicit that they are not Turks or Arabs, as they 
were categorized by Western authorities upon their settlement in Western 
countries (see further Chapters 1 and 5). Later, among themselves, the 
majority of Assyrians/Syriacs stated explicitly that they were not Othuroye 
(Assyrians) but Suryoye. Only later did this ‘negative’ relational identification 
as not Othuroye begin to be expressed in terms of Syrianer or Arameans as an 
alternative name for ‘Assyrians’.49 In the present-day this is used as a similar 
concept and in competition (therefore relational) to the designation Assyrian. 
 The social is inherently antagonistic. Social antagonisms express the 
boundaries of identity formations. To explain the discursive construction of 
antagonisms, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 127-34) have introduced the twofold 
logic whereby meaning is constructed through and in discourses in terms 
either of difference or equivalence;50 respectively through the boundaries of 
inclusion or exclusion. The logic of equivalence creates equivalential identities 
which constitute the ‘others’. These identities are those which are excluded 
by the subject positions in the centre and are positioned in the constitutive 
outside. For instance, in the homeland Assyrians/Syriacs formed the chain of 
equivalence along religious boundaries. From their perspective as a non-
Muslim group, any follower of Islam was at the constitutive outside. Hence, 
their Christian identity functioned as a nodal point around which other 
                                                 
49Although the designation Syrianer has been used as a direct translation of and therefore 
synonymous with the emic name Suryoye, it must be noted that Syrianer is a new term 
introduced into Swedish language as an alternative name to the Swedish Assyrier (and the 
formerly commonly used term in Swedish – Syrier for Suryoye). I explain in Chapter 5 that they 
refrained from the use of Syrier (in Swedish) and Syrian (in English) because it did not 
distinguish them from the present day citizens of the Syrian Arab Republic. 
50 This specific terminology might be confusing for the readers who are not familiar with the 
terminology of discourse theory. It should be noted that the terms equivalence and difference are 
not used in a literal sense to express respectively ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’. It is the other 
way around, namely the logic of equivalence can be understood as the chain of the ‘others’ and 
the logic of difference as the chain of ‘Us’.   
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elements were organized. After their settlement in Western countries, the 
nodal point ‘Christian identity’ partially dissolved and assumed a more ethnic 
character. Hence, they began to base their chain of equivalence along ethno-
national lines.  
 The existence of antagonisms imposes also an ‘irreconcilable negativity’ 
on social relations. Thus, the constitutive outside prevents the constitution of a 
‘full identity’ and functions as ‘the symbol of my non-being’. In the example 
of Assyrians/Syriacs, the existence of a Syriansk identity prevents the full 
constitution of an Assyrisk identity and vice-versa. This outside is not only 
posing a threat and blocking the identity of the ‘inside’, but at the same time 
is the prerequisite for the ‘definition of inside’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 
Torfing 2005). Therefore, the Syrianer and the Assyrier have to be defined in 
relation to each other. 
 The logic of difference aims to lessen existing group differences and displace 
antagonistic polarities in order to broaden the chain of difference (and thus the 
inside group). In modern times, the Assyriska Movement has employed the 
logic of difference to unify the different Syriac churches under a national 
umbrella. Their historical theologically based differences are put aside. 
Instead, the focus has shifted to their similarities and their common destiny 
as a vulnerable minority which seeks to survive among other peoples or 
nations. A very recent attempt from the last ten years is from elite members 
(mainly Assyrier) who explicitly state that no matter by which name 
Assyrian/Syriac individuals choose to refer to themselves and no matter 
what ideology they adhere to, they can be included in the chain of difference, or 
to put it another way, in the definition of ‘their people’. Through seeking 
‘unity’, they aim to fix the meaning of a more broadly defined national 
identity and by doing so; they demand the recognition of their people. 
Because of the lack of hegemony, discourses of unity are still weak among 
Assyrians/Syriacs (see further Chapter 7).  
  
After having illustrated how identity is constructed in the tension between 
the differential and the equivalential logics, I shall commence with a discussion 
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2.4.2 The Construction of the ‘People’ 
...the construction of the ‘people’ will be the attempt to give a name to 
that absent fullness. 
              Laclau (2005: 85) 
In one of his latest works, On Populist Reason (2005), Laclau devotes a specific 
chapter to the construction of the ‘people’ by introducing the concept of 
demand. Laclau defines social demand as the smallest unit required for the 
construction of an identity. Basically, the emergence of a demand first takes 
shape either in terms of a request or a claim. If the demand is satisfied, this will 
be the end of the process of articulation. But, if it is not, those who raise the 
demand will co-operate with other ‘unsatisfied’ demands. This is how the 
formation of an internal dichotomization occurs. The accumulation of 
‘unfulfilled demands’ and the ‘inability of the institutional system to absorb 
them’ lead to the establishment of equivalental relations at the constitutive 
outside and hence to an internal frontier (Laclau 2005: 73-4). As discussed 
earlier, the formation of internal frontiers leads to the two modes of 
constructing the social: either through the assertion of a particularity of 
demands in terms of the logic of difference or through the logic of equivalence. 
These two logics require each other as necessary conditions for the 
construction of the social. Here, the identity of objects – as I discussed above 
– is constituted not through a separation, but rather within the tension 
between the two logics. As Laclau (2005: 80-81) puts it, all discursive identity 
is constituted at the meeting point of difference and equivalence. This is the 
moment at which an element (identity or demand) should assume the 
representation of the whole. Laclau mentions the case of Solidarnosc in which 
the demands of a group of workers in Gdansk came to signify a much wider 
popular camp against an oppressive regime. In order to embody the 
equivalential chain under a certain identity, a ‘radical investment’ which has a 
totalizing function (A=B=C > D) is necessary. ‘D’ represents the whole 
antagonistic camp of the ‘others’ through sharing the same purposes. For the 
construction of a ‘populist identity’, Laclau (2005: 110) emphasizes the 
importance of a passage and a radical investment in order to transform particular 
demands into a ‘universal’ one. This is compulsory if political frontiers are to 
be formed. By radical investment, he means something ‘qualitatively new’ which 
differs from the level of particular demands. An understanding of this 
concept clarifies why no political movement managed to emerge as a populist 
movement among Assyrian/Syriacs. First of all, a ‘passage’ as described 
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above was not formed in order to transform particularities into universal 
demands. Consequently, every particular demand (identity) remained as such. 
This is also what Laclau defines as ‘self-defeating’ pure-particularism. 
Secondly, a ‘radical investment’ which differs from the demands of the 
particularities did not emerge. Had this process been successful, it could have 
offered a possible ‘solution’ to the ‘name question’ among Assyrians/Syriacs. 
 
2.4.3 Identity as an Act of Power 
Laclau (1990) points out the role of power relations and hegemony in the 
constitution of identities as: ‘the constitution of a social identity is an act of 
power and that identity as such is power’. The formation of any identity 
depends upon its ability to repress whatever threatens it. Therefore, the 
fixation of identity is considered as an act of power and is a result of power 
relations.  
 The power aspect of DT has developed through the radicalization of 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and through a critical reading of Foucault’s 
power approach in his archaeological writings. Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony broke down the dominant understanding of economic 
determinism inherent in classical Marxism. Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 65-71) 
point out two fundamental achievements of Gramsci’s theory. In the first 
place, Gramsci formulates ideology not in terms of the false consciousness of 
social agents, but, as an organic and a relational whole embodied in 
institutions. Secondly, ideology does not have any necessary class belonging. 
The problem with Gramsci’s approach is considered to be the understanding 
of social classes as objective groups or as ontological foundations. Laclau 
and Mouffe radicalize Gramsci’s theory by discarding the essentialism which 
is attached to it. The importance of Foucault’s concept of power is that he 
links power and discourse to each other. Foucault ([1976] 2002: 103-4) 
argues that power is not something which is basically outside us but is 
ubiquitous as the ‘diversity of power relations’. Foucault (Ibid: 43, 54) 
postulates that those who are in power also control the discourses; they 
decide how topics can be spoken about and by whom. This is how they 
control the knowledge. From a discourse theoretical perspective, power and 
discourse constitute each other. Power is conceived in terms of hegemonic 
articulations of ‘inclusion and exclusion that shape social meanings, identities 
and that condition the construction of social antagonisms and political 
frontiers’ (Torfing 2005: 23). As noted in the previous section, the 
antagonistic relationship plays a fundamental role in the formation of 
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identities. It is the constitutive outside which makes the articulation of 
elements possible in order to give meaning and to form identities. To 
constitute an identity, it is necessary to exclude something and establish a 
power relationship between the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. 
Therefore, power is a condition of any identity that gains its main features in 
relation to what it excludes, denies or represses. Eventually, the weakening of 
power in any identity formation will lead to ‘the disintegration of the social 
fabric’ (Laclau 1990:  33). 
 In order to understand the conditions of existence of a given social 
identity, it is essential to study the power mechanisms which make the 
construction of any identity possible (Laclau 1990: 31–2). Without studying 
the role of power in the relationship between the Assyrier and Syrianer and 
without looking at the role of the Syriac Orthodox Church in relation to 
these two competing groups, it is an impossible task to understand the main 
clue to the ‘name debate’ and the split among Assyrians/Syriacs. In my 
empirical chapters, I shall illustrate how power relations are intrinsically 
linked to discourses of identity.    
 
2.4.4 The Primacy of Politics and Sedimented Discourses 
Unlike the idea of economic determinism, DT gives a primacy role to politics 
in the construction of meanings and identities of objects. Laclau (1990: 35) 
defines the field of the political in relation to the field of the social as follows: 
The sedimented forms of ‘objectivity’ make up the field of what we call 
the ‘social’. The moment of antagonism where the undecidable nature of 
the alternatives and their resolution through power relations becomes fully 
visible constitutes the field of the ‘political’. 
Three points in this definition require further discussion. First, the field of 
the social consists of sedimented forms of meanings and identities where 
antagonistic relations become provisionally invisible. This process can also 
be defined as the sedimentation of discourses. Secondly, through the exercise 
of political discourses the antagonistic character of relations again becomes 
visible. Politics involve ‘the construction of antagonisms’ and ‘the drawing of 
political frontiers between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (Howarth and Starvakakis 
2000: 4, Torfing 2005: 22-4, Dyrberg 2004: 252). Hence, the field of the 
political is what threatens and changes the sedimented forms of meaning and 
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identities; it puts forward alternative meanings. Thirdly, the boundary 
between the ‘social’ and the ‘political’ is continuously dislocated.  
 The sedimentation of discourses is important to explaining how the 
process of discourses of identity among Assyrian/Syriac elites assumed 
institutional forms at an early stage of settlement, and how these discourses 
have become ‘sedimented’ – both secularly and religiously (see further 
Chapter 7). DT views institutions as ‘sedimented discourses’ or as 
‘institutionalized discourses’. The link between sedimented discourses and 
social practice is based on a two-way relationship and is mutually 
constitutive. Sedimentation of discourses is discussed in the literature in 
relation to the concept of hegemony. As soon as discourses are articulated 
and represented, they seek to gain hegemony and become sedimented after 
successful political struggles. As successful hegemonic articulations the 
institutionalized discourses impose their values, norms and rules as an 
‘objectivity’ to live by. What is important is that this ‘objectivity’ is defined 
relationally and that its symbolic boundaries are of importance. For example, 
for a long period the Syriac Orthodox Church of Antioch – through its 
historically shaped discourses – has exercised hegemony over its members 
worldwide, framed their way of thinking and constituted norms and values 
by which to live. However, this has been only a temporary closure. There 
have been many dislocations both in the early centuries of the existence of 
the church and in the last century. In modern times, a very obvious example 
of this temporality was caused by secular movements which developed 
discourses of a cross denominational national identity for their people. The 
church has no longer remained the main hegemonic institution.  
 Turning to the question of when a discourse becomes sedimented, this is 
the moment when a ‘forgetting of the origins’ of the political struggles takes 
place (Laclau 1990: 34). And, hegemonic discourses and their political 
rhetoric appear as an ‘uncontestable truth’ (Torfing 1999). They become 
relatively permanent and durable as the universal form of the social reality. 
This explains the discussion between primordialists and instrumentalists about 
the concept of change in ethnic identities. Contrasting the idea of the 
‘ineffable’ qualities inherent in essentialist approaches, DT sees ‘contingency’ 
as the main characteristic of all identity formations. At the same time it 
acknowledges the idea of continuity in terms of objectivity and discourse 
sedimentation. Identities can also be understood as the sedimentation of 
particular discourses. For instance, no one questions the Dutch or Swedish 
national identities, because they have already achieved sedimented forms and 
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gained ‘objectivity’. Sedimentation of identity discourses means therefore a 
(temporary) stability and the forgetting of their origins.51 When sedimented 
discourses are threatened by the constitutive outside, the survival of these 
hegemonic projects depends on their ability and flexibility to adjust to 
changing conditions. If they cannot, sedimented discourses will lose their 
hegemonic role as ‘objectivity’ and will become contested. Hajer (2003) 
explains this situation in terms of ‘institutional ambiguity’. I shall discuss this 
aspect further in the section about dislocation. 
 
2.4.5 Historicity 
DT approaches all identities as historically constructed systems of meaning. 
The historical dimension of the ‘name debate’ among Assyrians/Syriacs 
requests to look into the emergence of discursive formations from a 
historical perspective. Laclau (1990: 36) explains how the historical 
dimension of discursive formations can be studied: 
To understand something historically is to refer it back to its contingent 
conditions of emergence. Far from seeking an objective meaning in 
history, it is a question of deconstructing all meaning and tracing it back to 
its original facticity. 
It is necessary to elabourate in more detail on two main aspects of this 
definition. First, from an ontological perspective history does not flow from 
an essence with a determinative centre which explains the flow of history as 
the realization of a thelos. DT sees history as the articulation of discourses 
through hegemonic struggles. From this perspective, all identity of objects 
and subjects is ‘changeable’. Therefore, even if there might be claims which 
aim to restore a previous identity (such as an Assyrian or Aramean past), it is 
still necessary to ‘reinvent’ that identity. They cannot simply rely on 
something given entirely beforehand (Laclau 2005: 121). Second, 
methodologically, in order to study the historical dimension of discourses, it 
is necessary to deconstruct their contingent conditions of emergence. My 
aim has been to understand how and why antagonistic discourses emerged 
                                                 
51 Although from a different ontological perspective, Renan (1882) in his lecture at the 
Sorborne ‘What is a Nation?’ (see further in Eley and Suny 1996: 41-55) said something 
similar about nationhood, namely that it involves shared memories but also a great deal of 
shared forgetting. 
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around the ‘correct name’ of the people. That is why I have deconstructed 
the meaning charged in the names used (Assyrier and Syrianer) and by doing 
so I have deconstructed the political discourses which these names represent. 
Therefore, my focus has been on the contextual conditions of the emergence 
of the antagonistic discourses and not on the search for an ‘objective 
meaning’ in history.  
 History concerns both the field of continuity and discontinuity. While 
continuity is a matter of discursive path-dependency, discontinuity indicates 
formative moments which have a discursive path-shaping character.52 DT 
approaches ‘discontinuity’ in terms of dislocation in history. The dialectical 
relationship between continuity and discontinuity explains the notion of 
change in identity formations. A ‘new’ identity does not necessarily mean a 
radical change or an entirely new formation. As Laclau (1996: 30) 
emphasizes, the ‘new’ identity cannot be the radical elimination of the other, 
‘but the constant renegotiation of the forms of his presence’. This is 
important to understanding and explaining the concept of continuity in 
identities. DT does not separate the past from the present. Identities are not 
taken as primordial, given entities, fixed once and for all. Instead, they are 
constantly subject to change. The idea of change does not mean that 
identities do not have some stability or temporary fixations. What it means is 
that identities are negotiated in relation to general contextual changes and in 
relation to particular dislocatory events. This approach transcends the 
primordial and instrumentalist approaches to ethnic identities. 
 
2.4.6 The Subject and Dislocation 
Subjects are seen as ‘positions’ in discourses (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 
115).53 Three points are central to this approach: a) subjects are seen as 
                                                 
52 Historical institutionalism explains institutional change in terms of path-dependency and 
unintended consequences (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 6-7). The concept of path-dependency 
explains the outcomes of policy shaping and decision-making in terms of the ‘initial 
conditions’ which become ‘locked-in’ and therefore establish a ‘path’ from which it becomes 
difficult or impossible to deviate. The concept provides a useful understanding of the impact 
of historically shaped institutions, formal and informal rules and norms. This can be seen as 
the historical element of a discourse (see further Pierson 2000, 2002; Aspinwall and Schneider 
2000). However, the premises of historical institutionalism differ ontologically from discourse 
theory. Therefore, Torfing (2005: 22-4) translates two concepts of historical institutionalism’ 
into DT: Discursive path-shaping and path-dependency. 
53 DT’s approach to the subject has been shaped in several steps. In Laclau’s (1979) early 
writings and Laclau and Mouffe (1985), his definition of ‘subject positions’ was influenced by 
the Althusserian ideological interpellation. Žižek (1990: 251) criticizes this approach saying it 
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internal to the structure; b) subjects enjoy a certain level of ‘autonomy’ and 
are therefore not the slaves of the structure; and c) subjects do not have a 
homogenous character with pre-given interests. Instead, the identity of 
subjects is fragmented, decentred, and cannot be reduced merely to one 
identity as it is in the concept of social classes or social groups; rather, they 
are over-determined. This approach differs from the classical Rational 
Choice theory of agents as autonomous subjects, and distances itself from 
class-based explanations of the Marxist theory which are rooted in economic 
determinism.  
 Laclau (1990: 30) builds his ideas about the dilemmatic relationship 
between structure and social agent on several assumptions. First of all, unlike the 
deterministic role given to structures in structuralism, DT understands 
‘structures’ as open and contingent; undecidability is implicit in the structures. 
Therefore, decisions in the field of discursivity are not determined by a 
particular structure. Instead, decisions are seen as external to the structure 
and constitute a reduction of the condition of possibilities. Secondly, ‘the 
agent [my emphasis] of that contingent decision must be considered, not as 
an entity separate from the structure, but constituted in relation to it’ (Ibid.). 
On the basis of these arguments, Laclau states that agents have a space of 
autonomy in the sense of transforming and subverting the structure through 
new decisions. Therefore, while the agent is not external to the structure, it has 
begun to function to some extent autonomously from the structure. 
 For instance, the secularization of the Syrianska Movement results from 
the decisions taken in the process of competition on the one hand with 
clergymen (as representatives of a church based structure) and on the other 
hand with the Assyriska Movement (as an already existing movement). 
Despite the fact that the Syrianska Movement started off as an opposition to 
the Assyriska Movement with religiously based arguments and a 
denominational based identity discourse, in its formation process it grew 
slowly into a secularly based movement, offering an alternative and 
competing ideology to that of the Assyrier. The religiously based structure did 
thus not determine its whole formation process. This is related to the extent 
to which the agent constitutes the locus of a decision which is not determined 
by the structure. With this point of departure, Laclau (1990: 30) emphasizes 
                                                                                                               
was still being framed from an Althusserian perspective which sees subjects as interpellated by 
ideological practices. In Laclau’s later writings under the influence of Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
the emphasis turned to the idea of the split subject. 
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that ‘the subject is nothing but the distance between the undecidable structure 
and the decision’.54 
 In his later writings, Laclau formulated the subject in terms of a split subject 
in relation to the concept of dislocation. In the study of identities, the concepts 
dislocation and split subject assume central importance. Both concepts provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the flexible and multiple characters of 
social and ethnic identities. Dislocation explains discursive changes; the inherent 
existence of dislocation in any discursive structure is the main logic which 
makes identities changeable and negotiable. Laclau (1990: 40) defines 
dislocation as both the simultaneous condition of possibility and impossibility of a 
centre. While the notion of impossibility prevents the formation of a closed 
totality, the condition of possibility makes it possible for new identities to 
emerge. As an analytical concept with multiple meanings and functions, 
dislocation constitutes both the very form of temporality and of possibility, but 
also the very form of freedom (Laclau 1990: 41-3). To clarify this further, I 
shall answer two questions: where and when does dislocation take place? 
Spatially dislocation is an inherent concept in every identity constellation. 
Dislocation occurs when a hegemonic discourse is confronted by new events 
which it cannot explain, represent or in other ways domesticate (Torfing 
2005: 16). And the constitutive outside is the place where the possibility of 
dislocation is formed. 
 In the long run, dislocation is an inevitable process with which all 
hegemonic discourses are confronted. In this sense, dislocation is the breaking 
point of the status quo which the established discourses enjoy. The rupture 
of the status quo opens up a new space in which discourses of previously 
excluded subjects as well as new subjects win space (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis 2000: 20). In Laclau’s (1990: 39) words, ‘…it will cause the 
accelerated tempo of social transformation and the continual rearticulatory 
interventions, through which new subjects or the re-definition of subject 
positions will occur.’ In short, excluded identities, subject positions or a new 
discourse could begin to challenge the established positions through the 
‘proliferation of floating signifiers’ with a new set of nodal points. The 
flexibility and integration capacity of the discourses which are threatened by 
the ‘new’ emerging (and competitive) discourses determine their hegemonic 
continuation and development. However, the inherent notion of dislocation 
                                                 
54 See further for a discussion about Laclau’s explanation on the subject in relation to an 
‘undecidable structure’ and ‘the decision’ in Norval (2004). 
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constantly diminishes the ‘pillars’ of hegemonic discourses. This leads to the 
increasing role of the subject. 
 Since the subject is ‘the distance between the undecidable structure and 
the decision’, dislocation leads to a situation in which more fields of 
decisions are not determined by the structure. Eventually in this situation, the 
distance will expand and this will allow the subject more space. In this sense, 
dislocation decentralizes the structure and the subject, which leads to ‘a 
failed structural identity’. Per definition, as a consequence of the dislocation 
of the discursive structure: ‘the subject always emerges as a split subject that 
might attempt to reconstruct a full identity through acts of identification’ 
(Torfing 2005: 17). Through decisions in an undecidable terrain (structure), 
subjects identify themselves with hegemonic projects and reduce the 
condition of possibility in order to find a solution to their experienced crises 
(Laclau and Zac 1994). The acts of identifications (or decisions) entail ‘an act 
of power’ in order to hegemonize a particular meaning. 
 These explanations are essential to the study of identities and 
particularly to the concept of change in discursive structures. In my study, I 
define the emigration of Assyrian/Syriacs as a dislocatory event which resulted 
in both – possibilities and impossibilities. Because of the dislocatory structure in 
the new societies, they were no longer visible as a distinct group of people. 
Dislocation in terms of emigration also allowed space for new conditions of 
possibility and hence, ‘freedom’ for the expression of their ‘national identity’ 
project. In order to heal this split subject, they have made use of the possibilities 
they encountered by making (conscious and unconscious) decisions about their 
collective identity. My case study illustrates that by way of making use of 
their new possibilities, Assyrians/Syriacs have come to identify themselves in 
ethno-national terms, using a Western concept of identity definition. 
Identification with hegemonic projects in terms of Assyrier or Syrianer can 
therefore be understood as attempts to find a solution to the constantly 
experienced (identity) crises after their emigration. However, these acts of 
identification are not permanent and constitute a partial closure; they are 
changeable, negotiable and have multiple characters, as I shall illustrate in the 
following empirical chapters. Now I shall look at two other important 
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2.4.7 Myth and Social Imaginary 
In order to explain new forms of identification after dislocation, Laclau 
introduced the concepts of myth and social imaginary in his theory. The 
emergence of myths is thus directly related to dislocatory events; myths emerge 
from the fundamental impossibility in society to fill the ‘gap’ or the ‘lack’ in the 
present such as in new socio-political demands for the creation of a 
‘promised land’ or ‘an ideal society’ (Laclau 1990: 63). The aim of a myth is 
thus the representation of an ‘alternative’ space to the present objectivity. 
Whenever a myth gains ‘acceptance’, a wide range of social demands will be 
inscribed in it (Howarth 2004: 261). This is the moment at which myths 
transform into social imaginaries and become generally accepted as common 
demands, such as the case with the Christian millennium, the Enlightenment 
and the communist utopia. Collective imaginaries have the capacity to absorb 
different kinds of social demands. Hence, the dissolution of an imaginary 
mainly depends on losing this capacity of absorption (Laclau 1990: 63-65). A 
central myth in the discourse of Assyrian/Syriac elites is the need for a 
‘homeland’ (athro).  They perceive themselves as a stateless people (‘amo dlo 
athro) whose survival in the Middle East is endangered and who live 
dispersed in a worldwide diaspora. In the structural objectivity there is no place 
for a country which they can call their own. Therefore, among some elite 
members the need for a country in the geography of the ancestral homeland 
has functioned as a myth – similar to the need felt by Jews at the beginning of 
the last century. However, this myth has not turned into a social imaginary 
because it has not been accepted broadly among Assyrians/Syriacs. 
 
2.4.8 Universal and Particular 
The last point that I will introduce here is the relationship between the 
universal and the particular which is essential for understanding the relational 
and contextual formation of identities. Laclau (1996b: 13) defines 
particularism55 as a relational concept: 
...something is particular in relation to other particularities and the 
ensemble of them presupposes a social totality within which they are 
constituted. 
                                                 
55 See further Laclau (1996b). Butler (1992) has also contributed to this discussion. 
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Any particularity gains its meaning in relation to other particularities. Taken as 
a whole, these particularities constitute a social totality within which each of 
them assumes its meaning. For instance, without analysing the ‘Swedish 
context’, it is impossible to understand the particularities of the Assyrier, 
Syrianer and the Syriac Orthodox Church in Sweden and their relationships. 
As Laclau (1996b: 30) writes, ‘If the racial or cultural minority, for instance, 
has to assert its identity in new social surroundings, it will have to take into 
account new situations which will inevitably transform that identity.’ To 
exemplify this statement further, both the ‘name debate’ among 
Assyrians/Syriacs and the institutional split resulting from the ‘name debate’ 
assume specific characteristics in different European countries. These 
differences can be best understood in relation to the context or social totality 
in which they developed. However, there are also some examples where the 
formation of identities does not follow the new contextual patterns. For 
instance, Assyrians/Syriacs in the diaspora have continued to define their 
identity to a large extent in relation to the Turkish, Arab and Kurdish identity 
although their emigration goes back more than forty years ago and their 
former relations (as neighbours) have been broken down to a great extent. 
Norval’s (1990: 157) explanation of the post-apartheid society is useful in 
comprehending the notion of continuity when defining identities relationally. 
She emphasises that ‘through a remembrance of apartheid as other’, a post-
apartheid society constituted itself. Similarly, in the Western diaspora, 
‘remembrance’ of the oppression which Assyrians/Syriacs experienced in 
Turkey and other countries in the Middle East has been central to the way 
they have continued to define their collective identity; Turks, Kurds and 
Arabs have continued to function as the main ‘others’. 
 In Laclau’s (1996b: 28) reasoning, the universal is nothing external to the 
particular; it is defined explicitly in relation to the particular: 
…the universal is part of my identity as far as I am penetrated by a 
constitutive lack that is as far as my differential identity has failed in its 
process of constitution. The universal emerges out of the particular not as 
some principle underlying and explaining the particular, but as an 
incomplete horizon suturing a dislocated particular identity. 
The universal is defined as an empty signifier which has no content of its own. It 
can only be understood in relation to the particular. In other words, the 
universal can only emerge out of the ‘particular’. As Buttler (1992: 8-9) 
indicates, the universal represents an empty, contested space in which subjects 
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struggle for hegemony. Filling the empty space of the universal with meaning 
indicates gaining hegemony for a particular identity (Torfing 1999: 175). 
Discussing Benedict Anderson’s (1983) seminal work, Laclau (2003: 25-28) 
analyzes the imagined community as an example for the concept of the universal. 
With the construction of nation-states, a new common space of political 
representation was created through bringing different particularities together in 
order to construct an ‘imagined community’. By doing so, hegemonic 
discourses filled the meaning of the universal (here, the imagined community).  
 In this thesis, I illustrate the central claims of Assyrians/Syriacs about 
their ancestry and their assertions about the ‘correct’ naming of their people 
in the present-day. While making universal claims about the ‘correct name’ of 
the people, they have forced their particularistic identity on the outsiders. 
Laclau sees a pure particularistic stand56 as ‘self-defeating’ and ‘ultimately 
inconsistent’, because the idea of pure particularism is based on ‘the 
constitution of the differences as differences and such a ground can only be 
a new version of an essentialist universalism’ (Laclau 1996: 26-27, 58). To 
exemplify this self-defeating logic of particularism, I should mention the 
example whereby Assyrians/Syriacs have begun to conclude that the struggle 
around their name in the diaspora has created a split in their socio-political 
life and that it is ‘self-defeating’. Some have begun to compare this situation 
with the Seyfo, a reference to the destructive effect of the genocide 
perpetrated on their people during the First World War. The ‘self-defeating’ 
element is that of imposing a pure-particularistic discourse (non-flexible and 
non-negotiatable) on the whole group in order to realize hegemony. This has 
resulted in deeply rooted antagonisms within the community. In Chapter 7, I 
illustrate how this antagonistic relationship in terms of difference as difference is 
played out in order to strengthen the position of particular discourses in the 
discursive field. 
 
In the following of this chapter I shall proceed with a discussion of the 




                                                 
56 I understand ‘pure particularism’ as a political and ideological stand which is not open to 
negotiate with others; an example for an inflexible discourse. 
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2.5 Methodology  
…This is not to say that methods do not exist for the treatment of the 
material, which could be useful in some circumstances… But the 
important point is that these tools that the researcher can decide ad hoc to 
use in each case for pragmatic reasons, and that they are not unified in an 
established and orderly system of procedures called ‘methodology’. A lot 
of time will be saved if the researcher knows from the beginning that 
nothing can substitute his/her personal intuition. 
                  Laclau (1991) 
 
Today, one of the main challenges for DT (since the publication of Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy by Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) has remained the 
methodological question. While recognizing the anti-essentialist and the anti-
foundationalist assumptions of DT as a strength, this theory has also been 
criticized for its lack of methodological guidelines, for its high level of 
abstraction and for its undertheorized concepts such as nodal point and empty 
signifiers (see further Fairclough and Chouliaraki 1999, Critchley and Marchart 
(2004), Howarth 2000, 2004, Torfing 2005, Montessori 2009). My aim has 
not been to discuss these critiques in-depth. I have mainly limited myself to 
the discussion of the concepts of DT in relation to my case study. 
Nevertheless, I would like to note that DT is not easily accessible and that it 
requires an active, creative and experimental attitude from the researcher in 
order to analyse the social and to make this analysis accessible to the reader. I 
assume that this is related to the more philosophical orientation of DT. To 
meet this need, Torfing (2005) notes that an increase in empirical studies in 
this field of DT can be of great help. The value of this study should 
therefore also be sought in that direction. 
 The ‘methodological deficit’ (Howarth 2005: 317) can also be 
approached as a puzzle for researchers to be solved in each specific research. 
There are two elements which transform the methodology of DT into a 
puzzle: a) the high level of abstraction inherent in this theory; b) its radical 
ontological and epistemological assumptions. In each unique context, 
puzzles are to be solved by applying methodological ‘tricks’.  In this sense, 
tricks are heuristic tools or ways of understanding which assist in resolving 
these puzzles (Becker 1998). In a nutshell, the puzzle of methodology in DT 
is still open to solution with the assistance of additional empirical studies and 
new attempts to fill this gap. Consequently, the question is whether DT 
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needs a methodological guideline to fill the experienced gap in the 
methodology.57 As I shall conclude, each new solution to the puzzle is but a 
temporary closure, because the ontological standpoint of DT is that truth is 
local and flexible. 
 As a starting point for this methodological discussion, in his above-
mentioned citation, Laclau stresses the importance of the researcher’s 
intuition when pursuing the research. What does he mean here by 
‘…nothing can substitute his/her personal intuition?’ I understand this as an 
appeal to the researcher’s intuition to make use of the space allowed for 
creativity and flexibility by the open character in the use of methodology 
within discourse analysis. This approach opposes theory-bound and method-
led research strategies. I understand this as the rejection of the researcher 
becoming the slave to a theory. Therefore it is essential that the researcher 
develops a strong reflexive attitude throughout the research process, as each 
research is unique in addressing its specific questions. Therefore, a ready-
made methodological guideline or ‘recipe’ will not satisfy the requirements of 
any research question. In order to meet the challenges of complex societal 
puzzles, it is important that the researcher makes use of her well-honed 
intuition and develops a free, open and engaged attitude (see further ‘the role 
of the researcher’ in this chapter).  
 In the following, I shall begin by taking a closer look into the 
characteristics of the distinctive methodology of DT. Thereafter, I shall 
discuss ‘the role of researcher’, my ‘methods of data collection’ and conclude 
with a brief explanation of how I have made use of the concepts of DT in 
my empirical chapters. 
 
2.5.1 The Logic of Methodology within Discourse 
Theory  
DT is not considered as an empirical theory in the narrow sense of the term 
but is thought of as a research programme or paradigm (Howarth 2005: 318). 
Howarth views this research programme as a system of ontological 
assumptions, theoretical concepts and methodological precepts.  
Furthermore, he emphasizes that the central idea of this research programme 
                                                 
57 An interesting task for future research in relation to this is an analysis of the mainstream 
discourses of methodology. Conclusions can bring us further in detecting and identifying 
strengths and weaknesses. This may develop new openings to the understanding of 
methodology. 
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is based on the assumption that all objects and practices are meaningful and 
that social meanings are contextual, relational and contingent. Three 
characteristics are central to the logic of methodology within DT:  
 
• DT has a problem-driven approach; 
• DT is based on distinctive ontological and epistemological 
assumptions; 
• Implicit to DT is that theory and methodology are intertwined. 
 
In contrast to theory-driven studies, DT has a ‘problem-driven’ approach. Its 
starting point is the problematization of social phenomena complying with 
epistemological postulations which claim that knowledge should not be 
taken for granted (Howarth 2005, Torfing 2005). In accordance with 
interpretative methods of social inquiry, it puts the focus on a deep 
understanding and explanation of discourses by providing plausible and 
convincing explanations of carefully problematized phenomena (Howarth 
and Stavrakakis 2000: 7). In this respect, Howarth (2005: 321) points out two 
dangers concerning the gap between the theory and what he calls the ‘real-
concrete’. The first danger is related to inductive methodology, which is 
based on the idea of unmediated access to the research object. DT opposes this 
positivistic and naturalistic conception of knowledge and method, which is 
based on empirical generalizations and testable predictions (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis 2000: 7). In antithesis to this approach, DT argues that there can 
be no unmediated access to the ‘real-concrete’. (In this context, the role of 
the researcher is vitally important. I shall discuss this aspect in the next 
section.) The second danger arises from applying a theoretical framework to 
the ‘real-concrete’ in order to test a theory. In contrast to this deductive 
approach, DT seeks to articulate each concept in its particular enactment of 
concrete research. In other words, the concepts and logics of the theoretical 
framework should be sufficiently ‘open’ and flexible to be adapted, de-
formed and transformed in the process of application (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis 2000: 7). 
 DT is based on an anti-essentialist ontology and an anti-foundationalist 
epistemology. It rejects both explanations related to an underlying essence or 
a transcendental centre and the idea (usually a starting point as pre-given 
analytical explanatory variable) of a fundamental belief or principle, which is 
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the basic ground or foundation of inquiry and knowledge.58 The anti-
foundationalist approach allows DT a more open methodological preference. 
Knowledge is not taken for granted. Truth is a local and flexible 
phenomenon (Torfing 2005: 27). Discourse theory rejects ideas of being able 
to access a final or absolute truth directly. People who espouse DT likewise 
distance themselves from truth as a kind of ‘subjective imposition’ in the 
sense of post-modern ‘relativism’ (Howarth 2005: 328-9). 
 The distinctive ontological and epistemological assumptions of DT 
locate this approach in the hermeneutical branch of the social sciences. 
 Hermeneutics is understood to be the method of grasping and producing 
meaning relations (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 23). More specifically, one of the 
main tasks of DT is to provide second-order interpretations of social actors’ 
own self-understandings and interpretations of their situations and practices 
(Howarth 2005). Discourse theorists are concerned not just with the way in 
which social actors understand their particular worlds.  They tend to focus 
their attention on the creation, disruption and transformation of the 
structures which organize social life.  One consequence of this hermeneutical 
orientation is that theory cannot be separated wholly and objectively from 
the reality it seeks to explain, as theoretical practices are themselves partly 
constitutive of (and shaped by) the social worlds in which the subjects and 
objects of research find themselves (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 8-9). In 
short, implicit in discourse analysis is the assumption that theory and 
methodology are intertwined. Therefore, throughout the research process, 
the constant interaction between theory and methodology pushes the 
researcher to consider both the ontological and the epistemological 
assumptions. This brings me back to the question of how to deal with the 
‘problem of application’.  
 Laclau (1991) points out that one of the most common mistakes occurs 
when the researcher fails to overcome the relationship between the theory 
and the empirical study. He argues that this failure often results in two rather 
disconnected parts. To counter this danger, Laclau advocates a highly 
developed theoretical and empirical analysis as a solution to the ‘problem of 
application’. Referring to Wittgenstein’s assertion, Laclau says that there is no 
                                                 
58 Ontology is understood as ‘the science or study of being’ (Blaikie [2000] 2008: 8). Its 
assumptions are concerned with what we believe constitutes social reality. An epistemology 
consists of ideas about what can count as knowledge, what can be known, and what criteria 
such knowledge must satisfy in order to be called knowledge rather than beliefs. 
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‘application’ of a rule because the instance of the application is internal to the 
rule itself. Therefore it transforms the latter. This is the main point which 
makes the methodology of DT distinctive: Instead of the ‘passive’ role 
ascribed to empirical data (which can also be understood in terms of a ‘one-
way-relation’) in theory-driven deductive studies, DT advocates an ‘active’ 
two-way-relationship between theoretical concepts and the empirical reality. 
Hence, the researcher needs to shuttle back and forth between the theory 
and the empirical field in order to reach a better understanding and 
explanation of the latter. Consequently, in assuming this active role as a 
researcher I propose to refer to this in terms of ‘interaction with the theory’ 
instead of ‘application of the theory’.  
 At this juncture, I shall discuss the role of the researcher which 
constitutes an essential point of the methodology in my research. This is 
because the bulk of my empirical material is based on field research, which 
includes in-depth interviews and participant observations. Therefore it is 
important to define my role. 
 
2.5.2 The Role of the Researcher 
I have been confronted with my role and position of researcher in relation to 
my research object in various ways, but specifically because I am identified as 
a member of the group which I am studying. I consider this confrontation 
something which can work out positively for any researcher in relation to the 
level of closeness and distance between the researcher and the study object, 
independent of the character of the relationship. This aspect has been 
touched on in the context of the question of ‘objectivity’ which a researcher 
is supposed to foster. Simultaneously, this question assumes the risk for 
‘subjectivity’ and, consequently, this ‘risk’ assumes a negative influence of 
this subjectivity on the research results. At this point I would like to state 
that I share the anti-foundationalist epistemology of DT, which rejects the 
idea of a fundamental belief or principle.  
 As said before, from this perspective, knowledge is not taken as granted 
and ‘truth’ constitutes a local and flexible phenomenon (Torfing 2005). 
Social reality can therefore never be fully captured. This should not be 
confused with ‘relativism’.  ‘Truth’ in this sense is subject to a constant 
change and is a matter of temporary closure in the field of discursivity. The 
role of the researcher is another puzzle in DT methodology. Much of the 
‘subjectivity’ in the social sciences is attributable to the specific interaction 
 DISCOURSE THEORY & METHODOLOGY         69 
 
between the researcher and the group under study. The heuristic ways of 
resolving this puzzle depend on how the researcher interacts with her 
research subject, how she gathers data, how she asks and what she does and 
how she interprets discursive and non-discursive material. The researcher is 
‘always located in a particular historical and political context with no neutral 
Archimedian point from which to describe, argue and evaluate’ (Howarth 
and Stavrakakis 2000: 7). Hence the researcher is also part of discursivity 
with contingent relationships in an antagonistic field. Therefore, it is 
impossible to achieve a completely objective and detached point of view. 
However, the researcher gives meaning to her empirical data and by doing so 
she makes temporary and partial truth claims. This is both ‘possible’ and 
‘necessary’. 
 In relation to the questions of closeness and distance between the 
researcher and the research object, both have advantages and disadvantages. 
Without dealing with them extensively, I do want to state that too much 
distance between the research object and the researcher can be problematic, 
because the researcher needs also a certain closeness to or affinity with the 
field in order to achieve a deeper understanding of the social in the field. As 
an outsider, there is a greater risk of misinterpretation or of generalizations 
as there is a danger of missing the subtle nuances in the meaning of words, 
incidents and gestures. To be part of the group under study, such as in my 
situation, can also be helpful in understanding the complexity inherent to the 
social. Therefore, the activity of conducting research is intrinsic to the role of 
researcher, hence to ‘subjectivity’. In tackling this ‘limitation’ in the study, I 
have attempted to develop transparency in relation to the aim of this study and 
by explaining what I did and how I did it. 
 I shall first say something more specific about how I have related to my 
study object over a longer period – as I have done so often in my first 
meeting with people from outside ‘the community’ whom I expected to meet 
more than once. And this is definitely a different version from when I meet 
with ‘my people’. For the latter group, it often suffices to say that I am the 
daughter of Barsaumo dbe Atto from the village Mzizah. If they do not know my 
father, mother or any other member of the family, they do know either 
someone from my village or someone who is somehow connected to this 
village. This is precisely what I experienced during my fieldwork. It enabled 
me to find easy access to sources. Undoubtedly, I was denied access to two 
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archives because of how people identified me in relation to their 
organization and socio-political sphere at that specific moment.59 
 Who am I for outsiders? Different versions of an answer to this exist, 
depending on the question to whom I speak. In the context of this study, it 
is worth mentioning that until the age of eight I grew up in the village 
Mzizah, born into a farmer’s family with a total of eight siblings. In 1980 (the 
year we fled to the Netherlands), Mzizah consisted of about 150 families; half 
of them Assyrians/Syriacs and the other half Kurds.60 Mzizah was also home 
to two Kurdish aghas who controlled the region under a feudal system of 
government (see further the Chapters 3 and 4). It is therefore not surprising 
that children growing up in Mzizah were well informed about the local 
politics. The situation required that their parents prepared them to develop a 
certain attitude and to behave in a certain way in order to maximize their 
safety; there were certain things which were done and could be said and 
others which could not. These instructions were imbued with discourses 
creating ‘us’ and ‘them’ categories among the local population. 
 I grew up speaking my mother tongue (which we at that time called) 
Surayt and in the present day Suryoyo and sometimes Turoyo. At the same time, 
from my interaction with the Kurdish population in the village, I also learned 
Kurdish (Kurmanji). I gained my first knowledge of the Turkish language 
during the year I attended the Turkish primary school (ilkokul) at the age of 
seven. Besides these languages, I had also begun to learn classical Syriac in 
the choir class. It had become like a second home in which Assyrian/Syriac 
children joined the Syriac classes in church in order to gain access to the 
liturgy. These lessons in the church were considered very important because, 
until 1953 (the year in which the first Turkish primary school was founded in 
Mzizah), this had been the only way for the Assyrian/Syriac villagers to gain 
access to education.61 In practice, only those people who joined the choir 
learned Syriac. This also meant that most of the villagers, among them my 
parents, were illiterate. Nevertheless, at a tender age I somehow already 
sensed that my parents considered education very important. 
                                                 
59 For reasons of confidentiality I shall not discuss these institutions here, as it adds nothing to 
the already broadly discussed topic of discursivity in this study. 
60 At that time in Tur ‘Abdin, Assyrians/Syriacs referred to themselves as Suroye and to the 
Kurds as Taye. Suroye and Taye were at that time used with the meaning of respectively 
‘Christians’ and ‘Muslims’. 
61 See for more about the position of this education in Chapter 3. 
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 In October 1980 my family decided to flee the area after considering the 
latest political changes in the wake of a coup d’état and the consequences for 
the local politics in Mzizah.62  The choice of the Netherlands was based on 
the fact that they knew relatives already living there. My father bought his 
children warm jackets (which I later called ‘Eskimo jackets’) ready to arrive in 
what we expected to be the chilly Hollanda. The city of Enschede in which 
we settled has now become the city with the highest number of 
Assyrians/Syriacs per capita in the Netherlands. During the asylum procedure 
which lasted two years, we were lucky that we could rent a small three-room 
apartment in which we lived with thirteen family members; many other 
community members remained in ‘asylum camps’. 
 Turning to my connection with ‘the community’, I can mention that, 
until I was in my mid-twenties, I grew up in the heart of the community and 
participated in most of the secular and church activities organised. As a 
student I continued my active involvement; first through founding, with 
other Assyrian/Syriac students, the first student organization (Suryoye 
Studenten Vereniging Edessa, SSV Edessa63) in the Netherlands which aimed at 
students from ‘the community’ – as we used to refer to it. It is worth 
mentioning that at that time we chose the emic term Suryoye consciously in 
order to be inclusive of the different ideas about the ‘correct name’ for ‘our 
people’ in Dutch language. Indeed, we created a platform in which students 
could co-operate (independently of their ideas about their people’s name). Its 
main aim was to stimulate the younger generations to pursue higher 
education. After I resigned from the board of SSV Edessa, I did not become 
a formal member of any other Assyrian/Syriac institution. Nevertheless, I 
have had contacts with most of the organizations, although with some more 
than with others; often depending on the individuals on the board in a 
certain period. I could therefore say that my contacts tended to depend on 
an individual basis. 
 The researcher is located in a specific historical and political context. As 
any other Assyrian/Syriac who grew up in a close relationship with her 
‘community members’, I have also been part of this field – and still I am. No 
matter whether I want to be or not; it is unavoidable. Consequently, my 
familiarity with these discourses could indeed have loomed as an obstacle in 
this research. The fact that I have been confronted with the aforementioned 
                                                 
62 See further also Chapter 4. 
63 This student organization published the magazine Infodessa. 
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question about my specific relationship to the study object has prompted me 
reflect on this aspect more than I would otherwise have done (and reflect on 
my assumptions, relationship to the field, about my own stand in relation to 
the researched and so forth). In this respect, Mason (1996: 109) speaks of the 
‘reflexive reading of data’, a role in which the researcher is located as part of 
the data generated, and in which he seeks to explore his role in the process 
of the generation and interpretation of data. Blaikie (2008: 54) refers to this 
position of researcher as that of dialogic facilitator, emphasising the dialogue 
between the researcher and the researched. Considering that this thesis is to 
a great extent built on empirical data which I actively collected in the 
research field, reflexivity has come in at both different levels and throughout the 
research process: from the research question to the final analysis and writing. 
As already assumed above, I follow Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 16) in 
their argumentation of reflexivity which implies that: 
The orientation of researchers will be shaped by their socio-historical 
locations, including the values and interest that these locations confer 
upon them. What this represents is a rejection of the idea that social 
research is, or can be, carried out in some autonomous realm that is 
insulated from the wider society and from the particular biography of the 
researcher, in such a way that its findings can be unaffected by social 
processes and personal characteristics. 
I worked for a relatively long period on collecting, translating and analysing 
my data. This allowed me plenty of time to reflect on my own taken-for-
granted understandings in relation to my data. As Philips and Jørgensen 
(2002) point out, it is important to focus on the study of common-sense 
understandings. Since I grew up within the community, I consciously had to 
question why certain ideas are accepted, naturalized and declared to be true 
and why others are rejected. To mention a few examples of commonly 
taken-for-granted terminologies are ‘my people’, ‘foreigners’ (nukhroye), Seyfo 
and Suryoye. How are these defined and why are they defined as they are? The 
fact that during the last three years I was also physically distanced from the 
field while writing this thesis helped me to reflect from a more ‘distant’ 
perspective. Nevertheless, I remained in contact through Internet, web-TV, 
radio and phone. 
 As an insider of the group, while growing up in one of the cities with 
the highest concentration of people who belong to my research object, I 
have been able to learn about cultural codes or norms and values. This 
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background knowledge has held me in good stead with my contacts in the 
field; it has also functioned as ‘luggage’ for the interpretation of answers in 
interviews. For example, it allowed me to sense intuitively that individuals 
were giving me socially desirable responses, whereupon I decided to interview 
more people in order to reach a more diverse representation of the group 
under study. Answers to questions in which, for instance, I touched on 
sexuality had to be paid particular attention to, because I was aware of 
certain norms and values in relation to this topic among the group under 
study.64 An example of an area in which I very clearly noticed socially desirable 
responses was in the following. Usually I conducted my interviews with 
individuals, without the presence of other people. In two situations the wife 
of the interviewee sat in our presence for short periods during the interview. 
When I asked the question: ‘What is it that you have achieved and are 
happiest about in your life?’ – both persons said that it was the moment they 
met their current wife and started a family life. I was struck by the fact that 
only in these two interviews the wives were present when I asked this 
question and only these two informants mentioned their wives. Moreover, in 
both cases the wives gave a smile of satisfaction in reaction to this answer. 
This demonstrated to me the strong interactive influence of the context of 
research and simultaneously its importance. In this sense, the question is not: 
‘Does my informant speak the truth’ but rather ‘How can I interpret and 
understand what he says’ in relation to the context in which he finds himself? 
 Especially when interviewing the clergy I conscientiously did my best to 
adhere to the socio-cultural norms in order not to offend them. When they 
tried to avoid answering a certain ‘sensitive’ question, I endeavoured to 
change tack in order to learn about their ideas through other questions 
relating to the subject. One method the clergy adopted to avoid answering 
questions or having to state certain facts about social life was to say 
something totally different. I have construed this behaviour as their way of 
developing space for themselves. They did not necessarily think that they 
had to give me subtle answers. This may have something to do with their 
position of authority. With the exception of a few cases, the clergy tended to 
answer my questions in a way quite close to what would have been expected 
to be the answer from someone in the position of clergyman. Moreover, the 
clergy have also been categorized in the groups of Syrianer and Assyrier; some 
                                                 
64 I have not written about this topic in this study and shall therefore write about it in the 
future. 
74                                              CHAPTER 2 
 
directly and others indirectly. The first group is so categorized because they 
express a specific stand and the others because they are organized 
hierarchically under the authority of an archbishop who is again categorized 
into the group of Assyrier or Syrianer. This categorization encompasses certain 
expectations. Not fulfilling them would endanger the clergy’s position for 
any other clergyman. The answers of the clergy should therefore also be read 
against this background of what is expected from them by church 
members.65  
 It is also necessary to reflect on the way my research object has tried to 
understand my position in the field and to classify me into one of the 
‘political groups’ which they identify. This classification was often based on 
where they saw me, what I did and with whom they saw me talking. 
Although I tried to work as an engaged, ‘neutral’ researcher and not to take 
sides, my experiences have shown that this is rather difficult. My personal 
stance in the field is only part of the ‘final relationship’. The other part is 
decided by the people with whom I interact in the discursive field. I shall 
recount a few experiences to illustrate this. In the period of the 
establishment of the TV channel Suroyo TV, people had become used to 
seeing big cameras both at secular events and in the churches. They 
identified these as the cameras of Suroyo TV. Just because I used a relatively 
big photo camera and a camcorder during my fieldwork, I began to be seen 
as someone working for Suroyo TV. In that period, this automatically implied 
that I would also be a member of their political organization, which I was 
not. In fact, I was not a member of any of the active organizations at the 
time of my fieldwork. A denial of this assumption often did not help. Even 
before Suroyo TV was founded, I had been walking around in the field with 
cameras. Interestingly, after its foundation, ‘suddenly’ all ‘people with big 
cameras’ were assumed to be working for Suroyo TV. To be in such a 
position militated against my wish to develop a ‘neutral’ position in the field. 
This put me into unpleasant and sometimes difficult situations. At an 
important cultural event of one of the Assyriska organizations I was not 
allowed to film because of this ascribed relationship to Suroyo TV. To 
mention another example: in the eyes of Assyriska or Syrianska activists, to 
disagree with some of their ideas or to engage with either of them 
immediately caused me to be classified in the group of the ‘others’ and thus 
                                                 
65 This was the case despite the fact I mentioned that their answers would be dealt with 
anonymously. 
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against their ideology. Being reflected upon in this way revealed that my 
position as a researcher was approached from the inside, as a member of the 
in-group who had to be identified among the identifiable sub-groups 
available. 
 
2.5.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
DT does not distinguish between the discursive and the non-discursive. It 
considers all data part of discourse. The problem-driven approach to the 
study of a phenomenon within a particular case study allows space for the 
collection and analysis of a variety of empirical data. What is significant is 
that this takes place in line with the philosophical assumptions of DT, which 
is therefore also referred to as an ‘integrationist’ approach (see further Van 
Leeuwen 2005, Phillips and Jørgensen 2002). Theories which may be based 
on different ontological assumptions should therefore be integrated or 
translated into the theoretical horizon and terminology of DT before they 
can be used in conjunction with DT. 
 I have opted for the method of triangulation (combining different 
methods of data collection and different sorts of data) in order to reach a 
more comprehensive understanding of the social field.  It has been of great 
importance to the interpretation of the data I acquired through the in-depth 
interviews, by contextualizing them in the data I gained from other sources 
in the field. In the position of an engaged researcher in the everyday life or 
‘natural setting’ of my research object, I have experienced how people talk 
about themselves and the ‘others’, how ideas are judged or stimulated, and 
how people create ‘similarities’  and ‘differences’. Consequently, this diversity 
of sources has complemented each other in drawing conclusions from new 
insights. Assumptions or what is ‘unsaid’ in one text may be ‘said’ in a 
different text. A combination of these texts allows a deeper understanding of 
the social. I have made use of the following methods of data-collection: 
• In-depth interviews and informal conversations with 
Assyrian/Syriac elite members in different settings; 
• Participant observations; 
• Study of primary and secondary sources produced by the research 
object and by outsiders: published literature, governmental reports, 
newspapers and magazines, websites and TV and radio programmes. 
76                                              CHAPTER 2 
 
Technology has become part of the discursive field. It is both a medium and 
a product of the social. My digital recorder has been very valuable for 
recording the interviews, with the permission of the interviewees of course. I 
also informed them that they could tell me to switch it off if they did not 
wish certain things to be recorded. This occurred a few times when the 
interviewee said something confidential or politically sensitive about the 
political situation in the Middle East. I also noticed that, when the recorder 
was on, some interviewees did not mention the term agha. Instead, they 
would say for example ‘that oppressor’ (u dolumawo) – assuming that I would 
know whom they meant. This was also the case with the reference to the 
Kurdish guerrilla movement PKK. Some referred to it as ‘those who live 
outside’ or ‘those of the name with the three letters’. Therefore it seems to 
have been helpful that I could switch the recorder off if they thought this 
desirable. 
 In addition to the recorder, I used a camcorder for filming activities 
organized by the group. This material offered a way to look back and to 
capture visual aspects which would otherwise have been lost. This was also 
the case with the photo camera which I used. I noticed that while filming 
and taking pictures I began to see new things which I would have otherwise 
missed, as I was able to take a different focus. Certainly, it has also worked 
partly the other way round; the new focus has certainly resulted in situations 
where I missed other aspects of the social. 
As mentioned in the introduction, I initially conducted the fieldwork 
for this study in three different countries (Sweden, Germany and the 
Netherlands), but with a greater focus on Sweden. In the end, I decided to 
base my chapters on the situation after the emigration principally on the data 
from Sweden. During my several periods of fieldwork, altogether I spent 
about six months in Sweden and two months in Germany. In both cases I 
stayed with members of the group under study. The main periods of the 
fieldwork were between 2004 and 2005. Since I lived in the Netherlands, I 
spent most of my weekends attending activities which the group I studied 
organized during the first year of the research (2003). 
 
Interviews 
The main data source for this study was in-depth semi-structured interviews. 
In these interviews my aim was to touch upon a broad range of aspects in 
relation to identity. Keeping the interviews semi-structured, I have tried to 
allow the interviewee space to elabourate on related elements which I would 
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otherwise have missed. As mentioned above, I have contextualized these 
data with informal conversations, participant observation, primary sources in 
any form (such as folders, magazines and information on websites, TV and 
radio) and secondary sources. As discussed in the introduction of this book, 
within the broader research object of Assyrians/Syriacs in the European 
diaspora, I have specifically focused on the discourses of elite members in 
Sweden. Although most of the fieldwork in Sweden was conducted in the 
province of Stockholm where the biggest concentration of Assyrians/Syriacs 
can be found, I also conducted fieldwork in Gothenburg, Jönköping and 
Örebro. 
 The people who have played a central and leading role in the debate 
about the collective identity of the Assyrians/Syriacs have been different elite 
groups. Therefore the focus of the interviews has been on their discourses. I 
have attempted to illustrate the contingency between the prevailing 
discourses which have come to dominate (to a certain extent) the discourses 
of the ordinary people. At the same time, as I shall discuss further in this 
study, inherent to these elite discourses is that they have been articulated 
within a certain sphere or at a certain level of society. Within the framework 
of this study, elite members are university graduates, clergy, activists (often 
people in key positions in secular and religious organizations) but they can 
also be members of the older generation who exert a certain influence 
among their people from a more traditional perspective. 
 Before I began with a longer period of fieldwork, I initially conducted 
three in-depth interviews with elite members in Sweden and at the same time 
orientated myself in the field. On the basis of these interviews, I worked on 
my interview questions, and decided not to use different semi-structured 
interview questions for the different elite groups (which I had initially 
planned). Comparison between individual discourses would otherwise have 
been more problematic. My first meeting with the interviewees was often in 
a (quiet) café and thereafter in their homes or in the associations they were 
active in. In the selection of my interviewees I aimed at a representative 
sample of the research object. A second aim was to select interviewees in 
order to include a ‘maximum’ of the diversity in discourses to illustrate the 
antagonistic field of study. Moreover, I also tried to capture the most 
dominant discursive discourses. The majority of my interviewees were male 
because positions in Assyrian/Syriac institutions are still strongly dominated 
by men. I have not attempted to ‘manipulate’ the social field in order to 
interview more women for the obvious reason that my starting point was the 
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antagonistic field of discourses as it is. Except for one interviewee, all others 
were born outside Sweden; the youngest was twenty-five and the oldest 
eighty-three66. In total I conducted 123 in-depth interviews, of which 
seventy-one in Sweden, thirty-six in Germany, eight in the Netherlands and 
eight in the Middle East. As mentioned before, I used the interviews with 
respondents outside Sweden only contextually. The duration of each 
interview was between three and twelve hours, with an average of about 
seven hours. For reasons of security and confidentiality, the names I have 
used are fictitious. Only in cases when I mention both the first and the 
second name does it concern the real name of the person. 
 I conducted the interviews predominantly in Suryoyo (the mother tongue 
of both the interviewees and me). In two cases I depended on English and 
Arabic. Later I translated these digitally recorded interviews into English. 
The analysis is based on the English version. I acknowledge that in the 
translation process information which is specific to a certain language may be 
lost to a certain extent. Especially so as Suryoyo uses different metaphors as it 
was developed in a context outside Europe. Therefore I have kept sayings, 
metaphors and certain phrases untranslated in order to analyse them at a 
different level and in order to keep their distinct meaning in the original 
language used.  
 I shall proceed with a discussion of how I tackled the process of 
analysis. During my fieldwork abroad, I spent all my time engaging in the 
field of study and completing my interviews. Although the translation 
process for producing the interview transcripts has been a very tiresome 
chore, I do value its importance for researchers because it is the first stage of 
the analysis, which actually already commences with conducting the 
interview. This meant that in the process of conducting the interviews and 
fieldwork I already started with the first rough analysis of the data. Based on 
this, I decided my next step in the fieldwork. For the further detailed 
analysis, I have made use of the qualitative data analysis programme 
ATLAS.ti. This has enabled me to categorize and analyze the enormous 
quantity of data which I gathered through interviews and the reports which I 
wrote on the basis of participant observations and informal conversations 
and reflections during the fieldwork. In the process of analysis, my first 
decision was to categorize data by more specific themes which I grouped 
into more abstract themes at a later stage. By taking this step, I have 
                                                 
66 The oldest whom I interviewed in Germany was 106 at the time of the interview. 
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attempted to avoid running the risk of excluding data from analysis. This 
thematization has helped me in developing an initial overview of the answers 
of my interviewees and it has helped me in recognizing the differences and 
commonalities between the answers. This categorization has also been useful 
in noticing irregularities and contradictions in an interview; I have used such 
points as interesting cases to be looked into in more detail. Here again I have 
intended to include a diversity of discourses and the most dominant 
discourses. 
 The themes which I identified in the first stage were: 
1. Middle East – What do people say about their position in the Middle 
East? 
2. Emigration – Their stories in relation to emigration. 
3. Name – Which name is perceived as the ‘proper name’ of the people 
and why? 
4. History – What is the role of history in identity discourses and how 
it is used? 
5. ‘Amo (people) or umtho (nation) – Which individuals and groups are 
included in these concepts and why? 
6. Athro (homeland) – Which geographical area is perceived as the athro 
and why? What relation do people have with the athro? 
7. Seyfo – What role does the Seyfo play in the identity discourses today? 
8. Culture – How is ‘culture’ in a broad sense talked about and what 
importance is it given? 
9. Language – What is perceived as their mother tongue, why and what 
role do they give to it? 
10. Host society – What are the discourses from and about it? 
11. Church – How is the church being talked about in a broad sense? 
12. Secular organizations – What role have they gained and how are they 
being talked about? 
13. Norms and values – How are traditionally central norms and values 
talked about in the present-day context?  
14. Future – How is the future talked about in relation to both 
individual and Assyrian/Syriac position? 
 
Furthermore, within these categories I have distinguished many more sub-
categories in order to achieve an analysis at different levels. 
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Participant ‘observations’ 
‘Observations’ have a connotation of distance.  Researchers in the field may 
indeed take different roles or may differ from each other in the distance they 
take in relation to the object of study. I want to stress here that my role has 
been that of an engaged participant for two reasons. Firstly, as a researcher I 
believe strongly in the value of active participation in the field in order to 
come to an understanding of the social from the inside. My starting point is 
that the researcher already becomes an inherent part of the social field of 
study through her presence, quite independently of what she says and does. 
Secondly, as an insider to the field of study, if I were to take a more detached 
position, I would feel my position was rather uncomfortable. Moreover, this 
would perhaps also be perceived as something odd by the social field. In 
addition to this criticism, my position as an insider to the group has enabled 
me to participate intensely as an insider in approaching the social from its 
perspective in order to reach a better understanding of it. The fact that I 
have taken the time to reflect on my observations has even allowed me to dig 
deeper into the discursive field in all its complexity. I can therefore compare 
my position in the field of research with taking part in bungee jumping: well 
prepared with the necessary technology, mental and emotional luggage and 
dress codes, every time I take the leap, I pass through different levels of 
space and, depending on what I experience at that specific moment, each 
time I see other aspects of the world around me. It is merely my position as a 
researcher which pulls me back into the ‘upper world’ in order to reflect in 
more depth on what I have seen ‘down there’. This whole process is always 
emotionally charged and fraught with anxieties which inevitably impinge on 
the future analysis. 
 Hence, in this role of active participant I have attended many activities 
which were relevant to my object of study: festivals, cultural and political 
meetings, soccer games, picnics, demonstrations, seminars, parties and 
religious ceremonies.67 In a few cases I participated actively by presenting, 
for example, a paper at a seminar organized by the group under study or by 
being somehow involved in the organization of an activity. Most of the time 
participation in these events has been open. In one case I was not allowed to 
attend the annual general meeting of a secular organization because the 
board believed it should be open only to its members. I acquiesced even 
                                                 
67 In total I have written forty-nine field reports of my observations: twenty-one related to 
activities in Sweden, eighteen in the Netherlands and ten in Germany. 
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though I did believe that they were in the position to make an exception. I 
accepted their standpoint as part of the antagonistic field of which I had 
become part. In such cases, when I did not manage to attend activities, I 
made sure that I read about them or that I informed myself by phone or in 
writing through people who had attended them. And, as also common in 
grounded theory with which the analysis does not commence after data 
collection but in which data collection and analysis continue while writing 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967), I have kept myself updated through following the 
latest developments in the social field with the available media and 
technology: websites, the Assyrian/Syriac radio programme Radio Qolo on the 
Swedish radio channel, the TV channels Suroyo TV and Suryoyo Sat and the 
TV programme Qolo Hiro. The fact that all these sources have been available 
through the Internet has been helpful. 
 
Primary and secondary sources68 
Primary sources produced by the group I study range from articles to 
folders, websites, paintings, national symbols, architecture, radio and TV 
programmes to even tattoos and so forth. My point of departure for the 
analysis concurs with the standpoint of DT which states that discourse 
includes both the discursive and the non-discursive fields. During my 
presence in the field, I have therefore been aware of the great diversity of 
sources and I have aimed to capture as much of this as possible, recorded on 
film, photo or in writing in the form of field notes. I have made use of 
secondary sources for the contextualization of my analysed data. And in 




To conclude this chapter, it is not superfluous to summarize a few points. In 
the discourse theoretical approach, theory and methodology are closely 
intertwined. The problem formulation, analysis and the methods employed 
in gathering empirical data are mutually inspiring. This is related to the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions of DT. 
                                                 
68 See further the outline in the introduction of this study for the way I have used these 
sources. 
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 DT does not take identities as pre-given and natural objects but it 
focuses on the flexible formation of identities and their institutionalization 
through hegemonic projects. DT’s relational, contextual and processual 
understanding of collective identities overcomes the weaknesses of the 
mainstream theories of identity. This theory analyzes the social as a field of 
antagonisms and all social formation as a matter of antagonistic social 
struggles; it gives essential importance to the role of power relations and 
hegemony in the formation of discursive identities. The concepts of DT are 
interlinked and should be used in relation to each other as I have attempted 
to do so in the following empirical chapters. 
  
 
3 THE POSITION OF ASSYRIANS/SYRIACS IN 
THE ‘HOMELAND’ 
In the next chapter I shall give an account of the emigration of 
Assyrians/Syriacs to Western countries over the last forty years. To put their 
emigration into context, it is imperative to pay attention to their position in 
the countries of origin. In this chapter I shall discuss the position of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs in the ‘homeland’69 – here limited to Turkey for two main 
reasons: the majority of my respondents emigrated from Turkey and the 
geography they were traditionally living in since time immemorial (Tur 
‘Abdin) almost emptied of this group due to the recent modern70 emigration. 
Today, only 2500 Assyrians/Syriacs still continue to live in Tur ‘Abdin and 
Mardin, south-eastern Turkey.71 The group’s position in Iraq and Syria shall 
be discussed briefly in relation to their emigration from these two countries 
in the Chapters 4 and 6. 
 
              Illustration 2: Tur ‘Abdin. Source: Hollerweger (1999). 
 
                                                 
69 In a future publication I shall discuss the different notions of the homeland, which exist 
alongside each other among Assyrians/Syriacs. 
70 Other geographies in Turkey emptied of Assyrians/Syriacs earlier in the twentieth century 
or before the twentieth century. There is no in-depth study of this demographic aspect yet 
available. 
71 See for a recent study about the situation in which Assyrians/Syriacs find themselves in 
South-East Turkey, Oberkampf (2011). 
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 Before commencing, it must be remembered that the Seyfo during the 
First World War had already had the horrendous effect of decimating the 
number of Assyrians/Syriacs72 by two-thirds.73 Seyfo is the Syriac word for 
‘sword’ and a metaphor which encapsulates their killing by ‘Muslims’74 in the 
collective memory of Assyrian/Syriac. In the context of the First World 
War, the term Seyfo refers above all to the orchestrated killings of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs by the Young Turks regime in the Ottoman Empire in the 
period 1914–1918.75 Assyrians/Syriacs perceive the Seyfo to be the latest 
overwhelmingly major incident of persecution in their history. Exemplifying 
the metaphorical strength of the term seyfo – today, the mass emigration 
from the homeland is compared to the effect that this event had on the 
existence of the Assyrians/Syriacs in the homeland. 
 In the new political constellation which evolved in the Turkish Republic 
after the First World War, the Assyrians/Syriacs once again found 
themselves staring at a long period of ordeals. In October 1918, the First 
World War ended in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The Turks started 
to rule the geographical area which is known today as Turkey, while the 
British and the French mandated (among other states) respectively what are 
now Iraq and Syria. The majority of Assyrians/Syriacs who survived the 
Seyfo continued to live in these newly founded nation states. 
 A thorough analysis of the position of Assyrians/Syriacs in Turkey is 
necessary in order to illustrate the relation between their formal position and 
historical processes leading to their marginalization in society. I argue that 
the mass emigration from Turkey is related both to their position in Turkish 
society and to their positive future expectations in Western countries or their 
myth about these countries. Ideas of dis-identification and identification – in 
relation to the place of departure and arrival – are also at stake here. The 
                                                 
72 Here, Assyrians/Syriacs is used across denominational boundaries and refers to the 
members of the different Syriac churches who lived in the Ottoman Empire during the First 
World War. 
73 See for a more detailed analysis of the number of Seyfo victims in Gaunt (2006: 300-303) and 
on the number of the Assyrian/Syriac population (Ibid. 405-432). 
74 Commonly, when they use the category ‘Muslims,’ they generalize their ideas about it 
distilled from their own experiences or the collective memories that passed down to them 
about the Muslim Turks, Kurds and Arabs among whom they have lived. When I use the 
category ‘Muslims’ in this chapter, it is from their perspective. 
75 Other people who have been victims of genocides also use specific terms when referring to 
them. Examples are the terms ha-Shoa for the Jewish holocaust, Aghed for the Armenian 
genocide and Porrajmos for the Roma genocide. 
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function of religion in the Middle East has created the ‘others’ along 
religious boundaries. In other words, the ethnic relations between different 
groups have been based on religious boundaries. Although during some 
periods the role of Islam was downplayed by the top-down state centric 
modernization discourses, such as the Kemalist regime in Turkey and the 
Baath Regimes in Syria and Iraq, religion has remained to be the focal point 
for determining the relations in daily life. At the same time, this mechanism 
functioned as a discursive foundation for their basic orientation towards 
identification with Western countries. Nevertheless, this discursive 
explanation does not suffice in the study of their migration, as I shall 
elabourate on in the next chapter. This chapter functions as background in 
several respects to the chapters to follow in this thesis; it contextualizes: 
 
• their narratives about their emigration and their ideas that their 
settlement in Europe is legitimate; 
• the process of the changes in their identification; both – processes 
of dis-identification and identification. This functions as a filter or a 
foundation for their future orientation. 
 
3.1 The Position of Assyrians/Syriacs in the Turkish 
Republic 
In this section, I shall discuss the formation of the minority policy and the 
subsequent position of Assyrians/Syriacs in the Turkish Republic.76 During 
the Ottoman Empire (after the occupation of Constantinople in 1453), 
minorities were defined within the framework of what has been referred to 
as the millet system, under which non-Muslims were considered subjects of 
the Empire and accorded dhimmi status, but were not subject to the Sharia 
law. Their contractual relationship with the State conferred certain 
obligations on them such as paying specific taxes in return for the right of 
residence. Millet77  is inherently a religious concept. According to this 
concept, all Muslims in the Ottoman Empire were defined as the Millet-i 
Hakime (the Dominant Millet) and all non-Muslims were defined as Millet-i 
                                                 
76 See for an article discussing the history of the different Catholic churches in Turkey after 
the Second World War, Teule (2010: 35-52). 
77 In Turkish ‘nation’, group of co-religionists from Arabic milla(t). 
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Mahkûme (the Dominated Millets) (Oran 2007a, Soykan 2000: 227).78 
Considered second-class subjects, the latter group was organized into 
religious communities (millets). Until 1882 the Syriac Orthodox Church was 
represented at the Sublime Porte of the Ottoman Empire by the Armenian 
Patriarch. In 1882 it became an independent millet – the Süryani Kadim Millet 
(Ancient Suryoye Millet). Under the Turkish Republic the religiously based 
definition of ‘minority’ and ‘majority’ identities has continued to be usedas 
the main classification; members of minority groups are defined as ‘non-
Muslim citizens of Turkey’ and hence as the ‘internal others’.79 
 The period between 1918 (the end of the First World War) and 1923 
(official proclamation of the Turkish Republic, October 29)80  was the 
transitional phase in which a whole series of negotiations was carried out 
between the Entente, Turkey and the different minority groups living in 
Turkey. Struggling to obtain a political foothold in the aftermath of the First 
World War, Assyrian/Syriac leaders negotiated their position and rights. At 
the Paris Peace Conference (1919), representatives of different groups were 
given the chance to submit their requests to the representatives of the Great 
Powers involved in the war. Among them were representatives of 
Assyrians/Syriacs (cross-denominational) who presented several petitions 
with their requests.81 The Syriac Orthodox Patriarch, Ignatios Elias III Shakir 
(1867-1932), deputized a delegation led by Archbishop Ephrem Barsaum82 to 
attend the Paris Peace Conference. In his petition (see Appendix 4), the 
Archbishop presented six requests on behalf of his people whom he 
introduced as ‘…our Syrian83 nation, descendents of the ancient Assyrian 
                                                 
78 In modern Turkish, Mahkûm means the ‘imprisoned, prisoner, inmate, convict’. 
79 For instance, one example of this can be found in the Turkish legislation for ‘protection 
against sabotages’ (Article 5/j) which was passed in 1988 and abrogated in 1991. In this 
Article, non-Muslims are defined as ‘domestic foreigners’ (yerli yabancılar) and consequently as 
a ‘potential threat’.  
80 This period can be extended to 1926 when the Mosul Question between Turkey and Great 
Britain was resolved. 
81 See further De Courtois (2004: 201-223) for a discussion specifically of the Syriac Catholic 
and Syriac Orthodox delegations and their demands. See Yacoub (1993) for the Assyro-
Chaldean delegations specifically. See Aprim (2006) for a discussion of the above-mentioned 
delegations.  
82 The successor of Patriarch Elias III. 
83 Here, ‘Syrian’ is used as the translation of Suryoye; it does not refer to the modern Syrian 
nation of Syria. In the same petition, he uses the compound designation ‘Assyro-Chaldean’ to 
refer to the people whom he represents. The latter designation was also used in the petition of 
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race.’ Among his arguments, he put a case for their autonomy84 in Turkey, 
asked recognition of the losses suffered by Assyrians/Syriacs in a broad 
sense and requested compensation. Under the prevailing circumstances, it is 
feasible to link the request for autonomy to a feeling of no longer being safe 
under Muslim rule.85 The dislocation which occured in the context of the 
First World War, more specifically by the appalling aftermath of the 
genocide, caused a split subject among Assyrians/Syriacs. Their search for 
autonomy can be interpreted as a way to heal this split subject and as a 
glimmer of hope for his people to be able to pick up the thread of their lives 
again.  
 The requests of the Syriac Orthodox church leadership were made only 
a few years after two-thirds of their population in the Ottoman Empire had 
been massacred but none was met. Reflecting on the process of the 
negotiations years later, Archbishop Ephrem Barsaum (1996)86 expressed his 
disappointment in the way Western Powers had dealt with his requests: 87 
There [the Paris Peace Conference, my addition] I revealed all the 
catastrophes which had befallen my people. I explained all the suppression 
and the grisliness in detail. Even though I particularly emphasized how 
our casualties were both bloodthirstily massacred and perished from 
hunger and cold during the war, when I saw that not one of the 
                                                                                                               
the Assyro-Chaldean delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, which encompassed 
all the different Syriac churches (see further De Courtois 2004: 217-223). 
84 The requested autonomous area is shown on the map Carte Ethnographique et Politique de la 
Nation Assyro-Chadéenne (see Appendix 5). The geography stretched from Urmia (in the east), 
Tikrit (in the south), Bitlis (in the north) to Adıyaman (in the west). See for further attempts to 
negotiate the rights of Assyrians/Syriacs with Western countries, the letter (February 16, 1921) 
from the Syriac Orthodox Patriarch, Ignatios Elias III, addressed to the British Foreign 
Minister, Marquis Curzon of Kedleston (Appendix 6). 
85 At the time of writing (2009), for the same reason as that which prevailed in the aftermath 
of the First World War several groups among Assyrians/Syriacs are lobbying for an 
autonomous area in Iraq. They consider that the Iraqi authorities cannot provide them with 
the essential protection which will safeguard them against attacks occasioned by their 
adherence to Christianity and for having a different identification to the majority groups. They 
have become the victims of the competition for political hegemony between the dominant 
groups followed by a subsequent policy of assimilation, which can be observed both in the 
Arab-dominated area of Iraq and in the Kurdish autonomous area in the north of Iraq. See for 
further reading the latest report by Human Rights Watch about Iraq (2009). 
86 In this publication, the name of the author is spelled ‘Mar Iğnatiyos I. Afrem Bet-
Barşawmo’. 
87 My translation from the Turkish translation of the original in Syriac. 
88                                              CHAPTER 3 
 
Conference participants shed a tear and felt no compassion for us, I felt as 
if I had delivered my speech to statues carved from stone. 
At this point, it is important to touch, albeit briefly, on how the Syriac 
Orthodox Church leadership, more specifically Patriarch Elias III, changed 
their standpoint in the negotiations in the period between the Paris Peace 
Conference (1919) and the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923), in the hope 
that this diversion might provide some answers to the question of why the 
Syriac Orthodox community has not been recognized as a non-Muslim 
minority group in the Turkish Republic. As mentioned above, at the Paris 
Peace Conference Archbishop Ephrem Barsaum presented a list of requests 
on behalf of Patriarch Elias III, among which autonomy for his people was 
very important. Three years later, in the period of the Lausanne Peace 
Conference (1922-1923) when Turkish minority policy was being shaped, the 
Patriarch no longer talked about these earlier requests and adopted a more 
explicitly pro-Turkish stand. 
 Patriarch Elias III assumed the throne in 1917. In 1908,88 he had been 
consecrated Archbishop in Diyarbakır,89 taking the name Mor Iwanasius, and 
he continued to serve there until his appointment as Archbishop in Mosul 
(1912-1917) (Zakaria Shakir90 1972).91 As the Patriarch responsible for his 
community, he found himself in a difficult political situation, in which a 
whole series of negotiations about the future of Turkey, its geographical 
borders and the status of minorities was taking place between different 
powers. Although the base of the Patriarchal See was in the Zafaran92 
Monastery in Mardin, the Patriarch had lived in Istanbul for more than three 
                                                 
88 Syriac Orthodox Resources: http://sor.cua.edu/Personage/PElias3/ 
89 In Diyarbakır, Naum Faik was the Diocesan Secretary and he taught Patriarch Elias Turkish 
language classes when he served there as Archbishop. Zakaria Shakir (1972) says that the 
Archbishop and Naum Faik had talks about religious and secular matters, about national 
identity and identification. According to him, Archbishop Elias thought that clergymen ought 
to deal with religious matters and that laymen should confine themselves to secular issues, 
which concurred with the ideas of Patriarch ‘Abded-Aloho II Sattuf (1833-1915), who had 
visited Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1913 to submit a request for the establishment of local lay 
councils in accordance with the law which had been passed to allow all Christians in the 
Ottoman Empire this right. 
90 Zakaria Shakir is the nephew of Patriarch Elias (son of his brother Yausef). 
91 The interview which Abrohom Nuro conducted with Zakaria Shakir in Arabic in Lebanon 
in 1972 was translated for me into English by Salim Abraham. 
92 Earlier Syriac names of this monastery were Dayro d-Kurkmo and Dayro d-Mor Hananyo. 
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years,93 presumably feeling he could use his influence in the political arena 
more effectively there. He was in contact with both Western diplomats 
(especially with the British and French) and with Turkish political elites 
(Zakaria Shakir 1972). 
 On September 26 1919, Patriarch Elias III had an audience with the 
Ottoman Sultan, Muhammad Rashid, in Istanbul in order to receive an 
official firman (decree) confirming his appointment as Patriarch.94 This 
audience with the Sultan draws attention to the fact that just one year after 
the First World War ended, the Patriarch submitted a long list of requests to 
the Sultan and that these were discussed by the Cabinet (Meclis-i Vükelâ) on 
22 November 1919 (Oral 2007, Hür 2007).95 Among these requests were that 
those people who had been deported during the Seyfo should be allowed back 
to their homes and have their property restituted and that kidnapped 
children and women and all those who had been forcibly converted to Islam 
should be allowed to return to their own religion.  
 Although the Patriarch also made these and other requests at the Paris 
Peace Conference (as mentioned above), throughout his career he had 
punctiliously demonstrated his loyalty96 to the Ottoman authorities and later 
to the Turkish authorities.97 Several sources98 indicate that after the war, the 
Patriarch told his community members to obey Turkish policy and rule and 
                                                 
93 Zakaria Shakir (1972) mentions that he remained in Istanbul for three and a half years. The 
Patriarch mentioned 3 years in the interview Süryani Kadim Patrikíne göre Anadolu. In Ikdam 
9076, 23 June 1922, p. 1. 
94 During this audience, Sultan Muhammad Rashid conferred the Ismania Medal on Patriarch 
Elias III. See further McCallum (2010) for a study about the Christian Leadership in the 
Middle East. 
95 See for the official decision about the Patriarch’s requests, Başbakanlik Osmanlı Arşivi 
Meclis-i Vükelâ Mazbataları (217), No. 553, 22 November 1919. 
96 This reveals that even during the dreadful year (1915) of the Seyfo, Archbishop Elias had 
been contacted by the Ottoman authorities who had requested him to use his influence to 
stop the ‘revolts’ by his community members in Midyad, Cizre and Diyarbakır (Kurtcephe 
1993). In this context, ‘revolts’ should be understood as attempts to defend themselves against 
those who attacked them. It is not known how the Archbishop reacted to this request. 
97 Outsiders have criticized him for this strong loyalty to the Turkish state. For example, Israel 
Audo (2004) refers to his attitude in terms of 'voluntary slavery' (see further Kurt 2010a, 
2010b). See for this sort of criticism also Holmes (1923) who was the principal of the 
American Orphanage for Armenian children in Urfa at the time of the Patriarch’s visit to Urfa 
in 1919. 
98 See for the directive of the Patriarch to the Adana congregation: Süryani Kadim Patriki’nin Bir 
Tebliği. In Ikdam, 8921, 15 January 1922, p. 3. See for the Patriarch’s decree to the Urhoy 
congregation in Akyüz (2005: 445) Zakaria Shakir (1972). 
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to refrain from any co-operation with the Armenians. During his visit to 
Urfa in 1919, he was criticized by some community members on account of 
his plan to visit the Turkish governor first and only after that the British 
governor. According to Abrohom Nuro (who is originally from Urfa) and 
confirmed by Zakaria Shakir (1972), the Patriarch reacted to this criticism 
with the comment: ‘My Son, let me do my job. I know what I am doing. The 
English are guests, whereas the Turks are here to stay.’  Especially after he 
had realized that the Western countries were not going to display much 
interest in Assyrians/Syriacs did he lean more towards the Turkish side and 
subsequently expressed his loyalty more explicitly to the members of the 
Turkish elite whom he met (among them Rauf Bey, İsmet İnönü and Fevzi 
Çakmak), as his secretary Zakaria Shakir (1972) confirms: 
…So when the Patriarch visits Turkish statesmen for the first time …he 
speaks about and explicates his Turkish policy… “We, the Syriac 
denomination, are loyal to the administration to which we are 
subject.”…“We don’t have any links with Western nations.”…He [the 
Patriarch] repeats this formula [to everyone he visits]. Rauf Bey [Prime 
Minister] thought it an overstatement. 
The Patriarch’s careful political approach was firmly rooted in a survival 
strategy and should be understood in the context of his own time. An 
excerpt from the interview of Abrohom Nuro with the Patriarch’s secretary, 
Zakaria Shakir (1972), clearly reveals that the Patriarch’s intention was to 
deal with issues within the accepted political boundaries of the Ottoman and 
Turkish rulers. At the same time, as their supreme leader responsible for his 
people, he negotiated political matters with Assyrian/Syriac lay elites: 
 
Nuro: At the time, Naum Faik expressed his preparedness to serve the cause 
of the Assyrian Movement. Did Patriarch Elias not implicitly object to 
the idea? What is your honest opinion about this? 
Shakir: During his time in Diyarbakır, Naum Faik performed a national 
service by forming a nationalist association. 
Nuro: The ‘Irutho [Renaissance] Association, perhaps! 
Shakir: The Association of Awareness. 
Nuro:   [Correcting him] Renaissance. 
Shakir:  Patriarch Elias did not oppose them [Naum Faik and his friends]. 
Indeed, he supported them. But he warned them: "Keep out of 
movements which trespass on Ottoman sensitivities, matters such as 
composing music... Movements like those which imitate the 
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Armenians, who demand independence." …He told them, "My Sons, 
we have not yet reached… the point in politics the Armenians have. 
Be careful." …"Be careful of movements which impinge on the 
sensitivities of the Turkish State." …"I see the Turkish State through 
the officials with whom I am in contact. They regard the Armenians 
with extremely caution and through a finely focused microscope." 
…"So, do not bring this tight scrutiny to bear on us," …"Let us 
[proceed] step by step..." …"You delight me when you raise 
awareness of the denomination and when you make progress," 
…"and are aware that you are a millet [people]," …"and to know that 
you have an entity and that you have a nation" ..."and you have an 
ancient history which you have to reinvigorate. Do your best, but the 
movements with which the State works are still those of the old 
tradition; the denominations haven't yet turned to music, therefore if 
you were to use music [this is as if you are imitating the Armenians] 
because the Armenian political party the Tashnaq99 [Party], has been 
the first [to use music]." …When the Armenians came, they 
composed music… This was before the war, 1910 and 1912. …He 
[the Patriarch] was pleased with them [Naum Faik and his friends]. 
And... 
Nuro:  Yet he used to give them fatherly advice. Yea, as a father; that is, a 
father who knows his duties and commitments. 
Shakir: [Interrupting to begin a new subject] Yea! There was both friction and 
a dialogue between him and Naum Faik. 
 
In this context, it is also important to mention that as a young monk 
Patriarch Elias had already been witness to the massacres of the Christians in 
the period 1894-1896, during the rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. Hence, he 
had already experienced the terrors a ruler could unleash on his subjects. 
Against this background, it is perhaps easier to understand the Patriarch’s 
attempts to negotiate between different powers and to meet – what he 
experienced as – the most urgent need of his community, namely, to save 
their lives. In the interview with Abrohom Nuro, Zakaria Shakir (1972) 
mentions that the Patriarch used to say:  
"We have to safeguard [the lives of] the living because the dead are not 
going to come back [to life]."…"We want to ensure that the swords are at 
rest." This was the term he used. 
                                                 
99 Founded in Tbilisi (Georgia) in 1890. 
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Consonant with his careful and obedient attitude, Patriarch Elias III 
maintained good relations with Turkish political elites. His secretary Zakaria 
Shakir (1972) says that he had three meetings100 in Ankara with Mustafa 
Kemal. On 9 February 1923 – prior to his meeting with Mustafa Kemal – 
Patriarch Elias III was interviewed by Celal Nuri, the owner of the 
newspaper İleri and an MP who was very close to Mustafa Kemal. In this 
interview, the Patriarch made a statement about his stand on the future 
position of Assyrians/Syriacs in the Turkish Republic: 101 
So far, the issue of minority rights has entered neither the minds nor the 
dreams of the community I represent. We shall protest this very 
vigorously. I, on behalf of my community, did not make any such demand, 
nor do I make it now, nor shall I in the future. Süryaniler are the minority 
of the people who live within the boundaries of the Misak-i Milli [National 
Oath]. They merely wish to live together with the majority [Turks] in good 
times and in bad and to enjoy the benefits of this... 
It is remarkable that the Patriarch had already said so much in the interview 
before he met Kemal. His expression of loyalty says something about the 
insecurity and fear which he felt; his cupboard was bare, he had absolutely 
nothing with which to negotiate the future of his people with Mustafa 
Kemal. The first time the Patriarch met Mustafa Kemal (20 February 1923) 
was at Ankara railway station where Kemal was being received by different 
people.102 A second meeting took place on 3 March 1923 (Oral 2007: 288) 
when, according to Zakaria Shakir (1972), Ismet Inönü (Minister of Foreign 
Affairs) also attended to the meeting. During this meeting the Patriarch 
informed Mustafa Kemal (Zakaria Shakir 1972): ‘I have people in Mardin, 
Diyarbakır and the other regions of Turkey.’ Subsequently, Mustafa Kemal 
                                                 
100 An article detailing the Patriarch’s gratitude for the reception he had received appeared in 
the newspaper: Süryani Patriki’nin Şükranı. In Ikdam, 9332, 9 March 1923: 1. 
101 Ileri, 9 February 1923. In some sources, the name of the newspaper is said to be Yenigün. 
This interview was re-published in a press release sent by the President of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church Board in Istanbul, Ferit Özcan, to the Turkish daily newspaper Milliyet (19 
November 1977) in reaction to a previously published secret US document about Turkey 
during the Independence War period. See for similar statements of Patriarch Elias III in 
Turkish newspapers: Süryani-yi Kadim ve Türkiye Patriki Ilyas Efendi Ankara’da. In Ikdam 9299, 4 
February 1923: 2; See Süryani Patriki’nin Beyanatı. In Akşam, 1572, 6 February 1923: 1. See also 
Süryani Kadim Patriki tarafindan Süryani cemaatinin sadakatini teýiden arz ve iblağ ediliyor. In Ikdam, 
9422, 10 June 1923: 2. 
102 A picture of this event still hangs in one of the public rooms in which guests of the 
Zafaran Monastery (Mardin) are received. 
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replied: ‘I congratulate you on this policy of yours’. …‘I put at your disposal 
…excellent means of transportation from Beirut… from here to Beirut and 
from Beirut to Aleppo.’  Zakaria Shakir says that a final meeting between the 
Patriarch (whom he had accompanied) and Mustafa Kemal was held in order 
to say farewell and ‘to be punctiliously and painstakingly provided with due 
orders to take to Mardin, ...as the professional and respected leader of a millet 
in Turkey.’103 Zakaria Shakir also mentions that in the same meeting the 
Patriarch was told by a representative of Mardin ‘...you have gained the trust 
of young and old in Ankara.’ The yearbook of Mardin (Mardin İl Yıllığı 1967: 
87 in Dolapönü [Dolabani] 1972: 102) mentions the approving words 
Mustafa Kemal had to say about Patriarch Elias:  
During the Independence War, as a true son of this country, the Süryani 
Patriarch Ilyas III, has shown that he is one of its heroes by having taken a 
combatant stand against the aggressors.  
With the exception of not requesting to be recognized as a non-Muslim 
community, what the Patriarch did or promised to be rewarded with so 
much trust by the Turkish political elites in Ankara and to be referred to as 
one of the heroes of the Independence War is no longer known. To what 
extent the attitude and policy of the Syriac Orthodox Church leadership 
effected the non-recognition of Assyrians/Syriacs in the Treaty of Lausanne 
is discussible. Even before the Patriarch gave an interview to Ileri and had 
met Mustafa Kemal, the minority question had been abandoned by the 
Western powers. An analysis of the documents of the Lausanne Conference 
clearly indicates that Western powers did not expend much time and effort 
on the ‘Assyro-Chaldean Question’ and certainly did not prioritize the 
topic.104 Therefore, to construct any formulation of the outcomes of the 
Treaty of Lausanne as these touched upon minorities, it is important to 
stress both the hats-off role of the Western powers in relation to Turkey and 
the rigid policy of the Turkish Republic in the wake of the success of the 
                                                 
103 There is no record of what orders Mustafa Kemal had given to the Patriarch. 
104 To exemplify this, prior to the Minorities Sub-commission meeting on 9 January 1923, the 
Western delegates came to an agreement with the Turkish delegation (led by İsmet İnönü) 
which specified that the minority requests would not be acceded. In order to convince 
outsiders that the Western delegates had indeed expended some energy in this matter, they 
agreed that they would deliver short speeches on the subject of homes for the Armenians, 
Assyrians and Chaldeans, and that the matter would be closed if Ismet Pasha peremptorily 
rejected these demands (Lozan Telgrafları, V. I, pp. 360-361). 
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Turkish Independence War. In view of the strong position the Turkish State 
could assume at the Lausanne Peace Conference, it requires no great stretch 
of the imagination to see how the Turkish delegation managed to prevent the 
participation of the delegations from minority groups.105 In the discussion of 
the position it took in the ‘Assyro-Chaldean Question’, the Turkish 
delegation was very assured. When this matter was tabled by Western 
diplomats, the head of the Turkish delegation, İsmet İnönü, stated that 
Chaldeans, particularly the Assyrians in Diyarbakır, had no truck with 
external provocations and lived peaceably side by side with Turkish citizens 
(Meray 1993: 347). And thus, under these circumstances, they had no need to 
be recognized as a minority. During the meeting of the Minority Sub-
commission on 6 January 1923, Rıza Nur Bey (member of the Turkish 
delegation) reacted vehemently to the submissions106 which Western 
diplomats made on behalf of ‘Assyro-Chaldeans’ and walked out of the 
meeting (Meray 1993: 183-347). 
 The eventual upshot of the post-First World War negotiations was that, 
as a group of people, the Assyrians/Syriacs were no longer protected by any 
treaty. In contrast to the position they had enjoyed in the preceding era 
before the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the Assyrians/Syriacs had 
now lost their formal status as a self-contained community (millet). Evidence 
of the weakened position of the Assyrians/Syriacs in the Turkish Republic is 
also to be found in modern, twentieth-century literature about Turkey. They 
are hardly mentioned and, if so, only marginally.107 
                                                 
105 Agha Petros (as representative of the Assyrian delegation) participated in the opening 
ceremony of the Lausanne Peace Conference in November 1922 (Nirari 1989: 191). 
106 These requests were discussed in conjunction with the quest for an ‘Armenian homeland’ 
undertaken by the same Western delegations. 
107 One example is Zürcher (2003), who mentions the Assyrians/Syriacs only in the context 
that after the First World War they were among the half-dozen linguistically smaller groups. 
He refers to them as ‘Syriac-speaking Christians’ (Ibid. 172). When he mentions the ‘delegates 
representing the different ethnic groups in the Near East: Greeks, Armenians, Turks, Kurds, 
Arabs and Jews, all pressing their conflicting claims’ (Ibid. 151), he fails to mention that the 
Assyrians/Syriacs were also represented at the Peace Conference in Paris. Moreover, when he 
mentions the figures of the victims of the First World War, he says nothing about the 
Assyrian/Syriac victims, but only the ‘Anatolian Muslims, the Armenians and the Greeks’ 
(Ibid. 171). Lewis (1994: 19) also fails to mention that their Aramaic dialect survived linguistic 
assimilation into Turkish. He restricts himself to the Greek- and Armenian-speaking 
Christians and Spanish (Ladino)-speaking Jews. These are only a few examples in the modern 
literature which provide indirect evidence that the position of the Assyrians/Syriacs has 
become negligible in the Middle East. It is only possible to learn more about them if 
something is written about them specifically as a group. 
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 The ‘official’ Turkish minority policy was outlined in the Lausanne 
Treaty (24 July 1923), where it was agreed that non-Muslims would be 
allowed to enjoy certain rights. Later, in 1932, Turkey inserted a clause which 
narrowed the definition of non-Muslim minorities to the Armenians, Greeks 
and the Jews only.108 The new clause made it officially possible for only the 
recognized non-Muslim minorities to establish their own schools, social 
organizations and magazines, which meant that the Assyrians/Syriacs were 
denied any access to these rights (Oran 2007b: 38-9).109 It is important to 
mention that even the recognized minorities did not fully enjoy the rights 
agreed on in the Treaty of Lausanne. Their ‘minority’ label gave them a 
status which was both feared and undesired as its automatic consequence 
was that its members were treated as second-class citizens by the rest of 
society, non-Muslims found themselves the victims of legal and social 
discrimination (Oran 2004: 48-49). Also Kurban and Hatemi (2009: 7) are 
critical of the extent to which minorities have been able to live by these 
rights: 
Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1926, the rights arising from the 
Treaty of Lausanne were pruned off with various exceptions, restrictions 
and conditions imposed through a series of laws, acts and practices. 
Finally, it became almost impossible in practice to benefit from most of 
these rights… In the 1930s, it became evident that pushing or directly 
forcing the few non-Muslims left in Turkey to abandon the country was 
an explicit state policy. The aim of the several discriminatory laws and 
practices, including the 1934 Western Thrace Incidents to the 1942 Wealth 
Tax, the 6-7 September 1955 Incidents and the 1964 extradition of Greeks 
with Greek passports, was to clear the country of non-Muslims. 
                                                 
108 See for further reading about this limitation also Cengiz (2003). 
109 An example which shows how difficult it had become for the Syriac Orthodox Church to 
educate its members in the liturgy and the Syriac language which will give access to it dates 
from 19 October 1949. Archbishop Dolabani applied to the Turkish authorities (via the 
Governor of Mardin) to obtain permission to start a Bible course in the Zafaran Monastery. 
The correspondence between the Archbishop and the Turkish authorities illustrates the 
almost insurmountable difficulties which Dolabani encountered when he made this 
application and how he eventually had had to give up because he failed to make any progress. 
This correspondence underlines the fact that the Turkish Ministry of Education set the 
condition that a compulsory Turkish language class, a history class and a geography class be 
included in the curriculum of the Syriac Bible course. See further for this correspondence, 
Akyüz (2005: 450-453). 
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As the authors indicate, the main logic of the Turkish minority policy was 
based on the exclusion and direct or indirect expulsion of non-Muslim 
populations from Turkey. The Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 on the 
ruins of the Ottoman Empire, at which point it shifted from being a multi-
ethnic empire to being a nation-state in which the ‘Muslim Turkish’ identity 
began to function as its core. The Turkish nation-building project was 
founded on assimilationist politics devised eventually to form a 
homogeneous population from a heterogeneous demography. As in the pre-
Republic period, the mentality, as Baskin Oran (2007c) points out, has 
remained unchanged110: non-Muslims have continued to be seen as ‘second-
class’ citizens and, adding insult to injury, have been charged in a negative 
discourse with being the ‘tools of foreigners’. 
 To return to the Assyrians/Syriacs, as they feared stigmatization and had 
lost hope of being able to effect any real change in their status, the 
representatives of the Assyrians/Syriacs never lodged any appeal against their 
status in the decades which followed the Seyfo. Therefore they were left with 
little hope of being granted any formal status at a later date.111 Their strategy 
has necessarily been to develop tactics to accommodate to their new position 
in Turkish society, hence it was characterized by obedience to a succession 
of Turkish governments. Characteristic for the discourses of loyalty of 
clergymen to the governments under which they live has been the 
depoliticization of their community. The present Patriarch of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church, Zakka I Iwas, expressed such a discourse of obedience 
when he spoke to his community members in the Zafaran Monastery 
(Mardin) in 2004:112 ‘In order to be a true believer in God, in the first place a 
believer should be a good citizen. If a believer is not loyal to his country then 
it is not possible to be a true believer in God’ (Quoted from Akyüz 2005: 
                                                 
110 See further for the ideological and organic continuity of the Turkish political elite in the era 
1908-1950, Zürcher (1984). See also Zürcher (2010) for further elaboration on his earlier 
study. 
111 On 30 March 1995, representatives of the Mor Gabriel Monastery in Tur ‘Abdin and the 
Syriac Orthodox Bishopric in Istanbul requested the then incumbent Turkish President S. 
Demirel and Prime Minister T. Ciller to recognize Assyrians/Syriacs as a non-Muslim 
minority and to grant them the rights inherent in this status. A respondent who was involved 
in writing this application informed me that they never received an answer to this request. 
Assyrian/Syriac activists in the diaspora have also run up against this wall of silence from 
Turkey in response to their requests, an indication that their requests have not been taken 
seriously. 
112 Patriarch Zakka I Iwas was officially invited by the governor of Mardin to attend the 
meeting ‘Kültürler Arası Diyalog Platformu’ which was held in Mardin (13 May 2004). 
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457). The Patriarch’s correlation between a ‘believer’ and a ‘loyal citizen’ 
provides a cogent illustration of how the clergy in particular have made use 
of loyalty discourses based on religious arguments to encourage the members 
of their community to become loyal and obedient citizens, a role which will 
ensure that they will be tolerated in the countries in the Middle East in which 
they live. This religious discourse shows no deviation from the tradition of 
Assyrian/Syriac clergymen which has been to convince the faithful to accept 
any hardship and persecution which happens to have to be endured in 
society. This strong discourse of ‘loyalty’ explains the fear they have 
experienced and should be seen in the light of a survival strategy.113 
 
3.1.1 The Removal of the Patriarchate from Turkey 
Despite the Patriarch’s policy of loyalty and obedience as an instrument for 
safeguarding the life of his community in Turkey, his purpose has failed. 
Most of the Assyrians/Syriacs have been forced to settle outside Turkey and 
the Patriarchate has also moved outside the borders of Turkey. The fact that 
the Syriac Orthodox community was not recognized as a non-Muslim 
community in the Treaty of Lausanne was the crucial step in clearing the 
path for the removal of the Patriarchate. If this is to be contextualized in 
more detail, the post-Lausanne developments have to be examined. 
Relations of the community with the Turkish State worsened after what was 
known as the ‘Nestorian revolt’ in the Hakkari Mountains in 1924 and again 
one year later after it emerged that some members of the Assyrian/Syriac 
community had supported the Sheikh Said Revolt114 in 1925. The Kemalist 
regime made use of these revolts to eliminate all oppositional power, even to 
weed out potential threats to the regime in good time. To support the 
effectuation of this policy, Independence Tribunals (İstiklal Mahkemeleri) were 
used.115 After the failure of the Sheikh Said Revolt, the State launched a 
comprehensive elimination and disarmament programme in 1926116 whose 
purpose was to achieve stability within the Misak-i Milli borders. Many 
people were arrested and brought for trial before these Independence 
                                                 
113 To give an example, many books written by Syriac Orthodox clergymen in Turkey have a 
frontispiece showing a picture of Mustafa Kemal. 
114 See for an early source, Sykes (1924: 473-74). 
115 See further about the Independence Tribunals, Zürcher (2003: 179-180). 
116 In June 15 1926 there was a suicide assassination attempt against Mustafa Kemal in Izmir. 
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Tribunals. A letter in the Secret Archive of the Vatican117 supplies the 
information that 150 Assyrians/Syriacs (both Syriac Orthodox and Syriac 
Catholics) were deported from Midyad, ‘Iwardo, Anhel, Mzizah and Midin. 
Another hundred persons were deported from Hazakh. The lawyer Malak 
Barsaumo (a member of the family Hanne Safar in Midyad) was hanged in 
Elazığ in 1926 (Beth Sawoce 2009: 259-270). 
 Oral (2007: 294-5) explains the removal of the Syriac Orthodox 
Patriarchate in the context of the Kemalist secularization policy which was 
adopted in 1923 and is indeed a central element in developing an 
understanding of the conditions in that period. For instance, in his speech of 
May 1924 Mustafa Kemal said that religious institutions constituted a 
discrepancy within a state which functioned on the basis of a single 
jurisprudence. 118 He declared in no uncertain terms that: ‘The Orthodox and 
Armenian churches and Jewish synagogues which are based in Turkey should 
have been abolished together with the Caliphate’. 
 In the political context of the mid-1920s, Patriarch Elias III ‘escaped’ 
(used in source) Turkey in late 1925.119 Oral and written sources indicate that 
his flight was the outcome of State policy. Despite its averred loyalty, the 
Kemalist regime perceived the Syriac Orthodox church leadership as a 
potential threat, which had to be eliminated. In 1924, an official decree 
issued by the authorities deprived Patriarch Elias III of his right to use his 
official title in his communications with the authorities (Srayel [Israel Audo] 
2004 in Beth Sawoce and BarAbraham 2009). An oral account given by 
Chorbishop Gabriel Aydin (Bar Yawno), who was a pupil at the Zafaran 
Monastery (Mardin) when the Patriarch received the message to leave 
Turkey, says: 120 
                                                 
117  Secret Archive of the Vatican (Archivi Nunziature Partigi). Busta 392. See also Luke 
(1925: 113) who mentions that the Patriarch was expelled (Spring 1924) from the Zafaran 
Monastery. 
118 Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri. Volume III, Ankara, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1997, pp 
102-103. 
119 Secret Archive of the Vatican (Archivi Nunziature Parigi). Busta 392. Letter from Hazakh, 
4 January 1926. 
120 My translation of the original in Turkish (Beth Sawoce and BarAbraham 2009). This oral 
account is problematic because Chorbishop Gabriel was born is 1926. According to other 
sources which I mention, the Patriarch left Turkey at the end of 1925. Therefore, either 
Chorbishop Gabriel’s date of birth is incorrect or he might have heard this quotation from 
others at a later period after he had commenced his studies in the Monastery. At the time of 
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…one day the governor121 of Mardin came to the Monastery to deliver a 
telegram from Atatürk [Mustafa Kemal] which had been sent to him [the 
governor]. The telegram read: “The clerical leader in the black cassock [the 
Patriarch] should leave Turkey immediately and should never ever return!” 
Following this decree, Patriarch Elias III left Turkey and, with the removal 
of his physical presence, the Syriac Orthodox Patriarchate moved too.122 The 
Patriarch travelled to Jerusalem123 where he lived for three years (Zakaria 
Shakir 1972). On February 16 1931124, he journeyed on to his church 
community in India, where he died in 1932. By an official directive125 (July 
7th 1931), Patriarch Elias III was deprived of his Turkish citizenship on the 
grounds that he had acquired Iraqi citizenship without seeking permission 
from the Turkish authorities and that, as a consequence,  he no longer had 
any relations with Turkey. In 1933, the official Patriarchal See of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church was established in Homs and since 1959 it has been based 
in Damascus.126 
 After the Patriarchate was removed from Turkey, the Turkish 
authorities prohibited Patriarch Ephrem Barsaum to re-enter Turkey because 
in the post-war negotiations he had argued the case for the rights of 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Turkey. A governmental decree (7 June 1937), which 
                                                                                                               
writing, the Chorbishop Gabriel’s frail health prevented him from talking about this matter so 
it was impossible to discuss it with him personally. 
121 Other oral information which is commonly heard among Assyrians/Syriacs says that the 
governor of Mardin, Abdülfattah Baykurt Bey (1923-1925), had a very good relationship with 
the Patriarch and therefore informed the Patriarch that it would be better for him to leave the 
country if he were not to forfeit his life. If he did not take this advice and leave, when the 
governor received the telegram from Ankara it would be too late to save his life. It is said that 
when he heard this news, the Patriarch decided to flee the country. 
122 It draws attention to the fact that Dolapönü [Dolabani] (1972: 165) mentions the necessity 
for Patriarch Elias III to leave the country in more general terms, namely: that, after the death 
of Patriarch Elias III in India, it was absolutely necessary that the Patriarchate be moved to 
Homs in Syria during the Patriarchate of Ephrem Barsaum in 1933. And that later, during the 
reign of Patriarch Yacob III, it was moved temporarily to Damascus in 1960 (1959). To 
believe that this was a temporary decision assumes the hope that it will return to the Zafaran 
Monastery in Mardin. 
123 Dolabani (1972) mentions that he travelled (first) to Aleppo to consecrate a church. 
124 Zakaria Shakir (1972) mentions that they went at the end of 1930 to India. 
125 This document was signed by the President of Turkey (Mustafa Kemal), Prime Minister 
Ismet Inönü and other cabinet members. See for this document: T.C. Devlet Arşivleri Genel 
Müdürlüğü, BCA- Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Başvekalet, 036/16/01/02, 17-1-18. 
126 Patriarch Elias’ initial attempt to establish the Patriarchate in Mosul was prohibited by 
King Faisal. 
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was signed by Mustafa Kemal, Ismet Inönü and other cabinet members, 
banned the bringing into Turkey of publications by Patriarch Ephrem 
Barsaum (Süryani kadim patriği Efrim) ‘because of their dangerous content’.127 
 
3.1.2 The Era of Turkification and Eradication of Non-
Muslim Minorities  
Following the extermination of Armenians and Assyrians/Syriacs and the 
forced mass-population exchange between Greece and Turkey, in concerted 
efforts to create a homogenous Turkish nation the policy of Turkification 
has been strongly directed towards Muslim groups.128 As Zeydanlıoğlu (2008: 
7) notes, this ‘civilisational necessity’ was intensified once homogenization in 
terms of getting rid of the non-Muslim minorities had been accomplished. In 
the concept of Turkishness the latter have been included either as Turks or 
‘Turks-to-be’ (Hamren 2009). Interestingly, despite the secular nationalist 
project pursued by the Turkish Republic, paradoxically the Muslim religion 
has become a central element in the discourses on Turkishness. Poulton (1997: 
97-100) notes that Mustafa Kemal saw Christians as inappropriate candidates 
to become ‘Turkish’. The founder of the Turkish State ideology, Ziya 
Gökalp, also accords religion a central role: ‘religious identity is a key 
element in nation-building even in a secular republic.’ As far as their position 
in daily life is concerned, this ambiguous attitude has meant that both the 
recognized and unrecognized non-Muslim minorities have been excluded 
from access to State institutions.129 As compensation, in the public sphere 
they have therefore devoted themselves to becoming strong achievers in the 
economic field. Nevertheless, despite their commercial success, throughout 
the period of the Turkish Republic, the attitude towards them has been to 
regard them as gavur or the ‘others’, who sooner or later should be expelled 
from the national territory. 
 Legally speaking, the difference in religion has meant that the 
Assyrians/Syriacs have been excluded from the newly emerging Turkish 
                                                 
127 T.C. Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, BCA- Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Başvekalet, 
030/18/01/02, 75-50-1. 
128 See for the demographic engineering policy and the construction of the Turkish nation-
state, Üngör (2010). 
129 From 1926 to 1965, Law 788 regulated the employment of civil servants (Memurin Kanunu). 
One of the conditions for employment as official in the Turkish Republic was to be a ‘Turk’ 
(Çağaptay 2003: 603). In 1965 this law was superseded by Law 657 which requires Turkish 
citizenship as a prerequisite to being eligible to become a State official. 
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national identity. Only a few Assyrians/Syriacs might have been aware of the 
full extent of what the new State ideology would mean to their formal 
position in the Turkish Republic, even though they have experienced the 
direct everyday consequences of that policy. Assyrians/Syriacs have found 
themselves confronted with an ambiguous policy regarding the role of 
religion in Turkish society. In a broad sense the Turkish Constitution 
excludes the background and affiliation of the Assyrians/Syriacs from the 
definition of a Turkish identity which represents the Turkish Republic. The 
foundation of the ambiguity of the role of religion is rooted in the definition 
of a national Turkish identity which focuses on the unity of different 
elements. Article 81,130 regulating the platform of political parties, reveals 
how the central government has been trying to develop its nation-building 
programme by setting its sights on the homogenization of society, which has 
included attempts to intervene in the field of religion. After a survey of the 
situation in Turkey Francesco Capotorti, who was appointed by the United 
Nations to oversee the prevention of discrimination and assure the security 
of minorities, concluded (Atto 2000): ‘…the available information indicates 
that the government is making a continuous effort to achieve cultural 
homogeneity, as evidenced by the education system, which is designed to 
channel the minorities into a uniform stream of Turkish culture. This 
obviously tends to reduce the prospects of preserving the cultural identity of 
minority groups.’ 
 This is why it did not take long for people to realize that the ideology 
(discourses) of the Turkish Republic did not offer much scope for a 
community life to such groups as Assyrians/Syriacs. The basic principles of 
Kemalist ideology (the ‘six arrows’) were laid down in the 1931 programme 
of the Republican People Party (CHP) and incorporated into the Turkish 
Constitution six years later in 1937 (Zürcher 2003: 189). These principles 
                                                 
130 ‘Political parties may not claim that there are minorities on the basis of religion, culture, 
sect, race or language in the Turkish Republic. Political parties may not engage in activities to 
promote languages or cultures other than Turkish, thereby seeking to create minorities which 
threaten the unity of the nation’ and ‘Political parties may not use any other language than 
Turkish in their statutes, programmes, congresses or rallies. They may not distribute posters, 
records, cassettes, videos, brochures or statements in any other language than Turkish...’ In 
the same way, the Turkish Act of Association Nr. 2908 limits the freedom of associations to 
the norms laid down in Article 5: ‘Associations may not be established if their aim is to 
destroy the ‘territorial national identity of the state’, or if they seek to claim that minorities of 
different races, religions, sects, cultures or languages exist within the Turkish Republic, or if 
through the promotion of other languages and cultures other than Turkish they seek for one 
religion, race, class or group to win privileges over another group of a certain religion or sect.’ 
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formed the basis for indoctrination in schools, the media and the army. 
Secularism and nationalism were the most prominent elements in the policy 
of Turkification in the 1930s. Minorities were forced to change their 
surnames to Turkish ones,131 just one consequence of the Surname Law of 
1934.132 Similarly, the names of Assyrian/Syriac villages were changed to 
Turkish names at the beginning of the 1940s.133 
 Secularism was interpreted as the removal of religion from public life 
and the establishment of complete State control over any remaining religious 
institutions. The Turkish concept of secularism was heavily geared to serve 
the concept of Turkish nationalism. This nationalism can be seen as the 
development on an earlier foundation of pan-Turkism, laid by European 
Turcologists in the second part of the nineteenth century. They helped the 
Turks to restore their pre-Islamic past which had been eclipsed by Islam 
(Lewis 1994: 83). In such a climate, the focus shifted to extolling the unity of 
the Turkic-speaking peoples said to stretch from the Aegean across Asia to 
the Pacific. The new Turco-centric focus totally ignored the past of other 
peoples in the territory of Turkey as its chief concern was with Turkic-
speaking groups –the majority of whom resided outside this territory (Lewis 
1994: 84). Making good use of history and archaeology, the nationalism 
propagated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk after the First World War embraced 
the idea of a Trojan and Hittite past and was devised to make the Turks in 
Turkey identify with the geographical area which they inhabited (Ibid. 93). 
By its very nature, it was also a way to repudiate Greek claims to land in Asia 
Minor. In the early Republican era, it was in fact conceived as an instrument 
to encourage the idea of a great Turkish civilization which had reached its 
apogee, epitomized by the ‘Turkish History Thesis’ (Özkırımlı and Sofos 
2008: 91).  The Turkish Historical Society (Türk Tarih Kurumu)134 was 
                                                 
131 Upon arrival in Europe, many Assyrians/Syriacs changed the Turkish family names thrust 
upon them back to their former family names. In Germany, and also in the Netherlands, this 
has been much harder. Nevertheless, some families have managed to change their surnames 
after a great deal of effort. 
132 This law prohibits the use of surnames which are related to ‘races and nations other than 
Turkish’ (Güven 2006: 115). It also forbids the use of certain suffixes in surnames, such as –
yan, -of, -ef, -vic, -ic, is, -idis, -pulos, -aki, -zade, and -bin. 
133 According to studies which have been conducted, the names of approximately 28,000 
places have been changed into Turkish names since the 1940s, when the Expert Commission 
for the Modification of Names (Ad Değiştirme Ihtisas Komisyonu) was established. See further 
Tuncel (2000) for the 1949 legislation pertaining to the administration of cities (Il Idaresi 
Kanunu).  
134 See further the website of Türk Tarih Kurumu: http://www.ttk.org.tr/ 
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founded as a result of this nationalist discursive formation, and the famous 
‘Turkish History Thesis’ (Türk Tarih Tezi) and the ‘Sun Language Theory’ 
(Günes Dil Teorisi) were formulated in the 1930s to support it. After this 
period, a line of assimilation policy emerges quite clearly. As a means to 
support this racist assimilation policy, several studies which strove to 
demonstrate the role of ‘Turks’ in the development of civilization were 
conducted. Almost all minorities living in Turkey were defined as ‘Turks’. 
The Sun Language Theory asserted that all the major languages in the world are 
derived from Turkish. In this period, the policy was to purify the Turkish 
language and to turkify society (Çağaptay 2004: 86-91). 
 
3.1.3 Attempts to Weaken Non-Muslims Economically 
The Turkish authorities have made use of political means to undermine and 
to weaken the economic strength of non-Muslims. It is even not wrong to 
say that the Turkish bourgeoisie and the Turkish national economy have 
been created through the elimination135 of non-Muslims from the economic 
field and the confiscation of their financial capital. For example, in the first 
years of the Turkish Republic the economic field was still dominated by non-
Muslims.136 However, due to the implemented of a strong Turkification 
policy in the economic field, non-Muslims lost their dominant position and 
the majority of them left the country. 
 During and after the Second World War, the nationalization 
(Turkification) of the economy intensified. With the implementation of the 
ihtiyat policy which involved imposing a capital levy (Varlık Vergisi)137 and 
                                                 
135 Already in 1923, the non-Muslim merchants were no longer allowed to be a member of the 
Istanbul Merchant Association (Aktoprak 2010). 
136 According to a survey which was conducted in 1922 and which aimed to map the 
composition of the bourgeoisie in Istanbul, the number of Muslim merchants who were 
working with export-import was no more than four percent (Alexandris 1992: 110-111). 
137 The imposition of the varlık vergisi bears some resemblance with the jizya tax system in the 
Ottoman Empire. In both cases, non-Muslims had to pay taxes in order to protect their 
property and safety. The jizya tax system, was part of the dhimmi (an Arabic word meaning 
‘protected’) legislation, which was included in the sharia law that encompasses the relationship 
of Muslims and non-Muslims at the theological, social, political and economical levels. 
According to this system, non-Muslims had to pay jizya taxes and show loyalty in return for 
protection of their individual life, property, and religious praxis. Under the Ottoman rule, 
non-Muslims were also considered as raya(h) or reaya (‘cattle’ or ‘flock’) which means in 
Ottoman Turkish a member of the tax-paying lower class of Ottoman society, in contrast to 
the elite class (askeri). Although the term originally included Muslim taxpayers as well, it was, 
in its later use, reduced to Non-Muslim taxpayers. 
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the mob against the non-Muslim entrepreneurs (at that time mainly Greeks, 
Armenians, but also some Jews), the nationalization of the economic policy 
reached its peak. The main logic behind this praxis was (in line with the 
discourses of Turkification) to create a ‘Muslim Turkish bourgeoisie’, and by 
doing so, to transfer the capital from the non-Muslim to the Muslim 
entrepreneurs (Oran 2007a).  In 1942138 the Şükrü Saraçoğlu government 
imposed a capital levy on big property owners (Donef 1998: 64). During the 
drafting process of the Varlık Vergisi, the Turkish Prime Minister Saraçoğlu, 
in his speech at the parliament, defined the ‘Wealth tax’ as a revolutionary 
law which will give the Turkish market to Turks (Aktar 1996: 148). 
Commissions, which dealt with this matter, were formed entirely of Muslim 
Turkish businessmen, bureaucrats and politicians and were authoritized to 
determine the amount of taxes to be paid within a period of fifteen days 
(Cengiz 2003).139 As a result of this discriminatory praxis, members of the 
minority groups were forced to either sell their property or to join the 
labourer battalions (Amele Taburu). Sotiriyu (1970: 63) notes that it would be 
more correct to call these ‘death battalions’. Among the great number of 
non-Muslims who left Turkey due to this policy140 were also 
Assyrians/Syriacs who settled in Syria and Lebanon. 
 In the area of Tur ‘Abdin, Assyrians/Syriacs discovered that the policy 
went much further than big property owners. People owning property, 
which gave them just enough to live, also had to pay a disproportionately 
high amount of taxes. In fact many were forced to close down their 
businesses.141 Non-Muslim citizens of Turkey had to pay as much as any 
non-Turkish citizen: ten times the amount paid by the Muslims. This 
indicates that non-Muslims in Turkey were practically classified as 
foreigners.142 Those who could not pay the amount requested, were sent to 
labour camps which were originally organized to employ the non-Muslim 
                                                 
138 The Turkish National Assembly passed the Law on November 11, 1942 (Law 
4305/12.11.1942). The implementation of this law continued until 1944 and was abolished 
with Law 4530 (March 15, 1944). 
139 According to Ökte (1951: 48) in the implementation of the Wealth Tax, non-Muslims 
became the subject of official police records through information provided by MIT (Turkish 
Intelligence Service) and CHP (Republican People Party). 
140 For further reading see Cengiz (2003). 
141 See further about the implementation of the Wealth Tax in Tur Abdin, Beth Sawoce (1995) 
for interviews with eye-witnesses. See also Gabriyel (2008). 
142 Until the 1940s, non-Muslims in Turkey were registered in the section of ‘foreigners’ 
(ecanip) in the population registers. See further Çetin (2002:73-75). 
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reserve forces. Therefore Assyrians/Syriacs refer to them by the term ihtiyat 
(‘reserve forces’ in Ottoman Turkish). Assyrian/Syriac respondents who had 
been sent to these labour camps spoke of very bad treatment and hard work.  
 In 1946, the CHP published a report announcing that by the 1950s the 
geographical area of Anatolia should be purged of Christians and Jews. 
Istanbul would follow.143 On 6 and 7 September 1955 systematic attacks 
were organized against the shops, houses and institutions of these groups.144 
This can be interpreted as a physically violent continuation of the imposition 
of the varlık vergisi in 1942. Zürcher (1996: 241-2) discusses the political 
situation at that time and notes that the riots (which started after a 
demonstration) were most probably mobilized by the Prime Minister 
Menderes and the foreign minister, Zorlu, in order to give vent to their ideas 
on the Cyprus issue. Apparently the authorities had also planned an attack on 
Midyad in 1955. In a meeting with the authorities, the Kurdish agha Nuri 
Dbe Azizke showed his unwillingness to co-operate in this attack. He argued 
that the Assyrians/Syriacs in Midyad would be able to defend themselves and 
that the authorities may not win the attack quite easily. Whether this was the 
reason for not continuing the planned attack on Midyad or not, is unclear. 
This information reached the Assyrian/Syriac leaders (Chorbishop Brahim 
Dbe Hajjo, Gabro Isa Zatte, Shabe Dbe Brahim) through a servant of Nuri 
Dbe Azizke who had attended this meeting. According to sources of Jan 
Beth Sawoce, the places Diyarbakır, Mardin and some of the villages in Tur 
‘Abdin had also been in danger at this period.145 
 
3.1.4 The Role of Religion in Social Organisation 
As indicated before, Assyrians/Syriacs have had an ambiguous position in 
society. In the discourses of Turkish nationalism, being Turkish means to be 
‘racially/ethnically’ Turkish, religiously a Muslim, that one adopts Turkish 
language as one’s mother tongue and shares a Turkish nationalist ideology. 
Although Assyrians/Syriacs living in the cities managed to adopt some of 
                                                 
143 See further about this report and the 6-7 September pogroms, Güven (2005). 
144 About 4214 houses were attacked, 1004 shops, 73 churches, 1 synagogue and 2 
monasteries. Many non-Muslims left Istanbul leaving yawning gaps in the market. Ironically, 
as I point out in my next chapter, Assyrians/Syriacs who settled in Istanbul in the second part 
of the 1950s profited from the new market opportunities which became available. 
145 See further Beth Sawoce’s (unpublished) interviews with Gawriye Beth-Mas‘ud (2007), 
with Jozef Diyarbekirli (1994) and with Ilyas Tamraz (1985). These are available at the 
Mesopotamian Library, Södertörn University. 
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these requirements (especially by speaking Turkish instead of Suryoyo), in the 
agricultural Assyrian/Syriac heartland of Tur ‘Abdin, these Turkish discourses 
remained at distance. Society continued to be organized along religious lines, 
Kurdish aghas continued to exercise their power over peasants within a 
structure which was inherently undemocratic. The Kemalist reforms 
designed to create a national Turkish identity only reached the 
Assyrians/Syriacs (mostly)146 in the second half of the twentieth century.147 
Usually their relationship with the Turks operated mainly at an administrative 
level; their direct daily contact with outsiders was mainly with the Kurdish, 
the Mhalmoye148 and the Yezidi population.149Another element adding to the 
ambiguity of the policy regarding non-Muslims began with the recognition of 
non-Muslims as enshrined in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, even though 
the official national policy was focussed on the denial of minorities. Non-
Muslims have continued to be suspected of threatening Turkey’s national 
unity. Therefore, security surveillance has loomed very large over ‘minorities’ 
in Turkey. One of the measures taken to assist this was the establishment of 
the Secondary Committee for Minorities (by secret decree in 1962) in order to 
carry out security surveillance on minorities (Report of the European 
Commission about religious freedom in Turkey, 2004) 
 Despite the proclaimed secularism, religion continued to play a 
considerable role in Turkish society and this had consequences for the 
political, social, and economic life of Assyrians/Syriacs. First, in view of their 
religious affiliation, they have continued to be seen as foreigners, outsiders; a 
threat to the national unity. Quite apart from the changes stemming from the 
fall of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Turkish Republic at 
national level, this collapse and rebuilt also heralded a change at local 
political level for the Assyrians/Syriacs. Under the Ottoman Empire, the 
Christians were permitted to play a considerable role in the administration 
and to hold public offices. Under the new regime, they were banned from 
                                                 
146 I mentioned already that the names of their villages and their family names were changed 
into Turkish names in the 1930s and 1940s. 
147 See further also Zürcher (2003) and Lewis (1994: 56, 62) on the implementation of 
Kemalist principles. 
148 Although the Kurds consider the Mhalmoye to be Kurds, not all Mhalmoye identify as such. 
See further about the Mhalmoye Chapter 9. 
149 For this reason, besides their mother tongue Suryoyo, Assyrians/Syriacs often knew, 
Kurmanji, the language of the Kurds and the Yezidis. Only those who had the chance to go to 
Turkish schools or had served in the military had learned some Turkish, which they would use 
in their contact with the Turkish authorities. 
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being public servants. Complaining about their position in Turkey, 
Assyrian/Syriac men still lament ‘I could not even become a garbage 
collector!’ as a metaphorical reference to their position.150 Although the job 
of garbage collector is the lowest level of public servant, they were still 
excluded from it. There is the implicit idea that their position in society has 
been marginalized, especially socially and politically. Economically, they have 
managed to develop a niche as farmers and merchants. Secondly, the 
religious affiliation of Assyrians/Syriacs has had consequences for their 
social relationships in society. Although Muslims and non-Muslims have 
continued to live discretely together in the same geography, their religious 
affiliation has determined their specific relationship. This is illustrated by the 
de facto position of non-Muslims in court. Christian testimonies have not 
been given the same credence as those of Muslims. Consequently, Muslims 
had an advantage of being backed up by a juridical system. The major 
consequence at social economic level has been that non-Muslims have 
developed survival strategies. Assyrian/Syriac respondents mentioned, for 
example, that they bribed Muslims to testify for them. 
 Also during the military service Assyrian/Syriac men were confronted 
with the fact that fundamentally Turkish society did not function on a 
secular basis.151 It was not possible for them to pursue a professional army 
career or to be promoted in rank position during military service. Even in the 
1980s, my respondent Jesu‘ said he had a class at the Lise (high school) in 
which pupils were taught about Mustafa Kemal’s ideas regarding 
modernization and the possibilities to pursue a military career. Since this 
appealed to him he applied to the military academy. His application was 
rejected on the basis that he was informed he was not eligible to apply 
because he was a Christian.152 It is probable that collective discrimination in 
Turkish law was enforced through by-laws. It is public knowledge that 
Christians were assigned special ID numbers to become visible to the 
authorities.153 Assyrian/Syriac soldiers serving in Turkish military service also 
endured individual discrimination and were assaulted by Muslim comrades-
                                                 
150 This is a reference to law 788, regulating the employment of officials (Memurin Kanunu), 
which was applied between 1926 and 1965. 
151 This information is based on the individual experiences of Assyrian/Syriac men who had 
served in the military. 
152 In order to be admitted to the military schools in Turkey one has to be ‘Turk’ or of the 
‘Turkish race’ (Yildiz 2001). 
153 For further reading see Oran (2004). 
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in-arms who forcibly tried to convert them to Islam.154 At times when 
religious oppression and discrimination have been experienced, as in military 
service, the Assyrian/Syriac men used the principle of secularism, as one of 
the ideals of Mustafa Kemal, in order to protect themselves. Examples were 
given by respondents who had done their military service and who had been 
mistreated (by their Muslim colleagues) in efforts to convert to Islam. 
Conscious that the symbolic stature of Mustafa Kemal was enormous in the 
army, in their argument for rejecting conversion to ‘the religion of 
Muhammed’ (u dino de Mhammad, as my respondents referred to it), they 
stated that they followed Mustafa Kemal’s ideals of secularism. This 
argument often seemed to be helpful. 
 The experiences of Assyrian/Syriac men who had died because of ill-
treatment during their military service or returned home with a life-long 
disability sowed enormous fear among future generations; an important 
reason why Assyrian/Syriac men were not looking forward commencing 
military service. My respondent Ilyas was witness to the mounted troopers 
(rumoye) who came to the village of Mzizah with lists of names of men who 
had not responded to the call-up for the military service. Those who had 
taken their courage in their two hands and did report were prepared for their 
ideal by the village priest Sleman. He gathered them and informed them to 
keep strong in the face of the humiliation and the pressure to convert to 
Islam which they were going to experience. Father Sleman prepared them 
psychologically to remain true to their Christian religion, even if they were 
threatened with death. Parents of male children started to give their boys 
Turkish names in effort to keep their Christianity hidden.155 Though their 
religion was registered in their passport, they wanted to avoid their sons 
being confronted with it at any time of the day. Another ruse parents used 
was registering their sons as being a couple of years younger than they really 
were so that they would be more robust if labouring they were hurt 
                                                 
154 In Turkish this process of conversion is called şehadet (‘to be witness to something’. Ritually 
to repeat şehadet makes someone convert to Islam). An individual has to recite (supposed to be 
with conviction) that there is one God and that Muhammed is His Prophet. My respondents 
said that whether or not an officer or general tolerated discrimination and oppression of the 
Christians could make a huge difference. 
155 They often chose secular Turkish names or a Turkish version of a name which was not 
directly identified as a Christian name. For example, instead of Jesu‘ they would call their son 
‘Isa – the Turkish equivalent of Jesu‘. 
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physically during the military service.156 In military service, besides labouring 
under the aversion to Christianity they were also seen as exotic because of 
the myth about the gavur (infidels), which had been put into circulation.  
 The concept of gavur is central to Turkish discourses about Christians in 
Turkey. Lexically, the Turkish word gavur means unbeliever. Within the 
discourses of Islam, any non-Muslim is accounted as gavur and with that as 
the ‘other’. Muslims, who had never before seen gavur, and had only heard of 
them, had developed the idea that gavur could be identified by animal 
characteristics: big ears, different kind of eyes and a tail.157 Therefore, at first 
meetings, they were surprised when they learned that the gavur looked 
physically just as they did. And among themselves those Muslims who were 
acquainted with the gavur, referred to them as such in daily life. Moreover, 
Muslims commonly to use terms like ‘gavur apartment’, ‘gavur shop’, ‘gavur 
quarter’ or even ‘gavur cami’ (mosque).158 The use of gavur in daily life did not 
only mean humiliation to those who were its object but it has had also 
practical consequences. A central idea in gavur discourses is that all non-
Muslims are rich, that they hide their property well, that they steal Muslims’ 
properties and so forth. Based on this discourse it is considered to be 
legitimate (helal) to covet the property of non-Muslims. Therefore, gavur have 
been seen as an object or target to be exploited or eliminated. 
  
3.1.5 Between the State and the Tribal: Political 
Constellation in Tur ‘Abdin 
In Tur ‘Abdin, the political interaction consisted of two inescapable 
relationships: to the Turkish State and to the Kurds. In the 1960s and the 
1970s with the exception of Istanbul, the most substantial Christian 
population lived in the area of Tur ‘Abdin and Mardin.159 In these 
                                                 
156 When asking for the date of birth, respondents often mentioned two different versions: a 
later year which was mentioned in the passport and an earlier year in which they were actually 
born. 
157 This myth seems to have had an effect on the presentation of the two characters 
representing the only two Assyrians/Syriacs in the Turkish series Sıla broadcasted on Turkish 
TV Channel ATV (2006/7): the character representing the boy has been given jug ears and 
his sister walks with a limp. 
158 An example of the last is the mosque of Assyrians/Syriacs who converted to Islam in the 
period of the Seyfo in the First World War in Adıyaman (south-eastern Turkey). 
159 According to Anschütz (1985: 30), Father Bedros Ögünc (Dbe Shushe) completed a list of 
the Syriac Orthodox families living in Tur ‘Abdin and Mardin for the year 1978, which 
numbered 2577 families. He based it on information from the Mor Gabriel Monastery and 
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geographies, the local administration and a great many officials were ‘ethnic’ 
Turks mainly. The latter group represented the central government at local 
level and attempted to supervise the ‘correct attitude’ of Turkish citizens. 
Until roughly the beginning of the 1980s, Assyrians/Syriacs referred to the 
Kurds by the term Taye (here with the meaning of ‘Muslims’). This changed 
after this group had developed a strong national political identity as Kurds 
towards the end of the 1970s. Since then, depending on the context, 
Assyrians/Syriacs have referred to them by the terms Kurd and Taye 
interchangeably. It is necessary to explain the political relations and the 
specific dynamics of interactions between Assyrians/Syriacs, Kurdish and 
Turkish populations in the area. I shall therefore look at the local politics in 
the rural area of Tur ‘Abdin in which traditional Kurdish tribalism has played 
a central role. 
 The embryo Turkish State was not omnipotent and had to co-operate 
with local power structures to make its presence felt. Despite the fact that 
one of Mustafa Kemal’s aims was to modernize the country, and although he 
terminated the rule of many aghas who had rebelled against the authorities 
(belonging mainly to the Heverkan Confederation160) – he never abolished 
the tribal agha system completely. In the area of Mardin and in Tur ‘Abdin, 
the society was still mainly rural and social organization continued to be 
based on tribalism. In order to effectuate State policy, in time-honoured 
fashion, the representatives of the State made use of the local social political 
organization. Since the socio-cultural differences between the Turkish 
administrators and the Kurdish population were conspicuous, Kurdish 
middlemen (aghas) were essential to the effective execution of Turkish 
government as they linked this to the Kurdish population. Van Bruinessen 
(1992) shows that the competition for political power waged by the aghas 
must be understood in the context of their relationship to the State. The 
aghas represented each a different political party. As intermediaries between 
the Turkish administration and the local population, and combined with 
elements of their tribalism, they achieved enormous power over the local 
population. This socio-political structure virtually precluded permeation of 
State influence without the involvement of this entrenched power group. 
                                                                                                               
information collected among the members of this group. He did not mention the number of 
members per family. Father Bedros mentioned to me that he had considered the parents and 
children as one family, no matter whether the children were married and had their own 
families. 
160 See further on the Heverkan Confederation, Van Bruinessen (1992: 101, 103, 307). 
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The population was used to alternate threats and protection from the agha to 
whom they allied.  
 As the main Christian minority in the area, Assyrians/Syriacs had a 
specific role in the local socio-political life of Tur ‘Abdin. Especially in 
villages which were inhabited by both Assyrians/Syriacs and Kurds they had 
been forced into the Kurdish political organization which was ruled by 
Kurdish aghas. Van Bruinessen defines ‘tribe’ in this context as follows: ‘The 
Kurdish tribe is a socio-political and generally also territorial (and therefore 
economic) unit based on descent and kinship, real or putative, with a 
characteristic internal structure…’ It is important to note that tribes in the 
context of my writing had become political units, although the background 
to the sense of tribe could have a more primordial notion as the definition by 
Van Bruinessen suggests. The village in which I was born, Mzizah (in Tur 
‘Abdin), had become a base for the main Kurdish tribes of Tur ‘Abdin. I 
remember the older people talking about the band dbe Çalabiyo and the band 
dbe Batte. Here, the term band is used in the sense of a party in a local political 
context. In fact, they were speaking about the tribes as defined by Van 
Bruinessen. As Christians living among a Muslim majority population, 
Assyrians/Syriacs were forced into these local political constellations because 
the aghas, as leaders of these tribes, dominated that geographical area. Since 
Christians in Tur ‘Abdin could not become aghas over Muslims,161 they had to 
align to one of the tribes in order to ‘protect’ themselves against other tribes. 
As such, people were more or less compelled to loyalty to one of the aghas 
present in the area. Choosing independence also meant that a person was 
liable to become the victim of the power of all the aghas. Loyalty to an agha 
also implied that he could be expected to extend protection in the event of 
threat from other tribes. In short, much of the local power was channelled 
through these aghas.162  
                                                 
161 In other geographies, especially in large cities, some Christians were able to accumulate 
wealth and hold the title of agha. Information on Assyrian/Syriac aghas is particularly rare to 
come by. One Assyrian/Syriac agha family was the Fathi Zadeh mercantile family of 
Diyarbakır in the 18th and 19th centuries. Patriarch Ephrem Barsaum, in his posthumously-
published manuscript catalogues (Barsoum 2008: III, 150) mentions a Beth Gazo (liturgical 
melody book of the Syriac Orthodox Church) from the 1500’s repaired for ‘Naum agha son 
of Khawaja Elias agha Fathi Zadeh in 1221H [1806]’. See further the article on Elias Fathallah 
(Fathi 2011) for an interesting biography of a member of this family in the 18th century. 
162 In the mid 19th century, for example, Kurdish aghas seemed to enjoy so much power that 
they were able to buy both the land and its Christian owners, and then to employ them (Van 
Bruinessen 1992: 66). Because of this, aghas referred to Christians as zerkerri (bought with 
gold) or as filehe min (my Christians) (Taylor 1865: 51 in Van Bruinessen 1992: 66). ‘High value’ 
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 The status and position of the Assyrians/Syriacs in this local politics was 
again determined by their Christian background; however, not always and 
not necessarily in a negative sense. Aghas considered their alliance important 
since they did seem to derive more income from the land of Christians, 
whom they found also more loyal and trustworthier than the Muslim or 
Yezidi163 members of the tribe. Loyalty should perhaps not be understood as 
a result of integrity but rather as a survival strategy adopted to avoid worse. 
The Assyrians/Syriacs were in the worst position when aghas did not see the 
advantage of having Christian members. And, because they had no recourse 
to protection at court, they were more vulnerable than their Muslim 
neighbours.164 
 The commonality of religion between the Kurdish agha and the Turkish 
officials formed the main basis in their relationship. Under such 
circumstances, it was impossible for Assyrians/Syriacs to be appointed an 
agha and function as a middleman between the Turkish administration and 
the local population. This dependence on the Kurdish agha, who functioned 
as an intermediary between the State and the people allied to him grew. An 
agha is strong only as long as he has good relationships with the Turkish 
administration. Therefore, one of his great services to other people was that 
he had access to the central government. The necessity of having a Muslim 
agha to obtain access to the Turkish administration inevitably weakened the 
position of the Assyrians/Syriacs. Consequently, the position of 
Assyrians/Syriacs was invariably especially weak at the times that the Turkish 
administration and the Kurdish population choose to focus on a collective 
self-identification as Muslims in relation to the Assyrians/Syriacs as a 
Christian minority. At such times, oppression, discrimination and unequal 
access to public services always increase. 
 The introduction of the multi-party system in the rural tribal areas of 
Tur ‘Abdin in the 1950s indirectly meant a deterioration of the position of the 
                                                                                                               
Christians also became their curse in their competition with other aghas. One of the methods 
used by an agha to hurt another agha, was by killing ‘his Christians’, as the most valuable 
possession he ‘owned’. 
163 The Yezidi population had a socially and politically weaker position than Christians. The 
aghas used often Yezidi men for ‘dirty jobs’. 
164 A Muslim could easily accuse a Christian of having killed someone whom he had actually 
killed himself. A court hearing would often be decided in favour of the Muslim. Therefore, in 
such situations, an agha could present a solution. Thus, if he valued his Christian tribe member 
he could use his power to get him free. 
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Assyrians/Syriacs.165 This ushered in the first important change in local 
political relations since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. Democratic 
elections mixed with tribalism resulted in the growth of political clientalism. 
Tribal leaders espoused a new role as representatives of the various political 
parties and continued to pursue their tribal competition through these parties 
with unabated fervour. This was exacerbated as they developed a middleman 
and broker position between the Turkish administration and the local 
population (who were allied to these tribal leaders). Demographic clientalism 
– created by giving each individual the same weight in elections – placed 
greater importance on the demographic balance between Kurds and 
Assyrians/Syriacs. Considering the relatively low number of 
Assyrians/Syriacs in the area, aghas were less in need of support from the 
Assyrians/Syriacs to win votes in local elections. Moreover, in the 1960s and 
1970s the perception of a Muslim identity began to reinforce the unity of the 
various Muslim populations in Tur ‘Abdin (Arabic- and Kurdish-speaking) 
and the Turkish administration. The mounting antagonism against 
Assyrians/Syriacs as Christians built up tension between the two religious 
groups. The dynamics of this social organization developed structural 
disadvantages for the position of the Assyrians/Syriacs; they saw their 
position within the local socio-political system in Tur ‘Abdin ebb away. 
 An examination of the socio-political changes in the area of Tur ‘Abdin 
shows that the dynamics in the relationship between the Assyrians/Syriacs 
and the Muslim population are an important component. Because it is 
human to tend to remember the negative experiences in a person’s life or 
history, some expressions (in both Kurdish and in Suryoyo) speak volumes 
about the relationship between these two people who have been coexisting 
in the same geographical area for hundreds of years. A prime example is the 
Kurdish expression: ‘Na b-barfa sebbaha u na b-koma Fellaha’ – (‘[We (Muslims) 
are] neither [afraid] of the heavy morning snow, nor of a group of Christians 
who gird themselves up for a fight’). Heavy snow in the morning soon 
stopped and did not continue all day. Metaphorically it implies that 
Christians (in Tur ‘Abdin) are boasting when they claim that they will retaliate 
against the Muslims if they have to engage in a struggle with them, but in the 
end this is all sound and fury, signifying nothing! Therefore, Muslims did not 
need to fear them and sensed they have a stronger position. The imbalance 
                                                 
165 Before the 1950s, only the CHP, the party which was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 
was allowed to exist. 
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in power between the Kurds and the Assyrians/Syriacs allowed the misuse of 
power and made it relatively easy. Assyrians/Syriacs use several versions of 
the saying: ‘U Tayo d-howe habusho ste, lo mahtatle b-kisukh; u hakka mahatlukh, 
sem naqwo u tray d-nofel.’ (Even if a Muslim were an apple, do not put him in 
your pocket; and if you were to put him in your pocket, make sure you make 
a hole in your pocket so it falls out). This expression is used among the older 
generation Assyrians/Syriacs in situations when they want to warn each 
other when entering into relationships with Muslims. They refer obliquely to 
historically bad experiences with Muslims; situations in which Muslims had 
abused the trust between them. They keep this memory alive to ensure 
certain social boundaries with the Muslims are maintained. One of my 
respondents referred to an example from the period of the Seyfo to explain to 
me how Muslims abused the trust of the Assyrians/Syriacs after they had 
vowed not to do so. A Kurdish agha had sworn to protect Christian families 
from being massacred, saying he would make love to Fatima (the daughter of 
the Muslim Prophet Muhammed) on the back of a pig if he were not to keep 
his promise. Despite this vow, the agha killed the Assyrian/Syriac families. 
My respondent argued that it is legitimate for Muslims to misuse non-
Muslim trust since it is legitimate to fail to keep a vow made to Christians 
and still retain one's honour. 
 This subordinate position is often strongly expressed in the stories of 
emigration. The elderly woman from Mzizah, Shmuni, reflected on the time 
she lived in Tur ‘Abdin and the position of Assyrians/Syriacs in relation to 
that of the Muslims: 
Let me tell you that our parents survived the Seyfo. When Suryoye allied 
with an agha in order to survive and the other agha retaliated, the Muslims 
[as allies] of that agha would plunder them [Assyrians/Syriacs] as much as 
they could. This is how they [Assyrians/Syriacs] lived.166 …[After the 
Seyfo] we lived without land. I assure you that the Muslims had taken all 
our land after the Seyfo. We were already happy enough that they allowed 
us to go back to our village [Mzizah] after having spent seven years in 
other places. We were seven years in exile [guini] 167 in the village Kafro… 
We went back, but we did not get enough of our land back. The agha did 
                                                 
166 See also Van Bruinessen (1992: 66, 106) on the relationship between agha, Muslim and 
Christian allies and their positions. 
167 Guini is a Kurdish term for exile.  
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not help us to get all our land back.168 We were constantly plundered. 
They would plunder us at every opportunity; even the doors of the 
houses! The Suryoye of Mzizah were in a terrible state. And we worked hard 
[khiwaylan britho muklo169]. I remember that one of the Muslims in the 
village said in Kurdish Fellah denya qebbala gert, meaning, the Christians 
want to till all the land on earth. He said this because we worked so hard 
in the years after the Seyfo. Each family member did their bit; we started to 
build up a new life. He laughed at us and could not understand us, since 
we worked so much. I can tell you that after so much work, we reached 
the level of the Muslims in the village again. This was in about the 1960s. 
With the fruits of our labour, we bought ourselves new land from the 
Muslims. And after that, when the road to Europe had opened [bether me 
du darbo l-Aurupa de ftih], we abandoned all our possessions [maal] and left 
for Europe… We fled [mahzamlan] and left everything behind. We put our 
house in order and left! We already had a house, but since it was small and 
had a small courtyard, we rebuilt it and made it bigger. It had become very 
nice… After we finished the house, we did not live in it for as long as one 
decade. First we left for Midyad because of the barbariye [local village 
politics] in the village. We spent nine years in Midyad. Then we came here 
[Sweden]. 
The subordinate position of the Assyrians/Syriacs was institutionalized in 
daily life; for instance, it was also reflected in the ritual of slaughtering the 
animals. When I went back to Tur ‘Abdin for the first time in 2004 (twenty-
four years after my parents had fled their village Mzizah), I encountered the 
same ritual in one of the villages.170 The family who were my hosts wanted to 
slaughter a kid in my honour. It was a way to show how happy they were to 
see me again. Besides that, they knew that back home in the Netherlands I 
would tell how lovingly I had been received and how tenderly they took care 
of me. Soon the twelve-year old Abrohom jumped among the very young 
kids and came back with one in his arms (similar to the way Jesus is 
portrayed with a lamb).  
                                                 
168 During the Seyfo, Çalabiyo agha was imprisoned. The Batte agha tribe opposed to the return 
of the Assyrians/Syriacs to their village Mzizah. About seven years after the Seyfo, after 
Çalabiyo agha was released from prison, he negotiated with the Muslims in the village to allow 
the Assyrians/Syriacs to return. 
169 Literally this means: ‘We ate the world’. 
170 For safety reasons I cannot mention the name of the village. 
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I said to Holo Makko: “I am really not a meat-eater, and I would prefer 
you not to slaughter the kid for me.” But, Holo Makko insisted. I did not 
want to reject his offer, since otherwise he may have been offended. Holo 
Makko shouted in an excited voice and a proud smile on his face to his 
son Abrohom: “Go and ask the neighbour to come and slaughter it, 
before it gets dark!” I did not understand why the neighbour had to 
slaughter the kid. “Why do you want the neighbour to slaughter it?” I 
asked him. He said: “It is a ‘ade [tradition] that a Muslim should slaughter 
the animals of the non-Muslims. It is a way of showing respect to the 
Muslims – otherwise they are offended.” After ejaculating an automatic 
“Aha” I began to analyse this ‘tradition’ in order to understand its context. 
“Is it because if you slaughter the kid, it will be perceived as haram 
[unclean, forbidden]?” I asked. Holo Makko said: “Yes.” “Will you give 
him a portion to take back home too?” I continued. “No, not necessarily; 
today, we will not give him a portion, but it is just a tradition [‘ade] that we 
have to ask the Muslims to slaughter it,” holo Makko said.171 He could not 
tell me more than this. 
Back in Europe, I heard of more examples of this ‘ade from my respondents. 
My respondent Simon was a young boy when his parents migrated to 
Sweden in 1978. He remembered well how his father experienced this ‘ade: 
When we came to Europe in 1978, we had a calf left to slaughter. After it 
was slaughtered, I remember that my father said: “When we go to Sweden 
we shall no longer have the problem of asking these ‘dogs’ to slaughter 
our animals” [dezzano l-Aurupa gkhulsina mi menna da kalbani]. 
By ‘inviting’ a Muslim to slaughter their animals, the meat became accessible 
to Muslims for consumption whenever they wanted.172 This gesture affirms 
that non-Muslims obey the Muslims; thereby acknowledging their power and 
that they allow them to share in the possessions of the Christians. This 
Islamic ritual of purity (halal) in food consumption symbolically gives 
Muslims who lived by this ritual a sense of superiority. The ritual also 
                                                 
171 From another source I heard that Christians gave at least the liver to the Muslim who 
slaughtered the animal. 
172 Interestingly, in Midyad, where the majority of the population by far was Christian, the 
Christian butchers had developed an alternative to inviting a Muslim to slaughter the animals. 
On the knife which was used to slaughter the animals they wrote the Koranic text: la ilaha ill 
Allah (There is no God but Allah). This replaced the role of the Muslim believer in the ritual 
of slaughtering animals while the meat sold by the Christian butchers was considered to be 
halal by the Muslim customers. 
 THE POSITION OF ASSYRIANS/SYRIACS IN THE THE HOMELAND         117 
 
functioned as compensation for the often economically better position of 
Christians to Muslims. In short, Christians became the scapegoat of their 
position. In the 1960s and 1970s, this element played an important role in 
the relations between Muslims and Christians in Tur ‘Abdin. Today, only in 
cases where Assyrians/Syriacs think that the Muslims would not learn about 
the slaughtering they decide not to ask them to slaughter the animal, for 
example when the animal to be killed is a chicken. It is less important 
whether a Muslim neighbour could eat from it or not. 
 In the Middle East, the ‘acceptance’ of this specific relationship with 
their Muslim neighbours can be seen as a survival mechanism, because they 
were not in the position to discuss or change their subjugated position. Holo 
Makko who continued to live in his village in Tur ‘Abdin did not question the 
tradition of slaughtering his animals. In contrast to his acceptance, Simon’s 
father, who had decided to leave Tur ‘Abdin, did reflect negatively on this 
tradition just before his departure. He felt that now on the point of leaving 
he was in a position to express himself differently from before, since he 
knew that his position was going to change in Europe. What is more 
important is that this is a symbol of obeying, of putting oneself at a lower 
level than the Muslims. When I asked an older lady for her experiences 
regarding the position of Assyrians/Syriacs in relation to that of Muslims in 
Tur ‘Abdin, she gave me a concise answer, using an expression in a 
combination of Arabic and Kurdish language ‘ben hashek’173 (‘sons of the 
stick’): ‘Ben hashek wayna’ (‘We were the sons of the stick’).174 My respondent 
assumed that I knew what she meant by this. I said to her that I had never 
heard it before.175 She then explained that it is a reference to their subjugated 
and defenceless position in relation to the Muslims. The expression assumes 
that the Muslims held the stick and hit whenever they wanted, or 
deconstructively: they subjected the non-Muslims, as they wanted. Two more 
commonly heard expressions for expressing this same idea are: qar‘ayna 
kifowa alle (‘our head was bowed to them’) and i hatro de Mhammad ‘al rishan wa 
                                                 
173 Ben hashek is also used when referring to a situation where a husband is dominated by his 
wife. 
174 ‘Ben’ is probably a short form of the Arabic noun ‘Ibin’. And hashek is Kurdish for Stick. 
The verb that is used in this expression – wayna (‘we were’) – is used in Suryoyo. I have no 
knowledge about the use of this expression in Kurdish or Arabic language context. 
175 I may have heard it before in gatherings with older people when I was younger but I am 
not conscious of it. I only started to pay attention to the metaphorical language after I started 
writing this thesis. 
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(‘[We lived with] the stick of Muhammed above our head’)176. All three 
expressions reveal metaphorically how Assyrians/Syriacs experienced their 
position in Turkish society. 
 Political alliance to a certain agha – or between Assyrians/Syriacs and 
Kurds generally –was only possible through breaking the religious 
boundaries. Some religious rituals were sometimes forgone by Muslims in 
order to be able to develop a closer relationship with the Christians, as the 
example of the Mhalmoyo Sheikh Fathullah shows. Another example is the 
‘kriv177 relationship’ between Christians and Muslims (although not very 
common but an exception). During the circumcision ceremony of Muslim 
boys, it might happen that the parents of the boy decided to have a Christian 
man as the kriv of their son instead of a Muslim man (as was the custom).178 
Therefore, it was a way to honour the Christian as a very close and dear 
friend of the Muslim family. The expectations from this relationship were 
that both families would protect each other during times of trouble. In daily 
life, they would continue to call each other by the term kriv instead of using 
the name of the person. 
 
3.2 Effects of Turkey’s Crises on Assyrians/Syriacs 
Although Turkey is formally a secular State, especially at times of internal 
and external crisis the Assyrians/Syriacs may be excused for thinking 
otherwise. Whenever Turkey was in conflict with Western States (which are 
identified as Christian) – the Assyrians/Syriacs living in Turkey suffered 
repercussions. As Christians in the Turkish Republic, they were perceived to 
be the allies of the Christian West and therefore internal enemies or 
foreigners.179 In their invidious position they became the reachable 
                                                 
176 Literally, the expression means ’The stick of Muhammed was above our head’. 
177 The social concept of kriv (in Kurdish) dates back to the Middle Ages in the Middle East. 
It was one of the forms of contracts between people to formalize social relationships. 
178 The man would hold the boy in his lap during the circumcision. This ceremony is 
comparable to the godparent-relationship which is an intrinsic part of the sacrament of 
baptism in the Christian tradition. 
179 The caricatures representing the Muslim Prophet Muhammed in the Jyllands-Posten had a 
similar effect. Various attacks were made on Christian churches in Iraq, Lebanon and Turkey. 
The priest in the Syriac Orthodox church in Adana had requested police guards because it was 
attacked by people throwing stones. In Mardin and in Midyad the Muslims had also organized 
demonstrations in 2006. One of my informants living in Sweden mentioned to me that when 
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scapegoats who were within grasping distance. To illustrate this I shall 
explore the ripple effect of two conflicts: the Cyprus crisis and the PKK 
conflict. 
 
3.2.1 The Cyprus Crises 
The influence of external crises on the relationship between 
Assyrians/Syriacs and Turkey was unequivocally revealed by the political 
crisis which erupted over Cyprus. In 1960 a military coup d’état took place in 
Turkey. On 16 August of the same year, the independence of Cyprus became 
a fact and Archbishop Makarios became the first president after its 
independence. The conflicts between Cyprus and Turkey (in 1964180 and in 
1974) twice resulted in reprisals against the Christian population in Turkey 
including Assyrians/Syriacs. The Muslim population was mobilized to agitate 
against the Christians in the area. This intensified polarization between them 
increased the strong sense of insecurity among the Assyrians/Syriacs in Tur 
‘Abdin. Inevitably, the local repercussions of national political events 
amplified the structural weakness of the Assyrians/Syriacs in local politics. 
Among the Assyrians/Syriacs these events roused fears of the spectre of the 
Seyfo during the First World War. Internally, the Cyprus crisis encouraged the 
politicizing of Islam, leading to antagonism against Christians in Turkey. 
Another element which exacerbated the tensions between Christians and 
Muslims was the manipulation of politicized Islam in the politics pursued by 
Prime Minister Demirel from the mid-1960s. Assyrian/Syriac respondents 
who had experienced the crisis in Midyad – following the Cyprus crisis in 
1964 – felt danger had virtually come knocking on their door. They talked 
about the planned demonstration of 1964181 (known as the Miting182 in 
Midyad) by armed Muslims from the neighbouring villages, as if they had just 
escaped the conflict by the skin of their teeth. A respondent in his fifties 
recounted what he experienced back then in Midyad: 
                                                                                                               
he visited Mor Gabriel Monastery in 2006, a soldier came to warn the people residing in the 
monastery to be careful. 
180 When president Makarios and his government made plans to limit the rights of the Turkish 
minority in Cyprus by changing the Constitution in 1964, this resulted in a civil war in which 
both Turkey and Greece were involved. 
181 See further Beth Sawoce and BarAbraham (2009). 
182 Miting is the Turkish word for ‘demonstration’. 
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In 1964, Turkey was again embroiled in a conflict with Cyprus. I heard 
that the Muslims from Karshaf, the Mhalmoye, Dalaniye and ‘the whole world 
of the Islam’ [I Tayutho kula]183 had organized an attack on Midyad. It was a 
very dangerous situation! If Dr Ref‘at had not been there, the Suryoye 
would have been slaughtered again, just as in the Seyfo. Dr Ref‘at went to 
the vali184 [governor] and the kaymakam [deputy-governor] and told them: 
“If even as much as a chicken is killed in Midyad, the two of you will be 
held responsible.” He [Dr Ref‘at] was a Muslim, the son of Merado Dbe 
Chalef [Kurdish clan in Midyad]… This is what we heard when we were in 
Midyad. Dr. Ref‘at had saved the Suryoye… At that time there were strong 
Suryoye men in Midyad! There was Biro Dbe Murekke, Silo Dbe Yoken… 
Makko Dbe Habsuno, Hanna Dbe Hendwoko Kfarzoyo, and others... 
They had ordered the Suryoye in Midyad to defend themselves if they 
[Muslims] launched an attack on the Suryoye… Finally, the vali and the 
kaymakam did not permit the Muslims to hurt the Christians. Had they not 
done so, the Muslims had decided to finish off the Christians in twenty-
four hours185… At that time the people [Assyrians/Syriacs] were ready to 
defend themselves, since they were threatened with eminent death. The 
survivors of the Seyfo were still alive; they still bore the scars of the pain 
and the hardships from the time of the Seyfo. What else could they do but 
defend? They said: “A new Seyfo has begun!” They could finish us in two 
hours if they wanted... My uncles were also in Germany. We feared that 
something similar to what happened at the time of the Seyfo would take 
place in Midyad. The Suryoye in Midyad were terrified and were once again 
seized by a sense of insecurity. When people started migrating, my mother 
left first to go to Germany where her brother was already living. 
In internal politics, Islam also started playing a larger role as it was also seen 
as an instrument to oppose the influence of leftist ideology. In the 1970s, 
several events took place in Turkey which led to instability and aroused fear 
                                                 
183 I Tayutho kula (literally: The whole world of the Islam) is an expression which 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Tur ‘Abdin often used to express that many Muslims had collected 
somewhere. This expression has a negative connotation and shows the fear Assyrians/Syriacs 
have of Muslims whenever they assembled to hurt them. 
184 A vali is the governor of a bigger city like Mardin. My respondent may have been wrong 
that the Suryoye had informed the vali too. Midyad had the status of a qaza (a smaller city) and 
had therefore a kaymakam (deputy-governor). The müdür nahiye ruled in a place which had the 
status of nahiye (smaller than a qaza but bigger than a village), such as Kerboran. In the village 
the mukhtar was in charge.  
185 The use of 24 hours or 2 hours is a metaphorical for saying that the Muslims could kill the 
Christians very easily and that the latter were defenceless. It also expresses how they sensed 
the power difference between them and the Muslims. 
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among the population. The first event, which affected all of Turkey, was the 
military coup on 12 March 1971. The atmosphere in Turkey heavily 
permeated by the struggle between the State and its organized nationalist 
followers on the one hand and the leftist movements on the other hand. In 
1970, influential academics, politicians and businessmen founded the 
extreme nationalist organization Ülkü Ocakları (The Hearths of Idealism). Its 
goal was to break the monopoly of the left-wing intellectuals on the social, 
political and cultural debate in Turkey (Zürcher 1996: 303). Influential 
Turkish politicians were attracted to the ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’ (Türk 
İslam Sentezi). Its principle was that the Islam exerted a special attraction on 
the Turks because of a number of (supposedly) striking similarities between 
their pre-Islamic culture and Islamic civilization (Ibid.).186 The idea was that 
Turkish culture was built on two pillars: a 2500-year-old Turkish element and 
a 1000-year-old Islamic element. Hence, the destiny of the Turks was to be 
the ‘soldiers of Islam’. In the late 1970s, the National Salvation Party (MSP) 
and the Nationalist Action Party of Turkey (MHP) were ardent adherents of 
this ideology. In a later period, this ideological constellation also appealed 
after the military coup of 12 September 1980. The military employed this 
ideology as an instrument to combat communist and socialist ideologies in 
Turkey.  
 In 1974, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi,187 CHP) 
came to power again. In this political atmosphere the second Cyprus crisis of 
1974 erupted, resulting in the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey on 20 July 
1974.188 The platform for a link between national identity and Islam was not 
limited to one political party. During the years 1975-1977, the government 
was based on a coalition between the National Salvation Party and the fascist 
Pan-Turkish Nationalist Action Party. The polarization of religious and 
ethnic differences became the focus of their propaganda. The nationalist 
newspaper Hürriyet (27 September 1978) for example discussed the alleged 
secret education in the Syriac Orthodox Zafaran Monastery thought to be 
                                                 
186 For further reading about Türk-İslam Sentezi see also Güvenç et al. (1994); Bora and Can 
(1999). 
187 The founder of this party was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938). 
188 The Greek Cypriots had already been encouraged by the Greek junta to achieve unity 
(enosis) with Greece in 1967. In 1974 the Greek junta organized a military coup d’état against 
Makarios in Cyprus, using the Cypriot National Guard which proclaimed unity with Greece 
(Zürcher 1996: 289). Fearing this unity, Ecevit decided to intervene with the idea of stopping 
this enosis: The Turkish armed forces occupied about 40% of Cyprus on 20 July 1974. 
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intended to send the pupils to higher education in Armenian schools in 
Istanbul in order to transform these Syriac Orthodox children into Armenian 
nationalists (Andersson 1983: 130). The Governor of Mardin, Fahri Öztürk 
confirmed this in an article in the same newspaper two days later, writing 
that the order to close down this educational activity was about to be 
executed. On 25 May 1979 this stream of education indeed stopped.189 
 
Alienating Christians 
The Turkish invasion of Cyprus provided a further platform to alienate 
Christians as a foreign element. During and after the days of the invasion, 
religious nationalism (Türk-Islam sentezi) grew in Turkey. Christians began to 
be referred to as Rum (Greek) or sometimes as Makarios (after the President 
of Cyprus). The Assyrians/Syriacs, who were perceived as allies of the 
Greeks because of their common faith, found themselves the focal of 
Turkish anger. Repercussions of such allegations on the Assyrians/Syriacs in 
Tur ‘Abdin and Mardin were followed by attacks from neighbouring 
Muslims.190 All respondents who talked about this period mentioned the 
sense of threat they experienced emanating from neighbouring Muslims in 
their villages. In Mzizah, the Assyrian/Syriac men stood on guard the village 
at night for about two weeks. One example of this threat was the violent 
demonstration in Midyad by the Muslims from the surrounding villages. The 
woman Nisane explained how she experienced the threat of this 
demonstration (which took place after the Cyprus crisis) in Midyad in 1975: 
When the conflict between Cyprus and Turkey broke out, the Muslims 
started to threaten the Christians in Midyad. They hung a cross around the 
neck of a dog [representing Archbishop and President Makarios] and they 
chased it with a stick through the streets in the centre of Midyad, past our 
churches. Parents barricaded their windows from the inside. My family put 
all of the young children, including me, food and water in our new well 
which was not yet used and therefore still dry. In Midyad we also had a 
network of subterranean canals. Some Suryoye hid themselves in these 
canals. They were very afraid for the young girls… We wept buckets of 
tears and our mothers even more than we did; hawar u hawar dithe [they 
screamed for help]. If this happened to us; what had happened to those in 
the Seyfo? My grandmother went crazy after the Seyfo!.. After about a week, 
                                                 
189 Until 1979 teaching had been tolerated, despite the fact that it was formally not allowed. 
190 See for oral accounts about the Cyprus crisis in Beth Sawoce and BarAbraham (2009).  
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the military came down and told us: “We had seen you armed in the 
churches.” But that was a lie! We were not armed [before the attack]. But 
the Suryoye men had also prepared themselves for defence against any 
attack… I was about six or seven years old, but I remember everything! A 
child does not forget something like that! The voice over the loudspeaker 
promised that we were free again… We endured this situation for about 
ten days. And when I listen to the Turkish channel saying “We did not do 
anything to the Christians,” I am furious! And this took place after the 
Seyfo. Before these events we had not yet planned to leave for Europe. But 
after this, we tried to get our papers ready to leave for Europe fast… We 
handed the keys over to them and left! ‘Dogs’ that they are!  
Metaphorically speaking, ‘to leave someone the keys’ means to leave 
everything behind and flee. Assyrians/Syriacs used to resort to this in times 
of crisis. Another version is ‘We closed the door behind us and gave them 
the keys’ (skhirlan u tar‘o bethrayna u hulanne a qlide).191 When I asked another 
respondent in what context this had been used, she referred to the recent 
example of refugees fleeing their houses in post-war Iraq (2003). 
 There are many examples showing that this change in tone towards the 
Assyrians/Syriacs trickled down to daily life. For instance, on one occasion 
Shushan told how Assyrians/Syriacs in the villages around Midyad 
experienced this threat from their Muslim neighbours (after the Cyprus crisis 
in 1974). Shushan was twelve when she experienced what happened in the 
village Bote192 in 1975: 
                                                 
191 In the context of the genocide in the First World War and the period thereafter, one such 
case resulted in the enrichment of one of the wealthiest families in Turkey, the Sabancı ailesi. 
Jan Beth Sawoce interviewed two elderly Assyrian/Syriac men about what happened: 
Chorbishop Brahim Hajjo and Iso‘ Dbe Qasho Malke. It is said that an Assyrian/Syriac man 
Garabet, who was originally from the village Saleh in Tur ‘Abdin, had settled in Adana where 
he established seven factories manufacturing cotton thread (Beth Sawoce mentioned four 
factories; a great grand daughter of Garabeth in Sweden mentioned seven factories in a private 
correspondence). After the French informed the remaining Christians in Adana that their 
mandate would come to an end in 1922, he decided to join his co-religionists in their flight 
because they feared the consequences of the withdrawal of French protection. Apparently he 
had just left the keys behind and departed. Later, one of his Turkish employees who used to 
serve Garabet and his guests drinks, took over the factories as his property and developed the 
enterprises into the Sabancı Holding; in the present-day this family is counted among the richest 
in Turkey. Garabet settled in Lebanon. Malke Asaad married his daughter Ghazme, whose 
daughter and chandchildren live in Sweden. There are many similar stories about this period. 
This topic has become the main theme in the latest works of the famous novelist Yaşar Kemal 
(1997, 2002a, 2002b). 
192 The distance between Midyad and Bote was about ten kilometres. 
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I lived in Bote until the age of thirteen. I have found memories of the fruit, 
vegetation and the nice and the pleasant simple life. The unpleasant 
recollections I have are related to persecution by Muslims. After I grew a 
bit older I noticed that [persecution] very clearly. When I was younger I 
did not understand why my family always said: “Take this buttermilk to 
those dogs” when they meant the Muslims. Many times I asked myself 
“Why do they give them something if they do not like them?” Later I 
understood that they gave the Muslims something to keep them satisfied 
and to develop a friendly relationship with them. 
 What I remember very clearly from the athro [homeland] in the year 
[1975] before we came to Europe is that the Muslims started behaving 
very badly towards us; it became almost a trauma with me. There was a 
Muslim man who shouted from one of the roofs in the village and 
threatened us saying that they [Muslims] would kill all the Christians – 
again. I froze to my very marrow [jamedli] when I heard this. The older 
people started crying. I heard that the Greeks and Turkey were at war. 
Therefore, the Muslims in our neighbourhood wanted to take revenge on 
the Christians, by killing us. They assumed that we were allies of the 
Greeks who were at war with Turkey. This made me very afraid… In the 
past, when my grandfather and other elderly people used to talk about the 
Seyfo, I always thought those stories had taken place in the distant past, 
something that could not happen again. Besides, the stories about the Seyfo 
sounded to me like myths and beyond my comprehension [lo ‘obar wa l-
mehi]. But, when the elderly people began to weep about the children who 
would be slaughtered, I started to think of myself as being one of those 
children. I was twelve at that time. I froze [jamedli] and asked myself “how 
could the Muslims ever slaughter us!?” Until then I assumed that people 
slaughtered only animals and not children like me who had not done 
anything wrong. I began to feel very sad and angry with the older Suryoye 
people. Until then I had assumed that they would be able to protect me 
from anything which could harm me. But at that moment I saw that they 
were very weak and that they could not protect me against the Muslims. I 
started to feel weak and unprotected against what others could do to me...  
 In 1976 I came to Sweden… I did understand why I fled to Sweden, 
but I did not have any idea about when I would go back. As a child I did 
not understand these things; why I had to leave my parents to go to a 
place which I do not know about. It was not a nice experience. We came 
to Sweden as orphans, since families were not allowed into Sweden at that 
time.193 Therefore our families sent us first. Besides the general dangers in 
                                                 
193 It would have been much harder to be accepted as a family. The parents wanted probably 
to make sure that at least the children were safe and sound. 
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the area, we [the girls] had reached the age [13] that we might be 
kidnapped by the Muslims. Therefore my parents preferred us to be safe. 
In Sweden we asked for asylum as orphans. 
In 1975, the Assyrians/Syriacs in Midyad were shaken by another violent 
event. A Muslim girl fell in love with an Assyrian/Syriac boy from Midyad 
and eloped with him.194 Such event was unusual and unacceptable for the 
Muslims. The Muslims in Estel (twin town of Midyad with Muslim 
inhabitants) and in the villages around Midyad organized an attack on the 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Midyad. The Assyrians/Syriacs managed to defend 
themselves effectively because they had been warned by a Muslim woman195 
from Midyad’s twin town Estel who had heard about the preparations for the 
attack. Despite the fact that the violent attack was halted after some days 
through the intervention of the military, the event prompted many 
Assyrians/Syriacs to have their passports ready to leave for one of the 
European countries. 
 As indicated before, the Assyrians/Syriacs were not in a good position 
to defend themselves, and the authorities did not offer them any protection. 
In 1976 the instability and chaos deepened as many Kurds who worked 
illegally in Lebanon returned to Tur ‘Abdin. Upon arrival, the latter began to 
take revenge196 on their Christian neighbours by killing, stealing and 
kidnapping (Anschütz 1985: 59, Roldanus 1984). It is a general grievance of 
Assyrians/Syriacs that they are vulnerable in a Muslim society because the 
authorities do not offer the protection needed. Considering that 
Assyrians/Syriacs already felt defenceless (twiroye) even in situations which 
are not major crises, conflicts as that described above were like pouring oil 
on fire –resulting in another situation fraught with fear. This sense of being 
                                                 
194 In the few cases in which Muslim girls eloped with Suryoye men with whom they fell in love, 
these couples were forced to move to another area to continue their lives secretly. An example 
is the kalo (bride) of Dbe Denjeke in Midyad. The Muslims from the surroundings villages 
attacked Midyad. The bride and groom eloped to Germany. In 2005/2006, a series appeared 
on Turkish TV which was based on this story which had taken place in Midyad. Some of the 
episodes were also filmed in Midyad. See also Miroğlu (2009) for an account of this story. 
195 She is said to be the daughter of an Assyrian/Syriac woman (from the Dbe Dehabe family 
in Midyad) who was abducted by the Muslims of Estel during the Seyfo. She apparently found it 
intolerable that Assyrians/Syriacs would be endangered in such an attack and informed 
Chorbishop Abdallah about this plan. 
196 The Kurds working in Lebanon considered themselves to be on the side of the Muslims 
who were fighting the Christians during the Lebanese Civil War. Resettling in Tur ‘Abdin, they 
continued to perceive Christians as those with whom they were at war. 
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defenceless has become almost all pervading since the 1960s, because 
Christians were deprived of the ability to protect themselves in the new 
social political arena. The case of a priest in one of the villages of Turo d-Izlo 
in Tur ‘Abdin at the end of the 1970s, who found himself thrust into a 
dilemma provides an apt illustration: He sat about renovating the church in 
which he had been inducted as priest that year and the work was not finished 
yet. While thus engaged, he was sorely troubled by unprovoked attacks by 
Kurdish Muslims in the region. He had endured various attacks on his village 
and on himself personally. Since many of the younger people had already left 
the village, he felt that he could no longer defend the remaining 
Assyrian/Syriac villagers. After the priest had gone to the local yüzbaşı197 to 
report this on numerous occasions, the yüzbaşı advised the priest: 
Father, listen to me, I must tell you that you cannot live in this land. The 
people in this land are simply like this. If you stay here, this will be your 
life. Nothing will be solved when you report the various attacks on your 
life and on that of your villages to the authorities. 
For the priest this was a sign that the authorities could not or did not want to 
expend any energy to protect them either. This realization prompted him to 
begin discussing the situation with his villagers: 
In a gathering with the villagers I explained to them: “The situation in the 
village is as you can observe it. Nevertheless, if you promise me that you 
will not leave, I shall stay with you. I have put enormous effort into 
rebuilding the church and it is not finished yet.198 I don’t want to abandon 
it and just leave.” But each of them told me: “As soon as we get the 
passports we applied for, we shall leave and we advise you to do the 
same.” This is how I left for Germany in 1978. 
As I discuss in the next chapter, this is the period in which the mass 
emigration to Europe started. Experiencing threats and danger particularly 
after the Cyprus crises and Turkey’s political conjuncture, they turned their 
face to the ‘open road to Europe’. 
 
                                                 
197 Equal to Captain’s rank in military. 
198 He renovated the church illegally. At that time the Turkish authorities had not given yet 
permission for Assyrians/Syriacs to renovate churches. 
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3.2.2 The Armed Struggle between the Turkish Army and 
the PKK (1975-99) 
In the 1970s, the Turkish authorities made attempts to break down the 
power of the leftist movement. This plunged Turkish society into extreme 
disorder. The actions taken by the authorities to control this situation had 
far-reaching consequences for everybody in society – whether they wanted to 
be involved in the conflict or not. One group in this Turkish leftist 
movement would later focus on specifically Kurdish rights in Turkey.199 In 
the provinces of Mardin and Diyarbakır, the first Kurdish activists who 
espoused the struggle and mobilized the movement, were known as the 
talaba (students); a reference to the high rate of sympathizers and activists for 
their ideology among this group. Since the 1970s, the talaba (later to be 
organized as the PKK), have been the main power challenging that of the 
Kurdish aghas in the area of Tur ‘Abdin. In 1978 Abdullah Öcalan founded 
the PKK (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan, Workers Party of Kurdistan), a Kurdish 
guerrilla organization.200 
 
Leftist Movements and Assyrians/Syriacs 
The leftist201 movement in Turkey also left its mark on the Assyrian/Syriac 
students – although they could be counted on the fingers of one hand – in 
cities like Istanbul and Ankara and on pupils at secondary schools in Tur 
‘Abdin, Mardin and Diyarbakır. Specifically during the 1970s the activities of 
the Assyrian/Syriac cultural association MED Kültür Derneği in Istanbul were 
stimulated by Assyrian/Syriac students who had grown up in an 
environment dominated by the leftist Turkish movement.202 Nevertheless, 
only a few of these students actually joined the Turkish leftist movements in 
                                                 
199 See Van Bruinessen (1992: 275) about the first Kurdish political organizations, such as the 
Kurd Teavun ve Teraqqi Jamiyati (Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and progress) which was 
founded in 1908, following the Young Turk revolution. 
200 Both the talaba and the Apocu came to be known as the PKK. Its goal was to found a 
socialist independent Kurdish state in the Middle East. Later, with the capture of the leader of 
the movement, A. Öcalan in 1999, the movement has started to change its program and some 
of its aims, particularly the claim for an independent Kurdish state.  
201 See for a study of the Socialist Movement in Turkey, Lipovsky (1992). 
202 MED derived its name from Mardin, El ‘Aziz and Diyarbakır – names of the towns from 
which the founders originally came. The founders (about ten academics) got a formal 
permission to establish the MED Cultural Association in 1960. It functioned as a meeting 
point for Assyrians/Syriacs in Istanbul. See further Oussi (1998: 13, 14) and Akdemir (2009: 
150, 151). 
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the big cities in which they studied.203 Other Assyrian/Syriac youngsters did 
seem to have been influenced by these ideas but with the exception of one or 
two they were not active.204 Like other leftists in Turkey, Assyrian/Syriac 
students with leftist ideas ran into difficulties. As they sensed the danger of 
being caught, they mobilized the family contacts they had in Europe and fled 
the country. Some of them were imprisoned for a short period before they 
fled the country. 
 The presumable reason why not many Assyrian/Syriac youngsters 
joined the leftist movement is because of the historical non-active political 
involvement of their group in Turkish politics. Firmly on the outside, no 
culture of political involvement in the Turkish political system developed 
among them. The root cause can be inexorably traced to their historical 
position in a Muslim society, first as millet in the Ottoman Empire, and later 
as a non-recognized Christian minority. Any deviation from the norm could 
be perceived by the authorities as a threat to Turkish unity. Assyrians/Syriacs 
refer to this attitude of the Turkish authorities by saying ‘they kept a close 
watch on us’ (lasyewayne a‘layna). Another reason for the low involvement of 
Assyrians/Syriacs in even the Turkish leftist movement can be pointed out 
as the chauvinistic approach of this movement and the exclusion of minority 
problems. In addition, members of the leftist movement did not recognize a 
separate ethnic minority identity than the ‘Turkish national identity’. In this 
sense, also the leftist Turkish movement can be seen as a nationalist 
movement. 
 Roldanus (1985: 83) discusses the very careful attitude of the Syriac 
Orthodox church board in Istanbul and its attempts to meet the norm set by 
                                                 
203 This conscious attitude towards socio-political issues can be observed among the 
Assyrians/Syriacs generally and especially among the older generation. Assyrian/Syriac 
parents were usually very careful and did not allow their children to mix easily with the 
masses. They were not only afraid of the leftist ideas with which their children might come 
into contact, they were also plagued by a fear that the children might be harmed by the 
Muslims in some general way. This is often expressed with the statement twiroyena baynothayye 
(among them we are defenceless). Usually they did not feel secure enough to send their 
children to higher education schools which were based in cities – where the majority was 
Muslim. Respondents give a historical explanation for this fear. They remember cases of 
Assyrian/Syriac pupils and students who were killed by Muslim students simply because of 
their Christian background. 
204 An example is Ibrahim Seven who had the leadership in the Communist Party of Turkey 
Unity (Türkiye Kommünist Partisi/Birlik, TKP/B) and in the later founded Revolutionary 
Communist Party (Devrimci Komünist Partisi, DKP). 
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the authorities regarding politically correct attitude of ‘Turkish citizens’.205 
The church board was palpably aware that the authorities kept a constant 
check on them.206 This confirms and explains the stories of my respondents 
who were active in the cultural association MED Kültür Derneği during the 
1970s.207 Their efforts were constantly hindered by the Syriac Orthodox 
church board, which they perceived as the extended arm208 of the Turkish 
authorities in the latter’s attempt to control cultural activities209 they 
organized for the Assyrian/Syriac youth in Istanbul. Respondents who lived 
in this city in the second part of the 1990s complained about the controlling 
attitude of the church board whom were believed to make use of the 
position of the local Syriac Orthodox archbishop.210 Initially the church 
board agreed to the initiative launched by a group of students from the 
congregation who wanted to publish the informative magazine Sheblo – 
discussing both social cultural and religious topics. The church board 
censored all contributions before publication and changed some articles 
without the consent of the authors, because they did not find them 
acceptable in the light of Turkish public opinion. This is one of the reasons 
                                                 
205 See for the careful attitude of Assyrian/Syriac leaders also Roldanus (1985: 93), who 
mentions that in the beginning of the 1980s, some priests of the Syriac Orthodox Church 
wished to open a church school (madrashto) to teach Bible classes and church hymns to 
Assyrian/Syriac children in Istanbul. But this idea was blocked by the local church board, a 
result of its very careful attitude. Roldanus concludes therefore that the church board made 
enormous efforts not to experiment with new developments but instead preserved the status 
quo for the safety of the Assyrians/Syriacs. 
206 Roldanus (1985: 82) writes that during the time of his research in 1982, the authorities had 
checked the names of the candidates for the church board. They had the right to remove 
names from the list if they were not satisfied about their attitude. The authorities in Ankara 
give their authorization to the list of candidates through the governor in Istanbul. During 
formal church meetings, a representative of the authorities had to be present. 
207 The coup d’état in 1980 with a strong focus on uniformity in culture led to the disbandment 
of the association MED (Roldanus 1985: 84), Akdemir (2009: 151). 
208 According to several of my respondents who had been active in the MED Kutur Derneği in 
Istanbul, the Turkish nationalist author Mithat Sertoğlu published a book in which he claimed 
that Assyrians/Syriacs (Süryani) are of the Turan race. This was made possible with the 
financial help of individuals in the church board. When the church board tried to distribute 
this book among the church members, the MED activists protested and hindered its 
distribution in the church. 
209 They organized youth social outings, theatre plays, Syriac language classes and folkloristic 
dance evenings. 
210 Interview (2007) with one of the initiators of the magazine Sheblo and their radio 
programme. An informant mentioned to to me that in Damacus, the church board has a 
similar attitude, prohibiting all activities taking place outside the church, such as cultural 
activities, language schools and parties. 
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many works about cultural aspects, including the Syriac language, were not to 
be published. Anything written which touched on the theme of human rights 
in Turkey had to be withdrawn as well. The publication was produced from 
1995 to 1998; a period of continuous tensions between the students and the 
church board. In 1998 the church board stopped the publication.211 In the 
same period, similar incidents occurred after the identical group of students 
had arranged with a leftist Turkish radio station to broadcast one hour per 
week to discuss cultural and political subjects. After a few broadcasts, the 
church board requested the students to stop the broadcasts by order of the 
authorities. The church board in Istanbul has also opposed to the activities 
of the first civic Assyrian/Syriac association after the military coup of 1980, 
MEZO-DER (Mesopotamia Solidarity Association, 2004). According to my 
respondents, as soon as it was established the archbishop sent a letter to all 
his congregations in Istanbul to be read at the sermon of the Sunday mass, 
emphasizing that the diocese did not have any relationship with the 
mentioned association and that the church members were not supposed to 
get in close contact with this organization. This can be seen as a symbolic 
gesture towards the authorities, showing disapproval to this organization’s 
establishment. 
 
Caught Between the ‘Horse Shoe and the Nail’ 
In the second half of the 1970s, the conflict between the talaba and the 
authorities upset the provoking situation of the people in Tur ‘Abdin. The 
villagers were aware that the talaba were fighting the authorities and their 
institutions, including the police and the military.212 At that time, the 
Assyrians/Syriacs, particularly those in Tur ‘Abdin, were caught in the middle 
of the struggle between the Kurdish activists and the Turkish authorities. 
                                                 
211 After publication of the magazine Sheblo was stopped, the Archbishop launched a new 
magazine, this time with the Turkish name Yeni Gün Įşığı (Light of the New Day). The articles 
published dealt with internal church affairs. A few selected deacons were involved in the 
publication, which continued for only a few months. 
212 As a young child growing up in Mzizah, this part of political society touched my life too. 
Not because I watched television or listened to the radio. It was because some of the young 
Kurdish men in Mzizah were active in or had sympathies for the talaba. I remember that a 
young man in my village had written the name of the People’s Party in Turkey, CHP 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) on the wall of the village school in big letters around 1980. As soon as 
the soldiers came into the village and saw it, they went to the house closest to the school and 
beat the owner badly. At that time CHP was perceived to be more leftist. Moreover, often 
with the military coup, only military hegemony was accepted. 
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Respondents who lived in Midyad in this period remembered that the chaos 
there worsened and there were many nocturnal raids. 
 The end of the 1970s was marked by mounting problems of law and 
order: Kurdish separatism had gained ground, politicians reached a political 
impasse, the economy was collapsing and many sensed the threat of Islamic 
fundamentalism which was fed by the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran 
(Zürcher 1996: 282). The military intervened by staging a coup d’état on 12 
September 1980. The armed forces took over the whole political system and 
declared a state of emergency throughout the country (Zürcher 1996: 292-3). 
General Kenan Evren was officially declared head of State on 14 September. 
By June 1981, there was a ban on political debates in public. In 1983 the first 
Prime Minister after the coup d’état was Turgut Özal of the Motherland Party 
(Anavatan Partisi). Many members of the Motherland Party, including Özal, 
had been influenced by the ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’ (Zürcher 1996: 303). 
The orientation of the Republic deviated visibly to a Turkish-Islamic channel 
against perceived ‘ethnic separatism’ (emphasis on Turkishness against ethnic 
claims) and ‘communism’ (Islam against leftist movements).  
 After the military coup of 1980, the renewed focus on intertwining 
Turkish nationalism and Islamism infiltrated into various areas, as some of 
my respondents experienced during that period:  
• Religious education in Sunni Islam were made obligatory for all 
pupils213 from 1982 (independent of their religious belief);  
• A class on ‘national security’ (Milli Güvenlik) was introduced into 
high schools. Army officers taught about the role of the military in 
Turkish history and the army system; 
• Many churches were converted into mosques and the construction 
of new mosques was stimulated as a counterweight to communist 
leftist ideas. 
Turkish chauvinism swelled as a reaction to the attacks on Turkish embassies 
by the Armenian ASALA214. Attempting to avoid the stigma of disloyalty, 
                                                 
213 See more on religious education (Roldanus 1985: 79). 
214 ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) operated from 1975 to 
1986. The intention of the ASALA was ‘to compel the Turkish Government to acknowledge 
publicly its responsibility for the Armenian genocide during the First World War, pay 
reparations, and cede territory for an Armenian homeland’ (U.S. Department of State, 
‘Appendix B’, Patterns of Global Terrorism Report, 1996). 
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Christian minorities adopted certain strategies: those living in the cities gave 
their children Turkish names, and tried not to be recognized as non-Turkish 
in public life. Before the 1980s, Christian minorities which had been 
perceived to be the disloyal ‘internal enemy’ were referred to as Rum.  This 
reference changed to ‘Armenians’ or ‘members of the ASALA’ after the 
1980s. 
 In the 1980s and 1990s religious fanaticism also assumed a political 
character and started organizing itself. Especially in the bigger cities, the 
influence of the Islamists increased (Zürcher 1996: 310). In 1994 the Islamist 
Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) seized power. The Turkish Hezbullah, an 
Islamist Turkish terrorist group, was founded in the 1980s with the goal of 
fighting the PKK.215 Although allegations that the Hezbullah had been 
founded with the help of and with the collabouration of Turkish security 
forces, the Turkish military denied this sharply (Human Rights Watch World 
Report 2000).216 Assyrian/Syriac respondents recounted that in about 1988 
the people in Tur ‘Abdin grew aware of the existence of the Hezbullah: its 
male members started to wear full beards and even the attitude of women 
and children towards Christians assumed fanatical character.  
 My respondent Shabo explained how waxing religious fanaticism left its 
mark on the economic relations between Muslims and Christians: 
…Mullah Jubbair preached in the mosque that the Muslims should not 
buy from the Christians because their products were haram. He spread 
extreme and negative ideas about the Christians which led to a worsened 
relationship with the Suryoye. Consequently, the Suryoye sold fewer of their 
products in Midyad. Therefore, the Suryoye developed a new strategy to sell 
their food: they asked Muslims in the village to sell their products. In 
return, these Muslims shared in the profits. In this respect, they started to 
depend more on the Muslims in the village. 
The mounting social and political influence of mullahs in Tur ‘Abdin can be 
seen as an indication of the more rampant religious fundamentalism. On 
January 5th 1990, the Assyrian/Syriac mayor (mukhtar) of the village Anhel, 
Gevriye Bulut and his son Sami were killed by the Hezbullah and the mullah 
                                                 
215 For a background on Turkish Hezbullah see: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hizbullah-t.htm 
216 See the report about the Turkish Hezbullah by Human Rights Watch online: 
 http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/02/tur0216.htm 
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(Muslim religious leader) of Anhel. After the involvement of the mullah had 
become public, Mullah Zubair assembled the mullahs of the villages in the 
area to meet with the remaining Assyrian/Syriac men in Anhel. At that 
meeting, the mullahs requested from the Assyrian/Syriac men in the village 
not to request the authorities to punish the mullah, if they did so they 
threatened to unleash a second Seyfo (here: genocide) on the 
Assyrians/Syriacs and exterminate them. After this threat, the 
Assyrians/Syriacs kept quiet and many decided to leave Anhel for Europe.217 
Around 1991, the remaining Assyrians/Syriacs in Tur ‘Abdin began receiving 
letters from the Hezbullah in which their lives were threatened (Araz 2001: 
132). In the 1990s the Hezbullah kidnapped Assyrians/Syriacs with a central 
position in the community.218 The teacher Lahdo Barinç was kidnapped in 
1993. In 1994 the same happened to Father Melke Tok, priest of the village 
Midin. Both of them were released after negotiations and influence of 
European politicians and Assyrian/Syriac activists in the diaspora.219 A few 
days after Father Melke Tok was set free, the Assyrian/Syriac mayor of 
Midyad, Yacob Matte (who was involved in the negotiations) was killed by 
the Hezbullah (Araz 2001: 145/6). 
 
Daily Life and the PKK Conflict 
Towards the mid-1980s, Turkish fear of Kurdish separatism had grown, 
fanned by the intensified guerrilla war waged by the PKK in south-eastern 
Turkey since 1984. The new rhetoric of accusation alleged that the goal of 
the Kurdish PKK was separatism in south-eastern Turkey; the Armenian 
ASALA strove for a similar prize in the northeast and the east; and the 
Assyrians/Syriacs were allied to both of these ‘separatist’ groups. In the 
climate created by this false accusation, the position of the Assyrians/Syriacs 
                                                 
217 From an interview (2005) with a respondent who was among the last remaining 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Anhel. 
218 See forthcoming report by Abrohom Mirza. 
219 Lahdo Barinç was set free after the payment of two billion Turkish Lira (Araz 2001: 146). 
In that same year father Melke Tok narrated the story of his kidnapping on a cassette which 
was copied by the Assyrians/Syriacs in Europe. It was a sign that the situation in Tur ‘Abdin 
was very dangerous and that the Assyrians/Syriacs in Tur ‘Abdin were helpless. Talay (2004) 
published the story of Father Melke Tok with a German translation. The latest victim of such 
kidnappings was the Syriac Orthodox monk Daniel Savci (residing at the St Jacob Monastery 
in the village of Salah), on 28 November 2007. One of his kidnappers was a ‘village guard’ 
from the town Hazakh (Turkish: Idil). 
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became unbearable – a sentiment reiterated by all respondents who lived 
there during that time. In his account my respondent Shabo (at that time he 
was about 19 years old and living in Tur ‘Abdin) gives an idea of his 
perception about the conflict in the area and the groups concerned: 
Around the mid-1980s there were a couple of Suryoye youngsters who 
expressed sympathy for the ideas of the PKK, because it also fought their 
oppressor. Moreover, the PKK convinced these youngsters that if the 
Kurds were to realize a free Kurdistan then the Suryoye and all the other 
people in their territory would be allowed to enjoy much more freedom 
than they did under Turkish rule: “Then you will be able to enjoy the 
freedom that you need, to open your shops whenever you want it, to have 
your own flag, to have your own schools and so forth.” These Suryoye 
youngsters were not involved in the armed struggle, but they showed their 
sympathy for their ideology. Usually, the Suryoye people in the village were 
not aware of this. It was all secret… I was not convinced by this PKK 
ideology. It was the stuff which dreams are made of and not realistic. If 
the Yezidi, the Muslim and I were to decide to have a country together, 
then we should enjoy the same rights if we had fought alongside each 
other. First, I should be sure that this would be the case. And if this were 
not to be, I had little appetite for becoming involved in their business. 
They said that we would be able to live peacefully with them under their 
leadership. But history has taught us otherwise; from what we heard from 
our ancestors this is not possible. There is even a saying which goes “Even 
if a Muslim is an apple, do not put him in your pocket. And if you put him 
in your pocket then make a hole so it falls out.” The implication is that 
Muslims cannot be trusted. This has been our experience in this country. I 
could be free with my people and under the leadership of our people we 
could communicate with them, but I did not want to co-operate with 
them under their leadership, as I do not trust them. We would respect 
them and they should respect us. But each with their own rights. It was 
clear to me that if they were to achieve power in the future, they would 
not have granted us our rights. Therefore I did not want to get involved in 
their business. For example, the older generation [Suryoye] eschewed 
involvement with the Kurds, especially because they had still harboured 
memories of the time of the Seyfo. All they wanted was to live in freedom 
and peace – enjoying their rights… There is no certainty that they could 
enjoy a better position with more rights under Kurdish rule.  
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As a reaction to the increased guerrilla activities of the PKK, the authorities 
developed the system of ‘village guards’ as part of their strategy to break 
down the power of the PKK on two fronts.220 The idea was to prevent the 
PKK from infiltrating the villages and influencing the population with its 
ideology, and it was also a means to stop the villagers from providing them 
with food or any other assistance – in case requested (under threat) by the 
PKK. The military and the ‘village guards’ on their part did not hesitate to 
punish the villagers were they to have any ‘friendly’ contact with the PKK 
(whether out of sympathy or necessity driven by the fear of reprisals). Since 
these ‘guards’ were armed and allied to both the local agha and the 
authorities, they acquired power and dominance over the common villagers. 
Often they had no compunction about abusing their power for personal 
gain, getting away with the scot-free. Among the ordinary villagers, this 
increased the sense of becoming even more defenceless than they had been. 
A relatively high number of attacks against Assyrians/Syriacs are still 
reported to have been perpetrated by these ‘village guards’.221 People fear 
them since they are backed up by both the Turkish authorities and the local 
Kurdish agha.  
 Besides the high number of Assyrian/Syriac victims of murder by either 
one of the armed groups cooperating with the authorities (village guards, 
Hezbullah, Kurdish aghas, and the army) or by the PKK, Assyrians/Syriacs 
had foremost to endure the enormous pressure and danger they experienced 
from all these groups. It was clear that they themselves could not decide to 
stay out of the conflict between these groups. Several Assyrian/Syriac 
youngsters experienced imprisonment upon alleged connections with the 
PKK. It is remarkable that also in this political situation between the army 
and the PKK, Assyrian/Syriac victims were besides these baseless 
accusations, confronted with their religious affiliation to divert from that of 
the majority. Shabo, who had been confronted three times with such 
accusation during the 1980s, recounts that during the interrogation sessions 
                                                 
220 In Tur ‘Abdin, the agha Seyhmus Çelebi is in charge of all the village guards in the region 
(Koruçubaşı).The authorities delegate the responsibility for the financial payment of the village 
guards to this agha. Offering salaries higher than for example that of schoolteachers, the 
authorities have attracted many Kurds for these positions in order to fight the PKK. 
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the people in charge of the interrogation and torture questioned his Christian 
affiliation: 
…When it was my turn to be interrogated, they first took my picture. 
Then I had to sign a document stating that I was connected to the PKK. I 
said that I did not want to sign it, but else they would hurt me. Therefore, 
I signed. But first they had to prove that. Then the soldier asked me: 
“Where are you from?” “From Midyad,” I said. He looked at my identity 
pass [nüfus] and read that I was Christian. He asked me “Why are you 
Christian?” I said: “That is none of your business. There are many 
Christians. I am not the only one. There are many Süryani in Midyad, 
Mardin, Istanbul and Europe.” He said: “Why don’t you become 
Muslim?” I said: “I am happy with my religion, thank God.” Every time 
that it was my turn he shouted to me in Turkish: “Gel ulan Christo”222 
[Come here you Christ!] 
As were other Assyrian/Syriac victims of this situation, Shabo was released. 
One individual who was confronted with this politicized situation and had to 
endure political imprisonment of twelve and a half years on the basis of false 
allegations, was Soner Önder. His case is interesting for several reasons in 
relation to the position of the Christians during the civil war in Turkey in the 
1990s. Soner,223 then a seventeen-year-old university student, was arrested 
and taken into police custody in Istanbul on the 25 December 1991. 
According to the official statements, he was one of twenty-eight suspects 
charged following an arson attack on a department store in the Bakırköy 
district of Istanbul on Christmas Day. The firebombing of the premises was 
carried out by the youth organization of PKK. Soner was charged with 
aiding and abetting an illegal armed organization and with attending the 
demonstration held on that day. On 12 January 1996, Soner was sentenced 
                                                 
222  In this context, the term ulan is used with the meaning of ‘Hey you’. Christo is a derogatory 
reference to the Christians generally, but its use started with a specific reference to the Greek 
Orthodox during the New Turkish Republic. Christo could be perceived as another version of 
gavur (infidel). The Turkish film industry Yeşilcam especially mobilized its use through the 
image it showed of a typical Greek (Christo) in Istanbul, which had become the symbol for the 
historical struggle for power between the Turks and the Greeks. A Christo in those movies was 
presented as someone devilish, dark-looking with a long dark beard. The dark colour is 
presumably a reference to the black cloth worn by Christian clergy and to the dark image of 
the devil. The use of the term Christo was widely current after the first Cyprus conflict in 1955. 
223 Soner was studying at university in Istanbul when he was arrested at the age of seventeen. 
In international writings, he was identified as a member of the Chaldean Church, or Assyrian 
in Turkey.  
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to death. Nine years after this decision in 2005, when Soner was released 
after twelve-and-a-half years imprisonment, the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg condemned Turkey for violating Articles 3 and 6224 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights.225 
 On the basis of Soner’s own bibliographical writing, on 25 December 
1991 he was on his way to his sister’s house after Christmas Mass, which he 
attended at the Syriac Orthodox Church in Bakirköy, the quarter where the 
said demonstration took place in the morning of the same day. The police 
stopped the bus and checked the identity cards of all the passengers. Upon 
reading Soner’s Christian affiliation and Diyarbakır (known as the centre of 
Kurdish Separatist Movement) as his birth of place on his identity pass, the 
policeman shouted out at him Aşağı in, gavur! (‘Get off the minibus, gavur!’). 
This is how his twelve-and-a-half year history of political imprisonment and 
torture commenced. During periods of interrogation and torture, he was 
blindfolded and told to sign a document in which it was stated that he was 
involved in the PKK attack in Istanbul – if he refused to comply they would 
continue with the torture. Being accused of PKK connections was not the 
only or even the main aspect of the way he was treated during the period in 
which he was imprisoned. To a very great extent, his Christian identity 
seemed to assume a more central role in the way his accusation was handled 
by the authorities. In his unpublished biographical writings, Soner states that 
the policemen in charge intensified the torture as soon as they discovered 
that he was not circumcised. The police introduced electric shocks through 
cables attached to Soner’s nipples, toes, ears and penis and added to this: 
‘Now we shall make sure that you will not be able to become a father’. In the 
torture sessions which followed, his sexual organ became the focal point of 
the treatment. Moreover, the policemen forced him to discuss his Christian 
belief and he was confronted with such exclamations as ‘You Christians, do 
you believe in  destiny? You will see what your destiny will be!’ When Soner 
– upon being asked who he was - defined himself as Süryani (Turkish for 
Assyrian/Syriac), the reaction of the police chief was: ‘You also want an 
independent state, Asuristan! (Assyria)... You, the Armenian sperm! (Ermeni 
                                                 
224 Article 3 prohibits torture, and ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. Article 6 
provides a detailed right to a fair trial. 
225 Application No. 39813/98, European Court of Human Rights. Press release issued by the 
Registrar. Chamber judgement concerning Turkey (12 July 2005). 
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dölü!)226… You are all the same!’  Similarly, in the national Turkish 
newspapers, Soner was portrayed as ‘an Armenian Terrorist’. This again 
indicates that all Christians in Turkey were lumped together in the 
constitutive outside as the ‘others’ and the internal enemy. In Turkish 
nationalist discourse, ‘Armenian terrorist’ invariably works because of its 
historically constructed meaning. Religious discourses also assumed a central 
place during the court sessions. To mention the dimension of the witnesses, 
the Archbishop of the Syriac Orthodox Church in Istanbul submitted an 
affidavit to the Court in which he stated that Soner had been in church at the 
time of the attack. The court did not take this evidence into consideration 
and afterwards the Turkish media portrayed the archbishop as the defender 
of ‘terrorists’. Instead, the judge based his verdict of a life sentence227 mainly 
on the evidence of a Muslim fanatic who attacked Soner’s family during the 
court hearing and testified against Soner.  Even though his testimony was 
completely inconsistent and obviously fabricated, the court regarded him as a 
reliable key witness and reached its verdict on the basis of his testimonies. 
The same man later also identified Soner as one of the persons who 
murdered a police chief; a month after he had actually been taken into 
custody, and was consequently behind bars. 
 It is also remarkable that the ‘deep state’ hung Soner’s picture on the 
wall of the visitors’ room as a poster with a text which was addressed to the 
families of the other prisoners: Soner Önder, Christian Chaldean. This is the 
terrorist leader who misleads your children! Here again, Soner is not presented as an 
individual for what he was accused for years before but as what he was 
alleged to be: the Christian enemy who fools the Muslim ‘children’, 
apparently into acting against the State. The victim is transformed into the 
focal point of the anger of the ‘deep state’ and used in its strategies to handle 
their internal ‘political problems’. The fact that Soner’s death was twice 
announced in the Turkish national media during his imprisonment also 
indicates that the ‘deep state’ wanted him to disappear. After having been 
released from prison at the age of thirty, Soner analysed the acts of the 
Turkish authorities as follows in his bibliographical writings: 
                                                 
226 In the 1990s, the reference Ermeni dölü! was also used by the Interior Minister of Turkey, 
Meral Akşener, about anyone whom she considered to be the internal enemy of the state.  
227 Later the verdict of a life sentence was changed into a sentence of 16 years and 8 months 
because Soner was underage. 
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I was a scapegoat just because I was a Christian Assyrian. It is no secret 
that for a long time the Turkish authorities have tried to involve Christians 
in PKK separatist war in order to cleanse Turkey of any Christian 
presence. 
Assyrians/Syriacs became also victim to another strategy which the Turkish 
military used in order to weaken the PKK; the destruction of entire 
villages.228 This policy was decided on by the Turkish State of Emergency 
Co-ordination Council in February 1993. Eventually, this would have to be 
implemented in broad terms. Indeed, in the course of the 1990s many 
villages were destroyed and the inhabitants were forced to settle elsewhere. 
Little to no attention was paid to the villagers themselves. Among these 
villages there were some where the entire population consisted of 
Assyrians/Syriacs.229 The authorities requested them to sign a report that the 
PKK instead of the authorities forced them to leave their village. This 
betrays the pursuit of a conscious policy. An Assyrian/Syriac respondent of 
the sociologist Araz (2001: 143) talked about the evacuation of his village 
Hassana230 in the Sirnak region, south-eastern Turkey, illustrating that they 
had been left to their own fate, since they were not offered an alternative 
place to move to: 
In the ‘agha conference’231 in Ankara it was decided that our village was to 
be among the other villages to be evacuated. They [authorities] accused us 
of serving two flags, namely that of the Armenians and the PKK, and 
rejecting the Turkish flag. This was shown on the National TV the same 
day and the next day in the newspapers. We did not have a clue what they 
were talking about! Consequently the village of Hassana was evacuated by 
the Turkish army on 20 November 1993… The villagers had to find 
themselves a new temporary home. Some families went to the village 
Miden, others to Hazakh, some to Bnebil, and a few found shelter in the 
Zafaran Monastery. After some time the provincial governor in Hazakh 
invited the representatives of Hassana to meet him. He offered us 
                                                 
228 About 3000 villages had been evacuated by 1996 (Zürcher 1996: 327). 
229 Within a period of about ten years the residents of around twenty Assyrian/Syriac villages 
were evacuated (Araz 2001: 139-143). Among them were Hassana, Miden, Dayro du Slibo and 
Dayro d-Qubo (also known as Dayr Qube). 
230 Hassana was inhabited by members of the Assyrian Church of the East, the Chaldean 
Church and the Syriac Orthodox Church.  
231 The agha conference in the 1990s is a reference to the meeting of the Minister of Interior with 
the head of ‘village guards’ who belonged to the big tribes. 
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compensation for the loss of our houses, land and anything else we had 
had to leave behind because we could not take it all with us: …each family 
would be paid about 500.000 TL, [31 Euros232]. We did not accept this 
ridiculous offer and told the governor that the State needed this money 
more than we did. “We can feed ourselves with shovels and axes,” I told 
him… Furthermore, the governor asked us to sign a document stating that 
the village was evacuated because of the PKK. I told him: “The State 
evacuated our village – why should we accuse the PKK of this?” Then he 
told me: “You are just as the gavur [infidels] once were!” 233 
Dislocated as they have been they have brought their stories with them to 
urban and often Western areas where they have newly established 
themselves.234 
 
European Accession Process 
A relatively important change occurred in 1999 when the Helsinki European 
Council granted Turkey the status of candidate country for membership of 
the EU. Since then, Turkey has indeed initiated several reform packages in 
order to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria; one of the main conditions for EU 
membership. In this EU accession process, some changes (regarding 
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of 
religion, thought and conscience, place and personal names and others)235 
                                                 
232 Interview held in 2005. In 1993 this would be about 31 Euros. 
233 The governor was presumably referring to the perception the Turkish authorities have had 
of Assyrians/Syriacs as Christians and therefore as khayin, betrayers of the state. 
234 Many people from Hassana have today settled in Mechelen (Belgium) also referred to as 
‘New Hassana’ (see further www.shlama.be). 
235 Some of the problems and achievements related to minority rights in Turkey are 
summarized in the report of Minority Rights Group International (2007): 'There are 
constitutional restrictions on the use of minority languages in education. Article 42 of the 
Constitution declares Turkish the ‘mother tongue’ of Turkish citizens and prohibits public 
education in any other language, reserving the terms of Lausanne...' (p. 15) 'The Provincial 
Administrative Law of 1949 allows the Ministry of Interior to change ‘village names that are 
not Turkish and may give rise to confusion’. As part of the reform package of 15 July 2003, an 
amendment to the Civil Registry Law removed the restriction on parents’ freedom to name 
their children with names deemed ‘offensive to the national culture’, which in practice was 
used to ban non-Turkish names, but kept the requirement that the names should comply with 
‘moral values’ and should not be offensive to the public...' (p. 18) 'There is no legal framework 
enabling minorities to use their mother tongue in their relations with public authorities...' (p. 
19) 'The October 2001 constitutional amendments achieved considerable progress in the 
protection of free speech through removing from Articles 26 and 28 the restriction on the use 
of any ‘language prohibited by law’ in the expression and dissemination of thought and in 
broadcasting, respectively. However, the amendments left untouched the restrictions attached 
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have been applied to conform to the requisite of the EU reform packages. 
One of the latest reports236 about minorities in Turkey, – apart from the 
problems they still face in Turkey – mentions a positive trend in the 
atmosphere which the EU accession process has introduced: 
Arguably, the most significant achievement of the EU process has been 
the way in which it has created space for various minority groups to 
demand recognition of their distinct identities, the reformulation of the 
exclusive Turkish citizenship and the removal of barriers to the free 
exercise of their religious, political and cultural rights.  
Nevertheless, big problems still loom large at the level of implementation. 
Most importantly, minorities whose rights had not been implemented after 
the Lausanne Treaty, among them the Assyrians/Syriacs, are still stuck with 
their non-recognized minority status. In the Turkish Constitution, which is 
mainly a product of the military coup of September 1980, there is still no 
space for minorities and their issues. In 2009, one of the still functioning 
Assyrian/Syriac monasteries, Mor Gabriel, was faced with several juridical 
processes devised to facilitate the confiscation of its property rights.237 
Despite these setbacks, there have been new developments within Turkey 
which have given Assyrians/Syriacs in the diaspora more space to visit their 
villages. Some individuals have even resettled there and rebuilt their homes 
and churches. This process began when the Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent 
Ecevit, made an official statement on June 31 2001 in which he called upon 
Assyrians/Syriacs to return to their villages. Another example of positive 
change has been the election of the first Assyrian/Syriac individual to 
Turkish Parliament on 12 June 2011.238 
 Baskin Oran (2007) analyses the ‘changing’ atmosphere in terms of a 
historical transformation of the ‘paradigms’ which the Turkish Republic has 
established. However, as I indicated, the public and official discourses 
towards minorities have remained largely unchanged. Non-Muslim 
minorities especially have continued to be seen through the discourses of 
                                                                                                               
to the exercise of these rights for the purposes of, inter alia, safeguarding the indivisible 
integrity of the State with its territory and nation' (pp. 22-3). 
236 Minority Rights Group International (2007: 32). 
237 See further also the introduction to this thesis. 
238 In the 2011 elections, Erol Dora was elected from the province of Mardin as the candidate 
of the Platform Barış, Demokrasi ve Özgürlük (Peace, Democracy and Freedom).  
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gavur as the ‘others’ and dealt with as an internal tool for external powers. In 
the same line, Turkish identity has continued to be based on an exclusive 
approach. Besides ‘ethnic’ origins, Islam constitutes one of the main nodal 
points in Turkish identity discourses. In the long term, the exclusive and 
particularistic character of Turkish identity discourses has led to the virtual 
disappearance of non-Muslims in Turkey. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, my purpose has been to discuss the position of 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Turkey. Characteristic of the position of the survivors 
of the Seyfo in this country has been their continued subordinated position as 
a non-recognized minority. Subsequently, they have not been protected 
either by any international treaty or by the Turkish Constitutions of 1923, 
1961 or 1980. In comparison to what their position had been under the 
Ottoman Empire, it can be said that it has worsened. This is expressed most 
cogently in their virtual disappearance from their historical habitat. In the 
official and public discourses, they have continued to be categorized as gavur 
and regarded as a potential ‘internal enemy’. The response of 
Assyrians/Syriacs to this discriminatory politics has been to seek practical 
‘solutions’ in order to survive. Their emigration to Western countries is one 
example of their survival strategies. Therefore, this chapter should be read in 
relation to the following chapter about emigration. 
  
 
4 THEY HAVE GONE TO FOREIGN LANDS: THE 
EXODUS FROM THE HOMELAND 
 
How can the sons of the nation be sent into exile? 
How can they accept any form of oppression? 
As if they were sons of foreigners.239 
 
     Archbishop Yuhanon Dolabani 
 
Emigration is certainly not a new experience for the Assyrians/Syriacs. 
Throughout the ages, the Syro-Mesopotamian area has been the stage for a 
long series of dominant powers under which Assyrians/Syriacs have lived as 
a subordinated group of people and have often been excluded from access to 
the dominant power structure of the region.240 Persecutions, but also 
economical difficulties often compelled them to migrate to other areas in 
Syro-Mesopotamia.241 Thus, depending on the circumstances and the 
exigencies people decided to move to places which offered a better life. 
Emigration within the Syro-Mesopotamian area continued until new 
opportunities for settlement or means of escape appeared (starting in about 
mid-nineteenth century) to areas farther away – the area of the modern 
diaspora in Western countries. 
 What meaning do they give to their emigration and how do they explain 
and contextualize it? I shall look into their migration process in order to 
understand the logic of emigration among Assyrians/Syriacs and the choices 
made in the field of discursivity. Furthermore, I shall explain how their 
emigration discourses relate to the formation of new diasporic communities 
                                                 
239 A few lines from Dolabani’s poem Ulitho d-Motho u samo d-Haye (Lamentation about the 
nation and medicine of life) (Dere and Isik 2007: 309). My translation of the original in Syriac. 
240 Any book of their authors dealing with the history of their people or church touches 
somehow on persecutions which they endured under foreign rule, starting under Byzantine 
and Persian rule and continuing through centuries of the Islamic Caliphate, the Ottoman 
Empire and in the modern nation-states in the Middle East. 
241 Most of my respondents have had a background in the area of Tur ‘Abdin before migrating 
to other parts of the Middle East along the last century. The oral family histories that reached 
them (and sometimes they base their information on colophons in manuscripts) show that 
they had roots in other areas, outside of Tur ‘Abdin (for example Urmia, Urhoy or Mosul). 
Sometimes respondents could rely on a family history of 1000 years. 
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in Europe. On the receiving side, I shall illustrate how Sweden and Germany 
as receiving countries have handled the immigration of the Assyrians/Syriacs 
and how this has influenced the process of emigration. 
 As mentioned above, the history of Assyrians/Syriacs can be seen as a 
sequence of dislocatory moments (such as massacres and emigration). In modern 
times, their distinctive ethno-religious based identity in a Muslim majority 
society has turned them into a vulnerable group. They have had two main 
alternatives: either to use their local survival strategy which means the 
acceptance of the subordinated status, or to emigrate to relatively more safe 
places. While their local survival strategies have been based on the 
acceptance of the status quo, emigration has become a necessity at moments 
where alternative chances to continue to live in the homeland were not 
available. Emigration became a new opportunity at moments they no longer 
accepted the status quo and functioned thus as a (temporary) ‘solution’. In 
discourse analytical terms, emigration can also result from the creation of a 
myth about the place of destination. Laclau (1996c: 63) explains the 
emergence of a myth in terms of filling the gap or the lack in the present 
objectivity, which is needed for the creation of a ‘promised land’ or an ‘ideal 
society’. The articulation of the myth has always manifested itself as an 
alternative space and as a new discursive opportunity for the current 
situation or objectivity (see further Chapter 2). Therefore, often immigrants 
have had a positive image – a myth – about the country they have planned to 
emigrate to, as in the case of Assyrians/Syriacs.242 I have distinguished three 





They are based primarily on the scale of emigration, but the type of 
emigration (labour migrants, refugees or family reunion) is also taken into 
account. The distinction between labour migrants and refugees is essential 
for making sense of the numbers of migrants in a certain period. I refer to 
                                                 
242 As I shall discuss in the Chapter 5, they develop also a negative image of the new countries 
they settled in when they start experiencing problems in the new context (such as, the 
disobedience of young generations to the older people, and other newly introduced problems 
such as drugs, alcohol and a high percentage of divorces). 
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‘labour migrants’ when individuals have settled in a country for the formal 
reason of seeking employment. Asylum seekers are individuals who settle in 
a country for reasons of seeking refuge and to be recognized as such.243 
Nevertheless, in time the first group may coalesce with the second group, as 
is the case of some Assyrians/Syriacs, especially in Germany. Moreover, 
refugees may also choose to settle in another country as labour migrants; 
labour migration becomes only an instrument for finding a new home for 
the long term. 
 One can distinguish eight paths of migration between the area of 
departure and the area of arrival (I shall not discuss them specifically in this 
order): 
 
1. From Tur ‘Abdin to Syria and Lebanon 
2. From Hakkari and Tur ‘Abdin to Iraq 
3. From Syria to Lebanon 
4. From Tur ‘Abdin to Istanbul 
5. From Tur ‘Abdin directly to Europe 
6. From Tur ‘Abdin to Istanbul and then to Europe 
7. From Gozarto (northern Syria) to Europe 
8. From Gozarto to Damascus, Aleppo or Beirut and then to Europe 
 
The consideration of their broad dispersion is important for understanding 
the new encounters of the people and their discourses in Europe. The waves 
of emigration should not be seen as independent from each other. 
Unquestionably, each new emigration wave had a nourishing influence on 
the following. Therefore, neither religious and secular elites in the countries 
of origin nor Assyrian/Syriac institutions and authorities of receiving 
countries have been successful in keeping the migration under control, let 
alone being able to halt it. When Assyrians/Syriacs in the diaspora discuss 
the emigration (golutho)244 retrospectively, a frequently heard lament is that 
                                                 
243 According to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a 
refugee is a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside 
the country of their nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
him/herself of the protection of that country. This definition was expanded by the 1967 
Protocol of the Convention and by regional conventions in Africa and Latin America to 
include persons who had fled war or other violence in their home country. 
244 The Syriac term golutho does not mean in the first place migration. As discussed in Chapter 
5 it designates also the condition and sense of a ‘forced exile’ and dispersion culminating in a 
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they did not take steps to organize the emigration process collectively, 
ignoring the circumstance that they had no organizations to undertake such a 
huge task. And even their institutions – both the church and the Assyrian 
Democratic Organization (ADO, at that time their main secular 
organization) – took commonly a stand against the emigration. This regretful 
hindsight is generated by the assumption that a collectively co-ordinated 
emigration could have avoided the present-day dispersion in the diaspora. A 
closer look at the emigration stories reveals that individuals joined other 
relatives or friends who had settled in the diaspora (chain migration) and 
hence the dispersion was still relative. 
 The material in this chapter is based mainly on interviews I had with the 
elite members who migrated from Turkey, Syria and some from Lebanon 
(those who had settled there after their emigration from Syria). While not 
discounting the importance of the other two groups, I still concentrate more 
on the emigration from Turkey, since that is where most of my respondents 
were living before settling in Europe. To such an extent indeed, that Tur 
‘Abdin in south-eastern Turkey which they consider their home, has virtually 
emptied of this group. 
 Before discussing the emigration to Europe, it is essential to sketch a 
picture of the migration within the Middle East. It provides a background to 
the later pattern of emigration to Europe and the family relationships and 
networks between people. The importance of this chapter should be 
considered in the study of emigration processes over a relatively longer 
period and in different continents. 
 
4.1 Migration within the Middle East  
During and after the First World War many Assyrians/Syriacs from Turkey 
found refuge in today’s neighbouring countries such as present day Iraq, 
Syria245 and Lebanon.246 The post-First World War situation looked much 
                                                                                                               
state of diaspora. It has in this regard a similar meaning to the Hebrew term galut that 
expresses the worldwide dispersion of Jews. Another term that is used besides golutho (for 
emigration) is ‘roqo, meaning ‘flight’ or ‘to flee’. 
245 See for an article about the flight of the Assyrians/Syriacs from Urhoy to Syria in the years 
after the Seyfo, Sato (2003). 
246 The migration from the more agrarian society in Tur ‘Abdin in Turkey to the more 
urbanized areas in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, led to the adoption of a more urban life-style by 
the Assyrians/Syriacs. Although the Gozarto region in Syria can be perceived as an agricultural 
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more positive in these countries since they were under respectively British 
and French mandate. The mass of the Assyrians/Syriacs interpreted the 
presence of Christian powers in the Middle East to be positive.247 An 
important reason for this was that during The First World War more than 
half of their population in the Ottoman Empire was massacred under the 
Young Turks regime.248 European powers were regarded as sufficiently 
powerful to spare them from another horrible experience and were expected 
to take up a paternalistic approach towards them. From their perspective 
these Christian powers could also offer them stability (including economic 
prosperity) and more freedom.249 This is how the French and the British 
mandates in Syria and Iraq became temporary shelters for the survivors of 
the Seyfo. 
 
4.1.1 The Simele Massacre and Settlement on the Banks 
of the Khabur River 
During the British mandate of Iraq (1920-1932), many Assyrians/Syriacs 
from Iran and from the Ottoman Empire, mainly present-day Turkey, settled 
in Iraq. The British raised an army regiment from this group known as the 
Assyrian Levies.250 During their settlement in British- mandated Iraq, the 
representatives of members of the Assyrian Church of the East (Mar Eshai 
Shimun) especially negotiated for an ‘Assyrian enclave’ in their historical 
homeland. Nevertheless, none of their requests were met. After the 
                                                                                                               
region, the Assyrians/Syriacs in Qamishlo and Hasake had built up cities with an urban 
character. Those who left Adana in December 1921 (during the fasting period before 
Christmas), settled in Trablus (Lebanon), Homs and Damascus in Syria and others left for 
Marsaille in Fance and Agos in Greece. The Dbe Zerekke family (Dbe Urhawi) living in 
Stockholm have relatives among those who settled in Greece. When a family member from 
Stockholm visited them in the 1990’s in Greece, an elderly lady among them still spoke Suryoyo 
(Surayt) but the younger people knew only Greek. 
247 During the Second World War Great Britain, which supported King Faisal of Iraq, had 
recruited also among Assyrians/Syriacs, who served in the British army until a couple of years 
after the war.  
248 This genocide is known among Assyrians/Syriacs as the Seyfo. See for further readings 
from a historical perspective, Gaunt (2006), De Courtois (2004) and Yonan ([1989] 2006). 
249 One consequence of the French mandate was that the conflicts between the 
Assyrians/Syriacs and the Kurds increased. According to Van Bruinessen (1992: 98), the 
Christians felt protected by the French and no longer resigned themselves silently to 
exploitation and humiliation by the Kurds. The administration and courts developed by the 
French had decreased to a great extent the political power of the Kurdish agha. 
250 See further Solomon (1996). 
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resolution of the Mosul question in 1926, the Assyrian question was more or 
less abandoned and it was mainly defined around the ‘settlement of 
Assyrians’. In the situation after the First World War, they were not wanted 
in any of the countries in the Middle East; they had become homeless in 
their homeland. 
 The wish of the Assyrian leaders to be resettled in their former 
mountainous home of Hakkari,251 now on the Turkish side of the border 
with Iraq, could not be met. Turkey had no intentions at all to allow any 
Assyrian who had fled Turkey to return. Already on June 25, 1928 the 
Turkish consul general at Baghdad declared:252 ‘The Turkish amnesty law 
does not cover the Assyrians who would not be allowed under any 
circumstances to reenter Turkey; that any Assyrian who attempts to enter 
Turkey would be punished.’ In search of a new home, Patriarch Mar Eshai 
Shimun and other malik (Assyrian tribe leaders) sent (23 October 1931) a 
letter to the Chairman of the Mandates Commission of the League of 
Nations after having taken a unanimous conference decision:253 
...WE ARE POSITIVELY SURE THAT IF WE REMAIN IN IRAQ, we 
shall be exterminated in the course of few years. 
WE THEREFORE IMPLORE YOUR MERCY TO TAKE CARE OF 
US, and arrange our emigration to one of the countries under the rule of 
one of the Western Nations whom you may deem fit. And should this be 
impossible, we beg you to request the French Government to accept us in 
Syria and give us shelter under her responsibility FOR WE CAN NO 
LONGER LIVE IN IRAQ and WE SHALL LEAVE. 
Another initiative to find a new home in Syria, taken in the summer of 1933 
by such lay people as Malik Yaqu and Malik Loko, did not succeed. The Iraqi 
Army which took over the power from the British mandate rule in 1932 
seemed extremely agitated by the attention which the Assyrian Levies had 
attracted during the mandated period and by their continued good relations 
with the British. When an opportunity arose to weaken the Assyrians, they 
seized upon it. A little later the same year, the 800 men who had crossed the 
                                                 
251 This was also one of the demands raised by the Assyro-Chaldean delegation in the Paris 
Peace Conference in 1919. 
252 League of Nations: The Settlement of the Assyrians, a Work of Humanity and 
Appeasement, Geneva, 1935, Information Section, 12. 
253 Malik (1935), Appendix-A. Original letter was in Syriac. The English translation is taken 
from Malik. 
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border with Malik Yaqu and Malik Loko to negotiate with the French to 
allow them254 to settle in French-mandated Syria came back because this 
permission had been refused. As they crossed the river back into Iraq, the 
Iraqi Army opened the fire on them, triggering an armed conflict between 
the two groups. In the wake of this, the Iraqi Army killed a great number255 
of Assyrians (mostly in the village Simele256 and its surroundings) and looted 
about sixty Assyrian villages257 in the Nuhadra (Dohuk) and Mosul areas of 
Iraq in August 1933.258 In this campaign, the army used the local Arab 
Bedouin and the Kurdish population. This event was later to be known as 
the Simele Massacre.259 
 Although the British had attempted to deal with the Assyrian question 
before they left Iraq (the Assyrian question was discussed several times in the 
League of Nations), they did not take any decisive action.260 They did search 
for alternative solutions outside the Middle East because the Assyrians made 
it abundantly clear that they no longer wanted to live under the rule of a 
Muslim majority whom they felt they could not trust. Stafford (2006: 207) 
ends his book with: 
... the lot of the Assyrians is indeed a tragedy. They feel, and they have 
long felt, that no one wants them, and such a feeling does not make them 
easy to deal with. The last twenty years of their life have been a nightmare. 
It is not pleasant to hear people say, “Oh, we are accustomed to being 
massacred!” 
                                                 
254 According to Jacoub ([1986] 1993: 123) the migration movement involved nearly three 
hundred families which were to be followed by 5000 other people. 
255 Sources give different numbers. Annemasse (1934: 55) mentions that the massacres during 
August 1933 were three thousand, including those of the Simele massacre. 
256 Simele is sometimes also spelled as Simmel. See Annemasse (1934) for a reflection about 
the settlement in Iraq, the Simele massacre and the resettlement in Syria. It is assumed that 
this anonymous author is Mar Eshai Shimun, Patriarch of the Assyrian Church of the East. 
See for a broad account of this process, the British Administrative Inspector who served in 
Iraq for six years, Stafford (2006). See also Aprim (2006: 155-183). 
257 Jan Beth Sawoce mentioned to me that the priest Abdulmesih Qarabashi (not to be 
confused with the author) who was born in this area informed him in an interview which he 
held in Sweden, that among the victims there were also Syriac Orthodox and Syriac Catholics. 
258 See for a list of the damages Annemasse (1934: 64-68). 
259 Raphael Lemkin coined the term ‘genocide’ when he heard of the Simele Massacre and the 
eradication of the Christians in Ottoman Turkey during the First World War. 
260 See further Malik (1935). 
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Eventually, in the aftermath of the Simele Massacre the French allowed the 
Assyrian refugees to settle at the Khabur River in Syria, 40 kilometres from 
the Iraqi border. Approximately 15,000 Assyrians emigrated to this area 
where they founded thirty-five new villages (Al-Jeloo, Awde and Lamassu 
2007: 11). It hardly needs to be said that for those Assyrians/Syriacs who 
continued to live in Iraq, the Simele Massacre and the subsequent looting of 
the villages must have played an essential role in shaping their future political 
attitude towards obedience to the regime in Iraq. The message was 
unequivocal:  deviation from the main political line was not appreciated and 
would be punished severely. Patriarch Mar Shimun was sent into exile to 
Cyprus by the British on 18 August 1933.261 Murre-van den Berg (2011) 
illustrates in her article ‘Light from the East (1948-1954) and the de-
territorialization of the Assyrian Church of the East’ that eventually, the 
Patrirach of the Assyrian Church of the East, Mar Shimun, changed his ideas 
about a homeland for the Assyrian people and that he relinquished his 
responsibilities in the secular domain to the governments in which Assyrians 
lived at the end of the 1940s.262 
 Different from the Assyrian Church of the East leadership, the 
leadership of the Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholic and Chaldean churches 
did not request temporal power and proclaimed their unity and loyalty with 
the Iraqi government. They even refused representation as non-Muslim 
minorities in the Chamber of Deputees, claiming that they sought no special 
rights (Coke 1924: 243 in Joseph 1983: 115). One of their magazines from 
the 1930s reminded its readers ‘not to forget the fate of the Armenians and 
Assyrians, who put their trust in the Christian powers of Europe and were 
practically exterminated in consequence.’ (Quoted from Joseph 1983: 115). 
Their stand is similar to that which the Syriac Orthodox Patriarch Elias III 
took during the Lausanne Peace negotiations and that of Patriarch Ephrem 
Barsaum in Syria. The latter insisted on the leave of the French from Syria 
and hand over power to the Syrian Arab rulers to whose later governments 
he had shown great loyalty during his life-time. 
 
 
                                                 
261 On 15th August 1933 an emergency law for the deportation of the Patriarch passed and his 
Iraqi nationality was annulled with the approval of the British Embassy (Annemasse 1934: 63). 
262 She bases her conclusion on the analysis of the magazine Light form the East (1948-1954), 
published by Mar Eshai Shimun in Chicago. 
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4.1.2 They Have Gone Taht u Khat (Down the Border) 
In the post-Seyfo period Turkey, many Assyrians/Syriacs had been left behind 
with hardly anything. The land of many Assyrians/Syriacs in Turkey was 
confiscated and people had lost a great number of their family members in 
the Seyfo and at the same time an extreme famine (kafno or ghala) scourged in 
the region. French mandated Syria offered them new economic 
opportunities, besides their idea to be living under Christian rule. First, many 
Assyrian/Syriac men crossed the border into Syria (taht u khat) to sign on as a 
soldier in the French Army (‘askar de Fransa). This had become a relatively 
good option for employment in the chaos of the post-war situation. A 
second reason for the settlement of the Assyrians/Syriacs (especially from 
Tur ‘Abdin) in Syria was the opportunity to work as agricultural labourers for 
Assyrian/Syriac large landowners.263 At that time it is said that there were 
about twenty Assyrian/Syriac families in the Gozarto of Syria who owned 
large agricultural properties.264 They had a significant impact on the 
agricultural development, because they had developed and introduced 
mechanized agriculture in Syria. Besides being innovators they employed 
many people which helped the economy of the area to flourish. The 
increasing Arabization of Syria incurred a change in the position of 
Assyrians/Syriacs. In 1958 (the year in which the President Nasser of Egypt 
and the Syrian authorities started to co-operate in the United Arab Republic), 
the first step in the nationalization of large property was taken: the 
authorities terminated large property and large landownership.265 The policy 
                                                 
263During the French mandate of Syria, the French authorities had appropriated land and 
assigned it to certain people in Syria. The French used the social structure of the Arab 
Bedouins and the Kurds as a point of reference in distributing agricultural land to families: 
respectively through the Bedouin sheikhs and through the Kurdish clan leaders (Interview 
with Assyrian/Syriac respondents from the Gozarto, 2007). This was apparently also a means 
to keep them satisfied and disposed to function as a means of co-operation with the French 
presence in the area. The Assyrians/Syriacs missed the power through such a structure. Some 
families who had some good understanding of agriculture started to farm land which was not 
assigned to them but which did not yet belong to anybody. 
264 Among them were for example: Çarmukli (from the village Çarmukli near Omid), Gallo 
Shabo (from ‘Iwardo), Dbe Hadaya and Terzi Bashi (from Mardin), Dbe Najjar, Dbe Majid 
Asfar (from Omid) and Dbe Baho. The family of Dbe Asfar was the wealthiest among 
Assyrians/Syriacs in the area. At that time they grew 40,000 sacks (çawalat) of grain and 20,000 
sacks of rice. The majority of these families had settled in Syria after the First World War. 
265 In order not to hand over all their property to the authorities, such families as Dbe Najjar 
and Dbe Asfar who were large landowners and owned agricultural machines, donated their 
agricultural machinery to their Assyrian/Syriac employees. The latter continued as mechanized 
agriculturalists for Bedouin sheiks and others (interview with a respondent who grew up in 
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of further nationalization of property continued with the takeover of the rule 
by the Baath regime in 1963.266 Consequently, Assyrian/Syriac families with a 
large amount of landed property left the country: after a brief settlement in 
Lebanon they continued their journey to America.267 
 
4.1.3 They Have Gone to Lebanon 
During and after the Second World War – but prior to the Lebanese Civil 
War in 1975 – Assyrians/Syriacs from Syria and Turkey, seeking a safe haven 
or in search of better opportunities in life often migrated to Lebanon. Once 
again they were poised on the brink of another dispersion – also at family 
level. The following example also shows that families kept in touch and that 
these relations had influence on the future emigration. The academic activist 
Denho who lives in Germany explains why he met his brother again only 
after forty years in Sweden: 
My brother fled [from Turkey] to Syria in 1942… because of what they 
called the ihtiyat [mobilization].  What the Germans had done to the Jews 
in Germany, the Turks did the same with the Christians in Turkey. At that 
time they imposed a capital tax law [varlık vergisi].268 And they were all 
called up for the ihtiyat.269 The Suroyo mukhtar [mayor] in Midyad advised 
the young men in the family to flee the country into Syria.270 There, my 
brother served in the French army until France left Syria. After that he 
decided to leave to Lebanon… My parents died but he [my brother] never 
                                                                                                               
Qamishlo, 2007). See further about the role of Assyrian/Syriac families in the modern history 
of agriculture in the Gozarto, Abdalla (2005). 
266 Part of the nationalized land in the Gozarto was divided among landless, mainly Arab 
Bedouins, who were living in south-eastern Syria and Raqqa. These people were offered land 
in the northeast of Syria, present-day Gozarto. Assyrians/Syriacs and Kurds from the northeast 
were given some unfruitful land in the South-East of Syria. The Assyrians/Syriacs did not 
move to the South-East of Syria from the Gozarto area, although some of them were now 
landless (interview with a respondent who grew up in Qamishlo, 2007).  
267 Yacob Najjar went to Saudi Arabia and developed irrigation systems there, which resulted 
in the production and selling of corn. In the early 1990s, he was invited to return to Syria by 
the Syrian authorities and developed agriculture (without owning it) on part of the land which 
he had once owned (about 500 hectares).  
268 In 1942 the Turkish Prime Minister Mehmet Şükrü Saracoğlu imposed a capital levy (varlık 
vergisi) on property owners. The law was enforced on non-Muslim minorities (see further 
Chapter 3). 
269 Non-Muslims who belonged to the reserve troops were organized in working camps. Men 
who came back from the ihtiyat told horrific stories about the circumstances and the way they 
were treated. See Chapter 3 for more about the ihtiyat.  
270 The mukhtar was probably aware of the hardships they had had to endure during the ihtiyat. 
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saw them again after he had escaped Turkey. Today he lives in Sweden. 
After forty years [of separation], I met him again. 
With the end of the French mandate in Syria, a considerable number of 
Assyrians/Syriacs who lived there moved to Lebanon. Lebanon was 
perceived to be a country with relatively more freedom, which was especially 
important to political activists and intellectuals. At the practical level, 
Lebanon offered more work opportunities. Many respondents said that 
Lebanon was thought of as a Christian society in which they felt more at ease 
than in Syria – where Arabization was more stringently enforced than in 
Lebanon. In 2006, I met a member of the Syriac Orthodox Church attending 
Mass at the Syriac Catholic Church in Paris. When I asked him how he 
ended up in Paris, he said that his grandparents were originally from Tur 
‘Abdin. In the aftermath of the Seyfo they had moved to Syria. After the active 
Arabization politics in Syria had started, he decided to move to Lebanon. He 
stayed there until the civil war. After that he migrated to Canada. Because he 
was not granted a permit to stay in Canada, he migrated to France where he 
had settled since then. 
 The first obvious cause for the emigration to Lebanon was Syria’s new 
co-operation with President Nasser of Egypt in 1958. Its repercussions had 
an extensive influence on the political, social and cultural life in Syria. 
Measures were taken to limit the freedom of particular groups and 
individuals through, for example, banning them from membership of certain 
political parties. This erupted into a more public political conflict, in which 
the authorities adopted a very hard line. They were feverishly resolved to 
uncover whatever they considered being kept secret. No one dared to 
criticize the authorities. People identified each other as belonging to different 
political ideologies; the most dominant groups were the Baathists, the Suri 
Qawmi271 and the Communists.  
                                                 
271 When Assyrians/Syriacs mention this party, they refr to it with Qawmi Suri. This party had 
a pan-Syrian nationalist approach with an orientation towards a Greater Syria. Its full name is 
al-Hizb al-Suri al-Qawmi al-Ijtimaa‘i (The Syrian Social Nationalist Party or SSNP). Antoun 
Saadeh, its founder, initially believed that Syrians are not Arabs. Saadeh defined a Syrian 
nation in the Fertile Crescent consisting of a mixture of Canaanites, Akkadians, Chaldeans, 
Assyrians, Arameans, Hittites, and Metanni. As it recognized the pre-Arab past of the people 
of Syria and preached total separation of religion and state, this party attracted some 
Assyrians/Syriacs and other minorities. See further about the pan-Syrian nationalist approach, 
Pipes (1990). 
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 The take-over of the rule by the Baath party in 1963 inevitably had new 
consequences. Arabism272 emerged as the new political discourse in Syria. 
The fact that Baathists belonging to the Alawi minority later took over 
political power from the Sunni majority allowed for a state policy in which 
religious minorities were less discriminated against. Assyrians/Syriacs have 
been allowed to occupy official positions in Syria as long as they stand 
behind the ruling government.273 In Syria, religious affiliation played a 
different role than in Turkish society. Therefore, Assyrians/Syriacs in Syria 
have enjoyed more religious and cultural freedom than in Turkey, but 
politically they were still obstructed. 
 Another reason for the emigration from Syria to Lebanon especially 
during the 1960s, according to my respondents, was the increased number of 
Kurds who had begun to settle in the area and who endangered their life, 
since raids were organized on rich Assyrians/Syriacs. Adding to the turmoil, 
since the beginning of the 1970s, the officials of the Syrian mukhabarat 
(intelligence police) blackmailed Assyrian/Syriac entrepreneurs. For those 
who found such practices as blackmailing intolerable, this weighed heavily in 
their decision to leave the country. Respondents explain that Assyrian/Syriac 
entrepreneurs had no means to protect themselves against this pressure and 
were dismayed by their vulnerability.  
 As a place of refuge Lebanon was not sought on at an individual level 
only. Even before the mass emigration of the Assyrians/Syriacs to Europe in 
the 1970s began, the Assyrian/Syriac activists discussed the idea of relocating 
Assyrians/Syriacs in southern Lebanon with President Chamoun.274 
                                                 
272 Two articles from the Baath’s Constitution which back up the Arabization politics are: 
Article (8) The official language of the country and the officially recognized language in 
writing and education of the citizens is Arabic. Article (10): An Arab is everyone whose 
language is Arabic and lived in the Arab land or was born in it and believed in his affiliation to 
the Arab Nation. In contrast to the Baath in Syria, President Nasser recognized anyone 
speaking the Arabic language as an Arab. 
273 For example, the mayor in Qamishlo has often been an Assyrian/Syriac. There were also 
some Assyrians/Syriacs in the Syrian Parliament. 
274 The idea was the result of a critical analysis of their position in Middle Eastern society. In 
the beginning of the 1970s, before the war broke out, representatives of (ADO) and the 
Assyrian Universal Alliance (AUA) discussed the situation of the Assyrians/Syriacs in Tur 
‘Abdin in several meetings with Kamil Chamoun (at that time General Secretary of the 
Lebanese Liberal Party) (Unpublished information from two former ADO activists in Sweden 
and in America). Chamoun encouraged them to resettle all in the empty villages in Southern 
Lebanon. Partly it was because the Christians in Lebanon seemed to be interested in 
increasing their numbers of co-religionist inhabitants. The crisis in Lebanon resulting from the 
conflict between President Chamoun (1952 – 1958) who adopted a more pro-Western policy 
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Assessing the situation, the Assyrian/Syriac activists in ADO and AUA 
(Assyrian Universal Alliance) considered the collective emigration of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs an ambitious plan which they found too big a 
responsibility to shoulder.275 Despite the difficulties (resulting from their 
illegal status in Lebanon), the Assyrians/Syriacs continued their emigration 
to Lebanon on an individual basis until the civil war broke out in 1975. After 
the war began, the people who planned to migrate to Lebanon cancelled 
their plans. Europe became a new alternative destination. The escape to 
Lebanon offered a solution for Shabo’s family when they found themselves 
embroiled in berberiye (local traditional politics) with the rest of the village. 
Their punishment was to be forced to leave the village:  
The people in the village who used to ally themselves with our gabo [party] 
no longer supported my family. We had no allies left in the village. 
Therefore they forced276 us to leave the village, despite the fact that we 
probably owned most of the agricultural land in the village. I remember 
that there was an old man in the village who said: “I cannot understand 
how they can leave all this land behind and depart.” But we had no other 
option. In an armed conflict my grandfather was hit by a bullet which he 
carried until we arrived in Sweden. We had come up with two alternatives: 
moving to Istanbul or to Lebanon. But, we had heard about Istanbul and 
its difficulties… Therefore, we planned to go to Lebanon. Some relatives 
had gone there already to get things prepared for our big family. But when 
my father went to the Mor Gabriel monastery [in Tur ‘Abdin], he met the 
present Archbishop George Saliba, who was a monk then and living in 
Lebanon. When Brother George heard about our plans he said to my 
father: “How could you contemplate moving to Lebanon at this moment? 
There is a war now.” This is the reason how we changed our minds and 
                                                                                                               
and the Muslim part of the population attracted by a Pan-Arab and pro-Nasser ideology had 
an indelible effect on the policy regarding granting immigrants Lebanese citizenship. After 
1958 it had become barely possible for Assyrian/Syriac migrants to acquire Lebanese 
citizenship (Björklund 1981: 29). If the Christian Assyrians/Syriacs were granted citizenship 
then the same right had to be extended to Muslim immigrants. This would be a risk to the 
balance between the about 50-50 balance in the Muslim and Christian population. 
275 One of the ADO members who was involved at that time says: ‘We have kept this fear 
with us and lack sufficient courage to take on responsibility for big matters; otherwise or else 
we would have organized ourselves now in one place instead of being dispersed all over the 
world.’ By ‘fear’ he refers to the historically developed chronic anxiety among the 
Assyrians/Syriacs living in the Middle East. Generally this is often expressed in talks about the 
attitude of the Assyrians/Syriacs in relation to the other populations in the Middle East. 
276 Traditionally, forcing people to leave the village was used as a punishment. It was similar to 
sending someone into exile by the dominant or ruling group. 
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found departure to Sweden as a solution. We knew a Suryoyo living in 
Gothenburg.  
The collective emigration plan to Lebanon was also discussed among the 
Assyrian/Syriac elite in Europe: how should they pick up the thread from 
here? The fact that some Assyrians/Syriacs labour migrants living in 
Germany had ideas to move further to Lebanon instead of going back to Tur 
‘Abdin in Turkey indicates that the pre-civil war Lebanon was a country 
which interested them. After the war started, they decided to join their 
relatives in Sweden.  
 
4.1.4 They Have Gone to Istanbul 
Several factors have played a role in the settlement of the Assyrians/Syriacs 
from Tur ‘Abdin in Istanbul.277 Firstly, Assyrians/Syriacs from Mardin and 
Diyarbakır – already living in urban centres – took the initial step of 
migrating to Istanbul at the beginning of the 1950s.278 As businessmen, they 
were more mobile than the farmers from the villages in Tur ‘Abdin.279  
 At the end of the 1950s the Armenians and the Greeks had left Istanbul 
in the wake of the pogrom, which was unleashed on 6 and 7 September 
1955. The Assyrians/Syriacs newly settled in Istanbul, to a great extent, took 
over the market that the Armenians and the Greeks had had to leave behind 
                                                 
277 The first Assyrians/Syriacs who settled in Istanbul emigrated from Bitlis, Varto and 
Simhor (present-day south-eastern Turkey) in the 1840s (Akdemir 2009: 92-94). The decision 
to consecrate a church in Istanbul was made by Patriarch Elias II Hindi in 1841. His 
representative, Archbishop Qurillos Yacob (the later Patriarch Yacob II), bought a house in 
Beyoğlu Tarlabaşı in Karnavula Street (today known as Karakurum Street). After it burnt 
down, he rebuilt it and opened a church (dedicated to the Virgin Mary) built of wood in 1844; 
see for an image of this building, Illustration 3.  The name of the church in Syriac ‘… ’Ito 
Qadishto d-Yoldath Aloho Maryam b-Byzantia d-Suryoye Qaqme…’ has been translated into 
English as follows: ‘The Pera Assyrian Church of the Holy Virgin’. ‘Pera’ refers to what is 
now the Beyoğlu area in Istanbul. The use of the designation ‘Assyrian’ in the name of the 
Syriac Orthodox church in that context is remarkable. In 1870 the church again burnt down 
and was rebuilt in stone. It was re-consecrated in 1880. This church is the See of the Bishopric 
of the Syriac Orthodox Church in Istanbul.  
278 The history of Kent Gıda A.Ş. dates back to 1927, when the Tahincioğlu Family first 
started to produce tahin, (a sweet from sesame seed oil). In 1946, they enlarged the business 
with the production of halvah and hard candy in Diyarbakır. In the early 1950s, the 
Tahincioğlu Family moved to Istanbul where in 1956, Kent Gıda was established which would 
later become the largest confectionery company in Turkey. See further Akdemir (2009: 162, 
265-266). 
279 According to the Vice-Governor of Istanbul, about 500 Syriac Orthodox families (about 
2000 people) were living in Istanbul in 1959 (Akdemir 2009: 123). 
THE EXODUS FROM THE HOMELAND          157 
 
and continued their entrepreneurial work as goldsmiths in Kapalı Çarşı (The 
Grand Bazaar) in Istanbul. Roldanus (1985: 109) adds to this that 
Assyrians/Syriacs were also needed as employees for the Greek churches. It 
is important to note that besides the area of Tur ‘Abdin, Istanbul was the 
main centre in Turkey where some elements of Christianity continued to 
exist. Working for Christian employers encouraged their sense of safety. 
 
 
       Illustration 3: Syriac Orthodox Church in Tarlabaşı, 
       Istanbul in the mid 1840s. Source: Akdemir (2010: 97). 
 
Secondly, in the 1960s the mobility of people improved because of modern 
forms of transportation, and this led to a fast urbanization process. Thirdly, 
modernization had also permeated to the Assyrians/Syriacs in Tur ‘Abdin. 
The technology made its mark on agricultural production: not all the family 
members were now needed on the land; they could offer their labour 
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somewhere else. 280 Therefore, already by the 1960s, Assyrian/Syriac men 
could be found working in the construction business in Keban (Al ‘Aziz, 
Turkish: Elazığ), İzmir and İskenderun. They went there to work for a 
certain period of time later to return to their families in the villages.281 
Towards the mid-1960s, Assyrian/Syriac ‘farmers’ from Tur ‘Abdin, also 
found their way to Istanbul. In 1967, only few families from Tur ‘Abdin were 
living in this city.282 The first to venture to Istanbul to seek jobs were the 
young single men; presaging the labour migrants who went to Germany. 
Their plan was to spend a couple of years working in Istanbul and then 
return home. After the young men had set off for Istanbul, some parents 
joined them with the idea of taking care of their children. Single men who 
started working in Istanbul often built up a family there. Their numbers 
increased from 2000 in 1963 to 14,000 in 1984. Most of them lived there 
only for a couple of years.283  
 The first young men from Tur ‘Abdin who settled in Istanbul found 
work mainly in the field of handicrafts, trade and some in industry. Many 
found a job in Greek and Armenian hospitals, or as an apprentice in 
goldsmith businesses or sewing ateliers. An important intermediary between 
the new arrivals and the employers was Father David, who originated from 
Mardin. He had good contacts both among the Christian employers in 
Istanbul and with the Assyrians/Syriacs who had just arrived from Tur 
‘Abdin and were seeking employment. There has been a prevailing idea 
among Assyrian/Syriac employees that Christian employers preferred 
employing them to Muslim employees, as they believed ‘one cannot trust a 
                                                 
280 The introduction of fertilizers on the market increased the crop. A village like Marbobo 
made good profits from the cotton industry. A similar development was the recent availability 
of pesticides. And instead of working solely with cattle in the production process, farmers 
could start to make use of the tractors which had become available, and the derraaza (harvest 
machine). For example, these machines reached my village Mzizah in the 1970s. Before that 
they used the jarjar (threshing sledge), which required the participation of many more manual 
labourers. Both derraaza and jarjar are of Arabic origin (see further Lane ([1863] 1992). 
Maclean (2003: 55b, 56a) gives a clarifying description of the jarjar as ‘threshing-machine’: ‘a 
sort of sledge drawn by horses, buffaloes, or oxen, round and round the pile of corn-sheaves, 
and fitted with knives which cut up the straw’. The Syriac word for jarjar is gargro but it was 
not used by all Assyrians/Syriacs in the spoken Suryoyo in the everyday life of Tur ‘Abdin. 
281 Only few had settled with their families in these cities. 
282 According to one of my respondents who settled there in 1967. 
283 When meeting them in Europe, it is often obvious that they have lived some time in 
Istanbul as they use more Turkish loanwords than do Assyrians/Syriacs who have not lived in 
Istanbul. 
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Muslim’ (layt amniye bu Tayo).284 Roldanus (1985: 65) observed that 
Assyrians/Syriacs who worked for an Assyrian/Syriac industrial employer 
were organized in a different department of the factory, kept apart from the 
Muslim employees. 
 Of all of those who went to Istanbul, those that established themselves 
as goldsmiths became probably the most successful. Sometime in the period 
around 1972, the (often) single men who had learned the business from 
Armenian and Assyrian/Syriac goldsmiths (from Mardin and Diyarbakır)285 
opened their own businesses and achieved success. Presumably they belong 
to the first group of Assyrians/Syriacs the majority of whom settled there in 
the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s about 20 per cent of the businesses in 
Kapalı Çarşı were owned by Assyrians/Syriacs. At times of socio-political 
crisis, they have fallen prey to criminals or Muslim fanatics who have taken 
advantage of the situation to attack them with impunity. Many of these 
people migrated to America instead of to Europe. 
 Istanbul fulfilled different functions for the Assyrians/Syriacs. In the 
first place – certainly in the beginning – Assyrians/Syriacs from Tur ‘Abdin 
saw Istanbul as a place offering an alternative career choice besides farming. 
Gradually, for some it became a new place of permanent settlement; besides 
work opportunities it was believed to be safer than Tur ‘Abdin with all its 
complicated local politics, berberiye.286 Although the power of the local 
Kurdish agha could also stretch to Istanbul, the instruments he could use to 
interfere in their life were less effective. The city was no longer the local 
village where every individual knew each other and where they were 
encompassed within a power network. Therefore, people who had lived in 
fear had found a relatively safer alternative in moving to Istanbul, not 
considering yet new or other unpleasant aspects of living in the heart and 
most modern part of society. For individuals it was much easier to live in 
anonymity. Engulfed in the urban mass, at a collective level they were also 
                                                 
284 Roldanus (1985: 65) mentions that after he had observed the relatively high number of 
Christian employees in the factory of an Assyrian/Syriac and asked him if he had a selective 
policy, but the employer denied this. He then concludes that working for a Christian employer 
could have been the choice of Assyrians/Syriacs themselves. Without going further into this 
answer, I doubt whether this is the whole story to the motivation of the employer. 
285 Cetrez (1998: 106) also mentions that the background of the 2 per cent very rich 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Istanbul lie in Mardin and Diyarbakır. 
286 Van Bruinessen (1992) discusses the social and political structures of the area. Although 
the focus is on the Kurds, much can be learned about the position of the Assyrians/Syriacs 
and other non-Muslim groups in relation to the Kurds. 
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less visible287  as a group (which they were in Tur ‘Abdin). Within a few years, 
the number of Assyrians/Syriacs in some of the villages in Tur ‘Abdin 
decreased, namely: Harbtho (also known as Kharabe Mishka), Sederi, Badibbe, 
Arbo, Besorino and Midin. The position of Istanbul was also transformed from 
a (temporary) place of refuge to a jumping off place ‘to the four corners of 
the world.’ Saro was a young girl when her father decided to leave the village 
of Kerboran in 1978: 
In that year the Suryoyo Mukhtar [mayor] Endrawos Demir was killed by 
the Muslims. Before we and all the other Suryoye left Kerboran we sold the 
land we owned at a negligible price to the Muslims in the village. The 
Muslims knew that we would be leaving anyway and therefore they bid a 
very low price for it, which we had to accept. We left Kerboran and 
moved first to the village Qritho di ‘Ito, a Christian village near Nsibin. Since 
my father was an architect, he had to be often underway between villages. 
Because of his frequent absences, he found his village Kerboran to be at a 
too dangerous location. My father… felt much safer in the Qritho di ‘Ito. 
But after about four years we moved on farther to Istanbul. 
Another example rereading the role of Istanbul at that time is that of the 
parents of Mushe:  
The situation in Kharput deteriorated badly after the fascist regime became 
powerful in the 1970s. The authorities had already closed down my 
father’s business in Kharput a couple of times. Besides that, the fascists had 
beaten up my brother and me a couple of times because we had leftist 
ideas. The fear of my parents of losing their children combined with the 
fact that they did not get the chance to re-open their business, made them 
decide to move to Istanbul in 1977. 
Upon arrival in Istanbul, the first priority of Assyrians/Syriacs was to master 
the Turkish language quickly. This was among other things an attempt to 
diminish the chance that they could be picked out as being different from 
the Muslim majority population and an important precaution against 
discrimination. Another motivation for learning Turkish was that they 
associated it with being modern and related to an urban life-style. Those who 
returned to their village from Istanbul liked to show off their knowledge of 
the Turkish; displaying their contact with the modern world. In Istanbul, 
                                                 
287 This is a stark contrast to their attitude in Europe, where they have wanted to be visible 
and recognized as a group of people. 
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Arabic-speaking Assyrians/Syriacs from Mardin stopped speaking Arabic. 
Only the older generation continued to speak it (alongside Turkish) in the 
private sphere. Turkish became their first language. The Assyrians/Syriacs 
from Mardin probably attached less symbolic value to Arabic than the 
Assyrians/Syriacs (from Tur ‘Abdin) who spoke Suryoyo and who nurtured it 
as their mother tongue. 
 Assyrians/Syriacs newly arrived from Tur ‘Abdin lived in poor 
neighbourhoods such as Beyazit, Tarlabaşı288 and Beyoĝlu.289 The mostly 
timber houses were very old, shabby and therefore affordable. Mirza, at that 
time a teenager, experienced this and reflects on that situation:  
The living conditions in the village were much better than in Istanbul, but 
in Istanbul you could see something that you did not see in the village: 
there were cars, lights, fashion, electronics, cinema’s, and so forth. 
Therefore life in Istanbul was tolerable. With six Suryoye teenager friends 
we found a small room to live in. It was windowless and it had only a 
door. And we also cooked in this room. We did our best to receive and 
help any new Suryoyo arriving in Istanbul and in need of help. We did not 
care about luxury. It was all excitement to us. 
In Istanbul, they showed a marked tendency to live in the vicinity of other 
Assyrian/Syriac families, which meant that they did not need much contact 
with their Muslim neighbours (Roldanus 1985: 86). In their spare time they 
mainly socialized with Christians. Their life-style disguised their Christian 
identity from the bigger Muslim audience. Realizing that visibility would 
harm them, for many Assyrians/Syriacs in Istanbul it had become ‘normal’ 
to hide their identity to the broader public. Formally this was expected from 
them too. 
                                                 
288 See further about the history of this church, Akdemir (2009: 93-94, 122) 
289 As Roldanus (1985: 64) observes, as soon as they could afford to move to better 
neighbourhoods, they did so. At the time of writing (2009), mostly, they are gathered in three 
luxurious and upper middle class areas, Yeşilköy, Göztepe, Bakırköy and Şişli. See further 
about the church in Yeşilköy, Akdemir (2009: 251-255). They are also to be found in two 
middle class areas, Samatya and Kurtuluş. Only few families live in poor areas, except for the 
Assyrian/Syriac refugees from Iraq who have settled in Istanbul on their way to find a better 
place to live in Western countries. These refugees are to be found in old small houses, 
basements and shelters, surviving under difficult circumstances. The See of the Archbishopric 
of the Syriac Orthodox Church is based in Tarlabaşı, although no church members are living 
there (see also Section 4.1.4). 
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 Bestowing Turkish first names on their children who were born in 
Istanbul had become normal to many. Some, often Assyrians/Syriacs from 
Mardin, began to identify as Turks or and if not to at least express such 
identification in public in order to cover up their identity. Many of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs in cities like Mardin and Diyarbakır were already familiar 
with this attitude and they simply continued this life-style in Istanbul.290 
Assyrians/Syriacs from the villages in Tur ‘Abdin, also assumed this 
protective mantle of accommodation to Turkish society. Invisibility assumed 
the forestalling or circumvention of problems – which otherwise may have 
arisen. Nevertheless, as any other minority group has discovered, it is 
impossible to remain totally invisible to outsiders.  
 Two important aspects may help to account for this attitude. First and 
foremost, the Assyrians/Syriacs who had already settled in Istanbul were 
looked up to as modern people. In Tur ‘Abdin, the people from the cities like 
Midyad, Mardin and Diyarbakır were referred to as bajariye,291 with the 
meaning urban people and hence modern. Then, leaving aside this sense of 
superiority, they may have believed this approach was the best survival 
strategy for them as a community: they made it their accommodating strategy 
to adjust to the socio-political requirements in Turkish society. In this 
process of accommodation, those Assyrians/Syriacs who had already 
established themselves in Istanbul used their influence to make sure that the 
newly arrived Assyrians/Syriacs from Tur ‘Abdin would cultivate the 
politically ‘correct attitude’ (see further Chapter 3). 
 
4.2 Emigration to Western Countries 
There is no comprehensive study about the migration of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs worldwide.292 The biggest gap is to be found in early 
studies on the emigration of the Assyrians/Syriacs to North and South 
                                                 
290 Assyrians/Syriacs who chose to express their Assyrian/Syriac identity criticize this group 
for hiding and giving up their ‘ethnic identity’, purely to meet the requirements of the Turkish 
authorities. See also Chapter 9. 
291 Bajari is Kurdish for ‘urban’. 
292 Björklund (1981) and Deniz (1999) have written about the emigration to Sweden, Merten 
(1997) and Araz (2001) about the emigration to Germany, Roldanus (1984), Van Mierlo 
(1979) and Schukkink (2003) about the emigration to the Netherlands.  
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America and to Australia.293 Their emigration to North294 and South295 
America is often hidden in the study of migrants from the Middle East 
generally. They have been included in the category registered as Turks (El-
Turco) and Arabs since around the mid-nineteenth century onwards.296 For 
this reason it has become difficult to identify them retrospectively. Even if 
their emigration is identified, as the emigration to Brazil,297 the information 
available is often limited to the years and places of departure.298 The majority 
of those who migrated in the first half of the twentieth century to America 
                                                 
293 Modern studies on the emigration and settlement of Assyrians to North America are works 
by Ishaya (1977); Donabed (2003, 2006). 
294 Philip and Joseph Kayal (1975: 19) point out that statistics of the Christian migration from 
the Middle East to the United States is missing because they identified themselves by their 
millet upon arrival. These authors mean perhaps that they identified with the church of which 
they were member. The reasons for migrations from the Ottoman Empire were a mixture of 
religious, political and economic (Kayal 1975: 66). In the peak years of 1913 and 1914 the 
number of Syriac immigrants exceeded 9,000 (Kayal 1975: 67). The war years saw a steady 
drop. In 1918 only 210 Syriacs entered the United States. Note that by Syriac Orthodox 
Church in this work the authors mean the Byzantine Orthodox Church (Ibid. 53). They use 
the Jacobite Church and the Nestorian Church respectively for the Syriac Orthodox Church 
of Antioch and the Assyrian Church of the East. 
295 See on the emigration to Argentina, Civantos (2001). She mentions that the migration from 
the Middle East to Argentina started somewhere mid-nineteenth century. Furthermore, she 
states this immigration peaked between 1904 and 1913, and between 1931 and 1950s. The 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Argentina are mainly based in Cordoba, La Plata and Buenos Aires. The 
Archbishop’s seat is based in La Plata. 
296 McGuire (1974: 3) writes that immigration accelerated until the outbreak of the First World 
War. The 1920 census revealed that there were approximately 3,400 persons of Lebanese or 
Syrian origin living in Texas. In the state of Texas, they seemed to be called ‘Syrians’ (after the 
Syrian province of the Ottoman Empire), until the emergence of the modern national states 
of Lebanon and Syria. From then on, they began to make a distinction between their lands of 
origin and national identities.  
297 The first wave of Assyrian/Syriac immigration to Brazil took place in 1905: 101 people 
from Homs in Syria (unpublished fieldwork by Marta Wozniak). From Tur ‘Abdin (Midyad, 
Mardin and Hazakh), the migration took place before and after the Seyfo: in 1914 and 1925. 
After the Second World War, Assyrians/Syriacs living in Israel and Palestine immigrated to 
Brazil. 
298 Lesser (1999: 8) notes that the peak period of migration from the Middle East in the last 
century to Brazil was in the period 1900-1929. This may have been affected by the 
immigration statistics taken afterwards, such as the case of the collective resettlement of 
Assyrian refugees from Iraq, which was prevented by the Brazilian authorities at the beginning 
of the 1930s. Lesser (1999) notes that the Brazilians had developed a negative image of the 
people from the Middle East. When the League of Nations, in conjunction with the 
International Office for Refugees attempted to resettle 20,000 Assyrian refugees from Iraq in 
Brazil in 1932, this was heavily thwarted by Vargas, the president of Brazil at that time. 
Finally, the project of the League of Nations failed. This plan to resettle Assyrian refugees was 
related to the political unrest at the beginning of the 1930s (See for a broader context Malik 
(1935). 
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have apparently assimilated; they are no longer visible as a group distinct 
from the majority.299 In some cases, their institutions and churches have 
continued to exist and have been used by new settlers of the same 
community. 
 Two important factors which may have played a role in the emigration 
of the Assyrians/Syriacs to North and South America are the fact that, in the 
1880s, American missionaries sent young Assyrian men to the United States 
with the idea of training them to do future missionary work in their 
homeland (Naby and Ishaya 1980: 161-2, Ishaya 2003).300 In the ‘Diamond 
Jubilee’ publication (1899-1999) of the ‘Assyrian301 Orphanage and School 
Association of America’302 the author mentions the second factor for the 
emigration to America in the second half of the nineteenth century.303 He 
cites deteriorating social, economic and political situation in the Ottoman 
Empire, culminating in the massacres of Armenians and Assyrians/Syriacs in 
1895. From this perspective, the emigration to America can be perceived as 
                                                 
299 See more on the assimilation of different Christian groups from the Middle East in Kayal 
(1975). 
300 This first settlement led to a chain migration, which still continues until today. The reasons 
for the emigration differ, depending on time and place. 
301 ‘Assyrian’ here is probably used cross-denominationally. This school association was an 
initiative of the members of the Syriac Orthodox Church. 
302 A document, dated 8 October 1899, mentions the charter members of the Assyrian 
Orphanage and School Association in the Ottoman Turkish language: Hanna Bahoosh, Saliba 
Bahoosh, Hadji Hannosh Basmajy, Said Basmajy, Hadji Hannoosh Betterbed, Said Choolceh, 
Thomas Dartley, Said Najar Esia, Beshar Mardenly, Ibrahim Mardenly and Ermoosh Mazejy. 
Their family names indicate that they were not from the villages of Tur ‘Abdin but from the 
town: family names such as Mardenly and Basmajy are known to be from Mardin. A check in 
the baptism registers of the cities where Assyrians/Syriacs were living at that time may lead us 
to the city from which they migrated. 
303  The quote is taken from from Kass-Elias and Safar (Commemorative Eds. 1999): 
‘As the Nineteenth Century came to a close the once mighty Ottoman Empire was fighting 
for its survival. Internal corruption and uprisings by the mistreated and agitated subjects of 
the empire, as well as external pressures, signalled the beginning of the end of the empire. 
This, in addition to worsening economic conditions, created a ripe environment for yet 
another Christian massacre in 1895. Being law abiding and loyal subjects did not spare our 
people from such massacres and maltreatment. Atrocities and discriminatory government 
policies under more than five centuries of Ottoman rule had already reduced our community 
to a few tens of thousands. Most of them lived in Tur ‘Abdin and in cities and villages 
scattered around the northern edges of the Fertile Crescent. Diyarbakır was one of these cities 
where we had a dedicated and vibrant community, which revolved around the church of the 
Virgin Mary. During the 1895 massacres many Assyrians fled Diyarbakır and sought refuge 
and freedom in the United States of America. Most of these new emigrants settled in the New 
York – New Jersey area and began the process of building and adjusting to life in the new 
country.’ 
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an escape to a more stable and secure area with much more opportunities. 304 
The people who left were principally from such cities as Urhoy (Urfa), Omid 
(Diyarbakır) and Kharput. In the years after the Seyfo, Westerners (both 
American and European) who were in the area, took pity on the Seyfo 
orphans and organized them in orphanages in the area. There was even such 
an orphanage in Midyad. Some of them were taken to Western countries.305 
One of my respondents mentioned the American Ms. Franka who drove a 
horse and who took the orphans under her patronage to America. During 
the course of the last century, the emigration to the non-European Western 
countries continued but in smaller groups. A new wave of emigration to the 
United States started from Istanbul in the 1970s. Among them were many 
nouveau riche who had developed their goldsmith businesses in Kapalı Çarşı. 
People from Mardin, Diyarbakır and Iwardo had proven to be successful in 
business and now took it a step farther. Many of them settled in the area of 
New Jersey and in recent years they moved to Los Angeles. During the same 
period (1960s and 1970s), about 2000 Assyrians/Syriacs who did not have 
Lebanese citizenship migrated to the United States with the help of the 
World Church Council (Björklund 1981: 32).  
 In the mid 1960s, the emigration of the Assyrians/Syriacs changed 
direction and veared mainly towards Europe. This has resulted in an 
Assyrian/Syriac diaspora community numbering over 300.000 in Europe 
nowadays. In this section, I will explain the emigration process to Europe by 
contextualizing the reasons my respondents mentioned for emigration. Both 
in Germany and in Sweden reports by the authorities show that asylum 
seekers were not very specific in the motives for their emigration, apart from 
                                                 
304 See on the massacre in 1895, Gaunt (2006: 41-43); De Courtois (2004: 38); Anschütz 
(1989: 50-51); Qarabashi (2002: 39-44), Baum (2006: 53-66) and Yonan (2006). 
One of my respondents (Sweden) mentioned in an interview in 2004 that his uncles, Georgo 
and Stayfo, plus a member of his godfather’s family from Midyad went to America in around 
1895. Although they lived in Midyad, Uncle Georgo had been working in Adana before he left. 
It is possible that they came in touch with people in Adana who were informed about the 
opportunities to travel to America. The initial idea was to return. But, only Uncle Georgo 
came back a few years after he had heard that the Seyfo had taken place in the area. Upon 
arrival, he learned that only his brothers Hobil and Simon, and his sister Saro had survived. 
Their wives had been killed. 
305 Father Bedros Dbe Shushe said that in Munich, in the end of the 1970s, a shop-owner 
approached him when she heard him talking in Suryoyo with the two men who accompanied 
him. She said to him: ‘This is the language my parents spoke. And I know that some crisis had 
taken place in the place where I am from.’ Father Bedros mentioned she managed to tell them 
in a combination of German and Suryoyo that she had been born in the village Miden. She was 
brought to Germany and was possibly one of the Seyfo orphans. 
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the general reasons of persecution and oppression, expressed in the question 
‘Don’t you know they killed us’ (ma lo kud‘itu de qtellalan)? This question 
indicates that Assyrians/Syriacs did not have any idea about the isolation in 
which they had been living in; cut off from the outside world.306 Moreover, 
they assumed that ‘the world’ had been informed of their situation and 
therefore they were expecting from other Christians – farther away but 
brothers in faith – to help them. 
 
4.3 1965–1975: Labour Migrants, Stateless Assyrians 
and Others  
In the 1960s Assyrians/Syriacs migrated from three different countries to 
Europe: Turkey Lebanon and Syria. In the first instance it concerns active 
labour emigration; people applied307 to become Gastarbeiter in Germany for a 
short period. The emigration from Lebanon concerned ‘quota refugees’ – 
people who were invited by the authorities to settle in Sweden under the 
auspices of a quota policy regulating the permanent resettlement of refugees. 
In the case of the first emigration from Syria to Germany, these concerned 
often students who initially wanted to return to Syria after they completed 
their studies. I shall elabourate further on these groups below. 
 
4.3.1 Europe has Appeared: Assyrian/Syriac Labour 
Migrants to Germany  
Aurupa nafiqo (‘Europe has appeared’) is a literal phrase which assumes a new 
opportunity became available. The first emigration of the Assyrians/Syriacs 
from Turkey to Germany was organized under the Turkish-German 
Gastarbeiter system; an outcome of a bilateral treaty (1961) to regulate the 
recruiting of Turkish citizens for German industry.308 The new Turkish 
                                                 
306 This was also confirmed to me by Abdulmesih BarAbraham, the first Assyrian/Syriac 
official interpreter at the Central Asylum Center (Bundesamt für die Anerkennung ausländischer 
Flüchtlinge) in Zirndorf, Germany during 1979-1983. 
307 Applications were submitted to the İşçi Bulma Kurumları in Mardin, Diyarbakır and in other 
big cities. 
308 These bilateral agreements stipulated that recruitment would be carried out exclusively by 
government bodies. In Turkey all recruiting was in the hands of İş ve işçi bulma kurumu (the 
National Employment Agency) and the German corresponding organization Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeit.  
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constitution (after the military coup of 1960) guaranteed citizens the right to 
leave the country, partly to decrease the problem of the high rate of 
unemployment (Björklund 1981: 50). It was also advantageous to Germany, 
which needed labour workers to keep pace with the expansion of its 
industry. From 1963, among the many Turkish citizens who applied to be 
put on the list for Gastarbeiter, there were also Assyrians/Syriacs. Many of 
them settled in the cities Duisburg, Hamburg and Augsburg (Gallio 1992). 
 The first Assyrians/Syriacs to apply as Gastarbeiter were from such cities 
as Midyad, Mardin and Diyarbakır. These were often people who were 
craftsmen (besides the agriculture and the crops from which they lived). 
Since they lived in cities, they heard about the Gastarbeiter system earlier than 
the Assyrians/Syriacs in the villages. Moreover, they had mastered the 
Turkish language better than those in the villages – an acquisition important 
in developing external contacts to prepare the travel abroad. They also 
depended less on their land and were therefore more flexible about 
undertaking a move. Besides, as small entrepreneurs they had been used to 
travelling for their business or to moving to other cities in Turkey 
temporarily for seasonal work or projects. They could be classified as the 
middle class of the Assyrians/Syriacs in the area. They wanted to increase 
their capital fast and one way to do this was by going to Germany to work 
for a certain period, with the idea to return to their families – just as any 
other of their contemporary labour migrants.309 Another factor which 
prompted people to join the Gastarbeiter in Germany was that 
Assyrian/Syriac labour migrants who came back on their visits brought 
information about the world outside the village. 
 Those Assyrians/Syriacs who were already in Germany helped those 
who wanted to join them with acquiring a visa (since 1980 obligatory), 
housing and a job (repeating a process which had already taken place with 
the settlement in Istanbul). In their mother tongue Suryoyo, Assyrians/Syriacs 
refer to this process using the verb grosho (literally ‘to pull’). The family or 
friends greshshe (have pulled) those living in the homeland.310 This already 
gives a hint that the Assyrians/Syriacs in Germany were not thinking of 
going back to the homeland in the near future, since they had started to 
                                                 
309 Although in fewer numbers, Assyrian/Syriac labour migrants also settled in other Western 
European countries. 
310 See Björklund (1981: 80-93) for a full description of how relatives helped one another in 
the migration to Europe. 
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establish themselves. A strong chain which was reinforced by the strong 
dispersal and concomitant interconnectedness of the Assyrians/Syriacs 
worldwide. This is how Assyrians/Syriacs in the homeland came to hear 
about this new ‘opportunity’ very fast: ‘Europe has appeared.’  
 The dimension that the first Assyrian/Syriac Gastarbeiter went to Europe 
(especially Germany) and wanted to develop their economic position by 
working for some years abroad, does not necessarily bear any close 
relationship to the way they perceived their position and situation in Turkey. 
Their discourses display a marginalized and weak position in their homeland. 
The wish to develop their economic situation should primarily be seen in 
terms of their work ethic. Already in the homeland, Assyrians/Syriacs had 
been hard at work striving to improve their living conditions and they found 
with living at a minimum standard unsatisfactory. This makes it possible to 
deduce that the first labour migrants both to Turkish cities in more central 
and western areas of the country as to Europe belonged to the middle class 
of the Assyrians/Syriacs. Moreover, in Turkey, as Christians, 
Assyrians/Syriacs had to produce and earn more than they needed for their 
household, if they were to sustain themselves in a Muslim society in which 
they had to purchase their safety. Although the formal taxes (jizya) which 
non-Muslims had to pay during the Ottoman Period had been formally 
abolished, there was still an informal system which was intertwined with the 
local power structure.311  
 The preparations of the Gastarbeiter for their travels to Germany were 
not cheap. Often people had to pay a bribe to the administrators to obtain 
the passports needed to leave for Germany, up to 20,000 Turkish Lira at that 
time. There was a possibility to change one’s name and date of birth – as 
long as officials were venal. Moreover, the people in charge of the medical 
testing of the future Gastarbeiter sometimes needed to be bribed. The ban on 
immigration within the framework of the Gastarbeiter system in Germany was 
introduced in 1972. Assyrian/Syriac Gastarbeiter who had become 
unemployed in Germany in the 1970s were supposed to return to Turkey, 
but they did not. Some managed to find a new job. Others applied for 
asylum in Germany after they had learned about this new opportunity from 
the Assyrians/Syriacs who had arrived from Turkey in the 1970s and applied 
for asylum in Germany. Others managed to apply for asylum in other 
European countries, often Sweden. Some of those who had migrated from 
                                                 
311 See further Van Bruinessen (1992). 
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Turkey even had ideas of migrating to Lebanon, but the outbreak of the civil 
war there spelled the end of this. Before continuing with the emigration from 
Turkey, I will discuss the character of the first emigration from Lebanon. 
 
4.3.2  ‘Stateless Assyrians’: Emigration from Lebanon to 
Sweden 
…Finally, I would like to submit to you a new problem which has been 
brought to our attention by the UNHCR Representative in the Middle 
East. There are approximately 350 families comprising 1500 persons of 
stateless Assyrians in the Lebanon… However, it appears that increasing 
labour restrictions upon aliens now make it extremely difficult for the 
young men in the community to find work. This has produced a 
spontaneous desire for emigration and some 48 cases of 123 persons 
would like to emigrate to Sweden… While we realise that the 
transplantation of this group of refugees may present some special 
settlement problems, we note that those of them who have already 
emigrated to the United States are reported to have adapted themselves 
well. We would, therefore, greatly appreciate favourable consideration 
being given to the admission of some of these refugees to Sweden...312 
The World Council of Churches initiated the invitation of Assyrian/Syriac 
refugees from Lebanon through the UN High Commissioner. They made up 
part of the refugee quota which Sweden invited in that year. In the months 
of March and April 1967 two groups of Assyrians/Syriacs from Lebanon 
arrived in Sweden. Altogether the invited number amounted to 205 people313 
who lived in Lebanon illegally. They were denied citizenship and the 
Lebanese authorities had issued them with a document of statelessness 
(Björklund 1981: 57). Hence, in the emigration process, the World Council 
of Churches presented them as a people without a country – ‘stateless 
Assyrians’.314 
                                                 
312 Excerpt from a letter by S.J. Sims (Acting Chief of the Resettlement Section, UNHCR) to 
Mr. B. Olsson of the National Labour Market Board in Sweden, 18 July 1966. See Appendix 7 
for a copy of this letter. 
313 As Björklund (1981: 57/58) specifies, the majority of these Christians belonged to the 
Syriac Orthodox Church (Suryoye Ma‘erboye). Among them were smaller numbers of Suryoye 
Madenhoye (members of the Assyrian Church of the East), Suryoye Catholics and Suryoye 
Protestants. My respondents mentioned that there were a few Muslims too who had registered 
themselves as Assyrians, purely to obtain access to Sweden. 
314 See for example the letter by the World Council of Churches, Appendix 7. 
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 In 1974 another group of refugees was invited (Björklund 1981: 63) but 
many others left Lebanon on their own initiative. The civil war which had 
started in 1975 was an overriding factor in the emigration from Lebanon at 
that time. The knowledge that Assyrian/Syriac communities were present in 
Europe inspired many to decide to join relatives or friends. This ushered in a 
more or less permanent change of direction of the Assyrian/Syriac 
emigration from Syria and Lebanon. Before the 1970s the emigration was 
mainly directed towards North and South America, following the pattern of 
other Christian groups in Lebanon. After this period, the main destination 
changed to Europe (especially Sweden). The reason Assyrians/Syriacs from 
Lebanon and Syria tended to settle in Sweden rather than in continental 
Europe is that they had closer family relations with the Assyrians/Syriacs 
who were already living there. Only after the 1990s did the number of 
Assyrians/Syriacs from Syria increase in continental Europe. The example of 
Mushe shows how he used his network of acquaintances to flee the war in 
Lebanon: 
In 1969 I migrated from Syria to Lebanon. I lived there eight years… My 
brother, who was fifteen years old, was killed by a bomb which hit our 
house during the war. Then I decided that I did not want to stay there any 
longer. I wanted to leave; it could be anywhere: Australia, Canada, 
America, anywhere! After I received the passport I had applied for, I left 
for Greece. From there I contacted my friends worldwide to help me to 
get to one of these countries. Finally the friends in Sweden assisted me 
going there, since this was the easiest option at the time. 
The emigration after the civil war continued mainly as chain migration – in 
which the use of family relations has been essential. Within a period of forty 
years, the 205 ‘stateless Assyrians’ –who were invited to settle in Sweden in 
1967 – had become more than 100,000; a compilation of Assyrians/Syriacs 
from different countries in the Middle East.315 It was a consequence the 
Swedish authorities could not have thought of beforehand. 
 
4.3.3 Emigration from Syria 
The first Assyrians/Syriacs who went to Germany from Syria in the 1960s 
were students who travelled to Germany on the basis of a student visa. Their 
                                                 
315 This number is spread across denominational and does not contain only the members of 
the Syriac Orthodox Church, although they are the biggest group. 
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idea was to graduate and to go back to the Gozarto, the northeast region with 
the biggest concentration of Assyrians/Syriacs. Many of them were members 
of the (underground) ADO and aimed at enhancing the opportunities of the 
Assyrian/Syriac population in Syria with the education they had gained. 
Their hope was that they could raise awareness about specific rights 
regarding their mother tongue and to be able to live their culture, rather than 
to be arabized by the politics of the Baath party. Some316 of them did return 
to Syria but others remained. By and large, this first group did not have 
strong ties317 with the first waves of emigration to Germany (labour 
migrants) or the Assyrian refugees invited from Lebanon to Sweden. 
 A second group consisted of political activists and intellectuals, mostly 
active in ADO, who wished to live in a more open society. An example of 
the oppression of free spirits is that of the artist Simon who left for Sweden 
in 1976: 
I started publishing an art magazine myself. I also wrote for a Baathist art 
magazine, and broadcasted radio programmes… But I was not happy with 
the situation. The brother of the president [of Syria] was the editor-in-
chief of the magazine I worked for. I was uncomfortable working so 
closely with the authorities. In our family we were raised with democratic 
principles. Therefore I wanted to escape the situation I was in… When 
one feels a stranger in one’s homeland, this is much harder than feeling a 
stranger in a foreign land. I felt this!.. Inside I felt a stranger in my own 
homeland… I did not feel a first-class citizen and therefore I could not 
obtain positions that I should have been able to. The reason was because 
my name was Simon. I could not become a minister, only the assistant to 
the minister. When I left, I did not plan to go to Sweden. I applied for 
visas to different countries. Finally, I chose for Sweden. 
Generally, fleeing to Europe could have been the consequence of a direct or 
indirect threat, prompted by fear. The flight to Europe offered a good 
alternative, one in which people found a safe ‘haven’ and where they could 
continue their political activism without any danger. In contrast to the first 
                                                 
316 Upon arrival in Qamishlo, the physicians Dr Yacob Jallo and the late Dr Sanharib Hanna 
founded their private hospitals. 
317 Exceptions exist of course; especially the ADO activists, headed by the late Dr Sanharib 
Hanna in Germany, deliberately sought them out after establishing contacts; these were 
indeed far-reaching relationships which educated the Gastarbeiter or their children to bring 
about an awareness of a cross-denominational Assyrian/Syriac identity. 
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group, this second group used their family relations with those who had 
already arrived in Europe from Turkey and Lebanon. 
 Some of them utilized the strategies of Assyrians/Syriacs from Turkey, 
like the family of Saro, who has become a successful professional in Sweden. 
Saro’s father had escaped Turkish military service in the 1940s.318 He could 
no longer tolerate the way the Christian soldiers were treated. He escaped to 
Syria and stayed there until the 1970s. Saro’s brother left Syria to study in 
Germany. The terrorist attack of Palestinian activists on the Israeli team at 
the Olympic games of 1972 created a climate in which the German 
authorities decided to request all students from Arab countries living in 
Germany to leave. Saro’s brother resolved not to go back but to continue to 
live in Germany illegally. When Saro’s family heard about the Gastarbeiter 
system which was open to people in Turkey, the family decided to obtain 
Turkish passports, so that Saro’s mother could sign in.319 Since Saro’s father 
had escaped the Turkish military service, he could no longer enter into 
Turkey. He stayed behind but Saro’s mother took her children with her and 
went to Germany as a labour migrant. After a couple of years, Saro’s mother 
lost her job because of the economic recession; they had to leave Germany. 
By then, they had learned from family members in Sweden that this country 
accepted asylum seekers. The whole family decided to apply for asylum in 
Sweden. Saro’s father found an illegal way to travel from Syria to Sweden. 
After five years of separation, they started a new family life in Sweden in the 
second half of the 1970s. 
 
4.3.4 The Role of Family Networks in the Mass 
Emigration 
The emigration of the Assyrians/Syriacs to Europe was not planned at the 
collective level – except for the first group of invited ‘stateless Assyrians’ 
from Lebanon in 1967 (which was organized by the UNHCR). Within a 
period of ten years after the first wave of migration, the Assyrians became 
national news and visible in Sweden. How was it that so many 
Assyrians/Syriacs have left the homeland, despite the fact that their 
emigration was not organized at the collective level? Before answering this 
question, it is essential to realize that the daily mobility of the 
                                                 
318 See for the military service during this period Section 3.1.2. 
319 As she managed to sign it, it can be expected that recruitment still continued, although 
with reduced numbers. 
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Assyrians/Syriacs in Tur ‘Abdin was very limited. Many had never seen any 
villages or cities except their own. Historically they had a very strong 
connection to their native land and to their qadishe (patron saints). They left 
the land, on which they worked daily, including the family house which they 
had often built themselves, behind. Leaving everything behind, pulling up 
their roots (waride) and heading ‘to foreign lands’ (li nukhrayto) must have 
been an enormous strain.320 One way to explain the pace of the mass 
emigration of the Assyrians/Syriacs is to investigate their interconnectedness 
and the chain mechanism in the emigration process, as I have explained 
earlier. Their emigration can be characterized as a chain migration where the 
network of the extended family, the collective, made the pace and mass 
migration possible.321 Later, the family was also essential during their 
settlement and the process of adapting to the new society. Björklund studied 
this logic of their emigration process along family lines in more detail. 
 Björklund (1981: 64-101) has used the case of the Dbe Urhawi322 lineage 
to illustrate how the family structure and lineage of the Assyrians/Syriacs 
played a great role in the power of the chain migration from the homeland to 
Europe. He concludes: ‘The members of the lineage, setting off from their 
many different points of departure in Turkey, Syria and Lebanon in a partly 
coordinated movement, made their way to Sweden and re-formed 
themselves there.’ Furthermore, Björklund (Ibid.) illustrates how the 
interconnectedness of the families (through the extended family structure), 
made it possible to find help in the emigration process. Historically, the 
family structure and relationships have been used as a socio-political 
structure for survival and, as they have proven their worth, they have 
continued to use them up to today in Europe. With the example of the Dbe 
Urhawi lineage Björklund refutes the notion fostered by the Swedish 
authorities about the emigration of the Assyrians/Syriacs to Sweden, namely 
that the refugee wave from Lebanon in 1967 and thereafter and the sudden 
                                                 
320 Physicians noted psychosomatic illnesses among the first generation Assyrians/Syriacs in 
Europe. The first generation had never heard of psychosomatic illnesses and concluded that 
the physicians in Europe must be less good than the physicians in their own countries, since 
‘When we tell them that our back or head hurts, they tell us that it is because we miss and long 
for the village.’ They expected instead to get heavy medication to heal their aching ‘backs and 
heads’. 
321 Chain migration is not unique to Assyrians/Syriacs; it is common among refugees. The 
case of the group I study differs in the extent and the pace of the emigration, causing a 
demographic change in former areas they inhabited. 
322 Björklund uses the name biBurhawi. 
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‘spontaneous’ emigration of those from Turkey were unrelated. This 
misconception reveals that the authorities knew little about this group. Many 
entered the country despite the measures taken by the authorities; this would 
not have been possible without help from relatives and friends. And not, as 
the Swedish authorities suspected that this emigration was organized by an 
institution of this people, the ADO. This initial accusation was investigated 
by the authorities but no relationship between the two could be found (see 
further Nilsson 1981). 
 
4.4 U Darbo l-Aurupa Ftih or the Road to Europe has 
Opened (1975–1984) 
4.4.1 Finding the Road to Europe 
In the political state of affairs prevailing after the military coup of 1980, 
many obstructions were put in the way of Turkish citizens who wished to 
leave the country. It was precisely at this point that many Assyrians/Syriacs 
started to leave Turkey – tellingly without experiencing any obstacles from 
the authorities to leave the country. Some villages and cities in Turkey were 
already empty of Assyrians/Syriacs.323 
 Until the mid-1970s, the opportunity of ‘Europe has appeared’ loomed 
large in the horizons of Assyrians/Syriacs. In that period many seized this 
chance and ‘the road to Europe had opened’ (u darbo l-Aurupa ftih). 
Germany’s decision to close its borders to the labour migrants in 1972 and 
since 1980324 to migrants without a travel visa, did not seem to present much 
of a hurdle to the Assyrians/Syriacs who had found a way out of the Middle 
East, especially Turkey. For them, not only ‘Europe had appeared’ (which is 
a passive observation as a new opportunity), but ‘the road to Europe had 
opened’ – an opportunity at close distance. Instead of approaching Europe 
as an area with closed doors it now offered a new opportunity to find a new 
                                                 
323 In 1979/80 the first Assyrian/Syriac villages were already empty: ‘Arbaye, Binkelbe and 
Kerboran (Merten 1997: 101). In 1987/88 also all the Assyrian/Syriac families had left the 
villages Bote and Badibbe. And in 1989 the same happened for the village Kefferbe and the towns 
Gerçus, Nsibin, Omerli and Sawro. 
324 In 1980, Turkey was among the countries whose inhabitants had to have a visa before 
travelling to Germany. Airline companies were requested to transport refugees without a visa 
back to their country of origin.  The airport transit visa was established for the first time in 
1981, and extended to Turkey in 1989. 
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home. Soon they learned about the possibility to apply for asylum in 
Germany too, as did one of my respondents in 1976, as the first 
Assyrian/Syriac asylum seeker who applied to settle in Delmenhorst. 
Although he and others did not yet understand the concept of ‘seeking 
asylum,’ they understood that if a person wanting to settle in Germany 
could.325 They also learned about the process through which they had to go. 
A common discourse was that they mentioned their general defenceless and 
oppressed position as Christians in a Muslim society. 
 Two factors may have caused the high number of Assyrian/Syriac 
asylum seekers in Germany in 1980. Firstly, the consequences resulting from 
the military coup d’état on 12 September 1980. The struggle between the leftist 
and the rightist groups resulted in anarchy in which violence and robbery 
became part of the daily experience. When people had a choice in the matter, 
this may have been a strong impulse for the Assyrians/Syriacs to leave. 
Barse, an Assyrian/Syriac wholesaler in jewellery in Istanbul, made the 
decision to flee to Germany after word of the many attacks by robbers on 
Assyrian/Syriac goldsmiths had reached his ears.326 Barse believes that 
attacks on Christians tended to occur precisely in the chaos after a military 
coup or similar happening, since ‘it was legitimate for Muslims to kill us’ (u 
admaydan halal wa la Taye). ‘Perpetrators knew they would not be punished 
and therefore it was easier to kill us than to kill Muslims.’ 
 The German lawyer who was sent by the German authorities to report 
about the situation of the Assyrians/Syriacs claimed that the military coup 
had had positive consequences for the Assyrians/Syriacs (Merten 1997). The 
                                                 
325 My respondent in Delmenhorst said that he learned that the first step in such a procedure 
was to apply in Berlin. This was because Assyrians/Syriacs had learned that many Kurds had 
applied for asylum and were granted a permission to stay in Berlin. Therefore 
Assyrians/Syriacs assumed that applying for asylum was only possible in Berlin. When my 
respondent arrived in Berlin, after he had travelled already to Munich and Stuttgart, he learned 
from the Assyrians/Syriacs there that he could apply in the city he wanted to settle in, which 
was Delmenhorst. He chose for Delmenhorst because his brother had settled there as a 
Gastarbeiter. When he told his family that he wanted to apply for asylum in Germany, they told 
him that it was not possible, since they did not know about that possibility. As a new arrival 
he informed them that it was possible. After his first interview he was sent to a Lager in 
Nurnberg, a former military camp, where he waited for 2,5 months before he was sent to 
Hannover, where a couple of other Assyrians/Syriacs lived.  
326 One of his friends, the newly married Fehmi Dbe Qasho George, was killed in Rize 
(Turkey). He had seen Fehmi earlier that day during one of his business trips in Rize. Fehmi 
had told him that he had a passport ready to leave for France, but before that he wanted to 
request the 300 grams of gold, which he owned from a Muslim shopkeeper in Rize. After this 
entrepreneur had given him back his gold, he killed Fehmi to take the returned gold back. 
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reason for his rather surprising pronouncement is probably because he had 
been accompanied by Turkish officials while talking to people about this 
subject in Turkey. The Syriac Orthodox Chorbishop in Istanbul, Aziz Günel, 
reported similarly positively about the consequences of the military coup for 
his people to Roldanus (1985: 75-76). If this had been the case, how can one 
explain the high number of Assyrians/Syriacs leaving the country just at a 
time where it had become generally more difficult for Turkish citizens to 
leave Turkey (as a commonly well known fact among the people). My 
respondents did not experience any obstacle in obtaining a passport and 
other procedural legal formalities. They have understood this as a way of 
‘getting rid of the non-Muslims’. The second reason for the high numbers of 
asylum seekers during this period is that it was no longer possible to travel 
without a visa to Germany, Belgium or the Netherlands after 1980. 
Assyrians/Syriacs referred to this situation with the phrase u darbo gedmiskhir 
‘the road is going to be closed.’ Alerted by this, many people who were 
thinking of leaving Turkey took the bull by the horns in 1980. A 
combination of these two factors could explain the high number of 
Assyrians/Syriacs who applied for asylum in Germany but also elsewhere in 
1980.327 
 After Germany did not need labour migrants anymore and requested 
the unemployed Gastarbeiter to leave, some Assyrians/Syriacs who were in 
this position applied for asylum in Germany and others travelled farther to 
family (or extended family) members or acquaintances in Sweden and 
applied for asylum there.328 This begs the essential question of why they did 
not return to the countries from which they had migrated? I will discuss this 
from the perspective of my respondents, by contextualizing it in the socio-
political situation in the countries from which they migrated and those they 
settled in.  
 Allied to this, the freedom they enjoyed in Europe offered them many 
opportunities both at an individual and at a collective level. They were very 
aware that politically, as I discussed in Chapter 3, the situation in Turkey in 
the 1970s did not seem to improve. They were also highly conscious of the 
                                                 
327 The same conclusion can be drawn for Sweden and the Netherlands. 
328 In 1993 the fundamental right for asylum was curtailed severely. According to the German 
Basic Law (GG), art. 16a GG, refugees who enter Germany over land do not have the right 
for asylum (so called ‘third state rule’ ‘Drittstaatenregelung’, 
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drittstaatenregelung). 
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fact that many of the family members had already left the athro to go to 
Sweden or to another European country. Returning to Turkey did not 
necessarily promise a reunion with the whole family as ‘in the old days’. A 
typical question often raised among the older generation was329: ‘What is 
there to go back to?’ They combine this question with the statement: ‘The 
homeland should be farther removed from there’ (U athro trezze me tamo u 
lugab!). They were saying that they wanted to create even more geographical 
distance between themselves in Europe and the athro they left behind in 
distant lands. It is a strongly warded statement about how they relate to the 
athro. It is a rejection expressing that they do not want to have anything to do 
with the athro and that they have had enough of the way of life there. It 
encapsulates painful recollections of problems which had beset them in the 
athro and that they did not want to find themselves in that situation again – a 
non-geographical conception of the athro. This statement is permeated with 
great anger and bitterness. The anger is there because they are stripped of the 
hope that they can ever go back to settle and as a consequence of this pain 
people should not even mention the athro, since it is a closed episode.330 
When the younger generation activists say that, if possible, the ideal situation 
is to resettle in the athro, the elderly tell them cynically: ‘Oh yeah, the athro is 
there waiting for you; go and get it!’ It seems that it is easier for them to 
forget the athro than to be reminded of it without the hope of being able to 
go back and live there. 
 In contrast to those in the diaspora, some people who were still in the 
athro judged the emigration of the Assyrians/Syriacs negatively as soon as 
they understood that it would be permanent and en mass: ‘How could one 
leave one’s athro for a foreign country?’ The emigration to Europe was 
perceived as different to the migration within the region of the Middle East. 
It was seen in the light of disconnecting from the historical homeland (athro), 
letting go. Later, from about the beginning of the 1980s, attitudes altered and 
                                                 
329 After 2000 this attitude changed more positively, but the individuals concerned were still 
few. See also BarAbraham (2004). 
330 In the documentary film Kein Platz Dazwischen (Yanik, 2009), the grandmother of Daniel 
Yanik (director of documentary) expresses a similar feeling when she returns to her village 
Harbto (also known as Harabe Mishka) in Tur ‘Abdin for a short visit after having lived in 
Germany for thirty years. During her visit, when she experienced the burning of their land in 
the surroundings by the military, she was again overwhelmed by feelings of overpowering fear. 
Daniel’s grandmother expressed with a bitter looking face that she would never ever come 
back to Tur ‘Abdin again. 
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leaving the athro began to be perceived more as a bitter necessity by those 
who saw themselves condemned to live in the athro. 
 
4.4.2 The Choice for Sweden 
Why did many of these Assyrian/Syriac labour migrants from Germany 
‘choose’ to settle in Sweden instead of one of the other European countries? 
The answer should be sought in the connectedness of Assyrians/Syriacs and 
in the less restrictive Swedish asylum policy. A considerable majority of the 
labour migrants in Germany were Midyoye (people from the town Midyad in 
Tur ‘Abdin). In the meantime, it transpired that many of the Assyrian/Syriac 
refugees from Lebanon in Sweden were also Midyoye. Being related and 
consequently in close contact, the message was passed on to the 
Assyrian/Syriac labour migrants in Germany about the possibility to apply 
for asylum in Sweden. It was not necessary to be from the same place in Tur 
‘Abdin. Often, Assyrians/Syriacs from different places in the Middle East 
were acquainted with each other in some way or other through the extended 
family. This family network is how they kept well informed about the new 
dangers facing them ,or opportunities, which they could take. Right from the 
outset people learned about the different opportunities in both countries, as 
I explained above. Nahir, who was a teenager when his family migrated from 
Germany to Sweden, says: 
We lived in Germany for ten years and we were still not granted a 
passport. But in Sweden we were already given a Swedish passport after 
five years… Moreover, after you have been granted a residence permit, the 
authorities could no longer send you back… In Sweden you had a secure 
life. 
Until the mid-1970s, the character of settlement of the Assyrians/Syriacs 
differed between that in Sweden and in the other European countries. Their 
settlement in Sweden assumed from the beginning a more permanent 
character; eclipsing Germany which had become the symbol for Gastarbeit or 
temporary work initially. At this turning point, Assyrians/Syriacs migrated to 
and settled in Sweden. Midyoye both in the athro and in the nukhrayto (foreign 
lands) expressed their awareness of what was happening by saying: ‘Germany 
built up Midyad and Sweden destroyed Midyad’ (Almanya ma‘marla Midyad w u 
Eswed mahrawla Midyad). From the perspective of the Assyrians/Syriacs 
generally, but especially from that of the Midyoye natives of Midyad, this city 
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was the pride of Tur ‘Abdin. 331 It functioned as the symbol for the Suryoyutho 
(Assyrian/Syriac way of life) in the area, especially since people who had still 
some influence in the area were living in Midyad. Even more so, because the 
majority of the inhabitants were Assyrians/Syriacs and only a small minority 
of residents were Kurdish or Mhalmoye Muslims. Midyad was far more than 
the economic centre of the area; it was also the centre of the handicrafts, 
most visibly expressed in the stone cutting332 of the Midyoye mansions and 
churches. Until they migrated to Sweden or until they were granted asylum in 
Germany the labour migrants in Germany used the money they earned to 
invest in Midyad. People who settled later in Sweden chose a different path 
and sold some of their land and some even let their house go.333 Having 
metaphorically burned their bridges, they began to invest in Sweden. 
 ‘Germany built up Midyad’ (Almanya ma‘marla Midyad) referred very 
literally to the money streaming in for the development of Midyad and to the 
presumption that one-day all the people who had left it would return and 
preserve its character.334 But those who went to Sweden no longer envisaged 
returning to Midyad again and therefore it was said that Sweden destroyed 
(mahraula) Midyad; or in a less literal sense that Sweden had led to its 
abandonment. The adage encapsulates how they relate to Midyad, and it 
offers a clue to the future orientation of the Assyrians/Syriacs in Germany 
and Sweden. On another level it sums up their idea of how they thought 
about their position in these two countries succinctly. In Germany both the 
labour migrants and the asylum-seekers felt much more insecure than did the 
Assyrians/Syriacs who migrated to Sweden. In Germany, the residence 
permits were often not for an unlimited period of time. Only people who 
were granted refugee status received a permit to stay for an unlimited period 
of time. 
                                                 
331 See for the history of Midyad, Palmer (1990). 
332 Midyoye stonecutters had become famous both in the area itself and even outside Turkey. 
They were also asked to build mosques in northern Iraq and Syria. After settlement in Europe, 
the craftsmen used their skills to build the altars for several churches in Europe. Among them 
is the altar of the Mor Ephrem Church in Södertälje (Sweden) carved by Shabe BarAbraham. 
333 The ‘selling’ (negligible price was paid) of houses was often because they had already been 
occupied and disseized by the Kurdish population. 
334 When people visit Midyad today, they often lament that Midyad has not remained the 
Midyad they knew, that it is now inhabited by foreign people and has become ‘dirty’ (‘jiqo or 
msammo). In this situation, some mention that Midyad had been proclaimed the cleanest city in 
all of Turkey somewhere in the 1950s – the time when it was dominantly populated by 
Assyrians/Syriacs. 
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 In this period, most of the Assyrians/Syriacs migrating from the Middle 
East also changed the direction of emigration and opted for Sweden. An 
important reason was that it was relatively easier to get access to Sweden 
than to other European countries. Although both Germany and Sweden 
(apparently still less restrictive than Germany) had made it difficult for 
immigrants to enter the country, the emigration of the Assyrians/Syriacs to 
Europe had increased enormously after 1974-1975 (Björklund 1981: 96). 
Because of the change of the direction towards Sweden, the immigration of 
Assyrians/Syriacs increased substantially in the course of the years 1975-
1976, rising from about 1000 to possibly nearly 7000 (Björklund 1981: 96). 
Also Kai Merten (1995: 108-9) made this clear in his statistics about the 
number of Assyrian/Syriac asylum-seekers who were clients of the lawyer 
König335 between 1971 and 1992 in Germany.336 In the statistics there were 
three years in which the percentage of Assyrians/Syriacs who migrated to 
Germany was much higher than other years: 1976, 1980 and 1984. There are 
some well-founded explanations for these surges. Most prominent was the 
Cyprus crisis with Turkey in 1974. This revealed that the situation of 
Christians in Turkey, including the Assyrians/Syriacs, was neither stable nor 
secure. They no longer had to endure their invidious position as they had 
learned about new opportunities in the West. The new asylum-seekers from 
Turkey and the labour migrants who did not want to return to Turkey and 
who applied for asylum in Germany and Sweden explain the high numbers 
leaving for Germany in 1976 and the increase in their number to Sweden in 
1974-1975. The fear engendered during the Cyprus crisis had even reached 
Assyrians/Syriacs who were in Europe. Even if there were people who 
wanted to go back, this threat created another reason (besides certain 
advantages) for them to stay in the safety of Europe. Zakay, who was a 
young child back then and who had just migrated from Germany to Sweden, 
says: 
                                                 
335 König was probably the lawyer who acted for the highest number of Assyrian/Syriac 
asylum-seekers in Germany. Merten (1997: 108) estimates that the Assyrian/Syriac asylum-
seekers as registered in the archive of König make up about 4% of the Assyrian/Syriac 
asylum-seekers to Germany, if this number is estimated at about 35,000. Presumably the 
number of asylum-seekers could be estimated at a higher number. In 2009 the number of 
Assyrians/Syriacs (cross-denominational) in Germany was estimated at over 100,000. 
336 Merten could not make use of national registration offices or local administration offices 
because Assyrians/Syriacs were not registered as a distinct group of people, separate from 
other Turkish citizens. Immigrants were registered in Germany, as in other European 
countries, according to the state from which they migrated. In Germany, neither the religious 
denomination nor the ethnic group to which one belongs was registered.  
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When we came to Sweden from Germany, in 1974 we heard about the 
Cyprus crisis. My parents and others feared that another Seyfo was 
imminent. Wherever they met they cried out: “Hawaryo, hawaryo!” 337 They 
tried to have as many people as possible to come to Sweden. At that time 
there were still plenty of opportunities to come to Sweden. People came in 
groups. I remember that – my two cousins are blond – my sister and I 
woke up at five in the morning – and we did not know that we had new 
relatives over from Midyad. We woke up and saw seven children in our 
room and shouted: “Mother, mother, there are Swedish children sleeping 
in our room!” She said: “Quiet! They are not Swedish, they are your 
cousins from Midyad.” My youngest brother was born in the 1980s and we 
called him Marcus after Makarios [Cyprus Archbishop and President]. I 
am curious if Makarios really knows who we are and that we were plunged 
into problems because of his crisis with Turkey. 
 
4.4.3 Letters from the Diaspora 
In this context it is important to say something about the communication 
between those settled in the ‘foreign lands’ (nukhrayto) and those who had 
remained in the athro. In the beginning, their communication was mainly 
through cassettes and letters.338 These means of communication had 
different functions. Paramount was the emotional need to express the 
longing for those who had remained behind, the need to express their first 
impressions and astonishment about the new countries in which they had 
settled. A year after we settled in the Netherlands, I remember that I sat in a 
circle of family members around a tape recorder at the age of nine when my 
father spoke into the machine expressing his astonishment and rejection 
about ‘how men and women walked hand in hand and kissed on the street 
without any shame’. In these cassettes and letters the future prospects were 
also communicated. The teenager Yacob read and wrote the letters for the 
people in one of the quarters in Midyad, since most of the people were 
illiterate: 
The general perception I had after reading their letters about Sweden was: 
“It is like heaven here.”… They wrote about being left alone and about 
the freedom they enjoyed. “No one dares to say anything to us about 
                                                 
337 This is something like ‘a cry for help’ in situations where people find themselves in 
emergency situations at times of experiencing a disaster. 
338The villages in Tur ‘Abdin had telephone connections around the beginning of the 1980s. 
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being Christian, as in the athro,” they wrote. And they wrote about the 
beautiful nature and water… They did not write negatively about the dark 
evenings. Some also wrote about the many churches, and the humane 
character of the Swedish people. Something else I learned was that they 
wrote there were no Muslims in Sweden and that you can wear your 
crucifix openly around your neck. And I learned that there was an 
abundance of everything; people had cars, people are rich, and so forth. 
 
Matay, who was a child of about ten years when information from these 
letters and cassettes reached him, remembers that Assyrians/Syriacs in 
Midyad were saying: 
Sweden is a Christian country, the symbol of the cross is its flag, it is a 
very sympathetic country, it helps oppressed Christians and gives financial 
aid to people in need… In Tur ‘Abdin, my father spoke to a Qusnoyo339 who 
was sent back from Sweden and asked him: “How is Sweden?” The 
Qusnoyo answered him in a very sad voice: “I wanted to have died in a 
Swedish toilet and not to be sent back to here again [Khuzi moyaswayno340 bi 
twale du Swed u lo do‘arwayno larke]!” 
The wish expressed by this man should be understood in relation to the life 
of the Assyrians/Syriacs in Tur ‘Abdin. Sweden was defined by the 
Assyrians/Syriacs as a charitable and faithful (Christian) country (athro 
mrahmono u mhaymno). The element of ‘charity’ was probably important to 
them, because in the beginning many had to rely on social aid. The fact that 
the social system in Sweden was referred to as ‘charity,’ is an indication that 
they had not understood its concept. It also shows that they approached the 
Swedish system from their ‘Christian perspective’ when defining Sweden as a 
Christian country. Presumably, because Assyrians/Syriacs perceive charity as 
a Christian characteristic. They assumed that Sweden helped the 
Assyrians/Syriacs since they shared the same Christian religion with the 
Swedes. Only later did they learn that this policy touched not only 
                                                 
339 A Qusnoyo is an inhabitant of the village Bequsyone in Tur ‘Abdin. 
340 The people in the village of Bequsyone pronounce the sound ‘th’ as an ‘s’. Therefore this 
man pronounces the term moyathwayno as moyaswayno. Today, this pronunciation is considered 
incorrect by the ordinary people. Linguistically one can consider it as a regional dialectical 
difference. The pronunciation of a ‘th’ as an ‘s’ has also been common in the villages (in 
Turkey) Dayro du Sliwo (also spelled as Slibo), Mlahso (near Lice) and  in Assyrian/Syriac villages 
around Diyarbakır, such as in Ansha. 
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Assyrians/Syriacs but also extended to other refugee groups adhering to 
different religions. Initially, it was something they could not understand. 
Their point of departure was still the religiously based organization of 
people, rooted in the millet system in the Ottoman Empire. As I argued in the 
introduction of this chapter, they constructed the image of ‘Sweden’ as a 
place where their future expectations could be fulfilled. At the height of the 
mass emigration, the journalist Lars Welss, working for the Swedish daily 
newspaper Aftonbladet interviewed Assyrians/Syriacs in Tur ‘Abdin and wrote 
on the ‘dream about Sweden’ (26 June 1977). The first asylum hearings of 
the new asylum seekers in this period confirm the extent to which the myth 
about Sweden existed: ‘Everyone wants to come to Sweden’ (Fimmerson 
1976).  Sweden had become a social imaginary. 
 
4.4.4 ‘General Amnesty’ in Sweden and its Consequences  
The continuous and increasing number of Assyrian/Syriac asylum seekers 
was something the Swedish authorities had not expected and were not 
prepared for. Moreover, also the profile of the asylum seekers (illiterate 
farmers) did not fit the market needs of the Swedish economy. The Swedish 
Migration Board wished to grant asylum to academics (Gardell 1986: 79). 
Between 1975 and 1977 about 6000 Assyrians applied for asylum (Ornbrant 
1981: 8). This relatively high number is reason for Ornbrant to refer to this 
immigration as ‘unique’ in Swedish immigration history.341 Ornbrant notes 
that the high numbers of Assyrian/Syriac refugees kindled the renewed 
discussion about Swedish immigration policy and the immigration 
regulations as set down in 1968. Assyrians/Syriacs found all kinds of legal 
and illegal ways to travel to Sweden and other European countries.342 In 
                                                 
341 This is certainly not unique in the emigration history of Europe. One example is the 
settlement of the Tamils in the Netherlands in 1985. 
342 They managed to get false passports or to travel with passports of family members, hid 
themselves in trains and they made use of people smugglers to whom a relative big sum of 
money was paid. It grew into a well-paid business. In the second half of the 1990s a 
respondent of Araz (2001: 148) paid 7000 DM for a fake visa which he obtained through the 
smugglers. Merten (1997: 105) mentions the different routes which Assyrians/Syriacs took to 
reach Germany: a) through Brussels; people without a visa were not sent back directly as was 
the case in Germany. From Brussels their relatives or friends drove them through the 
Netherlands to Germany; b) some flew to Zürich. From there they drove farther by car or 
they took the train to Germany. There were even people who crossed the grüne Grenze on foot; 
c) some first flew to Vienna and from there they continued by car, taxi, bus or train to 
Germany; d) others flew directly to a German airport. This was possible because they had a 
ticket with destination London. Therefore they did not experience any difficulties when 
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Sweden, the so-called Eslöv-case received much attention. In March 1980, 
the border police made a body-visitation to a person travelling from Turkey 
and found a passport which was sticked to his body (Nilsson 1981: 58). After 
investigations, it was concluded that the same passport had been used for 
more than 50 trips within the period of one year. This led to a juridical 
process against the owner of the passport that was discussed as an example 
of human trafficking and illegal emigration at the Eslöv Court. By far, this 
case was not unique. They headed off to Europe via a multitude of paths. 
Were they denied access in one country, they tried another one. Faulus, 
whom it took a couple of years to be granted asylum and who thereafter 
managed to set up a successful life in Sweden, says:  
From Tur ‘Abdin I first went to Switzerland. From there I went to Sweden. 
I was sent back to Switzerland. I decided to go to relatives who lived in 
Germany and I remained there for three and a half years. Thereafter I 
managed to get back to Sweden again and was granted asylum. 
Seeking a solution for this ‘problem’ of immigration, the Swedish Parliament 
passed two resolutions in February and November 1976: granting all the 
Assyrians/Syriacs who had applied for asylum in Sweden a permit to stay, on 
humanitarian grounds.343 The names of the prime minister at that time, Olof 
Palme, and that of ‘their lawyer’, Kjell Jöhnson, assumed a positive 
connotation among Assyrians/Syriacs. The singer Hanna Shabo dedicated 
one of his songs to them and distributed the cassettes all over the world. 
Consequently, Assyrians/Syriacs ‘in the four corners of the world’ knew who 
Olof Palme and Kjell Jöhnson were. The ‘general amnesty’ granted to the 
Assyrian/Syriac asylum-seekers attracted many other Assyrians/Syriacs from 
                                                                                                               
departing from Istanbul – the intermediate landing became their final destination instead; e) 
some flew into East Berlin and from there they crossed the border to West Berlin; f) there 
were also people who travelled overland through Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Austria. And especially 
later they travelled trough Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, or through Italy and Switzerland, 
or through France or Belgium to Germany, g) some first flew to Lebanon and from there they 
set off for a Western country; h) a few took the ship or bus to Greece – from Athens they 
flew to a Western country; i) there were even people who flew through Arab countries, such 
as Iraq, Egypt or Tunisia. See also Araz (2001: 187-201) and Björklund (1981) for more about 
the routes to their destinations in Europe. 
343 The resolution in February was passed by the Social Democrats and granted 1200 
Assyrians asylum (Ornbrant 1981: 11). That of November was passed by the coalition of the 
ruling rightist parties and granted 2000 Assyrians asylum. Initially they received collectively the 
refugee A-status. Later, the authorities changed this in a B-status, which was granted on 
humanitarian grounds, as stipulated in the International Conventions. Those who were 
granted an A- status after 1976 received the refugee status on an individual basis. 
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other parts of the world to seek asylum in Sweden. The family relationships 
between those who had already settled and the new migrants played an 
important role in this process. As mentioned before, Assyrian/Syriac labour 
migrants in Germany who had become jobless and were therefore obliged to 
leave, or those who were rejected asylum in Germany, applied for asylum in 
Sweden. Despite attempts by the Swedish authorities to limit immigration by 
introducing a severer selection procedure, it remained relatively easier to be 
granted asylum in Sweden than in the other European countries.344 After 
asylum seekers set foot on Swedish soil, the policy to send them away was 
again less severe than in other European countries, at least from the 
perspective of the asylum-seekers.345 
 
4.4.5 Attempts to Stop the Emigration 
In February 1976 visas to Sweden were made compulsory. To travel to 
Sweden on a legal basis became suddenly much more difficult. In the 
meantime, the Swedish authorities had sharpened the selection procedure for 
asylum-seekers. Many Assyrians/Syriacs were forced to live illegally and 
underground with other family members for years. The situation in Germany 
was the same, especially after 1980, when a travel visa was made mandatory. 
By then, about fifteen years after the first Assyrians/Syriacs settled in 
Sweden and Germany, the authorities seemed to have developed more 
knowledge and insight into their migration case. Nevertheless, they still did 
not understand the Assyrian/Syriac metaphorical use of the phrase ‘they 
killed us’ (qtelallan). The Swedish National Police Report (1981) notes that 
many Assyrians/Syriacs refer to the oppression by the Muslims, but that they 
fail to mention any specific examples regarding themselves, but referring 
generally to the Seyfo.346 Apparently the – mostly illiterate347 – asylum seekers 
                                                 
344 An Assyrian/Syriac man who had swum from one of the other Scandinavian coasts to 
Sweden was not sent back but granted asylum, since the authorities were said to have been 
impressed by his dedication to reaching Sweden. This example indicates that the authorities 
were not strictly unrelenting in their policy. 
345 Although already from the beginning Assyrian/Syriac asylum-seekers in the Netherlands 
had to go through a more severe procedure, in the end, no considerable numbers were sent 
back. 
346  This is also true of asylum-seekers in Germany, the majority of whom referred to the Seyfo. 
See further BarAbraham (2006). 
347 The majority of the Assyrian/Syriac asylum seekers from Tur ‘Abdin were illiterate or had 
just a primary school diploma. The first public schools in the area of Tur ‘Abdin were 
established in the beginning of the 1950s. 
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were unable to convince the authorities that they were persecuted and 
singled out (two requirements in Refugee Law) in their hometowns and 
villages by members of the Muslim majority. Qtellalan (they killed us) had 
become a metaphorical term for their subordinated position in Turkish 
society. It is a reference to their increasingly weakened position in which they 
found themselves in the decades in the aftermath of the Seyfo. The question 
of why Assyrians/Syriacs did not mention very specific reasons to explain 
their personal state may have been attributable to the fact that their 
framework of reflection on themselves and their predicament in relation to 
the others in society differed from that of Europeans. They had been used to 
thinking in terms of us (Suroye, used in the sense of ‘Christians’)348 and them 
(Taye, Muslims) and the historical traditional position and relationship of 
these two groups. Since they characterized the position of ‘us’ (Christians 
among Muslim majority) as that of being oppressed (dishe), subordinated and 
defenceless (twiroye), they assumed that the Europeans as Christians knew 
about this position and that a brief reference to their ‘defenceless position’ 
would suffice to have the European authorities understand why they applied 
for asylum in Europe. 
 
 
      Illustration 4: An asylum-seeking family that lived underground in  
      Sweden. Source: Länstidningen 1976. 
                                                 
348 In Tur ‘Abdin, Assyrians/Syriacs more often used the designation Suroye than Suryoye when 
speaking in Suryoyo. The latter term has been commonly used in the diaspora in the spoken 
tongue. 
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In the meantime, the authorities in Sweden and Germany made several 
official investigating visits to Turkey in order to learn more about the reasons 
for their emigration. In the end, they did not seem to get much further. The 
general conclusion drawn from these conversations was that the Turkish 
officials and Assyrian/Syriac clergy and laymen (on the church board in 
Istanbul), declared that Assyrians/Syriacs in Turkey did not suffer from 
religious persecution (Nilsson 1981). This stand had already been stated by 
the Turkish ambassador, Mehmet Baydur, in an interview with Finn Norgren 
(1978). It is highly problematic that during these visits, the official 
delegations discussed the reasons for emigration mainly with the Turkish 
officials and with religious leaders of the Assyrians/Syriacs in Turkey, while 
being accompanied by Turkish Intelligence Officials. A formal visit of 
Patriarch Zakka I Iwas in May 1982 to Turkey in which he expressed himself 
about the emigration of his community members from this country 
illustrates the politicized context of such statements.349 Before visiting his 
community in Mardin and Tur ‘Abdin, he visited the President of the Turkish 
Republic, Kenan Evren, who was the mastermind and leader of the military 
coup of 1980. In an interview with the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet 
(Türkiye’deki Süryanilerin bir derdi yok,350 30 May 1982) the Patriarch made the 
statement that Turkey shows great respect to the human rights and that 
‘Those who say “we are persecuted in Turkey” use this just to get residence 
permission in European countries. They are not part of us.’ With this, he 
distanced himself from his whole community in the diaspora, today 
numbering more than those in the homeland. The Chorbishop Aziz Günel351 
                                                 
349 See further about the political role of the Patriarch in the Contemporary Middle East, 
McCallum (2010). 
350 Translation of Turkish: ‘Assyrians/Syriacs in Turkey do not have any problems’. 
351 Beth Sawoce (2001) published a long interview with Chorbishop Aziz Günel and many of 
his private letters as well as newspaper articles. From these writings, it appears that as a 
clergyman he was involved in the Turkish political system to a greater extent than was usual; 
he had very regular, close contacts with high-ranking Turkish officials, including members of 
the police and the military. In his letters and articles in Turkish, he defines Assyrians/Syriacs 
as Turks and displays a discourse of strong loyalty to Turkey. As a high-ranking cleric, he goes 
as far as to write: ‘I would deny even Jesus Christ if He were against the Turkish Republic’ 
(Ibid: 20). During the Cyprus Crisis of 1964, Chorbishop Aziz also adopted an active position 
on the Turkish side and tried to stimulate other Syriac Orthodox clergy to support his stand 
and distance themselves from the Greeks. See further his letter (1964, January 22) to 
Abdunnur Aydiner (Ibid: Turkish section, p. 19-20). Among Assyrians/Syriacs the general 
idea prevails that Chorbishop Aziz Günel was a Turkish agent. According to Chorbishop 
Aziz, this accusation had also reached Patriarch Jacob III (Ibid: 29-30). He discusses this 
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(based in Istanbul) made a similar statement when he visited the Turkish 
ambassador in Berlin in 1982 (Tercüman, Türkiye’de huzur içinde yaşıyoruz352, 13 
November 1982):353 
We are sad about the news about our people in the European newspapers. 
We, who live in Turkey as the citizens of the Turkish Republic and as the 
Turkish Süryani Kadim Community, have never been persecuted in Turkey. 
Some people use this argument when they apply for asylum. But, this is 
not true. We are Turks. Throughout the history we have never been 
oppressed. We have always enjoyed the freedom to live our religious 
activities.  
In the Swedish National Police Report of 1981, the Patriarch of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church in Damascus made a similar statement and explained the 
emigration of the Assyrians/Syriacs as a wish to improve their already good 
economic position in Syria.354 
 Andersson (1983: 129, 132, 140) criticizes the non-critical approach 
taken by the Swedish officials to arguments adduced by the Turkish officials. 
Namely, that these arguments were used instrumentally by the Swedish 
authorities in order to justify the ban on the admission of the 
Assyrian/Syriac asylum-seekers. The German authorities also sent officials to 
Turkey and drew more or less the same conclusion as the Swedish 
authorities. They do not place the emigration of the Assyrians/Syriacs in the 
context of the life in which this group lived in the Turkish society. 
Nevertheless, when Assyrians/Syriacs discuss their general life in the Turkish 
society informally and off-the-record, it is not uncommon to hear complaints 
similar to that of the Assyrians/Syriacs who have settled in Europe when 
recalling their reasons for emigration. In contrast to the people who have 
migrated, religious leaders in the different countries of the Middle East often 
acquiesce in their position. This can be seen as the continuation of a 
                                                                                                               
accusation for instance in his letter (1973, April 26) to I. Tahincioğlu (member of an 
influential Assyrian/Syriac family in Istanbul). 
352 Translation of Turkish: ‘We live peacefully in Turkey’. 
353 My translation of the original in Turkish. 
354 Such statements may have been one of the reasons Assyrians/Syriacs from Syria were 
often refused asylum. This may also explain to a great deal why many of the Assyrians/Syriacs 
who emigrated from Syria informed the Swedish authorities that they were from Turkey or 
Lebanon (see further Nilsson 1981). Had they not done so, they knew they would have been 
sent back to Syria.  
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tradition. In the literature of the Assyrians/Syriacs, authors reiterate that a 
good Christian should accept punishment in the name of Christ, since that is 
what Christ himself had predicted to be the fate of his followers.355 
Given their compliance, both the German and the Swedish authorities 
found discrepancies between what the Assyrian/Syriac asylum-seekers 
reported as the reasons for emigration to Sweden or Germany and what their 
religious leaders in the Middle East reported to the European authorities. 
This discrepancy and the stand of the religious leaders can be understood in 
the light of the responsibilities and tasks the religious leaders had to shoulder 
in the history of the Ottoman Empire and later in Turkish and Arab 
societies. As religious leaders, their authority extended beyond the religious 
matters in their millet; they were accountable for the inculcation of the 
correct socio-political attitudes of their flock. When rulers encountered 
difficulties with the members of the Süryani Kadim Millet or the Syriac 
Orthodox Church, they held the religious leaders accountable and expected 
them to influence their flock in adopting the ‘correct attitude.’ 
 At a more fundamental level, the stand of the Assyrian/Syriac religious 
leaders – stating that they are not endangered as a group of people in the 
countries of the Middle East – may be interpreted as a means of survival. 
Any reporting that they endured difficulties as a group of people could serve 
the Turkish authorities as ammunition to accuse the Assyrians/Syriacs of 
being betrayers of Turkey and therefore legitimating reprisals against them. 
This idea was also expressed by one of the archbishops in Sweden when 
explaining the opinion of the Syriac Orthodox Clergy in Turkey: 
Here [in Sweden] we have the opportunity to talk more openly. Here, we 
are invited to express our thoughts and to claim our rights. There – if we 
talk – this will lead to oppression, our relationships deteriorate and they 
[authorities] will look upon us as betrayers and troublemakers. 
Historically, official punishment meted out by the authorities or actions 
launched against them had been legitimized with this discursive argument.356 
                                                 
355 See for example Gallo Shabo’s discourse about the suffering during the Seyfo (Atto 2008). 
See also Merten (1997: 117) who writes that especially among Assyrian/Syriac Protestant 
opponents of migration, the discourse that Christ never promised a life without suffering and 
persecution is prevalent. Roldanus (1985: 106) noted the same discourse among the 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Istanbul in the beginning of the 1980s. 
356 The Turkish national thesis about the genocide on the Christians in Turkey also 
commences with this argument. See further Gaunt (2006). 
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In fact, the Assyrian/Syriac religious leaders in Turkey did mention to the 
Swedish officials that they feared the consequences of what the 
Assyrian/Syriac asylum-seekers in Europe report about the Turkish 
authorities. Roldanus (1985: 84) confirms this in his research conducted in 
1982 and 1984. He mentions that Assyrian/Syriac laymen in Turkey likewise 
complain about the repercussions of open conversation of Assyrians/Syriacs 
in the West who live in a safe society and are unheeding of Assyrians/Syriacs 
who continue to live in Turkey. The Human Rights expert Dietmar Oehring 
reported that religious leaders disclosed that the State was monitoring their 
activities and systematically tapping their telephone conversations.  
 
 
Illustration 5: A demonstration for the asylum rights of Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden. 
Source: Länstidningen (1976). 
 
Another explanation for the compliant attitude of the religious leaders in the 
Middle East is that European politicians are often accompanied by Turkish 
officials when visiting the Assyrian/Syriac representatives in the Middle East. 
As mentioned earlier, this makes it impossible for Assyrian/Syriac religious 
leaders to have an open conversation with European officials, as they are 
aware that the Turkish authorities can easily accuse a Turkish citizen of 
committing an offense against the Turkish State or of constituting a threat to 
THE EXODUS FROM THE HOMELAND          191 
 
Turkish unity or of ‘insulting Turkishness’ as formulated in the controversial 
Article 301 of the current Turkish Penal Code.357 
 As leaders in charge of their flocks, they observed the exodus of their 
people and dwell on the consequences. It could lead to undermining the 
authority of the religious leaders who remained behind. They probably have 
felt the despair and feared the danger of the disappearance of their church, 
undermining an already weak position in society. Since the most influential 
laymen had left Turkey, religious leaders were left behind alone to cope with 
few or no means to protect those community members who had not 
emigrated. In the athro (homeland), especially the Archbishops Mor Ewannis 
Ephrem Bilgiç of Tur ‘Abdin and his later successor, Mor Themotheus 
Samuel Aktaş, made many attempts to stop the mass emigration of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs. In 1993 it was decided that priests who left the athro for 
Europe would be expelled from the church (Merten 1995: 116). Especially in 
the middle of the 1980s Archbishop Samuel visited the different villages of 
Tur ‘Abdin and tried to convince people to stay. The emigration stopped for 
a short period, but resumed again as soon as an incident, which provoked 
fear among the people, took place. Their reasons for attempting to keep 
people in the homeland were patriotic: ‘So that the homeland is not deserted 
[from Assyrians/Syriacs]’ (u athro dlo khole). This attitude was also made clear 
to Swedish journalists who were sent to the emigration countries, such as in 
the case of Finn Norgren working for the Swedish daily Svenska dagbladet in 
1977.358 In an interview (Vi kallar dem Assyrier, 2 June 1977) the Archbishop 
Samuel Aktas of Mor Gabriel Monastery reports:359 
The Christians have no future here [in Tur ‘Abdin]. In ten years we are 
going to become extinct.... It had been better if Europe had said no to all 
immigrants, then we would have a chance here [Tur ‘Abdin]. You [the 
European governments] should decide, all of us or none of us… Now, we 
have become a half-people. Both, those who have continued to live here and 
those who are abroad are not happy...  
                                                 
357 See further the public statement of Amnesty International (2005, December 1) Turkey: 
Article 301 is a threat to freedom of expression and must be repealed now! The Turkish government 
made an amendment to this article and changed the emphasis from ‘Turkishness’ to ‘the 
Turkish nation’. Before, the restrictions on freedom of speech were formulated under the so-
called separatism Article §312 of the old Penal Code valid until 2005. 
358 Norgren (1977) published a series of three articles about his trip to Turkey. 
359 My translation of the original in Swedish. 
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Furthermore, in this article Archbishop Samuel questioned the possibility for 
the survival of his people’s culture in Europe. This fear for cultural survival 
was also expressed by Patriarch Zakka I Iwas in an interview with the 
journalist Anders Thunberg (1981) for the radio station Dagens Eko. No 
matter how hard they tried, Sabro’s citation illustrates how little influence 
and authority clergy had left over their flock in the matter of the emigration: 
My parents came to Germany in 1984. In that year the situation in Turkey 
worsened and my sisters had grown into young women. I was already in 
Germany. My father said to me: “I came to Europe to save your sisters! 
Were they to be kidnapped by Muslims I would not be able to save them.” 
He regretted that he had not already left for Sweden in 1976. My father 
took his final decision to leave Tur ‘Abdin after he had heard the late 
Chorbishop Aziz [Günel] talking positively about [the Muslim Prophet] 
Muhammed and the Muslims in his sermon in Mor Akhusnoyo Church in 
Midyad in 1984. This was probably another attempt of our religious leaders 
to encourage patience and obedience for the situation they were in. But, as 
soon as he [father] heard him talking like that, he thought, “This is 
enough!” He said he could no longer listen to more hypocrisy. In 1976 my 
father already had a passport ready to leave for Sweden. But, since the late 
Archbishop Yacob the ‘Iwarnoyo came to the Mort Shmuni church in 
Midyad to please the people and begged them not to leave their blessed 
athro, my father decided not to leave. He even burned his passport in the 
stove! The late Archbishop Yacob even promised to go to Sweden to 
fetch back the people that were already there. Later, my father cursed the 
archbishop because he went to Sweden and never came back to his people 
in the athro.  
Assyrians/Syriacs in Europe were aware that the attitude of their 
representatives in Turkey hindered them being granted asylum. Central to 
the asylum policy of European authorities was the definition of a refugee as 
specified in the UN Convention of 1951 in relation to the status of refugees: 
refugees are outside their country of nationality and are unable or unwilling 
to return due to a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality or membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion. The interpretation of this definition was grasped as an instrument 
by those in charge of the immigration policy. Generally they received the B 
instead of the A-status – in all European countries where this distinction 
between statuses existed. Consequently they were granted asylum for 
humanitarian reasons. In Sweden specifically, before the mid-1970s many 
had been granted an A-status. Thereafter, as a group they usually received a 
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B-refugee status. The Swedish Immigration Board defended this decision 
with the argument that they were not systematically persecuted and that the 
Turkish authorities could protect Assyrians/Syriacs living in Turkey. 
 
 
Illustration 6: The emigration of Assyrians/Syriacs to the Netherlands 
expressed on a hand made carpet by the community that migrated to the 
Netherlands. Today it is hanging in the corridor of the Syriac Orthodox 
Monastery Mor Ephrem. Photo: Naures Atto. 
 
In fact, the Assyrian/Syriac emigration resulted in or accelerated a de facto 
change in the Swedish Law pertaining to the status of immigrants. The 
second paragraph on the immigration law (utlänningslag) of 1954 specifies the 
definition of political refugees. With the two governmental decisions on 26 
February 1976 and 12 November 1976, Assyrians/Syriacs – who were at the 
material time in Sweden – acquired residence permission with a specific 
refugee definition. In reality this was an expansion of the refugee category. In 
1975-76, in the process of changing the immigration law, the government 
submitted a proposal which also included a proposal for asylum seekers who 
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need protection but who do not fulfil the criteria of political refugees.360 As 
Ornbrant (1981: 28) notes, this addition was born of the practical need to 
solve the dilemma existing in relation to the immigration of 
Assyrians/Syriacs to Sweden. The Swedish authorities did not classify the 
Assyrians/Syriacs as A-refugees with political reasons for settling in 
Sweden.361 Nevertheless, they had to find a solution to their mass settlement 
in the country. The B-refugee status which was mostly granted to 
Assyrians/Syriacs was classified on a par with the A-refugee status – in the 
sense that individuals with the B-status received and were treated in the same 
way as A-status refugees. This measure was promulgated after it was realized 
that Assyrians/Syriacs were going to stay in Sweden (see further Chapter 5). 
 Contrary to the religious leaders in the athro, the late Archbishop Julius 
Jesu‘ Çiçek362 for Central Europe and the Benelux held a different opinion 
about the emigration of Assyrians/Syriacs from Turkey. Appointed the first 
Archbishop in Europe, he poured enormous efforts into requesting 
European governments to grant Assyrians/Syriacs asylum. He himself spoke 
relatively openly about the situation of the Assyrians/Syriacs in Turkey. In 
my last interview with him in 2005, he mentioned that the Roman Catholic 
and the Protestant churches in Germany had been of great help in this 
effort.363 Also in Sweden, the Free Church Council of Sweden 
(migration/refugee unit) has been very supportive of the idea to take up 
Assyrian/Syriac asylum seekers as political refugees.364 In their turn, 
Assyrian/Syriac activists in Europe published reports about formal and 
informal oppression and murder as a reaction to the ‘positive reports’ 
published by the European authorities about their position in the 
homeland.365 Activists used these reports to present their views on the 
                                                 
360 Proposition 1975/76: 18, Regeringens proposition om ändring i utlänningslagen (1954: 193). The 
new immigration law entered into force in July 1980. 
361 Gardell (1986: 80) notes that the stand of the Swedish authorities to reject the classification 
of Assyrier as political refugees is against both the Swedish Law and the UNHCR principles. 
362 He arrived in the Netherlands as a monk in the year 1977. Two years later, in 1979, he was 
consecrated as Archbishop for Central-Europe and the Benelux countries. As one of the first 
clergy, and later as the Archbishop with the largest diocese in Europe, he exerted a telling 
influence on different aspects in the lives of his people. 
363 See about the relationship with these churches also Merten (1995: 119). 
364 See further for its analysis about the situation of Christian minorities in Turkey, Free 
Church Council of Sweden (1981). 
365In this respect it is necessary to mention the Advisory Reports (Gutachten) of the German 
Historian Gabriele Yonan which were commissioned by various German organizations (both 
THE EXODUS FROM THE HOMELAND          195 
 
situation in Turkey to the European authorities. One example is a letter366 
sent by the president of the Mesopotamien Verein in Gütersloh (Germany) to 
the newly appointed Chancellor Kohl on 26 October 1982, informing him of 
and explaining the attitude of the Assyrian/Syriac clergy in the Middle East: 
To the Chancellor of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
Respected Sir: 
We are delighted that you have taken your oath as Chancellor. In the first 
place we would like to wish the industrious, civilized German people as a 
whole and yourself in particular good luck. Our origins lie in Turkey, Syria 
and Iraq. We are Assyrians and are committed Christians. The reason for 
our residence here is the constant flight which we have had to take from 
the Islamic persecution and extermination of our people. Jesus also had to 
take refuge in Egypt to escape killing. ‘Germany’ has become our Egypt... 
We had to leave our country for one reason and one reason only: our 
loyalty to the Christian Faith and our people. Of course, no Islamic 
government will admit this but will invariably claim that the Assyrians 
enjoy the same freedom as anybody else. 
If you question our priests in the homeland, of course they are not in a 
position to tell the truth, since by doing so they will face at least ten years 
imprisonment. Peter also denied the Lord three times because he was 
afraid. 
We came here with our hearts full of hope, because we knew there were 
Christians living here. Can Christians not help each other? 
In advance, we thank you for your fraternal help and efforts... 
 
                                                                                                               
churches and Human Rights) and which played a positive role in the acceptance or toleration 
(German Duldung) of Assyrian/Syriac asylum seekers in Germany. They had been used at 
German courts, countering the official reports of the German Ambassador in Ankara. 
366 My translation of the original letter in German: ‘Sehr geehrter Herr Bundeskanzler, Wir 
haben uns darüber sehr gefreut, als Sie als Bundeskanzler den Eid geleistet haben. Wir 
wünschen zuerst dem fleissigen, zivilizierten Deutschen Volk, dann Ihnen einen guten Erfolg 
für immer. Wir kommen aus der Türkei, Syrien und Irak. Wir sind Assyrer und bekennen uns 
zum christlichen Glauben. Der Grund unseres Aufenthalts ist die ständige Flucht vor den 
islamischen Verfolgungen und Ausrottung unseres Volkes. Jesus musste auch vor Tötung 
nach Ägypten flüchten. Unser  Ägypten ist “Deutschland” geworden. … Wir mussten unser 
Land aus nur einem Grund verlassen: Unsere Treue zum christlichen Glauben und unseren 
Volk. Natürlich wird das keine islamische Regierung zugeben, sondern immer behaupten, die 
Assyrer seien frei wie die Anderen. Wenn man unsere Pfarrer fragt, die in der Heimat sind, 
natürlich können sie die Wahrheit nicht sagen, weil sie dafür mindestens 10 Jahre Gefängnis 
bekommen. Petrus hat auch aus Angst den Herrn dreimal verleugnet. Wir kamen mit grosser 
Hoffnung hierher, weil wir wussten, hier leben Christen. Die Christen können einander nicht 
helfen? Wir bedanken uns für Ihre brüderliche Hilfe und Mühe im Voraus ….’ 
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What is remarkable in this letter is that the president of the Mesopotamien 
Verein presents the Assyrians/Syriacs as Christians, who fled to their ‘Egypt’, 
present day Germany, and that the clergy of the Assyrians/Syriacs in Turkey 
bear a close resemblance to (the disciple) Peter, who also denied the truth up 
to three times. These arguments fit in the religious discourse generally used 
by the Assyrians/Syriacs in their emigration stories. Moreover, giving 
Germany the metaphorical position of Egypt ties in the idea that they have 
become orphans367 in the diaspora. 
 
4.4.6 Istanbul: an Alternative to Flee to? 
The question of whether Istanbul could present flight alternative refuge for 
the Assyrians/Syriacs instead of them fleeing to Europe occupied the minds 
of many European authorities.368 The importance of this question is related 
to the admission and the recognition of Assyrian/Syriac asylum seekers as 
refugees. Although European countries have tried to judge the asylum cases 
of Assyrians/Syriacs on an individual basis, Assyrians/Syriacs themselves 
have requested a more collective approach to their case as an ethnic and 
religious minority in the countries from the Middle East. In few instances 
and for a limited time, German courts acknowledged the collective 
persecution (Gruppenverfolgung) of the Assyrians/Syriacs. With exception of 
the two collective amnesty decisions of the Swedish government in 1976, the 
European authorities tried to find interim ‘solutions’ to this question. And 
Istanbul was identified as one of the alternatives where the group could 
settle. 
 Assyrians/Syriacs themselves had an unequivocal answer to the above-
mentioned question. The common idea about a life in Istanbul has been: ‘We 
are like sheep among wolves’. The metaphor of ‘sheep’ is generally used by 
Assyrians/Syriacs to express their attitude of obedience adopted towards the 
Muslim majority in a Muslim society in order to survive. In a nutshell, they 
are giving vent to their dissatisfaction with this need to obey – in contrast to 
some influential Assyrians/Syriacs in Istanbul, who have developed a 
strategy of hiding a distinct collective identity and becoming invisible in the 
Turkish public space – a second nature to meet the required ‘correct attitude 
of good citizenship’ (from an official Turkish perspective). In such a 
                                                 
367 See also Chapter 5 about the notion of having become orphaned in Europe. 
368 For instance, the German Embassy in Turkey in its regular country reports did always refer 
to Istanbul as a so-called inländische Fluchtalternative (internal flight alternative).  
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situation, the most their name Suryoye can mean is ‘Christians’ – formulating 
their collective identity solely in religious terms. An ethno-national Christian 
collective identity is perceived as a threat to Turkish national identity by the 
Turkish government and therefore undesirable (see further the previous 
chapter). 
 Individuals give examples of their experiences and discomfort with the 
situation. Assyrian/Syriac children who attended school in Istanbul still 
encountered difficulties. People who were confronted with such situations 
and could find an alternative place to which they could move, decided to cut 
the Gordian knot, like the father of Ken‘an, who decided to move to Sweden 
after the experience of his son at school: 
There were pupils who fought with me and questioned how I as a 
Christian could become the best pupil at school. Afraid, the next day my 
father no longer allowed me to go to school. In 1978 he called my sister in 
Sweden and told her that he would send first me and that he and the rest 
of the family would follow me.  
The strong fear and reaction of this parent is not uncommon among 
Assyrians/Syriacs in especially the villages of Tur ‘Abdin, where only a 
primary school was based in most of the villages. Parents remembered cases 
of children who were killed at school at such occasions as described above 
and attempted to protect their children as much as possible. In many cases, 
these parents in villages decided not to send their children to the secondary 
school in the nearest town because of not trusting the safety of their children 
in a majority Muslim environment. Another example about the situation in 
Istanbul is the experience of a respondent from Germany. In 1985, he fled to 
Istanbul with his family – earlier he had fled his village Anhel to the town 
Midyad. He was fearful because Assyrians/Syriacs had been killed in the 
neighbourhood in which he was living. After they settled in Istanbul, the 
family sent their child to the primary school in the Koca Mustafa Paşa quarter. 
The director of the school told them that he would not enrol their daughter 
as long as he could not read a Muslim identity on her identity card. The 
father did not think that this was an option: ‘We were willing to die for our 
religion but under no circumstance willing to change it on our identity card. 
The only option we could think of at that time was fleeing to Europe.’369 
                                                 
369 The father of this family had visited Germany five times before with a valid visa, but he did 
not want to stay. Only after the fear had intensified did he decide to seek refuge in Germany. 
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 Considering how many Assyrians/Syriacs have travelled through 
Istanbul to get to further away places, the inevitable conclusion has to be 
that as they saw it, Istanbul did not present a permanent settlement 
alternative. By 1978, about 15,000 Assyrians/Syriacs were living in Istanbul 
(Björklund 1981: 47). It had become their urban centre in Turkey. In the 
1970s it had already functioned as a transit port for the Assyrians/Syriacs on 
their way ‘to the four corners of the world’ (la arba‘ qernawotho de britho) as 
Assyrians/Syriacs refer to their current diaspora among themselves. Between 
1978 and 1982, about 750 families had left Istanbul for the West (Roldanus 
1985: 96). And, whereas in 1984 the Assyrian/Syriac population in Istanbul 
numbered 14,000, in 2009 this number increased with several thousand due 
to the temporary settlement of Assyrian/Syriac refugees from Iraq who seek 
to find a visa to one of the Western countries. 
 
4.5 The Athro has Emptied (1984–Today)  
In the previous chapter, I elabourated on the situation of Assyrians/Syriacs 
in the period 1984-2000, in which emigration assumed the guise of a bitter 
necessity, also resulting in the emigration of those who had – until then – 
attempted to endure their violent living conditions in Tur ‘Abdin. In an 
interview with the Swedish journalist Finn Norgren (1977, June 2), the 
teacher at the Mor Gabriel Monastery in Tur ‘Abdin, Isa Garis (Gulten) 
forecasted already in 1977 what happened three decades thereafter:  ‘There is 
no space for us in the fight between the State and Kurds’. He uses the 
example of Kerboran370 in Tur ‘Abdin where in 1975 about 300 families were 
living, while a year after emigration started, in 1976 only twenty families 
remained. As in the previous period, they used their family members in 
Western countries to find a way out. 
 I have also shown that although the position of the Assyrians/Syriacs in 
Turkey was unenviable, in the course of time as a group of people they had 
developed survival strategies which enabled them to live alongside their 
Muslim neighbours and comply with the governmental institutions with 
which they had to deal in Turkish society. As soon as people started to leave 
Tur ‘Abdin, the position of the local social and power relationship network 
was thrown out of joint. Both the Kurdish aghas and the Kurdish inhabitants 
                                                 
370 Kerboran (Dargeçit in Turkish) gained the status of town in 1989. 
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in the area took advantage of the changes. Unquestionably, the fear of 
reprisals by the authorities to quell any unacceptable stance adopted 
increased, since many of the influential Assyrian/Syriac men had either left 
or had been killed.371 Aware there was safety in numbers, Assyrians/Syriacs 
who were more determined to continue to live in the athro (homeland), tried 
to convince others not to leave too. To live next to an empty house meant to 
be in a very vulnerable position. Unhappily, influential Assyrian/Syriac men 
could not be easily replaced, since often the power they exercised was 
informal; very much part and parcel of their personality. Parents were 
mountingly confronted with the situation in which they could not defend 
themselves should their daughters be kidnapped by the Muslims. A couple of 
girls ended up becoming nuns, simply because their parents could not 
protect them, as they were the last Assyrian/Syriac family in their village, in 
the midst of a Muslim population. Deprived of official protection and in 
situations in which the Kurdish aghas could act arbitrarily against their 
interests, the Assyrians/Syriacs found themselves exposed to all sorts of 
threats. Therefore, given the instability of their situation, Assyrians/Syriacs 
were overwhelmed by a great sense of insecurity. An example of how this 
worked out comes from the Assyrian/Syriac village Zaz, which was 
surrounded by five villages which are today inhabited by Muslims. Saro 
explained how the Muslims in the villages around Zaz were backed up by the 
agha in the region and that therefore the Assyrians/Syriacs in Zaz were 
threatened with death, as was her own family: 
My eldest brother had already fled to Germany in 1984 because my father 
was afraid that something would happen to him. We came to Germany in 
1985… My father identified the thieves, but they were not punished by 
the authorities… One day, two Suryoye were in a van [dolmush] with 
Muslims who threatened my father. They [Suryoye] heard them talking 
about their plan to cut the son of Isa [Saro’s father] into little pieces, no 
bigger than the pieces of his ear lobes. The Suryoye told my mother what 
they had heard in the van. Mother took it very seriously. My youngest 
sister was just one year old. My mother told us: “Your father will not do 
what I say.” In 1984 he finished the new house… We all begged father to 
leave… He sold half of the cattle for a quarter of their value and the rest 
of the house and the land he left behind just as it was… That is how we 
                                                 
371 Mirza’s forthcoming report ‘Dokumentation über Ermordungen und Vervolgungen der 
Assyrischen Christen in der Türkei 1976-2007’ shows that a considerable number of the 
Assyrian/Syriac men who were killed occupied a special position such as that of mukhtar.  
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abandoned everything behind. After we had left, the village of Zaz was 
deserted by Suryoye in 1993; they bombed our house in 1993. Today you 
would not even know that there had ever been a house standing there. 
They even stole the stones from which our house was built!..  
As the case of Saro’s parents above reveals, not many Assyrians/Syriacs who 
left Tur ‘Abdin were able to sell such possessions as livestock, land or houses. 
Some may have not thought about selling their land at all, keeping the 
possibility that they would go back one day in mind. But in many cases those 
who left Tur ‘Abdin in the 1980s could not sell their land and cattle without 
the consent of the PKK and the local aghas.372 They were expected to give 
both of them a share in the profits. In actual fact, the PKK did not want the 
people to go away, since empty villages would make it much harder for them 
to continue their guerrilla activities against the Turkish army; they wanted to 
make use of the villagers to continue their struggle. The people in the area 
were expected to feed them when the need arose. Therefore, 
Assyrians/Syriacs often left stealthily and confided their plans to only few 
people whom they trusted. Another reason for keeping their plans quiet was 
that their Muslim neighbours could kill them for their money, knowing that 
they would have collected all their worldly wealth a few days before leaving. 
Usually they hired a private car to take them to Midyad, travelling by night. 
From there they usually continued to Istanbul by bus. 
 Apparently the Yezidis (Çalkoye) felt that their position in the area had 
also been irredeemably eroded with the departure of the Assyrians/Syriacs 
from Tur ‘Abdin. When the Assyrian/Syriac Malkuno left, his Yezidi 
agricultural labourer made a cynical joke about it: ‘If you leave here, the 
Muslims will force us to convert to Islam.373 And since we are not wealthy 
enough to buy the tin messine, we will have to buy a plastic one.’ (A messine is 
kind of a jug, which Muslim believers use to wash themselves during the 
ritual ablutions before their prayers). This example also shows that the 
departure of the Assyrians/Syriacs initiated a change in the socio-political 
structure at local level in Tur ‘Abdin. 
                                                 
372 Van Bruinessen (1992: 54) writes that this had something to do with the tradition that land 
could not be sold to simply anybody because of the rule that privately owned land in the 
territory of a certain Kurdish clan is expected to remain the territory of that clan. 
373 The elderly in the village of Mzizah were informed by word of mouth that the Shefqattiye 
Muslims in Mzizah had converted from the Yezidi religion to Islam a few centuries earlier. 
They had been forced by the local agha. Otherwise they would have been killed. Only one of 
them fled and made it to the village Hapses and continued to live as a Yezidi. 
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 In the stories told by Assyrian/Syriac asylum-seekers after the 1980s, the 
war between the Turkish authorities and the PKK played a loom large. As 
Merten (1995: 111) notes, the high number of Assyrian/Syriac asylum 
seekers in Germany in 1984 can be explained by the upsurge in the military 
struggle of the PKK and the institutionalization of the ‘village guards’ in 
south-eastern Turkey. Assyrians/Syriacs were caught in the middle of this 
conflict even though politically they had no stomach for it – as people who 
lived through that situation explain it. Since both the authorities and the 
PKK tried to win the Assyrians/Syriacs over to their side, it was impossible 
to remain aloof from the conflict. One way or another they became victims. 
My respondent Gebro from Germany recounts the example of the incident 
on 14 November 1990: 
Bnebil was a Christian village. There were no Muslims in the village… The 
authorities requested the Suryoye to accept their weapons to keep the PKK 
out of their village. The Suryoye did not acquiesce in that request. 
Whereupon, the authorities accused the Suryoye of being allied with the 
PKK. This accusation made the villagers decide to accept the weapons in 
order to show that they wanted nothing at all to do with the PKK. When 
the PKK found out, its representatives paid a visit to the villagers and 
showed their displeasure with the fact that the Suryoye had accepted the 
weapons. The Suryoye said to the PKK: “We took the weapons of the 
authorities into our houses, but we will not fight you.” …The PKK issued 
an ultimatum to the Suryoye to give the weapons back to the authorities or 
else they would be killed. On a certain day they attacked the house of the 
mayor [mukhtar]. They collected the mukhtar, the two aza, and the bakçi in 
his house and killed them to a man.374 They killed the four most important 
people in the village in official positions. Later the PKK declared that it 
dispatched them for having accepted weapons from the authorities. 
Furthermore, Shabo, who had been imprisoned three times (after baseless 
accusations of relationships with the PKK), explained to me in a long 
account375 different aspects of the life in Tur ‘Abdin in the second half of the 
1980s: that life was controlled by the Turkish military and the PKK, anyone 
who was not publicly on Turkey’s side was assumed to be allied with the 
PKK, how little influence individuals had over their own lives, how the 
                                                 
374 The position of the mukhtar is comparable to that of a mayor (in a village or a villagehead). 
The aza and the bakçi are lower-ranking positions, assisting the mukhtar. The people killed 
were: Semun Onal, Bahhe Akgül, Yusuf Sürer and Celil Büyükbas. 
375 To be published in a future publication. 
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remaining Assyrians/Syriacs in Tur ‘Abdin felt about their position, and the 
attempts they made to remain in their homeland despite the danger in which 
they found themselves. As he narrated his experiences, it was as if Shabo had 
just been released, and had not yet reconciled himself to the situation in 
which he had lived. In the citation below, Shabo illustrates the influence of 
the arbitrary policy of punishment on the emigration of the last 
Assyrians/Syriacs in their homeland. He narrates about the moment he was 
released after having been imprisoned and interrogated for thirteen days: 
While waiting for the bus the older Suryoyo man said to me: “No way that I 
shall remain on this soil a moment longer! This is not a country in which 
one should live!” He was right. We were completely innocent and had 
been severely punished for thirteen days. We should actually have had the 
right to bring them [authorities] to court. When I was imprisoned this 
thought had crossed my mind. But in Turkey this is not possible... After 
we were freed in 1988, I continued working in my business. But, life 
became very problematic. Besides, more and more of our people were 
leaving, which was a very sad sight to behold. I saw all my friends with 
whom I went to school flee the village and end up in the diaspora. This 
was very sad to see. There was no one of my age left, nor anyone of my 
brother’s age who was still in the village. Why didn’t we leave? Because we 
did not want to leave my father behind in the village. Besides that, we did 
not want to leave our village behind empty of Suryoye. 
Another respondent, Gallo, had remained in Tur ‘Abdin until the beginning 
of the 1990s. His relatives, who had fled the village, had left him their 
vineyard. One day he noticed that the mullah in his village had appropriated 
the vineyard for his own use. The mullah told him that the PKK had granted 
him permission to have it. When Gallo went to the PKK leadership in 
charge in the area of Tur ‘Abdin, he was told that the mullah should have the 
vineyard, since: ‘You Suryoye flee, do not help us in the guerrilla struggle 
against the authorities and yet you want to continue owning the land, which 
is not going to happen.’ Gallo felt helpless in the face of this answer and 
could not stand the situation any longer: ‘What right do I have if I have not 
the right to have my own property? That is when I decided to leave to 
Germany.’ 
 The flight after the 1980s has often been perceived as a bitter necessity. 
Even those who had shown reluctance to leave decided to do so. And those 
who did not leave, more or less took this stand consciously, accepting the 
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risks for their life. Shabo explains the attempt of his fellow villagers to keep 
strong, although without much success: 
 
In our village we had gathered twice in order to keep our strength, to 
develop patience and to endure until the situation improved. I remember 
that initially we were composed of 100 Suryoye households [bote], but even 
when there were only thirty-four families left, we were happy and could 
still draw some strength [in relation to the Kurdish population]. When the 
people [Suryoye] started leaving in groups, the first time in the 1980s, we 
gathered at one of our houses in 1985. We discussed the problem of the 
flight [tehzimo] of the Suryoye and that the village would soon be left empty. 
We did not want that! There we decided to take a collective decision and 
to either leave or to stay together. We took the decision to stay. If people 
were to depart individually and leave the other Suryoye behind in the village 
and the members of the number of Suryoye were to diminish, the Muslims 
could persecute [dayshilan, literally to trample down] us even more. If our 
numbers did not decrease, we could still use our power in our dealings 
with the Muslims. For example, our Taye376 [Muslims] still came to us for 
anything they needed. But if we had become fewer in number, the 
Christians would no longer have a great deal of say. And even though they 
were already in the majority, we were more open-minded, harder workers. 
We had wells, fields, animals; we possessed more. 
 The second time we came together and made attempts to stop the 
golutho [emigration], a youngster raised his hand and said: “If someone 
leaves then I shall be the second one to do so.” When it’s all said and 
done, they are all youngsters; you never know. Sometime later, one of the 
guys decided to leave the village, and the others followed him, since he 
had broken the promise to the group. This is how eventually there was no 
one of my age left in the village. The promises we had made in our village 
were actually set as an example to the other villages too. The Suryoye in the 
other villages had nothing but good to say and were very proud of us. 
Unfortunately when we fled we did not take a collective decision; we took 
individual decisions. 
                                                 
376 The phrase a Tayaydan (‘our Muslims’) was used to refer to the Muslims in the direct 
environment of the Suryoye. Usually it was and is used to refer to the Muslims in the village 
with whom they had built up a specific relationship. 
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Shabo illustrates the way people fled the situation they found themselves in, 
by using a story about the doves that wanted to free themselves after they 
have been caught in a trap:377 
…The hunter prepared the trap by scattering seeds around doves to 
capture them. Then, each dove tried to free itself from this trap. The same 
happened to us. We were caught in this trap and each individual tried to 
escape by helping himself out of trap. Since each of these doves tried to 
escape independently of the others, they did not manage to escape. Then 
their leader said that they could not continue like this... “If we continue 
like this we shall all die” said the dove in charge. “But, if we want to 
survive then we should think of a collective plan to free ourselves.” They 
did indeed manage to get out of this trap by pulling it from the bottom as 
a team. This is an example, which teaches us something... It would have 
been good if we could have thought about leaving together, instead of 
questioning our departure afterwards. Later, each person blamed the 
other, but this can no longer heal the break – it is too late. We knew that if 
we left, our brother who stayed behind would be persecuted. And this is 
not umthonoyutho [love for one’s people]… In 1988, the Suryoye continued 
leaving and the numbers in the village decreased. The situation had 
become more dangerous. Therefore, for security reasons I moved to 
Midyad. The military already started to carry out controls at the checkpoint 
at 7 o’clock in the evening. 
After my respondent Shabo was baseless accused of having relations with the 
PKK for a third time, he decided to flee to Germany in 1988. From the 
perspective of the Assyrians/Syriacs who had taken the decision to leave the 
athro, those who stayed behind seemed ‘crazy’. When the last Suryoyo 
physician in Midyad, Dr Edward Tanriverdi, was killed in front of his house 
in December 1994, some Assyrians/Syriacs of the first generation in Europe 
commented in anger that it was his own fault ‘Why had he not left too?’ On 
the other hand, the umthonoye (mainly the younger and educated activist elite) 
thought that those who had remained behind in the athro were heroes, the 
courageous ‘guardians of the homeland’ (noture du athro). At a conference held 
in Sweden on the human rights of the Assyrians/Syriacs in Turkey in 2005, 
one of the Assyrian/Syriac participants from Turkey expressed this idea too; 
indeed angrily, as he condemned fleeing as the easy option. He also 
                                                 
377 The story about the doves is to be found in the book Klilo w Dimno, a Syriac translation 
from the Sanskrit Panchatantra of animal fables, in the sixth century. See for an English 
translation Falconer ([1885]1970). 
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presented himself as a guardian of the athro: ‘I would rather stay in the athro 
in a situation deprived of liberty than in the golutho (diaspora) and enjoy 
freedom!’ In contrast to the older generation Assyrians/Syriacs, the political 
activists discussed and reported Dr Tanriverdi’s murder to demand justice. 
This example shows that with the formation of communities in Europe, the 
relative power they once had in Tur ‘Abdin, evaporated. 
 In the following chapters I shall show that the younger members of the 
elite have developed new, modern political discourses. Safe in the guaranteed 
freedom of expression in the countries of diaspora in which they settled, the 
political activists among them especially have not been afraid to express their 
ideas about the violations of human rights of Assyrian/Syriacs in the Middle 
East. Often, those who stayed behind were mostly the elderly, who 
experienced extreme difficulties with the prospect of uprooting themselves. 
They did not want to abandon the native land where they had lived all their 
lives, the soil they had ploughed since their youth, the crops which they had 
nurtured, the houses they had built themselves and the sun they loved. An 
elderly man from the village Hapses advised his widowed daughter and her 
children not to leave for Sweden, because ‘…you [Assyrians/Syriacs in 
Europe] will become as peas which you throw onto the soil and are 
dispersed.’ This man had even composed his own version of the song Shamo 
mar:378 Shamo mar, men gsaymina, bebritho gmibarbezzina’ (‘Shamo tell [me] what 
are we to do, we are being dispersed all over the world’). A sense of crisis is 
expressed in this version, just as in the original version of the song in which 
the boy asks his lover how long they will have to wait before they can get 
married. 
 All the aforementioned accounts demonstrate how Assyrians/Syriacs 
accommodated their lives at the peak of the crisis in Tur ‘Abdin, and the 
circumstances under which Tur ‘Abdin was emptied of Assyrians/Syriacs, 
with only 2500 individuals left at the time of writing in 2009. 
 
4.5.1 Continued Emigration from Syria 
Since the 1980s it has been possible to identify two additional reasons (in 
addition to the reasons already mentioned for the earlier period) for the 
emigration from Syria. For this period, the first reason is perhaps the most 
                                                 
378 The Shamo mar song which has become a classic has for the first time been sung by the 
singer Habib Mousa. The lyrics are by Danho Dahho and the music by Chorbishop Paul 
Michael (Lebanon). 
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obvious; some Assyrians/Syriacs leaving Syria migrated for economic 
motives. As a consequence of the reduced annual rainfall and the closing of 
the dam at the Syrian border by Turkey, the crop yields in the Gozarto region 
were no longer sufficient. This and the consequent rising unemployment 
meant people were no longer able to make their living. They used the 
opportunity to join their relatives in Europe. The second cause was less 
obvious, namely Assyrian/Syriac men who had difficulty in finding a suitable 
partner in Europe went to Syria to find a marriage partner. Marrying an 
Assyrian/Syriac male from Europe was therefore an easy solution for single 
girls.379 These two aforementioned reasons reinforced the chain migration 
from Syria. 
 
4.5.2 A New Emigration Wave from Iraq  
In the period between the Simele Massacre and the fall of Saddam’s regime 
in 2003, Chaldeans/Assyrians/Syriacs380 found themselves living in a 
subordinated position under the strongly ubiquitous policy of Arabization. 
They had been considered ‘Christian Arabs’ by the Iraqi regime. At the same 
time, the Baath regime had made strong attempts to attract them towards the 
side of the government in order to develop a stronger position in relation to 
the Shiites in the South and the Kurds in the North. The regime also 
manipulated internal conflicts and played on the distinction between 
denominational differences within the group. Those who were willing to 
accept living with an Arab identity were favoured by being offered positions 
in the Baath administration.381 In this period, Assyrians/Syriacs were also 
seriously affected by such events as the Iran–Iraq War (1980-1988), the 
Anfal Campaign and the Halabja Massacre (1987-88). With the American 
invasion in 2003 and the subsequent fall of the Baath regime, the old status 
quo collapsed. In the subsequent confusion, increased violence flared up 
                                                 
379 This resulted in the situation in which a male from Europe could go to Syria for a couple 
weeks on holiday, find a girl to marry and continue to live together in Europe. The 
Assyrian/Syriac actor and film director George Farag in Germany made some sketches about 
this theme in his films Holo Malke bi golutho (Uncle Malke in the diaspora) (1993) and in his 
latest film (2006) Holo Malke bi malkutho (Uncle Malke in Heaven). In both films he criticizes 
men who approached the girls in Syria as an easy solution to find a partner. 
380 I use this combined name following the agreement of some representatives of the three 
church communities mentioned at the time of writing. 
381 A well-known example of someone who achieved a high position was the Chaldean Tariq 
Aziz (his original name was Mikhail Yukhanna), who held the post of Deputy Prime Minister 
(1979-2003) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1982-1991). 
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against Christians and other minorities in Iraq,382 perpetrated by the majority 
groups in the country. This persecution eventually led to their mass 
emigration.383 Despite these negative outcomes, a new opportunity has 
unquestionably emerged for the recognition of their cultural, political and 
administrative rights384 in one of their historical geographies, the Nineveh 
plains in northern Iraq.385 So far none of these rights has been realized. 
Instead, a great number of them have found a way to flee the country. 
 Since 2003, the high number of Chaldean/Assyrian/Syriac refugees 
from Iraq who have settled in Sweden has caught the attention of the 
international media. In 2006, about 90 per cent of the 1,809 refugees who 
applied for asylum in Södertälje were from Iraq.386 Ultimately, around 10 per 
cent of all refugees from Iraq did actually settle there.387 This percentage is 
higher than in any other municipality and about 99 per cent of the 1,300 
refugees who settled in Södertälje between May 2006 and May 2007 were 
Christians from Iraq: Members of the Chaldean Church, the Assyrian 
Church of the East and the Syriac Orthodox Church. Here again, they used 
their former collective ties in making their choice of settlement after their 
flight from Iraq. The presence of family members and friends has been 
undeniably important, but the existing infrastructure of secular institutions 
and churches also guarantees them a warm welcome. 
                                                 
382 The persecution of Christians and other minorities is well documented. See further, 
http://www.christiansofiraq.com/, www.aina.org and www.unhcr.org. 
383 Many of these refugees live in the refugee camps in Syria and Jordan. Those who have 
managed to escape to Europe, to Sweden in particular, have chosen to live in Södertälje. 
384 This is the foundation for the right to build their own autonomous area. See further the 
Iraqi Constitution, Article 125: ‘This Constitution shall guarantee the administrative, political, 
cultural and educational rights of the various nationalities such as Turkomens, Chaldeans, 
Assyrians, and all other constituents, and this shall be regulated by law.’ (The Iraqi 
Constitution, [Chapter Four] ,The Local Administrations Article 125). See also the 
Constitution of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq: ’Kurdistan Region as a republic within the 
boundaries of a federal Iraq recognizes All Ethnic Groups: All nationalities and ethnic groups 
are recognized by the Kurdistan Region's constitution, including Kurds, Arabs, Turkmens, 
Chaldean-Assyrian-Syriacs, Yezidis, Armenians and Shabaks.’ 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS143893+15-Jul-2009+PRN20090715). 
385 Several lobbying organizations have been established to pursue the claim for their 
autonomy, such as the ‘Iraqi Sustainable Democracy Project’ (2005), the ‘Assyria Council of 
Europe’ (2007) and a recent initiative has been taken by ADO, which aims to achieve a 
consensus between competing Assyrian/Syriac/Chaldean parties in Iraq.  
386 1,059 refugees were granted a permit to stay in Sweden. The others continued to wait for 
an answer. 
387 Interview with an employee of the municipality Södertälje, held in July 2007. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I commenced by showing that the emigration of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs in the first part of the twentieth century took place within 
the Middle East and that their emigration in this period to areas outside the 
Middle East was mainly directed to North and South America. I then 
proceeded to discuss the first emigration waves to Europe, starting in the 
1960s from Turkey, Lebanon and Syria. These initial waves occurred 
independently of each other and were prompted by different reasons. I have 
studied the emigration process in relation to the emigration discourses of my 
respondents and against the background of historical events in the societies 
concerned. The discourses of Assyrians/Syriacs display two main 
dimensions. On the one hand, they reflect on their position in the Middle 
East having lived as a subordinated group about which they have expressed 
much dissatisfaction. On the other hand, they have identified Western 
countries as ‘Christian’ and thus as potential partners who can provide them 
a new ‘home’; to such an extent that they have exchanged their homeland 
(which is dominated by regimes which give them little space) for a position 
as ‘foreigners’ in a geography which is new to them in many respects, except 
for sharing Christianity as a religious belief. In their discourse, Western 
countries have been placed in their chain of difference (sameness). Therefore, I 
defined the mass emigration of Assyrians/Syriacs as an exodus to achieve 
and realize their myth.  The formation of the myth is directly related to their 
historical subordinated positions and to the constructed image of Europe as 
a new, alternative place of settlement; a place which they initially defined as 
‘Christian’, a place where they have eventually enjoyed many rights – social, 
cultural and political – and a place where economic stability could assist 
them to develop; everything they could not enjoy in their ancestral areas. 
 Furthermore, I have illustrated in this chapter how familial and 
collective ties among Assyrians/Syriacs have played an essential role in the 
emigration waves, the intensity of emigration and the pace of the emigration. 
One corner stone of the chain migration lies in the extended family 
structures in Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. It can be postulated that the 
specific social dynamics resulting from the collective ties among 
Assyrians/Syriacs have played an essential role in the migration mechanism. 
The increased mobility ushered in by the latest technology of advanced 
transportation means has also played an essential role in the success of the 
alternative migration routes taken. The mechanisms used by 
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Assyrians/Syriacs in the migration process have competed with an 
increasingly restrictive immigration policy stipulated by different European 
countries from about the mid-1970s. Their application for asylum on the 
basis of the definition of a refugee has often been rejected because the 
receiving authorities did not classify them as such; they did not recognize 
their subordinated position and persecution in the societies of the Middle 
East (including Turkey). Non-official persecution, discrimination and its 
consequences for their individual and collective life have not been taken into 
account. Nevertheless, despite the difficulties they have encountered in the 
emigration and asylum process, Assyrians/Syriacs have been persistent in 
their claim that they are an oppressed minority in the Middle East and they 
managed to settle en-mass in Europe. Mostly, they were granted a permit to 
stay based on humanitarian reasons (B-status); those who were granted the 
A-status in Europe have been few and far between. 
In the next chapter about the group’s settlement, I shall illustrate that the 
same familial ties and the dispersed character of their emigration process has 
marked their settlement and with that their transnational relationships which 






5 SWEDEN – THE LAST STOP 
 
The Turks and the Kurds have not bettered themselves as we have, since 
they have a homeland to go back to… But for us, Sweden is the last stop. 
We invest and buy houses here…  
Eliyo, teacher of Syriac 
 
Presenting Sweden as the ‘last stop’, it is possible to read several assumptions 
into Eliyo’s statement. His first postulation is that the journey which the 
Assyrians/Syriacs have made has had different stops along the way and 
consequently the people have been scattered; representing their move to 
different places, with Sweden as the final destination. Eliyo also draws the 
conclusion that, as a people, Assyrians/Syriacs do not intend to return to 
their athro (homeland), nor do they seem to show any disposition to continue 
their ‘travels’. Furthermore, he believes that, since Assyrians/Syriacs intend 
to remain and put down roots in their new country, they have ‘integrated’ 
more successfully than other migrants who do have a homeland to return to. 
In this statement, he also intimates that Assyrians/Syriacs will have a positive 
future in Sweden and that the Swedish authorities will not have to worry 
about any difficulties with them as new Swedish citizens. I shall illustrate that 
Assyrians/Syriacs perceive themselves as ‘new settlers’ who have established 
themselves relatively quickly in their new country. 
 In this chapter, I shall look into the settlement of Assyrians/Syriacs in 
relation to the integrationist policy of the Swedish authorities and the effect 
of this ‘intersection’. As indicated in the previous chapter, their emigration 
has constituted a dislocation in many respects. This process reveals some 
important characteristics: first, the emergence of a diasporic community; 
second, the emergence of new subject positions which differ from the 
traditional subject positions in their homeland; third, the dislocation of their 
collective identity. The Swedish integrationist discourses – which 
Assyrians/Syriacs have perceived as extremely positive and encouraging – 
have functioned as a general framework in the settlement process. My point 
of departure is that it is possible to speak of interaction between the Swedish 
integrationist discourses and the settlement discourses of Assyrians/Syriacs. 
Identifying themselves as permanent settlers, Assyrians/Syriacs have 
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perceived Sweden as their ‘new homeland’ which has offered them many 
possibilities. 
 The orientation towards permanent settlement in Europe has also been 
expressed in the way Assyrians/Syriacs have referred to their settlement 
space. Assyrians/Syriacs in the homeland spoke about them in terms of ‘they 
have gone to foreign lands’ (azzen li nukhrayto).388 ’Foreign lands’ (nukhrayto) 
had been transformed into an abstract idea about unknown places. This 
reference to ‘foreign lands’ expresses their ideas of how they have related to 
the new areas in which they would settle initially, in contrast to the ancestral 
geography, which is where their roots are. ‘Foreign lands’ also has a 
connotation of a black hole; the unknown, and not knowing what to expect 
there.389  In the article En Presentation av Assyriska riksförbundet (1 September 
1980), the editor of the magazine Hujådå wrote about the early period of 
settlement in Sweden:390  
For many of us, Sweden was an unknown country. Despite this, we 
commenced the journey towards our destiny without thinking about the 
consequences. We looked for a country where we would be accepted as 
human beings. The dreams were big but, at the same time, the level of 
unawareness in the group was high. We encountered big language 
problems... In many situations, we felt really alone and abandoned in the 
new society. The journey to Sweden was short but in reality we crossed 
many years in time. The culture shock was a fact. Today, thanks to the 
strong solidarity within the community we have survived as a group in 
Sweden. 
In Europe, those who were already settled in the nukhrayto (for about the 
first fifteen years) referred to it in the same way: Athina li nukhrayto (We have 
come to ‘foreign lands’).391 With the passing of time, they have begun to 
                                                 
388 This idea is also expressed in the song Azzen (They have gone) by the singer Josef Babure 
(released on his cassette Qolo d-Lebnon, 1989): Azzen, nafiqi mu athrathe, mahzamme li nukhrayto, 
hawen tamo goluye (They have gone; they moved away from their athro, they have fled to foreign 
lands; they have become refugees). 
389 The term nukhrayto (foreign lands) should be understood in relation to what is considered 
to be ‘home’. In Tur ‘Abdin people already referred to other villages in terms of the nukhrayto. 
They could, for example, say hulukh i-barthaydukh li nukhrayto? (Did you marry your daughter 
abroad?). In this case, they meant a village a few kilometres away. Today, the meaning of the 
nukhrayto has changed to mean areas farther away, such as those in the Western diaspora. 
390 My translation of the original in Swedish. 
391 Singers who have sung about having become foreigners in the nukhrayto are, for example, 
Hanna Shabo (1985) and Cebrail Aryo (1983, 1987). 
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refer to their new settlement outside the homeland as the golutho (diaspora). 
The focus has changed to an enduring residence in the nukhrayto (foreign 
lands). The new homeland has become the diaspora ‘in the four corners of 
the world’ (ba arba‘ qernawotho de britho). Moreover, they have begun to 
express their presence in the world in terms of dispersion – ‘Our people are 
dispersed’ (U ‘amayadan mbarbezoyo).  The state of dispersion in Western 
countries is signified here as a collective fate of living in the golutho. This 
implies that they identify each other as members of the same people – the 
‘amo Suryoyo. Consequently, despite their collective exodus, they have 
sustained a strong identification with each other. 
 In the present context, their golutho or diaspora has developed a double 
connotation. Certainly, their dispersed situation is perceived as a sad fact. 
From this perspective, it is felt to be a situation of being displaced from the 
ancestral homeland (u athro da abohotho). Nevertheless, it has created space for 
them in different aspects of life. This aspect gives them reason to value the 
state of the diaspora and develop it into a home for themselves. The split 
subject is healed through the creation of a new home; a new imagined 
community in the diaspora, although inherently dispersed. The idea of being 
dispersed as a people, in conjunction with the sense of being a distinct 
people without a country, has also resulted in them having a developed a 
relative view of the importance of their own State to sustain and develop 
their nationhood. What has become more important to them are the 
connections with the people to whom they feel related (this might be for a 
temporary period). Today, family connections function as a transnational 
structure for the ‘national connections’ of a people between States 
worldwide. Furthermore, more formalized institutional structures such as 
that of the dispersed church and secular institutions also play a role in the 
maintenance of connections between Assyrians/Syriacs. Visiting each other, 
family members bring something with them from the country they live in. 
This is how these family networks have functioned as a channel for the 
mobility of goods between Assyrians/Syriacs ‘in the four corners of the 
world’. Assyrians/Syriacs are now knowledgeable about the quality of Swiss 
knives, about the delicious taste of Swedish chicken herbs and about Dutch 
pindakaas (peanut butter). These are among the favourite goods which are 
transported as presents for family members living abroad. 
 Transnational interconnectedness – also at familial level –, is expressed 
when people phone the TV channels Suroyo TV and Suryoyo Sat to great their 
people: ‘I would like to send my regards to my people in the four corners of 
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the world’ (kobeno a shlomaydi lu ‘amaydi ba arba‘ qernawotho de britho). Some also 
seize the opportunity to mention individual family members living in the 
different countries of the world. In addition to the dispersed character of 
their emigration, they have settled in Western countries in which they have 
encountered an overwhelmingly modern society, both technologically and in 
the expression of ideas in which the individuals – instead of the collective – 
are central.392 In this sense, the society in the West can be characterized as 
the opposite of the society from which they emigrated in the Middle East in 
many respects: agrarian, traditional, religiously based, face-to-face 
communication,393 and an organization of people glued together by collective 
values. I shall illustrate this ‘jump into modernity’ by an example from the 
departing society. An elderly Assyrian/Syriac man was working in his 
vineyard in the village of ‘Arnas in Tur ‘Abdin, when he saw an aeroplane 
flying over.394 He knelt down on the red earth, opened his arms and prayed 
to God: ‘Oh Lord, here I am, come and fetch your amanee’ (‘what belongs to 
you’). This man was under the impression that the plane was the angel of 
God who had come to take his spirit. Being a faithful Christian, he 
welcomed ‘God’s messenger’. This is one of the many examples revealing the 
abruptness with which Assyrians/Syriacs came into contact with modernity, 
both in the athro and later at a greatly accelerated pace in Europe. 
 The confrontation with the new world and the dislocation caused by it 
has required shifts in their mindset in order to be able to understand the 
society around them. Moreover, they have had to redefine their position – 
both at individual and collective level – in relation to their new environment. 
This has spurred discussions and induced changes in perceptions about 
many, if not all, aspects of their life. Depending on who could exert 
influence on the agenda to be discussed, some aspects were omitted and 
have become taboo, while others have become central in the new countries 
of settlement. In this process, power and influence have depended largely on 
traditional relationships. However, the hegemonic articulation of new 
discourses has been imbued with new influences emanating from the 
                                                 
392 On the Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map which is based on the World Values Survey, the 
geographical area (Middle East) from which the Assyrians/Syriacs moved is characterized by 
values which are strongly traditional and based on survival values. In contrast, they have 
emigrated to an area (Northern Europe) where the values ‘secular-rational’ and ‘self-
expression’ score highly. 
393 The modern media were still absent, especially in the area of Tur ‘Abdin. 
394 This may have taken place in the 1970s. 
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educated or the new-rich elite. This has generated a specific form of social 
dynamics. 
 Among the aspects most discussed have been the definition and 
presentation of the ‘amo Suryoyo to the new ‘others’. Assyrians/Syriacs refer 
to the ‘others’ using the term nukhroye (foreigners). These could be various 
categories of people who are all defined within the chain of equivalence (the 
‘others’), whereas they define themselves through the chain of difference (‘us’). 
In the Middle East, the main group of ‘others’ in contrast to whom they 
developed their collective identity have been the people whom they have 
categorized as Muslims (Taye). With their settlement in Western countries, 
this principal category of Muslims as ‘others’ has gradually changed to a 
category of Christians representing the majority society as the ‘others’. This 
change introduced the need to re-define relations to the new ‘others’.395 
Consequently, the relationship with the Christian ‘others’ has affected the 
way they have wanted or needed to position themselves in order to keep a 
distinct identity. This search for an identity after dislocation is expressed in 
the poem Identitet (Identity) written by the activist Yusuf Barkarmo (1985) in 
the first years of his settlement in Sweden: 396 
                                                 
395 A remarkable phenomenon among the elderly Assyrians/Syriacs has been that in their first 
contacts with Europeans as the ‘new others’ they have been using the languages which they 
used with the ‘former others’ when living in the Middle East, because they did not have a 
command of European languages yet. Knowing that Europeans did not speak their mother 
tongue Suryoyo, they assumed that they would understand if they would communicate in 
languages which they formerly used to communicate with the ‘others’ in the Middle East. 
396 My translation from the original in Swedish: 
Tigris, Eufrat, Assyrien/ Turkiet, Irak, Syrien/ Förtryck, förföljelse/ Europa, Skandinavien 
Sverige välfärd och frihet/ samverkan och valfrihet/ svartskalle/ främling/ trygghet 
Jag söker identitet 
Socialbyrå hög status?/ fördomar/ segregation/ samhörighet/ Allt stämmer väl och utmärkt 
Religioner/ traditioner/ kulturkonflikter/ föraktfullhet räknas respekt/ anpassning språksvårigheter. 
Utbildning en rättighet/ mobbning/ kiss i sängen/ ont i magen/ stress, skolk/ halvspråkighet. 
Serietidningar/ tv, video/ musik, sprit, dans/ aktivitet. 
Jag söker/ jag söker min identitet 
Bil, video, färg-tv/ sex, mode, idol, självmord/ äktenskap? Nej, sammanbo/ hög standard en 
verklighet./Diskriminering/ isolering/ arbetslöshet/ O, nej! Jämställdhet och jämlikhet./Rösträtt?/ NEJ, 
NEJ!/ jobb och skatt min skyldighet. 
Jag söker och söker/ trötthet, ensamhet/ att jag är desperat får du tycka/ men ur detta livets kaos/ formas 
min identitet. 
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Tigris, Euphrates, Assyria/ Turkey, Iraq, Syria/ Oppression, persecution/ 
Europe, Scandinavia. 
Sweden welfare and freedom/ co-operation and freedom of choice/ black 
head/ foreigner/ safety. 
I am searching for an identity. 
Social office, high status? / prejudice/ segregation/ solidarity/ All of them 
fit well, perfectly. 
Religions/ traditions/ cultural conflicts/ Scorn is seen as act of respect/ 
the difficulties of adjustment. 
Education is a right/ harassment/ bedwetting/ pain in the stomach/ 
stress, truancy/ half-language-ness. 
The newspapers/ TV, video/ music, alcohol, dance/ activities 
I am seeking/ I am seeking for my identity. 
Cars, videos, colour tvs/ sex, fashion, idols, suicide/ marriage? No, living 
together/ high standards are a reality. 
Discrimination/ isolation/ unemployment/ Oh, no! Equality between 
men and women [jämställdhet] and [general] equality. 
The right to vote? / NO, NO!/ job and taxes are my responsibilities. 
I am searching, searching/ becoming tired and lonely/ You might think 
that I am desperate/ but my identity is formed by this chaos of life. 
In this chapter, I shall discuss the process of settlement of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs in the context of the Swedish policy towards this group of 
‘new settlers’. In Section 5.1, I shall deal briefly with the immigration and 
settlement policy to contextualize the time and space of settlement. The 
Swedish integration policy and its consequences will be the main focus in 
Section 5.2. This will be followed by Section 5.3, an explication of the 
formation of New Midyad in Södertälje and the rapid establishment of the 
group in the new country. In Section 5.4, I discuss how the quest for a re-
definition of the collective identity of the ‘amo Suryoyo developed during the 
settlement process. In the final section of this chapter, 5.5, I explain the 
Hostages’ and Orphans’ Dilemma (Yasire u Yatume) which they have been 
experiencing as a new challenge to life. 
 
5.1 Place of Arrival and Settlement 
Assyrians/Syriacs settled in a society which had rapidly developed into a 
welfare state in the Post-War period. Welfare, democracy, neutrality, 
modernity and Norden (the North) are considered the central nodal points in 
the Swedish model (Micheletti 1995, Stråth 2002). The ‘Swedish Model’ was 
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famous for its high living standards: A system which incorporates a free 
economy, democracy and a high-level of social security and welfare of which 
the motto is to support all individuals from ‘the-cradle-to-the-grave’. The 
Social Democratic Party has played a key role in this development.397 The 
hegemonic articulation of consensus-based discourses in Swedish politics is 
one of the main driving forces behind the development of this unique 
welfare system. The ‘good days’ of the Swedish economy continued until the 
mid-1970s, when the country began to face economic problems. This 
happened to coincide with the peak period of the mass emigration of 
Assyrians/Syriacs to Sweden. 
 Sweden began to accept immigrants and refugees from its Nordic 
neighbours and from central and southern European countries when the 
economic conditions of the Post-War period were flourishing.398 This intake 
of migrants increased the diversity in the population background drastically 
(Hammar 1985: 49).399 Until the end of the 1960s, immigration to Sweden 
did not feature on the political agenda; it was regulated in 1967 (Hammar 
1985: 17), the year in which the ‘stateless Assyrians’ from Lebanon arrived in 
Sweden. This was also the time when Sweden no longer needed labour 
migrants. In this context, the first Assyrian/Syriac refugees were received by 
the refugee centre of the Labour Market Board (AMS, Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen) 
in Alvesta in southern Sweden and from there they were distributed to ten 
other municipalities in southern and central Sweden, in compliance with a 
national policy of the dispersion of new immigrants: Eskilstuna, Märsta, 
Nyköping, Södertälje, and some other municipalities (Björklund 1981: 58-
63). Some smaller groups in Stockholm and Gothenburg were an important 
pull factor for more Assyrians/Syriacs to settle in these cities. My informant 
Mousa Afram, who was among the people who arrived on the first aeroplane 
from Lebanon, confirms that the policy about which the people themselves 
had protested for seven days, was to settle each family in a different place. 
Afram says that in Lebanon the Swedish authorities had promised that they 
                                                 
397 The Swedish Social Democratic Party governed the country without any break from 1945 
to 1976. The folkhem (the Home of the People) ideal with the folkrörelse (people’s movement), 
which evolved at the beginning of the 20th century, constitutes one of the core elements in 
this development.   
398 Initially attracted from Finland, Yugoslavia and Greece during the 1950s and the 1960s. 
399 According to the Swedish Statistics, in 2003 the number of foreign citizens in the country 
was 476,000 and the number of foreign-born inhabitants was 1,078,000. People born in 
Sweden with one or both parents born abroad numbered approximately 880,000, respectively 
16 and 20 per cent. 
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would be settled in the same place. A reminder of this earlier promise was to 
no avail. 
 A large number of Assyrians/Syriacs settled in Södertälje, a town west 
of Stockholm. Södertälje has always had an important place in the Swedish 
economy. Two of the biggest industrial enterprises in Sweden, AstraZeneca 
and Scania, are based in this town. According to the booklet Södertälje in the 
World, the World in Södertälje,400 it is one of the most trade-intensive 
municipalities in Sweden. Nowadays, it is home to more than 6000 
enterprises which produce more than 20 per cent of the total Swedish 
industrial export. In order to accommodate the needs of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs who settled in this town, new residential areas were built 
during the 1960s and the 1970s: Ronna, Geneta, Fornhöjden, Saltskog and 
Hovsjö (Björklund 1981: 5). An important consideration in the construction 
of the houses was that they were built spaciously to accommodate the 
traditionally big families.401 In contrast to Björklund, Olle Wästberg402 
indicates that the apartments which the municipality had built in Ronna403 
were empty at the moment they arrived in Sweden (Hujådå, September 1999). 
He claims that the local politicians in Södertälje regarded this as a chance to 
fill their empty apartments; a move which was made even more attractive 
because the State paid for the refugees’ housing costs. 
 In 1975, there were about 1000 Assyrians/Syriacs living in Sweden, 
mostly in Södertälje and the Stockholm area (Björklund 1981: 63). Although 
Södertälje had space to accommodate404 more immigrants, the local 
authorities seem to have been overwhelmed by the mass settlement of this 
group in Södertälje (see further Ornbrant 1981, Björklund 1981: 102, Gardell 
1986). The municipality of Södertälje insisted that the central government 
step in and handle the matter of the Assyrier in the autumn of 1975 
(Björklund 1982: 28). On the basis of a modification in the Swedish 
Immigration Law (Article 2, 1 January 1976), on 26 February 1976 the 
                                                 
400 The website of Södertälje Municipality (see Bibliography). 
401 The number of family members in many of the early Assyrian/Syriac families has 
decreased and they have moved to other quarters of the city.  Today, many of these 
apartments are inhabited by Assyrian/Syriac/Chaldean refugees from Iraq. 
402 Olle Wästberg was a member of the Swedish Parliament between 1976 and 1982 and Vice-
President of the Assyriska/Syrianska flyktingfonden (1977-2000). 
403 Today, about 95 per cent of its inhabitants are Assyrians/Syriacs.  
404 For instance, there were more than 100 empty apartments in the quarter of Ronna alone in 
1975. 
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Swedish government decided to grant Assyrians/Syriacs from Turkey asylum 
(see further the previous chapter). In the same governmental decree (1976), a 
visa obligation for Turkish nationals was announced. It was emphasized that 
it was no longer possible to allow more Assyrians/Syriacs to settle in 
Södertälje. Subsequently, in co-operation with the Labour Market Board the 
municipality of Södertälje made two attempts to stimulate the newcomers to 
settle outside the city (Andersson 1983: 68-69). In 1976, thousands of 
Assyrians/Syriacs were removed from AMS refugee camps and from 
Södertälje and distributed to more than forty different municipalities in 
central and south Sweden (Carragher 1978). Many Assyrians/Syriacs who 
were approached to settle outside Södertälje only wanted to do so as a group 
of families (Ornbrant 1981: 55), an indication of how strong their mutual ties 
were at that time. As in the 1960s, many of them returned to Södertälje soon 
afterwards. A respondent who holds a very central function within the 
community in Södertälje explained to me that in order to be moved to 
Södertälje, he said that he wanted to attend the cooking school in Stockholm, 
enrolled in this school and achieved the resettlement in Södertälje for which 
he had aimed, without ever finishing ‘his education’. Other friends of his 
followed similar successful strategies for resettlement. A third attempt at 
resettlement by the authorities was made between 1981 and 1983. 
 Financial inducements were offered to those accepting settlement and a 
job outside the city. After much hard work on the part of the municipality, 
only a few took this offer up. Remarkably, the ‘re-settling campaign’ was 
conducted by the Labour Market Board, in co-operation with the Board of 
Health and Welfare (Björklund 1981: 102). The Labour Market Board used 
its refugee centres and contacted employment boards to locate vacancies for 
the new immigrants elsewhere. The municipality of Södertälje did its bit in 
assisting these efforts by withholding social assistance and obstructing access 
to municipal housing (Björklund 1981, Ornbrant: 1981: 78). The isolation 
induced by this policy of dispersion was strengthened by the fact that the 
immigrants experienced difficulties developing new contacts with the local 
Swedish inhabitants. This stands to reason as they migrated from a society in 
which life was organized on a collective basis – at its centre family and 
acquaintances. Moreover, they migrated from a society where they lived as a 
minority group among a majority population and hence as a close 
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collective.405 In an effort to evaluate the policy governing the distribution 
and resettlement of Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden, the authorities appointed a 
working group in February 1980.406 This working group also concluded that 
living as a collective was a way to break away from the isolation they had 
experienced in Swedish society. The nub of the problem was that living in a 
concentrated area allows them to participate in activities organized by the 
community and in Syriac Orthodox Church services. This need for 
cohesiveness is why Assyrians/Syriacs did not understand the reason for the 
dispersion and questioned its purpose (Ibid. 3-7). The report ascribes this 
policy to the scanty knowledge which the officials in charge of the settlement 
policy had of the group. Recognizing this failure, the municipal policy of 
dispersion was changed in favour of one distributing the Assyrians/Syriacs 
within the province of Stockholm. It was constantly stressed that 
resettlement should be on a voluntary basis and take place as much as 
possible in close co-operation with the group.Despite the great attraction of 
Södertälje, there were also people who remained in the cities to which they 
had been moved. One such example is Shabo who talks about the year 1976. 
Shabo expresses himself fairly positively about the way he experienced his 
introduction to Swedish society and he even seems to have been astonished 
by his reception: 
…After we were granted asylum, we applied for work. They asked us 
where we wanted to live and work. We told them we did not mind. They 
showed us Jönköping on the map. We noticed that it was situated on the 
water and therefore expected it to be a pleasant place. For that reason, we 
chose to live there. We were about ten young men in all. They told us that 
they would drive us [to Jönköping] and if we did not like it, they would 
bring us back [to Södertälje]… The media wrote a lot about us. Headlines 
in the [local] newspapers read:  “The first Assyrians arriving in 
Jönköping,” and “Welcome to Jönköping.” Before us, in 1976 there had 
                                                 
405 The title of the book by the Dutch anthropologist Schukkink (2003) about the 
Assyrians/Syriacs in the Netherlands implies this too: ‘De Suryoye, een verborgen 
gemeenschap’ [The Suryoye: a hidden society]. 
406 The working group consisted of high-ranking officials from the Migration Board, the 
National Board of Health and Welfare, the Labour Market Department, the Federation of 
Swedish Municipalities, Södertälje Municipality, and representatives from the Assyriska and 
Syrianska riksförbundet. The working group published three reports (1980, 1981:10, 1982:1) 
about the situation of Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden, and particularly about the current project 
for the resettlement of Assyrier/Syrianer to other municipalities.  
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actually already been Suroye in Jönköping. In that period, the Othuroye407 
[Assyrians] had slowly become increasingly visible. Therefore, we attracted 
the attention of the media. The Swedish people knew very little about the 
Othuroye, and anything new is always interesting. The mayor of Jönköping 
welcomed us and invited us to dinner in a restaurant and afterwards we 
were taken to a hotel. The next day, they took us to different factories so 
that we could decide where we wanted to work... We were also allocated a 
house to live in… They drove us to and from work until we had our own 
drivers’ licences... 
These first settlers became a reason for newcomers to settle in towns which 
are located in central Sweden, such as Västerås, Örebro, Jönköping, 
Norrköping and Gothenburg. The present geographical spread of the 
community is to a great extent explained by this Swedish settlement policy. 
Finding appropriate jobs for the Assyrian/Syriac refugees was one of the 
tasks assigned to the receiving municipality. The profile of Assyrian/Syriac 
settlers, as I indicated before, did not suit the needs of the Swedish market. 
They were either farmers or craftsmen. Nevertheless, they accepted the jobs 
on offer for industrial workers, assisted by the municipalities, jumping at the 
opportunity to enter into the Swedish labour market and society. These jobs 
served as a springboard for the next job, which was either a conscious choice 
or because they were dismissed in the aftermath of the industrial recession at 
the beginning of the 1970s. 
 
5.2 Integration of the Stateless Assyrians 
The period before Assyrians/Syriacs settled in Sweden, the policy of the 
authorities was based on the idea that immigrants would eventually assimilate 
in Sweden. Therefore, there were no specific programmes planning their 
future in society (Hammar 1985: 33). In 1965, an important change was 
made in integration policy: a task force was established to propose measures 
aiding the integration and adjustment of foreigners (Ibid. 32). This new 
policy materialized the offer of free instruction in Swedish, the publication of 
an ‘Immigrant Newsletter’ with information about Swedish society in several 
languages and Swedish officials made use of the publication ‘New to 
Sweden’ in which the rights and responsibilities of immigrants were 
                                                 
407 Othuroye is here used synonymously and interchangeably with Suryoye but it is also used 
across denominational. 
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explained.  
 In 1975, the Swedish Parliament decided that immigrant and minority 
policy should be based on equality (already established in 1968), freedom of 
choice and partnership (Hammar 1985: 33). Equality aimed at offering 
immigrants the same living standards as the rest of the population. Freedom of 
choice referred to the choice which was given to immigrants of retaining and 
developing their cultural identity. Partnership implied the positive effects of 
working together for both the immigrants and the native Swedish 
population. Hammar (Ibid.) notes that these aims have retained a general 
character and that what actually happens depends largely on the agencies 
implementing this policy. The main agency for the integration policy, the 
Swedish Integration Board, co-operates with several other agencies involved 
in the formation and implementation of the policy. The municipalities play 
an important role in implementing the national goals in a very close 
relationship with the Labour Market Board, the Federation of Swedish 
County Council, the Migration Board, the National Agency for Education, 
the National Board of Health and Welfare and the Swedish Association of 
Local Authorities (Franzen 2004).  
 The execution of the Swedish integration policy is delegated to 
municipalities, with the request that they take in a certain number of 
refugees.408 Depending on this number, each municipality is granted an 
‘integration subsidy’ to assist with the reception of the refugees and to 
prepare them for society: educationally, socially and economically. The main 
goal of the Swedish national programme for the reception of immigrants is: 
‘... society’s initiatives for newly arrived refugees and other immigrants 
should provide everyone the opportunity to support oneself financially and 
to actively participate in Swedish society’ (quoted in Franzen 2004: 2). 
Despite differences at the local level, looking at the way Assyrians/Syriacs 
have made use of this policy and their development it could be said that it 
has had considerable effects on their situation. I shall examine these three 
aspects of Swedish integrationist discourses and their relationship with the 
way Assyrians/Syriacs established themselves in Sweden in more detail. 
 
                                                 
408 In 2007, the municipality of Södertälje complained about the high number of new 
immigrants to the city and requested the national authorities to apply a law which requires 
immigrants be no longer allowed to make their own choice to live in a specific area of 
settlement (Interview with an employee of Södertälje Municipality, 2007). 
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5.2.1 Equality 
The policy of equality became particularly visible after the first governmental 
decree in February 1976, when the first general amnesty was granted to a 
large group of Assyrian/Syriac asylum seekers. Between 1975 and 1977, the 
municipality of Södertälje received 22 million Swedish Krones for their 
reception and ‘integration’ (Ornbrant 1981: 153). After the mid-1970s, as a 
group Assyrians tended to be granted a B-refugee status and were classified 
on a par with A-status refugees. This made access to special aid programmes 
available (Björklund 1981: 123). The Consultative Group for Assyrian 
Refugees was responsible for their realization. Assistance to the Assyrians 
was to be carried out in co-operation with the Labour Market Board, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Board, the National Board of Health and 
Welfare, the National Board of Education and the National Police Board 
(Memorandum Information to municipalities in relation to the Arrival of 
Assyrian Refugees, 3 March 1977). 
 As Björklund (1981: 124-5) points out, the consequence of the policy 
delineated in the Memorandum was that the Assyrian/Syriac refugees ought 
to have been assisted in the way they ‘needed’, as they were going to remain 
in Sweden. At municipality level, specific services had been planned and 
executed, from accommodation to recreational activities (Björklund 1982). 
This strong State intervention is characteristic of the discourses of Swedish 
Social Democracy, namely the provision of services from ‘cradle-to-grave’. 
In order to communicate this policy to Assyrians/Syriacs, the authorities also 
invested time and money in informing them about their new environment. 
For example, at the end of the 1970s, instead of the usual written 
documentation, families received a cassette (a ‘talking newspaper’) with 
information in Suryoyo (circumventing their lack of literacy), informing them 
about the different Swedish institutions. The policy of equality also meant that 
the access to educational resources, especially to Swedish language courses, 
was free and easily accessible. It was perhaps for the first time that Sweden 
had had to deal with such a big group of illiterate or poorly educated people 
at one time. The activist Shabo provides an example of how this worked out 
positively for him: 
In 1976, I had already begun [learning] the Swedish language in the first 
week of my arrival, even before I registered at the police station!.. The 
third day I started school… Within three months, they asked us to work 
as interpreters. They accepted us after we had sat an exam for interpreters. 
We were even paid for it!         
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Shabo reflects on the time in which he began to learn Swedish with pride 
and some surprise.409 The fact that the courses were free made them easily 
accessible and stimulated people to attend them. When talking about their 
knowledge of the Swedish language generally, respondents exclaimed about 
how fast they had learned it and how they had even won prizes for what they 
wrote in Swedish during their first school years; competing with Swedish 
children. Knowledge of the Swedish language became the foundation for the 
next step in society, namely finding a job and assuming a position as 
intermediator between their own community and the Swedish authorities. 
The hegemonic articulation of Swedish integrationist discourses made it 
necessary to co-operate with ‘representatives’ of the group who knew the 
language. They began to fill the gap in the need for communication between 
the authorities and the group. As I illustrate in the Chapters 6 and 7, the new 
circumstances and the subsequent needs which have arisen in the diaspora 
have created space for the younger, educated generation to assume central 
roles in the community, stepping into the breach of their new needs in a 
modern society. This shows also the emergence of new subjects after 
dislocation. 
 This process of learning the Swedish language has been different for the 
Assyrian/Syriac refugees from Iraq who settled in Södertälje after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein in 2003. Despite the fact that this group of refugees is more 
highly educated than the Assyrians/Syriacs from Turkey (and also those 
from Syria and Lebanon), they seem to have experienced greater difficulty 
learning Swedish. The difference lies in the fact that, when the 
Assyrians/Syriacs from Turkey, Syria and Lebanon arrived in Sweden in 
large numbers in the 1970s, the local society was still dominated by the 
majority of the Swedish population with whom they had to learn to 
communicate before they could function in society. In contrast, in present-
day Södertälje and its environs, there are quarters where most of the shops 
are owned by Assyrians/Syriacs and where over 90 per cent of the 
population has this background. This makes it possible for new 
Assyrian/Syriac refugees from Iraq to communicate in their mother 
                                                 
409 Shabo expressed his surprise about being paid for the job of an interpreter for the 
Assyrians/Syriacs, probably since in his eyes this was as an unquestionable moral obligation to 
his people; a collective approach in which the individual is in charge of the collective needs. 
      SWEDEN – THE LAST STOP          225 
 
tongue,410 leading to a delay in the development of their knowledge of 
Swedish411 and consequently to a delay in finding a job.412 This development 
has caused the local authorities some anxieties, since they do not seem to 
have it under control.  
 
5.2.2 Partnership 
The aim of the government (1975) to develop a Swedish society which is 
based on partnerships has made the ethnic organization of Assyrians/Syriacs 
possible.413 Partnership is based on the idea that immigrants and minorities 
should work together with the majority population in the development of 
society (Hammar 1985: 34). This goes hand in hand with granting all the 
partners involved the freedom of association and the public support needed 
to found and maintain their own associations. As a result of this policy, after 
Assyrians were granted asylum they began to gain access to the same 
organizational resources and opportunities as the native Swedish population. 
This has had a considerable effect on the organization and development of 
the Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden. Not the least because of the low threshold 
in founding organizations. 414 The sole requirement is that the statutes are 
based on democratic rules (such as democratic voting principles); this is also 
a condition for financial support.415 Depending on the fulfilment of these 
                                                 
410 Among the newcomers from Iraq, there are also Assyrians/Syriacs who have acquired 
Arabic as their mother tongue and who continue to use it intensively within their social 
network in Sweden. 
411 One of my respondents mentioned that some people who arrived newly from Iraq and 
spoke the Sureth language learned to speak faster Suryoyo than the Swedish language. 
412 One difficulty for the new settlers is that, in contrast to the 1960s and the 1970s (when it 
was relatively easier to find manual work for which they did not need necessarily very good 
Swedish language skills), today a good knowledge of the Swedish language has become a 
requirement since such manual work is scarce. 
413 See further about this aim, the Statens offentliga utredningar (1974, The Swedish Government 
Official Report). 
414A non-profit organization can be founded by a minimum of three people who have a 
common interest. This organization becomes a juridical person when it has acquired its own 
statutes and a board. See further: 
http://www.sodertalje.se/mainupload/dokument/Se%20o%20göra/Föreningsservice/Starta
%20förening/Bilda%20förening.pdf. 
415 Subsidies for self-governing organizations are based on the number of members of the 
organization. In 2006, Syrianska riksförbundet had approximately 20,000 members and Assyriska 
had 9,000. See further for the rules for the financial support of organizations: 
http://www.sodertalje.se/mainupload/dokument/Se%20o%20göra/Föreningsservice/Söka
%20bidrag/Regler_föoreningsstod_070307.pdf. 
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principles, the State will consult with their representatives and allow them to 
participate in the decision-making processes in Swedish society. 
 Indeed, migrant organizations developed the function of teaching 
newcomers about the principles in the Swedish society; they aided their 
adjustments to those principles and helped them apply them in their new 
lives. The ethnic organizations have developed the role of gate-keepers, of 
educational institutions and of places in which representatives of the ethnic 
group can be instructed so as to be able to participate and function in the 
Swedish political system according to its principles. This includes the idea of 
involving them actively in decision-making processes about issues 
concerning the ethnic group to which they belong. Therefore, the active 
participation of their representatives is perceived as essential. It was also on 
this basis that the authorities stimulated the foundation of the first 
Assyrian/Syriac association in Sweden – Assyriska föreningen i Södertälje416. 
After the presence of Assyrians/Syriacs was acknowledged as a new interest 
group, Swedish institutions needed representatives from this group with 
whom to communicate on its behalf. The Swedish Immigration Board, the 
Council of Free Churches and some other national associations (such as 
KFUK-KFUM417) were instrumental (Rubenson 1996: 238) in the 
foundation of the Assyriska föreningen in 1971. In 1975, the Assyriska föreningen 
merged with the Assyriska Ungdoms Föreningen Ninves Sportklubb418 (founded in 
1974). In the decades which followed, this pioneer group became the model 
for many Assyrian/Syriac organizations. This is the explanation of why the 
associational life among the group emerged at an early stage of settlement in 
Sweden.  
 In a period of almost forty years, the Assyriska föreningen i Södertälje 
developed different functions in Swedish society; offering a home after the 
dislocation suffered by community members. Initially, the first association 
functioned as an office where Assyrian/Syriac newcomers could go to for 
anything they needed to assist with their settlement in Sweden. With the help 
                                                 
416 The name of this association in Suryoyo was Hudro d-Suryoye b-Södertälje (Beth Sawoce 2007). 
417 KFUK-KFUM is the Swedish-based YWCA; a border-crossing Christian youth movement. 
418 This is the first club in which the youth of the present well-known soccer club, Assyriska 
FF, played together. After it merged with the Assyriska föreningen, soccer continued to take a 
central place, especially after the team reached the higher levels. This is how soccer has played 
a central role in the social activities of this organization, of which the major event was the rise 
of its soccer club Assyriska FF to the Allsvenskan in 2005 (victory in 2004) – thirty years after 
the foundation of the club. 
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of Assyrian/Syriac intermediators, the Swedish authorities informed them 
about Swedish society.419 The function which the Assyriska föreningen has 
retained up to the present-day has been by far the most central:  it became 
the place where the first ideas about an umtho (nation) were crystallized 
furthering greater detail, taking shape from the ideas of umthonoye who arrived 
from different countries of the Middle East. In time, it developed a broader 
socio-cultural function for Assyrians/Syriacs (see further Chapters 6 and 7).  
 An indirect consequence of their right to found their own associations, 
the financial and advisory support by the authorities and the general 
framework of Swedish regulations has been the influence these aspects have 
had on the institutional culture of the Assyrians/Syriacs. The availability of 
this space with new opportunities has also increased the competition and 
conflict between the Assyriska and Syrianska elites, especially at institutional 
level. The easy access to governmental support and the liberal Swedish 
regulations have both enabled them to establish new organizations and to 
mobilize their own ideology in opposition to existing ideas. This is expressed 
in the institutional structure of almost every town which is inhabited by 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden.420 Each town has at least two associations, each 
adhering to either the Assyrier or the Syrianer ideology. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 7, without this high level of institutionalization the discussion about 
the ‘right name’ of their people would perhaps have developed differently 
and would have been far less institutionalized and antagonistic than it is at 
the present day. 
 As stated, the associations and the activities organized had to be based 
upon Swedish principles. This is the focal point at which Swedish public 
discourses influenced and greatly shaped the institutional structure of 
organizations. A look at the statutes of both federations reveals 
unequivocally that these principles are expressed in the aims of both the 
Assyriska riksförbundet421 and the Syrianska riksförbundet.422 
                                                 
419 People who did not visit the association heard about the issues discussed from other family 
members. The information which reached them was rapidly diffused among them because of 
their strong bonds and networks. 
420 The policy of dispersion of new immigrants throughout Sweden at certain time periods is 
another factor which increased the need for Assyrian/Syriac institutions in a certain place. 
421 With its aim of representing Assyrians in Sweden, the Assyriska riksförbundet mentions such 
specific goals as: putting the Assyrian question on the agenda of the United Nations; 
defending the use of the name ‘Assyrian’; working to preserve the language and develop the 
Assyrian culture; promoting study and sports activities and striving for the right to have the 
Assyrian (Syriac) language taught at primary schools. It also states that it promotes democracy, 
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Furthermore, the Swedish emancipatory discourses have also stimulated 
the participation of Assyrian/Syriac women in the public sphere. At the 
website of the Assyriska Kvinnoförbundet (Assyrian Women Federation), it is 
mentioned that, in 1980, the Assyrier women became aware of their 
marginalized position in the Assyriska organizations which were practically 
entirely run by men.423 In the mid-1980s they founded the predecessor of the 
present-day Assyriska Kvinnoförbundet as a reaction to this.424 The 
anthropologist Maryam Garis Guttman believes that by the 1980s the 
Assyrier women were much more aware of their marginalized position in the 
public sphere and aimed to change this at institutional level,425 whereas today 
they are more passive.426 Initially both federations had a women committee 
in charge of specific activities aiming at women.  At the time of writing, there 
are a few women on the board in both federations and in the case of the 
Assyriska riksförbundet two women have been president since it was 
founded.427 The active participation of women has been considered as an 
expression of processes of modernization within the group. The existence of 
specific youth federations also is attributable to the policy of the authorities. 
The aim has been to stimulate independence from the main federations and 
by doing so to give more space to the emancipation of the youth. The two 
federations representing the Assyrian/Syriac young people in Sweden are the 
Assyriska Ungdomsförbundet (AUF),428 founded in 1991, and the Syrianska 
                                                                                                               
equality and gender equality; that it will promote youth activities, so that young people 
participate actively in civic life; that it will contribute to children and young people developing 
bilingual skills and that it will promote Assyrian integration at European level. 
422 Fighting processes of exclusion and discrimination; promoting the integration of the 
Syrianska people in society; raising awareness for gender issues and initiating projects which 
deal with this, disseminating educational knowledge among its members, and so forth. 
423 See further, http://www.assyrianwomen.com/ 
424 Recently, the Assyrian Women’s Federation has accorded the gender issue a more central 
position on its agenda; it has organized various seminars and published the handbook 
Jämställdhet här och nu (2008) to encourage the development of an associational life with a focus 
on gender equality. 
425 Personal conversation with Maryam Garis Guttman, 2009. 
426 See further Garis (2005: 174-5) where she discusses the relatively low impact which the 
Swedish debate about gender equality has had on an internal debate among Assyrian/Syriac 
women. 
427 Ninwe Maraha served as a president in the year 2001 and Rachel Hadodo between 2007-
2009. 
428 The predecessor of AUF was the Assyriska Ungdomskommittén (AUK) – a federation of the 
youth committees of Assyriska associations in Sweden which was founded in 1985. In 2009, 
AUF had 32 member organizations; with a total number of about 8500 members (the majority 
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Ungdomsförbundet (SUF), which was founded in 1992. Its name was changed 
to the Syrianska-Arameiska Ungdomsförbundet (SAUF)429 in March 2010. 
Another example of the Swedish influence on the Assyrian/Syriac 
organizational life is that the political organizations of immigrant groups, 
such as ADO, have not been officially recognized. This is probably an 
important reason ADO has remained in the shadow of the Assyrian 
Federation and associations, despite the fact that most of these, especially in 
the beginning, were actually founded by ADO.430 This ‘shadow position’ 
occupied by ADO as a political organization has developed more space for 
activities with a socio-cultural character (see further Chapter 6). An indirect 
consequence of the Swedish regulation policy has been that the authorities 
have managed to steer their direction in the character of the political 
organization.431  
 
5.2.3 Freedom of Choice  
Freedom of choice refers to the immigrants’ right to ‘retain their own identity’ 
and found their own associations as long as they continue to participate in 
Swedish society.432 This right was formulated in an amendment which the 
government passed in 1976. The space to nurture ‘their culture’ and 
language, plus the educational law that immigrant children have the right to 
be taught in their mother tongue,433 has undoubtedly resulted in a modern 
revival of Syriac and the spoken Suryoyo language. New literature is being 
produced in both languages, the vocabulary has been enriched with new, 
                                                                                                               
was in the age range between 7-25 years). Their focus of attention is revealed in the titles of its 
five committees: National and Cultural, International and Homeland, Sports, Media and 
Information Technology (see further www.auf.nu). 
429 It has 50 member organizations (including youth sections) and 13,000 members in the age 
group (7-25). See further http://www.sauf.nu/ 
430 Another reason for the ‘low profile’ of ADO in Europe is that it had developed an 
underground culture, because it was an underground organization in Syria until the early part 
of the 1990s. Until then, the ADO leadership especially in Syria tried to keep the profile of 
ADO low, because of the risk to its members. 
431 The development and organization of Assyrians/Syriacs varies in the different European 
countries. Comparing the situation in Germany with that in Sweden, the pace of 
institutionalization in Germany has been less fast, the number of institutions are much fewer 
than in Sweden and they receive far less financial support from the German authorities. 
432 See further Statens offentliga utredningar (SOU 1995: 88). 
433 The starting point for this policy is that immigrant children will be able to learn the 
Swedish language better if they first learn their own mother tongue properly. 
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modern words and elite members have begun to think of strategies which 
can help the survival of these languages.  
 In the long term, this right to ‘retain their own identity’ has resulted in a 
new approach to culture among Assyrians/Syriacs themselves. The local 
Swedish institutions invited the Assyrian/Syriac associations to display their 
culture to Swedish audiences. In part this had to do with the role of getting 
to know the background of the Assyrians/Syriacs or becoming acquainted 
with each other better. The culture of the Assyrians/Syriacs has been 
presented especially through the folkloristic dances and food. The scholar 
Sabro Garis, who was one of the initiators of a folkloristic dance group and 
the music band Gudo d-Ninwe in Gothenburg, says: ‘We took the opportunity 
to present ourselves; [showing] that we are a people with a distinct culture, 
language, history, and so forth.’ For elite members such as Sabro, the 
performance of folkloristic dances and their culture have not remained 
functioning at a socio-cultural level. It has developed a political dimension; 
by presenting their culture, they presented Assyrians/Syriacs as a distinct 
people. 
 In this process, the ‘culture of the Suryoye’ has gained a new dimension 
which was absent before. It has been made exotic. Where Assyrians/Syriacs 
often equate ‘adat with the Western term ‘culture’, the meaning attached to 
the latter term seems to have changed and been reified in a new meaning. 
Traditionally among Assyrians/Syriacs, ‘adat (traditions) have not been talked 
about from the perspective of exhibiting them to the ‘others’. Instead, ‘adat 
were often used normatively, discussing how a matter or situation ought to 
be – ‘this is how we do things’. ‘Adat delineated what was socially acceptable 
and what was not. In contrast, kultur which has been adopted as a new term 
in Suryoyo language (besides the use of the mardutho) has developed the 
connotation of a grand ‘culture’. In the last few decades, this usage has been 
taken over by Assyrians/Syriacs worldwide, even as far as the agricultural 
area of Tur ‘Abdin. Its focus is concentrated more on the ‘positive’ aspect of 
the ‘adat or culture. It is ‘the culture’ (u kultur) which is promoted, exposed to 
the others and whose development is stimulated, as a nodal point attached to 
the identity discourses of Assyrians/Syriacs. It is that part of the ‘adat which 
was initially exhibited to the Swedish people, the new ‘others’. 
 This part was added by another from a more distant past. Assyriska and 
Syrianska organizations have been selecting elements of their assumed past 
and have presented these specifically as part of ‘their culture’ to present-day 
audiences. It was the part which is supposed to have been neglected 
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historically and which should be taken up again, insisted upon by both 
ideologies. In the folkloristic dances, the Assyrier use costumes which are 
based on the costumes used by the members of the Assyrian Church of the 
East in the Gozarto, in Syria.434 In short, it could be said that the space which 
the Swedish authorities created for the Assyrians/Syriacs to exhibit ‘their 
culture’ has led to a whole new approach to ‘adat in terms of u kultur and has 
given it a new dimension. 
 
5.2.4 Position of the Church in a Swedish Context 
The secular Swedish integrationist discourses have also significantly 
influenced the position of the Syriac Orthodox Church in Sweden and its 
relationship with Assyrian/Syriac secular institutions. From the perspective 
of the Swedish State, religion is a private matter. Therefore, the church is no 
longer assumed to be the only glue between members of a migrant group like 
the Assyrians/Syriacs. This approach has resulted in a situation in which the 
Syriac Orthodox Church began to lose ground to the Assyrian/Syriac secular 
institutions, particularly in the early years of the settlement. The Swedish 
authorities targeted secular institutions as the representatives of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs. This approach was diametrically different to the millet 
system in the Middle East, a legacy from the Ottoman Empire, where millet 
(nation) referred to the religious millet and had become synonymous for the 
national identity of a group of people. In that system, the religious leaders of 
a millet represented the people. Although that system has been abolished, 
minorities continue to be recognized solely on a religious basis. Therefore, in 
the Middle East the religious leaders of these minorities have continued to 
function as their representatives. 
 In Sweden, the change in the position of the church to being relegated 
to the background or to a different dimension and the policy of stimulating 
secular institutions to emerge into the foreground has also meant that the 
latter began to be given more ‘credibility’ to continue and develop (as 
discussed above), especially in the first period. For instance, compared with 
the secular institutions, the Syriac Orthodox Church has been granted little 
                                                 
434 They have been introduced into Sweden through the ADO-centric organizations which 
had developed contacts with the Assyrians in the Khabur region and who had copied the 
folkloristic costumes from them. 
232                                          CHAPTER 5 
 
subsidy and has not been granted a position in Swedish public law.435 At the 
local level, the approach of the authorities towards the Syriac Orthodox 
Church changed at a later stage of the settlement, when they became aware 
of its central role in the Assyrian/Syriac community. For example, in their 
communications with the community the authorities have also made use of 
the clergy and the church board and visited the community at church. This 
has given the church relatively more space than it had in the beginning. 
 At this juncture, something should be said about the installation of the 
first clergy in Sweden. In 1970, four years after the settlement of the group, 
Patriarch Jacob III appointed Father Yusef Said (from Iraq) to serve the 
community.436 This draws attention to the fact that, during the first two 
years, the salary of Father Yusef was financed by the Swedish Immigration 
and Naturalization Board; something which KFUM had been advocating 
(Björklund 1981: 63). With the mass emigration during the mid-1970s, the 
need for priests increased and community members began to approach 
priests who were still based in the homeland. An example is given by Father 
Simon: 
In 1975 I visited Germany and the Netherlands – at that time there was 
no priest yet in the Netherlands. The Suryoye in the Netherlands wanted 
me to stay there. I told them that I had just renovated my church and that 
I could not stay… In 1976 I came to Europe a second time. My uncle in 
Sweden had passed away. There was no priest there either.437 [The family] 
Dbe Halef Ya‘coubo asked me to stay and become their priest. But I told 
them: “I did not come to stay and therefore I shall go back [to Tur ‘Abdin] 
again.” When I went back, I noticed that half of the village had already 
left!... It was very sad since I had just finished the renovation of my church 
and I wanted to build an extra guestroom to be able to receive guests to 
                                                 
435 Only the Swedish church is granted a position in public law and therefore it is the only 
national church (Rubenson 1996: 240).  Consequently, only the Swedish church is permitted 
to receive a certain tax income from Swedish citizens. Currently, the Syriac Orthodox Church 
has applied for the same status, which inherently means that it will be able to apply the same 
tax system if this status is granted. 
436 This is also how other priests from the homeland were asked to serve the new community 
in Germany during the 1970s. In Germany, the community consecrated Deacon Bedros Dbe 
Shushe (from Midyad) as the first priest to serve them. Others priests who followed him 
during the 1970s were: Yuhanon Teber (from Midin), Abdullahat Qas Afrem (from Syria) and 
Yusef Harman (from Kerboran). 
437 Father Yusef Said was the priest at that time but the community was perhaps in need of 
more priests. Besides, it seems that during that period, there was a disagreement among 
community members about the appointment of Father Yusef. See further Chapter 7. 
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the church respectfully. On the other hand, I understood why the people 
wanted to leave this oppression we live in. Our people longed to live in a 
Christian country, since they had experienced heavy oppression [ta‘da]. 
They dreamt of finding a sheltered place [setrina] under the rule of a 
Christian country and to escape oppression [khulsina mu dhelm]. They had 
this opportunity, this road which opened [u darbano de ftih] and they took it. 
Meanwhile, within the framework of the Swedish integrationist approach, the 
authorities assisted and advised in the establishment of the Syriac Orthodox 
Church in Sweden. The clergymen were involved in projects, such as the 
KFUK-KFUM project. In order to illustrate the initial process, I shall 
discuss some elements from the report of the KFUK-KFUM Projekt för vissa 
flyktingar från Libanon, Syrien och Turkiet, (Project for some refugees from 
Lebanon, Turkey and Syria)’ (Carragher 1978).438 The activities of KFUK-
KFUM illustrate the integrationist discourses of the authorities. The purpose 
of the project was to integrate the Syriac Orthodox Church into the Swedish 
system. 
Within the framework of the mentioned project, KFUK-KFUM 
discussed co-operation with the Syriac Orthodox Church and the Swedish 
Free Church Council (Frikyrkoråd). The project leader, Desmond Carragher, 
sent a proposal about the organization of the Syriac Orthodox Church in 
Sweden to Patriarch Yakob III in Damascus. The Central Project Group for the 
Syriac Orthodox Church (CPSOK) was also included within the project in order 
to discuss the general affairs and needs of the Syriac Orthodox Church 
pertaining to church organization, administration, economy and other 
requirements. In the beginning, the project group pursued a progressive 
agenda; its aim was to develop an organizational structure for the Syriac 
Orthodox Church which was similar to that of the Swedish church. For 
instance, a federal structure for the church organization (four regions in 
Sweden), a central church council and each regional parish should become 
responsible for its own economy, administration, parish service and 
educational programme. A priest would be employed full-time. Moreover, 
the group wanted to advance the democratization process by holding parish 
elections; giving the right to vote for both men and women. To what extent 
this progressive agenda was implemented and positive results were realized is 
not clear from the activity report of 1977-78. The conclusion of the report is 
that the first step towards the democratization of the church organization 
                                                 
438 See for a further discussion of this report, Chapter 7. 
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was taken with the implementation of the first national structure of church 
boards which was based on democratic elections.439 It also concluded that 
the interest of the Syriac Orthodox Church in the implementation of the 
Swedish organizational church structure increased. Today, although the 
election system has remained intact, the structure of the church is divided 
and there are now two archbishoprics in Sweden. Each has its own national 
board and its local parish boards. 
 
5.3 New Midyad in Södertälje 
The Swedish expectations notwithstanding, the Suryoye have to a large 
extent turned out to be enterprising, clever and innovative. While the 
Swedish authorities have tried to administrate their distribution…, they 
have succeeded in finding homes where they live for the most part with 
extensive social networks within a convenient distance; while the 
authorities have complained about the hopeless unemployment, the 
Assyrians have largely managed to arrange jobs for themselves; while the 
authorities have tried to prevent their immigration, the Assyrians have 
organized their relatives’ travels to Sweden and their organizing the 
simplest matters, more and more Assyrians have founded small 
businesses…, which in a number of cases have grown into organizations 
of remarkable complexity. 
             Björklund (1981: 130) 
In 1981, Björklund already summarized the discrepancy between the 
perception of the Swedish authorities about the Assyrians/Syriacs and the 
reality these authorities encountered. It resulted (as Björklund writes) from 
the ‘tendency for the Swedes to regard the Assyrians as helpless and quite 
incompetent, illiterate as they are and unacquainted with the complicated 
industrial society’. Writing in 2009 and reflecting on the early 1980s, it is 
possible to draw the conclusion that the characteristics of this knushyo Suryoyo 
(Assyrian/Syriac society), as noted by Björklund above, have strengthened 
even more, expressing the dynamism and inventiveness of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs as a group of people (or ‘survivors’). In the following 
                                                 
439 At that time, the federal church structure was implemented with one national church 
board, four regional church boards and each with ten local parishes which had their own 
church boards. 
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section, I shall draw a picture of different elements of this knushyo Suryoyo, 
bearing in mind that it developed in relation to the reception policy 
described earlier in this chapter. 
 Between 1971 and 2005, the number of the inhabitants of Södertälje did 
not increase much (from almost 80,000 to 80,553), but the background of 
the settlers changed. The population with a foreign background (36.8%) in 
Södertälje is more than twice as that at the national level (16.3%). The text 
explaining this table states: ‘Södertälje is a municipality in which many 
nationalities live together. The dominant groups are the Finnish and the 
Assyrier/Syrianer, who can be defined as a population group which originates 
from Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon’. 440 Swedish people have been leaving 
the city to be replaced by new immigrants eager to settle in neighbourhoods 
where their relatives or community members live.441 In the table of citizens 
with a foreign442 (utländsk) background, about 15,000 people are mentioned 
as having a background in the countries Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon (in 
order of highest number) (Annual Report 2005). It is important to note that 
the third generation is no longer counted as foreign. This results in a lower 
number of Assyrians/Syriacs than is the actual number of people identifying 
themselves as such (besides their self-identification as Swedish). 
Assyrians/Syriacs personally consider their number in Södertälje to be at 
least about 25,000 of the over around 100,000 Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden. 
This makes them the largest immigrant group in this town. The booklet 
Södertälje i världen, Världen i Södertälje portrays the group as the most successful 
of all the immigrant groups in Sweden, taking their low rate of 
unemployment as a guide.  
 Earlier in this chapter, I illustrated how the Swedish authorities have 
attempted to distribute Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden. Despite their efforts, 
they managed to create their own knushyo (society, or in Tönnies’ terms, 
Gemeinschaft), with its main centre in Södertälje. Today, Södertälje has begun 
                                                 
440 This is my translation of the original in Swedish. It is remarkable that, in the annual report, 
the Assyrier/Syrianer are referred to as a specific group, although in the table about the 
background of the population in Södertälje, they are categorized according to their former 
nationality. This shows that, at local level, they have achieved the non-formal status of being 
identified as a specific group, despite the fact that at the national level there is not yet any 
formal administrative category to distinguish them. 
441 At the end of the 1970s, about 16 per cent of the population was counted as foreign. In 
2007, according to statistics of the municipality, about 40 per cent of the population is 
immigrant. 
442 People born abroad or whose parents were born abroad. 
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to be called New Midyad, after the town from which a large number of the 
Assyrian/Syriac inhabitants emigrated. The reason for the concentration of 
Midyoye in Södertälje is that those who were moved by the municipality to 
other places, returned to it as soon as they had the chance (Björklund 1981: 
103). Those Assyrians/Syriacs migrating from other villages in Tur ‘Abdin, 
who had been encouraged to move out of Södertälje in 1976, gathered in 
other towns.443 Many Assyrians/Syriacs from Syria and Lebanon tended to 
settle in the Södertälje quarters of Hövsjö and Geneta, instead of in Ronna. 
In 2009, a large number of the inhabitants in these quarters were new 
refugees from Iraq. Other Assyrians/Syriacs have begun to move away and 
buy houses in other quarters of Södertälje or outside this city. 
 Assyrians who arrived in Sweden in the mid-1970s soon felt at home 
with the knushyo Suryoyo they encountered in Södertälje. They met many 
people they already knew from the homeland – in the street, in church and in 
the associations which they established. The structure in the knushyo Suryoyo 
offered the newcomers many opportunities to engage in different aspects of 
the society. A second significant point is that the knushyo Suryoyo was 
characterized by a ‘new collective mix of Assyrians/Syriacs.’ They met Suryoye 
from other parts of the world with whom they might never have been in 
touch before – although they might be close or distant relatives. In the 
process of identifying each other in Europe, Assyrians/Syriacs from Turkey 
(as it was common in Tur ‘Abdin) asked the Assyrians/Syriacs from the 
Gozarto: ‘What village [in Tur ‘Abdin] are you from originally’? (bu ‘asel mayna 
qrithowayt?). They asked this question since they knew that the 
Assyrians/Syriacs in the Gozarto had migrated there in modern historical 
times. Although most of the families in Tur ‘Abdin already had relatives in 
Syria and Lebanon, Assyrians/Syriacs from the Gozarto who were asked 
about what village their parents were from originally were often annoyed and 
perceived this to be a discriminatory question. They often reacted with ‘We 
are all Suryoye! Why do you (people from Tur ‘Abdin) always ask about the 
place a person comes from?’ The answer which followed was often that they 
wanted only to identify the people to whom they were talking by their village 
                                                 
443 For example, the Kerboraniye in Västerås, the Botoye in Örebro and Gothenburg, and the 
Qelthoye (Arabic-speaking) in Märsta, a suburb of Stockholm. The Qelthoye have a successful 
soccer team, Valsta Syrianska IK (located in Märsta), playing in the third highest Swedish 
league, Division 1 since 2006. Throughout Europe, there was a similar process to that in 
Sweden where new relatives mostly joined family members who had already settled in a 
certain area. 
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and family relationships.444 
 In relation to the latter, an even more common question they ask each 
other when meeting for the first time is: ‘Whose son/daughter are you?’ 
Although in a new setting, Assyrians/Syriacs generally know each other 
through their extended families. Individuals are shorn of their meaning 
without the context of their relationship to one another. Therefore, if an 
individual does something positive, the positive reward extends to all the 
people in the collective group to which that individual belongs. Conversely, 
when that person does something which is perceived by the people to be 
negative, the reverse happens. Moreover, the collective image of the group 
reflects on its individual members. One of the consequences of living as a 
collective in certain areas has been that ‘social control’ among 
Assyrians/Syriacs has been kept intact. This situation is not to everyone’s 
taste and has prompted some individuals and families to decide to settle 
somewhere outside Södertälje; ‘fleeing social control’ and its consequences. 
 The mix of backgrounds which gathered in Sweden is also reflected in 
the language use of this group. Assyrians/Syriacs are often bi-lingual. 
Depending on the area of emigration, they speak either Suryoyo (which they 
see as their traditional mother tongue) or Arabic, Turkish, Kurdish (often a 
combination of these languages) and new acquired languages in the diaspora. 
The liturgical language has continued to be Syriac. In a few cases the 
congregation exists of many people who were raised with Arabic, Turkish or 
Kurdish. Consequently, at least one of these languages is used for the 
sermon and depending on the situation, parts of the liturgy may also be in 
these languages (especially Arabic), besides Syriac.445 Syriac is continued to 
                                                 
444 After Assyrians/Syriacs who had migrated from the Tur ‘Abdin region in Turkey across the 
border into the Gozarto region in Syria (in the post-WW I period), had stopped identifying 
each other by their villages of origin in Tur ‘Abdin. Respondents mention that the elite in the 
Gozarto had made efforts to stop making distinction between people from different villages 
and towns, as a process of emancipation of the people (in order to eliminate the difference 
between town and village people). Another reason for the difference experienced in Europe is 
that Assyrians/Syriacs arrived in Europe directly from Tur ‘Abdin, while those who arrived 
from the Gozarto in Syria had left Tur ‘Abdin one or two generations earlier. 
445 In the St George Church in Linköping, Father Sleman holds his sermon in five different 
languages (Suryoyo, Arabic, Turkish, Kurdish and Swedish), depending on his audience in the 
church. He meets in the needs of especially the first generation Assyrian/Syriac immigrants 
from different areas of the Middle East. Father Sleman originates himself from the town 
Kerboran in Tur ‘Abdin, where the mother tongue of the ordinary Assyrians/Syriacs had 
become Kurdish since about the period after the Seyfo.  Assyrian/Syriac elderly witness that 
only a few individuals continued to speak a form of Suryoyo in this town; it is not known 
whether this was the Eastern or the Western dialect (Private correspondence with the linguist 
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be seen as their national language. 
 The knushyo Suryoyo in Södertälje and its internal dynamic has functioned 
as the open framework in which Assyrians/Syriacs have made use of the 
opportunities offered by the authorities. The strong family connections and 
collective way of life has often assumed an educational function in 
transferring and transforming knowledge and by doing so, the development 
of the community, although this may not always be positively. Raising this 
element up to a higher national or international level, their 
interconnectedness also reveals its benefits in the adaptation processes to the 
new societies of settlement. The satellite TV channels Suroyo TV and Suryoyo 
Sat have enhanced this effect. Assyrians/Syriacs worldwide can watch the 
same programmes at the same time. This functions as a new network of 
connections. 
 
5.3.1 Södertälje: a Ghetto? 
In the last few decades in which a demographic change has taken place in 
Södertälje, this town has developed different meanings for different groups.  
The authorities and the media usually define the town, more specifically 
some quarters of it (such as Hovsjö and Ronna), as ‘segregated’ or as a 
‘ghetto’ where a ‘problematic’ group of Assyrians/Syriacs lives. This 
contrasts with how Assyrians/Syriacs themselves perceive their presence in 
this town. Although their settlement in specific quarters of Södertälje 
commenced as a result of the housing policy of the municipality, it fast 
turned into what people commonly refer to as a ‘ghetto’. Later, for the 
people personally making individual choices living in these ethnic segregated 
areas meant that the enforced ‘ghetto’ turned into an ‘ethnic enclave’. 
Respondents told me that they joke with their Swedish friends from outside 
Södertälje who visit this town, telling them: ‘Don’t forget to apply for a visa 
before you come to Södertälje.’ To take the case of the Assyrians/Syriacs in 
the Ronna quarter of Södertälje, these people seem to identify strongly with 
their neighbourhood (which consists mainly of big apartment blocks). In 
2007, I was walking through it when I saw a trendy male teenager whom I 
asked in his mother tongue, Suryoyo: ‘How do you like living here?’ He 
                                                                                                               
Michael Suroyo, 2009). They note that they used the ‘a’ instead of the ‘o’, respectively used in 
Eastern and Western Surayt.  Until the Seyfo, it was known that there was a quarter where the 
whole population spoke it. The drastic change to speaking Kurdish may have resulted from 
the severe killings which had been caused among Assyrians/Syriacs during the Seyfo. 
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answered with a smile: ‘It is great to live here. I feel at home with so many 
Suryoye around me.’ He does not feel estranged from the environment he 
lives in, something which is quit common for the Assyrians/Syriacs living in 
Södertälje. This does not necessarily mean that he and others do not 
function well in Swedish society.  
 To feel at home and ‘integrated’ (as people commonly call it) means 
something different for people living in the quarter of for example Ronna 
(mostly populated by Assyrians/Syriacs) than it does for outsiders. For 
example, the Swedish authorities’ discourse speaks of the Assyrians/Syriacs 
in Ronna being segregated,446 implying a negative development in this group. 
My analysis of the 2005 Annual Report of the Södertälje municipality reveal 
that it received a disproportionate number of Christian refugees from Iraq 
after the fall of the Baath regime in 2003. The message of the figures and 
discourse to be abstracted from the 2005 Annual Report is that the 
municipality no longer has the capacity to deal with them. In the same 
report, it is stated that, after an interval of three years, immigrants had still 
not managed to find jobs, to integrate, that they continued to depend on the 
State and tended to become social outsiders.447 These remarks seem to have 
summed up the general perception about the immigrants in Södertälje. The 
report fails to mention that about 37 per cent of the people receiving social 
welfare in Hovsjö in 2005 were newly arrived refugees who had fled the war 
in Iraq. This influx of new immigrants kept the average income of 
households in Hovsjö low. The report also argues that integration is 
undermined by the growing number448 of immigrants in Södertälje, which 
                                                 
446 This discourse became dominant again after the ‘Ronna incidents’ (Ronna-händelserna) in 
2005. It all started when a fifteen year old Assyrian/Syriac boy in the Ronna quarter of 
Södertälje called a Swedish girl of the same age who happened to be passing by: ‘Fucking 
whore.’ The girl retaliated with: 'Fucking black head' and afterwards her father called the 
police. This was the reason for what a few hours later came to be classified as the ‘violent riot’ 
in the Södertälje’s police report. The incident spun out of all proportions when the police 
arrived in Ronna from Stockholm with an extremely big force (100-150). This was the 
breaking point for the incident. The local Assyrian/Syriac inhabitants considered the police 
actions discriminatory and, later that same day the police station in Södertälje was shot at with 
automatic gunfire by young Assyrian/Syrian men. This evolved into a several weeks of debate 
about integration policy, Södertälje, ghettoization and a very negative image of 
Assyrians/Syriacs in the Swedish media. 
447 Of the social welfare provided to the population in Södertälje, 59% was spent on the 
neighbourhoods Fornhöjden, Hovsjö, Geneta and Ronna (Annual Report Södertälje, 2005: 
23). 
448 In 2005, about 900 new asylum seekers settled in Södertälje (Annual Report Södertälje, 
2005: 23). 
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has induced ethnic segregation. This rather negative image contradicts the 
figures about employment, income449 and education450 of the citizens in 
Södertälje, presented in the same annual report.  
 The discourses on segregation employed by the authorities imply that 
immigrants should remain invisible, should assimilate and that, if they do not 
conform, they should be classified as problematic. The media has played a 
central role in voicing this discourse. In the period until the mid-1980s, 
Gardell (1986: 78) distinguishes three different media discourses about this 
group. In the first period (1967), when 205 Assyrians/Syriacs arrived in 
Sweden as ‘stateless people’, they were presented as ‘honest people with no 
record of criminality’.  In the second period, with their mass emigration in 
the mid-1970s, they were presented as an ‘illegal’ group consisting of many 
economic frauds. As discussed in the previous chapter, this was also the 
period in which the authorities had made determined efforts to keep this 
group out of Sweden. In the media, most of the attention was directed to the 
problems which they caused as ‘immigrants’, or as the ‘others’; an image 
which stigmatized the group in Swedish society.451 This was also the case at 
the local level where the media was used as the vehicle to express the 
negative discourse of the municipality of Södertälje about the relatively high 
numbers of Assyrian/Syriac settlers in the city and the problems452 linked to 
them (Björklund 1981: 120, Ornbrant 1981: 10, Anderson 1983: 50). In the 
third period (towards the mid-1980s), their image was modified and they 
                                                 
449 A glance at the income level shows that the income per individual had increased each year 
between at least 2001, and 2005 (respectively the first year and last year mentioned in the 
report), to an amount of 36,654 Krones, which is 2,330 more than it was in 2004 (Annual 
Report Södertälje, 2005: 8). With a percentage of 4.2, the unemployment rate in Södertälje is 
even lower than the national level (4.3 per cent). 
450 Educationally, the level of the population in Södertälje barely differs from the average at 
national level, despite the fact the first older generation Assyrians/Syriacs from Turkey were 
either illiterate or poorly educated. However, as can be seen in the statistics, at some 
educational levels Södertälje has higher educational records. Folk-/grundskola counts 23 per 
cent in Södertälje against 25 per cent at national level, while the number of people with a pre-
university level count 48 per cent in Södertälje, against 45 per cent at national level. 
Population with a university degree (BA, < 3 years) is in both cases the same and the 
population with an MA (> 3 years) is 1 per cent above the national level. 
451 See further for this image in the Swedish media, Chapter 7. 
452 In reality the ‘problems’ seem to have been exaggerated. Stefan Andersson (1983: 66) 
mentions that, according to statistics of the National Police Board in 1980, forty of the 700 
cases brought before the district court of Södertälje were related to Assyrians/Syriacs. Two of 
them concerned serious charges relating to fraud and drugs. About ten dealt with false driving 
licences from Lebanon and others were minor offences.  
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have been presented as ‘ambitious’, ‘hard-working’ and ‘enterprising’. Since 
then this image has been dominant, occasionally interrupted by some 
negative news items, mostly related to criminality among the younger 
generation of Assyrians/Syriacs. The problem of criminality has also been 
considered as an increasing problem by the ordinary Assyrians/Syriacs. 
 Alongside the – over time – diverse discourses of the local authorities 
and the media about the immigrant-dense character of Södertälje, a fairly 
positive discourse has emerged among Assyrians/Syriacs about their 
presence in this town. They have come to perceive this town as their new 
‘home’; their New Midyad in Södertälje.453 In this respect their visibility in 
society has developed space for feeling at home. Therefore, 
Assyrians/Syriacs personally do not consider the phenomenon of living with 
a high concentration in certain areas such a big problem and they do not 
perceive it to be an obstacle to adapting and functioning well in Swedish 
society.454 In contrast, it has shown that their presence there has evolved in a 
sense of feeling at home in the new country and with that the strengthening 
of the connection of that collective to their new space of settlement. This 
solidarity is an instrument which helps to avoid the alienation which can 
occur in situations in which people feel that they are very different from the 
majority in their neighbourhood, and therefore not at home. Living as an 
ethnic enclave in certain neighbourhoods and the strong group ties between 
Assyrians/Syriacs in different areas of Europe have been instrumental in 
their upward mobility and the upsurge in self-confidence in the group, which 
has enabled them to take a pro-active position in society. They have already 
shown this in their economic entrepreneurship, in the educational field and, 
specifically in Sweden, in their political participation. 
 
5.3.2 Achievements in the New Country 
In connection with what has been said above, it could perhaps be said that 
Assyrians/Syriacs’ greatest achievement in Sweden has been that they have 
succeeded in creating a ‘new home’ for themselves in another corner of the 
                                                 
453 This is similar to the idea about the life they developed in the Gozarto (Syria), especially in 
Qamishlo, after they settled there in the years after the Seyfo. They speak with great pride about 
what they developed there in a short period of time: schools, cultural clubs, music, an 
economy and, since the mid-1950s their first political organization, ADO. 
454 Nevertheless, they do recognize the specific problems which they encounter as a group in 
such a context: the poor mastery of the Swedish of some of them (especially the new refugees 
from Iraq), the high degree of social control in the area or certain forms of criminality. 
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world. As mentioned earlier in this chapter and again extensively discussed in 
Chapter 7, they have managed to build up their own institutions in different 
fields and to secceed economically. Characteristic of Assyrian/Syriac 
entrepreneurship in Sweden is that it began with opening small businesses, 
such as kiosks, catering firms and tailoring.455 Except for the profession of 
tailor, the other businesses have been branches which are new to them. 
Despite having to adapt, they achieved success at an early stage. 
Assyrian/Syriac businesses often involve various family members, either 
through their financial contributions or by employing them.456  This might be 
one of the reasons for their success. Costs have been kept low by the use of 
financial support within the family network. The family network has also 
functioned as a backup in any risks taken. This flexibility in taking risks 
became an entrepreneurial advantage. The characteristics of their 
entrepreneurship can be explained by their experience of having lived as a 
minority in the different countries of the Middle East – where the socio-
political structure and system did not work in their favour. Their 
entrepreneurial experience in Sweden and the high increase in the number of 
university graduates457 among the younger generation has resulted in bigger 
businesses, chains of businesses and in more professional organizations. 
Moreover, those with a tertiary education have launched professional careers 
in different fields, including politics. 
 In the last decade, Assyrians/Syriacs have become more engaged in the 
Swedish politics. Especially in the last national and local elections, the 
number of Assyrian/Syriac candidates increased visibly. In the 2010 
elections, five458 Assyrians/Syriacs managed to become Members of the 
                                                 
455 Today, Assyrians/Syriacs are selling these small businesses, mostly to the members of 
other immigrant groups. 
456 See further about entrepreneurship among Assyrians/Syriacs, Pripp (2001). 
457 At the beginning of the 1990s, there were only a few highly educated Assyrians/Syriacs in 
Sweden, who all knew each other (if they lived in the same area). In 2007, the Assyrian/Syriac 
students organized themselves into two student federations, each with over 1000 student 
members. The Syriac Assyrian Academics in Sweden (Saais) was established in the year 2001. Saais 
works independently of other organizations. The ambition of Saais is to reach out to everyone 
in Sweden who is actively interested in higher education and the labour market. The 
Syriac/Aramaic Academic Federation (SAAF) was founded in 2002. It aims in the first place at 
motivating people to pursue higher education and secondly, at organizing social events for its 
members. 
458 These are Yilmaz Kerimo (since 1998 MP), Ibrahim Baylan, Robert Halef, Robert Haddad 
and Metin Ataseven. Ibrahim Baylan held the position of Minister of Schools in the Cabinet 
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Swedish Parliament (Riksdag). And a considerable number became members 
of the municipal (kommun) and county (län) council. Södertälje is the 
municipality which has the highest number (13) of Assyrian/Syriac members 
in the council, holding 20 per cent of all seats (65). Not only have they 
become more visible in Swedish politics; the political space has also meant 
that they have begun to negotiate – independently of their clergy – their 
socio-political rights in the Middle East. The recognition of the Seyfo as a 
genocide by Swedish Parliament can be seen as a milestone of their political 
lobby work (approval of resolution 11 March 2010). 
 
 
Illustration 7: Painting by Sargon Maraha, bringing together elements of his 
collective identity under the Assyrian and the Swedish flags: the Assyrian Empire, 
its glory expressed in architecture, art and military. The Christian identity of his 
people is also expressed through the crucified Jesus in the front and as victims in 
the Seyfo during the First World War in Ottoman Turkey. It draws the attention 
that the stadion of the soccer team Assyriska FF has been placed in the most 
central place of this painting, perhaps as the first great achievement which he as a 
young man believed his people had realized in the diaspora. Photo: Naures Atto. 
 
Especially in the first decade, the Swedish media broadcast negative news 
items about Assyrians/Syriacs as a segregated group in Södertälje. It is not 
                                                                                                               
of Göran Persson from 2004 to 2006. He was the first non-European immigrant to become a 
member of a Swedish Cabinet. 
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uncommon for immigrant-dense cities to have a negative connotation or a 
low status. Slowly but surely, this image of Södertälje has changed as a 
consequence of a positive development in this city. For instance, in 2004 the 
Assyrian/Syriac soccer team, Assyriska FF, succeeded in attracting positive 
attention after it managed to reach the first league in the Swedish 
competition (Allsvenskan). It became the first immigrant team in Europe to 
reach that position. Another team of theirs which is also based in Södertälje, 
Syrianska FC was promoted to the Swedish first league in 2010. 
Assyrians/Syriacs have been unquestionably proud of having achieved this 
success, especially because they find themselves in the diaspora. As a 
municipality, Södertälje uses this soccer success to underline the success of 
its ‘integration’ policy.459 
 Reflecting on these achievements, Assyrians/Syriacs are generally 
positive about their position and the development of their people in Sweden. 
When talking about their position, they compare themselves with other 
migrant populations who have settled in Sweden during the last forty years. 
The elite ascribe the ‘success’ of their people (in relation to other migrant 
groups) in Sweden to their hard work and their open and positive attitude 
towards Swedish society. The historical experience of the Assyrians/Syriacs 
as a minority group and the consequence that they have developed a 
collective way of life as a ‘community’ in which they have tried to help each 
other to survive is also believed to have eased their settlement process in 
Sweden.460 Overall, they assume that they do not cause too many upheavals 
in society and that they have ‘integrated well’. They use the term ‘integration’ 
in the sense of ‘adaptation’. Acculturation (the modification of one culture as 
the result of contact with another culture) is a dominant feature of the way 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden (and in other European countries) adapt to 
society.461 It comes close to their idea of what integration means to them and 
                                                 
459 The soccer player Kennedy Bakircioglu and the basketball player Nina Baresso were 
chosen as Ambassador’s of Södertälje; respectively in 1999 and in 2004. In 2003 Baresso 
played for the Solna Vikings which won the national championship in the Swedish Women 
Basketball League. 
460 In contrast to the Assyrians/Syriacs, other migrant groups which used to belong to the 
majority and dominant group in their homeland and which have gained the status of a 
minority in Sweden are therefore said to experience more difficulties in adjusting themselves 
to the new position of a minority group. This idea is also illustrated by the study of Woellert, 
Kröhnert and Klinghol (2009). The authors conclude that Turkish immigrants, who are the 
second biggest immigrant group in Germany, are least integrated, no matter how long they 
have been living in Germany. 
461 See further Cetrez (2005) about the acculturation process of Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden. 
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they prefer this path to assimilation which is perceived as a danger (of their 
disappearance as a distinct people). This idea implies that it is possible to 
retain a certain distinct identity and simultaneously to function well in 
Swedish society. The idea entertained by the activist and scholar Shushan 
that Assyrians/Syriacs want to be 100 per cent Assyrian/Syriac and 100 per 
cent Swedish approaches this way of thinking. Bringing up ‘adat (traditions), 
they believe that they have managed to live according to the values they find 
important in their own culture and that they have succeeded in combining 
them with the Swedish way of life. Often, representatives of Assyrian/Syriac 
institutions or concerned parents attempt to promote the idea of living by 
the best traditions of both the Swedish and Assyrian/Syriac culture, 
simultaneously distancing themselves from the negative characteristics of 
both cultures. They reify culture and rationalize their negotiations with this 
element of society, as if culture can be captured and managed to one’s own 
satisfaction. ‘Negotiating culture’ is approached as a rational process. This 
pragmatism says something about the ‘positive’ intention more than about to 
what extent they are successful in their intentions. Several elite members 
mentioned their active participation in the Swedish national holidays. During 
my fieldwork, I experienced this active participation on, for example, the 
celebration of Midsommar462 (Midsummer) and Santa Lucia.463 In some of the 
Syriac Orthodox churches, they have begun to organize the Santa Lucia 
processions, a clear influence from the local Christian tradition on Orthodox 
Christianity.464 Another example is the confirmation ritual at the age of 
twelve which is adopted from the Roman Catholic Church. 
 
5.3.3 The Swedish ‘Heaven’ 
Altogether, the achievements of the community and the liberal Swedish 
policy must unquestionably have led to the way in which Assyrians/Syriacs 
have come to conceptualize Sweden as ‘heaven’ (malkutho). This reference is 
made on the basis of their experiences both in the athro and in other 
European countries, especially in Germany. ‘Sweden as heaven’ is a concept 
                                                 
462 In 2005 it was the first time that Assyrians/Syriacs organized the city’s Midsommar in the 
churchyard of the Syriac Orthodox Church in Örebro. 
463 Santa Lucia is an Italian saint who is said to have brought food to the poor in Sweden 
during the Middle Ages. In Sweden they celebrate Santa Lucia on 13 December. 
464 Examples are the churches Mor Ephrem (Södertälje), Mor Petrus (Stockholm) and Mor 
Gewargis (Norsborg). 
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which reflects the positive aspects of Swedish society, stressing all the 
facilities provided, the freedom experienced and stability in particular. 
Despite experiencing some difficulties in the beginning, Assyrians/Syriacs 
have also expressed themselves in relatively positive terms about their 
reception in Sweden. They have developed respect for the country and 
generally express their gratitude. People conceptualize the ‘Swedish heaven’ 
at both an individual and a collective level. During the spontaneous after-
match party of the soccer game which brought Assyriska FF to the 
Allsvenskan (the Swedish Premiere League) in 2004, I saw an emotional fan 
(in his early forties) with tears of happiness in his eyes waving the flag of this 
soccer club with a small Swedish flag stitched in its corner. When I asked 
him about the latter, he explained that he wanted to express his feelings of 
gratitude to Sweden ‘for having taken us in and giving us these 
opportunities’. 
 Another example of this attitude of appreciation was voiced by the 
activist Aday. He compares his reception in Sweden with that in Austria, 
where his asylum application was rejected and concludes that the way he was 
received by the Swedish authorities has made an important influence on his 
attitude towards its society: 
The conditions in the ‘camps’ in which we were housed as refugees in 
Austria were terrible. I imagined that Hitler’s camps must have been 
similar... When I came to Sweden, I was accommodated in a hotel with my 
own room, TV and shower. I was thrown into confusion and assumed 
they [authorities] had made a mistake… I have a very positive attitude 
towards Sweden… I believe that Sweden is one of the countries in Europe 
which pursues a policy of showing respect to refugees. This has left me 
with a positive attitude towards Sweden. As you can see, I have the 
Swedish flag in my house. Usually I have an aversion to flags. When I was 
young I used to play with the idea of burning all the flags of the world one 
day. My sentiments about nationalism were very negative. But, I can 
accept, even like to have the Swedish flag in my house. I have respect for 
Sweden… 
Hammar (1985: 25) writes about the changes immigrants have encountered 
upon arrival in Sweden: 
Immigrants arrive in a society with a very explicitly expressed 
responsibility for the welfare of each individual. No longer are they 
expected to turn to family and friends for help when sick, aged, or in 
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trouble. Instead, they are encouraged to turn to a social agency which is 
administered by the state or the local community. 
For the elderly woman Maro, one aspect of this heaven has been that 
Swedish institutions take care of the elderly with all the facilities provided – 
the same as for any other Swedish citizen. She expresses her appreciation in 
terms of: ‘We are praying for the Swedish authorities – even our sons would 
not take care of us as much as they do. It is their country; they allowed us 
into this country – and therefore we should pray for them day and night.’ 
 
5.4 The Formation of New Identity Discourses in the 
New Country  
As I emphasized in the introduction to this chapter, emigration and 
settlement in the new country led to a transformation process in the identity 
concepts of Assyrians/Syriacs in Europe. From the very beginning, the new 
settlers were faced with the problem of positioning themselves in the new 
context; first in relation to the new ‘others’ and later, internally, in relation to 
each other’s new discursive identifications. In this section, I shall discuss the 
emergence of the need for a new identity discourse during the settlement 
process. 
 
5.4.1 Who Are You and Where Are You From? 
When they asked me: “Where do you come from?” I answered: “I am 
stateless.” …In the eyes of the Swedish government, I was a stateless 
person; that is how it classified me. I felt very happy I was able to make 
this classification and to tell them this. Under the Geneva Convention, 
one has the right to claim a stateless status. 
     University graduate Sallo, migrated from Lebanon in 1991 
 
Only few people make the idea of ‘being stateless’ explicit and formalize it in 
the way Sallo did. The first Assyrians/Syriacs who arrived from Lebanon in 
1967 were introduced into the Swedish society as ‘stateless Assyrians’, on the 
basis of the first letter in which the World Council of Churches presented 
them to the Swedish authorities (see Appendix 7). In Sweden, the singer 
Hanna Shabo (1976) sang about this aspect in the refrain of the song I 
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‘askariye du Swed (‘The Swedish Military Service’) – Mama latlan daule, gezzino lu 
Swed (‘Mother we do not have a country, I am going to Sweden’) – in answer 
to his mother’s reluctance to go to Sweden. The title of this song ‘Swedish 
Military Service,’ is a metaphorical reference to his new relationship with and 
loyalty to Sweden. The idea of being stateless is dominant among 
Assyrians/Syriacs and assumes a sense of distinct collective identity from 
other groups in the countries of emigration in the Middle East. They can be 
heard saying to each other ‘We do not have a country and therefore we are 
defenceless’ (Latlan daule u maukha twiroye na). Not having a country is used as 
an explanation for their historically weak political position in society. 
 The poem Vem är jag? 465 (Who am I?), composed by an anonymous 
Assyrier who wrote it while awaiting his asylum application in a refugee camp 
in Sweden in 1978, illustrates the impact of living with the feeling of being 
unrecognized and stateless, especially as an immigrant in a new country 
(Published in Hujådå, July 1978): 
I wake up in the morning and my voice is sobbing, my heart is crying out 
“Who am I?” And I am lost between imagination and the willingness of 
the pain and worries. 
I'm sad and I do not know what it means to be happy. 
I am thirsty for sunshine and tears of sorrow fall constantly and say: 
“Who am I? Who am I?” And Nineveh's466 voice is dead now, dead and 
stripped and burning and I continue to progress farther with my weak life 
in silence and my identity card displays: 
Name: Exhausted 
Citizenship: rogue 
Age: 4749 years467 
Address: Lost 
                                                 
465 My translation of the Swedish original Vem är jag? (Hujådå, July 1978); note that his 
command of Swedish was not very good. In the English translation, I have attempted to 
remain close to the Swedish original: 
Jag vaknar på morgonen och min röst snyftar, hjärtat skriker vem är jag? Och jag saknade mellan inbillning 
och viljan mellan värken och bekymret./ Jag är dyster och jag vet inte vad det betyder att vara glad./ Jag 
törstar efter solvärmen och hela tiden faller tårar av bedrövelse och sager:/ Vem är jag? Vem är jag? Och 
‘Ninives’ röst är död idag, död och berövad och brinnande och jag går med ett svagt liv i tystnaden och mitt 
personkort är följande:/Namnet: Medtagen / Medborgarskapet: Skälmen / Ålder: 4749 år / Address: 
Förlust / Kännetecken: en ansikte blick, två blinda ögon, ett svagt hjärta, två förlamade händer, en trasig 
kropp./ Jag sover, vaknar och min röst med förlust, gå inte! Kom inte dit! Viskar, ty talet är lögn och livet är 
förfalskat… 
466 Reference to Nineveh as the capital city of the Assyrian Empire (705-612 BC). 
467 The age is based on the Assyrian calendar. 
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Characteristics: a glance in a face, two blind eyes, a weak heart, two 
paralysed hands, a broken body. 
I sleep, wake up and with my lost voice: Do not go! Do not come here! 
Whispering, because speech is a lie and life is a forgery… 
The metaphors used in this poem exhibit the idea of a split subject. 
Simultaneously, the subject has not found its way to heal itself through the 
objectivity present in the status quo. Not being recognized and being 
stateless have blurred the clear definitions of ‘Who I am’. The first settlers 
faced similar problems in relation to their self-identification. They sometimes 
answered the same question ‘Who am I?’ by indicating only their ‘religion’ 
(which did not make any sense to Europeans), sometimes by emphasizing a 
national identity as Assyrians, and sometimes by mentioning the country 
from which they emigrated. As I have explained in the introduction to this 
book, the confrontation between the religiously based mindset of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs and the secularly based European equivalent made them 
aware that they had to redefine the identity in which they position 
themselves in the new societies in which they settled. This is how their 
migration eventually led to a change in their identification. In time, first 
among the elite and later among the ordinary people, their ethno-religious 
concept of identity was exchanged for an ethno-national concept.468 
 In Europe, national categories of people have often been based on 
politico-geographical boundaries.469 Because of the legitimacy of the category 
of ‘nation-states’ and the politics of labelling, some groups are accepted as a 
nation and others are not. Consequently the Assyrians/Syriacs have been 
tagged with the Western concept for defining national groups. From the 
beginning, they have not been recognized as a distinct national group and 
hence were registered according to their former nationality.470 One side 
                                                 
468 The change to an ethno-national idea of collective identity with their settlement in Sweden 
has already been concluded by the sociologist Deniz (1999). 
469 The fact that States in the Middle East have copied this model of nation-building is also 
expressed in the way the Assyrians/Syriacs are categorized as a religious group only, and 
defined by the different states as Christian Turks, Christian Arabs and, more recently, since 
the foundation of the autonomous region Kurdistan in northern Iraq, also as Christian Kurds. 
There too, the national politics seem to be heavily focused on and still are in the process of 
nation-building. The Assyrian/Syriac elites in the diaspora reject these categories and 
campaign against them in their writings. 
470 Theoretically this categorization according to nationality is also problematic because, even 
in Europe, it is used in several ways. Lewis (1994: 71) notes that there are differences in 
interpretation of the word ‘nationality’ between the different European countries. In the 
English and French languages, the words nationality or nationalité indicate the country of which 
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effect of this policy is that the Swedish authorities were not able to 
distinguish the Assyrians/Syriacs as a distinct group, nor were they 
identifiable in the national statistics.   
 Categorization according to nationality also had consequences for the 
daily life of the Assyrians/Syriacs in their interactions with the Swedish. 
Generally speaking, Swedes did not know much about the newly arrived 
Assyrians/Syriacs. In conflicts with this group, Swedish teenagers used 
curses like jävla Turk! (‘Damn you Turk!’) and Turk i burk smakar urk (‘A 
canned Turk tastes nasty’) – pejoratives they used indiscriminately for all 
people from the Middle East; ample evidence this group of Swedish people 
did not distinguish between the various migrant groups in Sweden. For the 
Assyrians/Syriacs, these kinds of expressions had a doubly negative 
connotation, because of their dis-identification with the category ‘Turk’. 
Among the younger generation, these experiences also played a role in 
sensing a greater need to position their group differently to the way in which 
the Swedish masses identified them. This ‘problem’ of classification was also 
experienced by the first Christians migrating from the Middle East to 
North471 and South America,472 and to Australia473 in the second half of the 
                                                                                                               
a person is a subject. In Germany the word nationalität has more of an ethnic than a legal 
character. The word Staatsangehörigkeit in German has a similar meaning to the English word 
nationality (Ibid.). The Swedish nationalitet is used with the same meaning as the English 
nationality (see further Eriksen 2004). 
471 Kayal (1975: 112) writes that they were often identified by the Americans as Turks or 
Arabs and treated accordingly. In a similar way to the situation in Europe, Kayal ascribes this 
to the fact that the immigration authorities did not differentiate between the different people 
coming from the Ottoman Empire. At all the ports to the United States, they were registered 
as ‘Turks’ and in South America as ‘Turcos’. However, in 1899 the ‘Syrians’ began to be 
classified differently among emigrants from the Ottoman Empire (Kayal 1975: 73; Naff 1992: 
142). The new classification was important to the Christians from the Ottoman Empire since, 
according to Kayal (1975: 75), they thought it a curse to be classified as ‘Turks’. See further 
Donabed (2003: 61-66) who shows documents in which Assyrians/Syriacs who emigrated 
from Kharput to America, often classified their ‘race’ as ‘Assyrian’ and their ‘former 
nationality’ as Turkish between 1870 and mid 1930s. Another change in the classification of 
the Lebanese Christians took place with the United States census of 2000, when it become 
possible to be classified as ‘Syriac’. The Maronites too were called on by the US Maronite 
Church Memorandum and by the American Maronite Union (AMU) to register as ‘Syriac’ 
(part of the category Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriac) instead of as Arab or Lebanese 
(http://amalid.com/articles/Maronites_are_Syriac_Not_Arab.htm). 
472 In Argentina too, prior to the 1920s, the Arabic-speaking people from the Middle East 
were classified differently: Turks, Arabs (1888-1897), Turks, Syrians (1898), Syrians (1899-
1909), Ottomans (1912-1914) (Bertoni 1981 in Klich 1992: 249). Lesser (1999: 49) mentions 
that both Brazilians and the group itself made a joke about the designation by which people 
from ‘Syria-Lebanon’ gradually became known in Brazil: ‘While newly arrived immigrants 
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nineteenth century (Kayal 1975: 73). Later in this section and farther on in 
this study, I shall show that the Assyrian/Syriac elites have challenged this 
classification by voicing their disagreement with its use and by offering an 
alternative. I shall also demonstrate that, in the process they initiated to 
redefine their collective identity, they copied the same Western concept of 
national identity to position themselves in secular European societies in 
order to be accepted as an ethnie or a nation (umtho), instead of ‘merely’ a 
religious group.  
 In addition to the discrepancy in relation to their identity, a common 
occurrence in all European countries has been that Assyrians/Syriacs are 
assumed to be or identified as Muslims, a misconception perhaps attributable 
to the common idea in Western countries that people in the Middle East are 
all adherents of Islam. Consequently, their church is referred to as mosque, 
their Bible as the Koran and their fast as Ramadan. Examples of such 
confrontations are discussed among Assyrians/Syriacs when they talk about 
the way the ‘autochthonous’ population in Europe approaches them. They 
express their astonishment about how, even after several corrections, 
individuals still do not understand that they are Christians and not Muslims. 
An elderly female respondent who visited her relatives in Sweden explained 
to me that for several years she had attended the Roman Catholic Church in 
Germany, since there was no Syriac Orthodox church in the neighbourhood. 
One day a German lady came up to her and asked her: ‘Are you reading the 
Koran?’ The Assyrian/Syriac woman was unpleasantly surprised by this 
question and answered her: ‘No, I am reading the Bible; why else would I 
come to your church?’ 
 Another reason prompting this sense of urgency to find an answer to 
their identity has been the confrontation with the two interrelated questions: 
‘Who are you? Where are you from?’ Any Assyrian/Syriac has been 
confronted with these questions upon settlement in Europe. 
Assyrians/Syriacs for their part have used the answers to these questions as 
an opportunity to focus on what they have found important in the collective 
                                                                                                               
were ‘Turcos’, a first steady job transformed them into ‘Syrians’, and shop or factory 
ownership remade them into ‘Lebanese’. 
473 Batrouney (1992: 417) too mentions that the early Lebanese immigrants to Australia were 
classified as ‘Turks’, because of the ‘Turkish’ documents with which they travelled to 
Australia. After Lebanon became semi-autonomous in 1926, people migrating out of Lebanon 
travelled with Lebanese passports. Only in 1954 did the Australian census officials made a 
distinction between Syrian and Lebanese migrants. 
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identity of their people when presenting themselves to the Swedish. 
Therefore this answer was not settled after the first asylum procedure they 
went through. Any Swedish person they encountered for the first time could 
potentially ask them these questions. Experiencing this as a daily reality – an 
answer became imperative. At a personal level, these questions made 
Assyrians/Syriacs conscious of the former designations and the categories 
they used when defining themselves. The student Matay explains how he 
dealt with these questions at the age of fourteen at the beginning of the 
1980s: 
They asked me, for example, “Where are you from?” For me, it was very 
important to say that we are not Turks when telling them that we are from 
Turkey. When I said that I am not a ‘Turk’, it meant not being ‘Muslim’. 
To me, being a ‘Turk’ was synonymous with being ‘Muslim.’ I thought it 
was important to explain to them that I was different from the other 
people whom they called Turks; with such names as Osman and 
Mohammed... for me personally; Christianity is like a culture which we 
live. Christianity is not just a matter of theology; it is much more than 
that… 
Matay’s answer in the citation is not unique to him, but is indeed a common 
answer among his people. Matay begins by answering what he is not: he 
comes from Turkey but he is not a Turk. This shows that it is paramount to 
him first to state that which he dis-identifies with. It also assumes that he had 
experienced the situation in which outsiders have assumed he was a Turk 
when he told them that he migrated from the geographical entity which is 
present-day Turkey. In his answer he set the boundaries for what he sees as 
the main constitutive outside. As indicated before, usually Assyrians/Syriacs 
state that they do not identify in the first place with the national identity of 
the country from which they migrated. From their point of view, to be from 
Iraq, Syria, Turkey or Lebanon does not make them either Arab or 
Turkish.474 
 Internally, the question, which followed ‘What are you then?’ was harder 
                                                 
474 Especially Assyrians/Syriacs from Lebanon, but also those from Iraq, did not distance 
themselves from respectively Lebanese or Iraqi national identity. At the same time, they did 
want to express their Assyrian/Syriac background in relation to not being Arabs. Nevertheless, 
in some cases, Assyrians/Syriacs from urbanized areas in Iraq have often been Arabized to 
such an extent that they do identify as Arabs; basing their identity to a great extent on their (in 
some cases) new mother tongue Arabic and the adopted culture which they define as Arab. In 
such cases, their distinct ‘identity’ from other ‘Arabs’ has been reduced to a religious aspect. 
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to answer. Given the fact that Europeans use a different concept of 
collective identity to that of Assyrians/Syriacs, it can be said that the 
question ‘What are you then?’ generated the need, and with that the space, to 
redefine the collective identity of the Assyrians/Syriacs, both linguistically 
and conceptually. Moreover, it is a question, to which any Assyrian/Syriac 
can relate (as mentioned before). In the Middle East, only some of the 
educated elite had embraced a secularly based national identity (see further 
Chapter 6). Now in Europe, this quandary has reached the ordinary people 
because it has become a ‘practical need’ and because it has become possible 
to express this need in the ‘proper’ terms. This is how internally, the question 
‘What are you?’ has played a central role in the internal dynamics among 
Assyrians/Syriacs. It is an issue developing from the debate about the ‘right 
name’ of the people (but also the other way around). Although this question 
is directed to an individual, the answer is expected to be related to a 
collective group. The categorized dimension of a collective group is that it 
bears a history and that it connects the present to the past of the collective. 
The myth about the past functions as a legitimacy for the present of the 
collective. 
 
5.4.2 Meeting the New ‘Others’ 
In Chapter 4, I discussed how Assyrians/Syriacs who came to Europe 
thought that they were going to settle in Christian societies and hence – 
expected implicitly – that they would encounter a similar religiously based 
society as in the Middle East.475 This time they assumed they would be part 
of the majority. They arrived in Sweden with a ‘clear’ idea about what it 
means for them to be Christian and brought a whole set of highly developed 
cultural aspects related to how they practised their Christianity in the 
homeland with them to Sweden. Historically, the collective identity of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs has been formed in relation to Islam, because the 
followers of this religion were the dominant group which formed the ‘others’ 
for many centuries. Characteristic of any identity is that it is relational; it is 
expressed in relation to the ‘others’. People say what they are above all in 
order to show what they are not. 
 After their settlement in Europe, it was of paramount importance to 
Assyrians/Syriacs to explain to Europeans that they were Christians and 
                                                 
475 This assumption has also been pointed out by Deniz (1999). 
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certainly not Muslims. However, in embarking on this process of 
communicating ‘their identity’ to the ‘Christian others’ in Europe, the masses 
of the Assyrians/Syriacs were not yet conscious that identities in Western 
countries were not formally defined along religious lines, but along national 
secular boundaries. Or, as is the basic idea in secularism, the norm is not to 
distinguish between religions in particular, because religion has become a 
private matter. Assyrians/Syriacs have learned this idea only with time. 
 Initially the older generation among them did not understand the 
concept of secularism and therefore failed to comprehend that secularism 
and Christianity could co-exist. They referred to the Swedes as atheists in 
situations in which they became disappointed that the Swedish did not 
distinguish between religious groups (or implicitly favoured Christians). The 
idea that Swedes are atheists was a strong reaction to their thwarted 
expectations of settling in a Christian country. Older generation 
Assyrians/Syriacs especially have continued to position and reflect on 
themselves in relation to the Muslims. The reaction of the elderly 
Assyrian/Syriac woman, Maro, to her son’s476 explanation that the Swedish 
news reporter on TV announced that ‘Gays have been allowed to get 
married in Sweden,’ exemplifies this mindset: ‘So, now Muslims will be able 
to laugh up their sleeves at us!’ (Anaqa tro tawo a Taye guhkhi a‘lan!). Implicitly, 
Hulto477 Maro shows that she does not approve of gays getting married, but 
what bothers her even more is that Muslims will have more opportunity to 
mock ‘us,’ Christians. From her perspective, it is like washing one's 
(Christian’s) dirty linen in public. In a conversation with Hulto Maro, she says 
in an astonished tone – still not understanding the Swedish approach – but 
apparently passively accepting it: ‘This is how it goes here’, elaborating on 
the difference between her approach and that of the Swedish: 
There are no Taye [Muslims] and Suroye478 here [Sweden]! When we tell 
them that the Muslims do not like us, they [Swedes] ask us why we 
distinguish between Muslims and Christians. They do not want to make 
this distinction. But the Muslims and we are miles apart from each other! 
They [Swedes] say: “If a girl wants to marry a Muslim then she can…” 
                                                 
476 Her son was one of my respondents and informed me about his communication with his 
mother. 
477 Hulto means ‘aunt’ (mother’s side). It is used as a courteous form of address when speaking 
to an older woman or when referring to her. 
478 Suroye is here used with the meaning of ‘Christians’ or ethno-religiously, as was common in 
Tur ‘Abdin. 
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By her first sentence ‘There are no Muslims and Christians here’, she means 
to say that no distinction has been made between ‘Muslims’ and ‘Christians’. 
Hulto Maro implies she was not reconciled to this essential aspect of 
secularism in Swedish society. In the quotation, she explains why. In 
reflections made by the older generation Assyrians/Syriacs, the remark is 
often made: ‘Ma lo kud‘i men semme eban?’ (‘Don’t they know what they 
[Muslims] did to us [Christians]?’) Or, the comment: ‘Gedgauri a bnothaydan u 
gsaymi a dkothani kulle Tayutho’ (‘They will marry our daughters and convert all 
these places [Europe] to Islam’). The implicit idea is that Assyrians/Syriacs 
(as Christians) perceive themselves as part of the ‘Christian countries’ and 
fear the intentional Islamization of these countries. Their fear is focused on 
the collective instead of the individual marrying a Muslim; marriage is 
transformed from a personal into a collective act and with that it becomes a 
dislocatory moment. Hence, assuming the same process which took place in 
the Middle East where Christianity was once the dominant religion.  
 The religiously based society as an integral part of a person’s luggage in 
their mindset has also influenced their settlement in Sweden. The high 
number of Assyrians/Syriacs in Södertälje has made it possible for them to 
exert influence on some socio-political issues in the city. An example is that 
Assyrians/Syriacs have tried to prevent Muslim migrants from settling in the 
city. The children of those Muslim families who lived in Södertälje were 
teased by Assyrian/Syriac children to such an extent the Muslim families 
decided to leave the city and settle somewhere else. Nahir, a local 
Assyrian/Syriac politician, says that he tried to explain this problem to his 
Swedish colleagues working for the municipality when he advised them not 
to settle Muslim families in neighbourhoods where many Suryoye live: 
We came from countries where they [Muslims] were in the majority and 
greatly oppressed us. We still carry this with us in our hearts. My Swedish 
colleagues thought that I was a racist when I gave this explanation. I told 
them that in giving them this explanation, racism was far from my mind. I 
wanted to make it clear that it was because we have internalized a dislike 
for Muslims as a consequence of what we had experienced from them in 
the athro. 
Gradually, Assyrians/Syriacs have learned that the Swedes do not perceive 
them as part of one collective group of Christians and that the Swedish 
Christians live their Christianity differently from the way they do. Moreover, 
the intensified contact between them has made Assyrians/Syriacs palpably 
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aware of the differences between the two groups. It was for the first time 
that they were confronted en masse with another form of Christianity which 
was lived differently from theirs. Interacting with the Swedes, they have 
gradually understood that being Swedish does not necessarily mean being 
Christian. Moreover, they have realized that being Christian does not mean 
following the same Christianity or traditions as that of the Assyrians/Syriacs. 
In the first years of settlement, Assyrian/Syriac children noticed that the 
Swedish children did not fast, that Swedish education taught the theory of 
evolution and that many Swedes did not relate Easter and Christmas to 
Christianity. These experiences were thought to be too different from their 
own and therefore ‘less Christian’. 
 In time, the same older generation have begun to place the importance 
of ‘their Christianity’ in relation to broader social life into perspective. They 
make remarks like: ‘…Nevertheless, they [Swedish] are better than we are.’ 
This can be better understood as a criticism of the (assumed changed) moral 
values among Assyrians/Syriacs in Swedish society. When judging certain 
practices among their people, they pose the question: ‘What meaning does 
our Christianity have if we behave this way?’ Aspects such as gossiping, 
criminality and fraud committed by community members are considered evil 
acts and judged negatively from that perspective – assuming their absence 
among the Swedes (an indication that they do not know the society well yet). 
 Besides the Christian religious context in which Assyrians/Syriacs 
developed their norms and values, so far one of their most important 
distinguishing characteristics has been that they still retain some traits of 
what was overwhelmingly a rural society with the closed character of a 
minority community in the Middle East (see further Chapter 3). Against this 
background, it is understandable that the aspect of social control has played 
an important role in such normative mechanisms as ‘shame’ and ‘sin.’ 
Traditionally, people have judged each other according to these two norms 
(among others). ‘Shame’ is a secular moral concept, whereas ‘sin’ is a 
religious concept. Ideas about what is ‘good’ and what is ‘bad’ – have been 
maintained through social and religious rules. From this perspective, 
experiencing some Swedish norms and values which were incomprehensible 
and unacceptable from their perspective, some older generation 
Assyrians/Syriacs judged the Swedish people saying censoriously: ‘They 
know neither shame nor sin’ (lo kud‘i lo ‘aybo u lo htitho). They did not 
understand the extent of freedom in social norms and the free Christian 
moral in Swedish society (compared to their own Christian moral). They 
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developed their prejudices asserting Swedes have too free a sexual morality 
(referred to by the term falite), assumed that this often results (among other 
things) in divorces, something which does not fit in with their system of 
norms and values.  
 Another example taken from their first experiences in Sweden illustrates 
how the norms among Assyrians/Syriacs have changed over time. Martha (at 
that time a young girl) reflected on her first summer in Sweden: ‘I found the 
Swedish people very strange at first. Whenever there was some sunshine they 
would lie down in their swimsuits, which we found strange; we asked 
ourselves why do these people lie down ‘nude’?!’ In other words, in their 
eyes, to see someone sunbathing in a swimming suit was tantamount to 
seeing someone nude. From their perspective, it could be perceived as a 
shameful act and as a sin, since they came from a society where they had 
been taught that the body should be covered from both a religious and a 
social perspective. Nevertheless, with time they have come to an 
understanding that (as they express it themselves): ‘Whether we want it or 
not, this is how life is here; we shall have to accept it’ (Eb‘ina u leb‘ina, a haye 
d-harke haukhane; glozem maqeblinane). It is an attitude of relinquishing and of 
accepting the way of life in the society. Not necessarily because they had 
consciously chosen to do so, but more because of the overwhelming 
strength and influential power of the surrounding society, which they can no 
longer resist. Consequently, despite their negative judgement of, for example, 
sunbathing when they settled, today it has become part of the 
‘Assyrian/Syriac way of life.’ Even elderly Assyrian/Syriac women have 
begun to go to the beach in their swimming costumes. 
 In contrast to the older first generation, the younger generations have 
been more receptive to the internalization of new norms and values in their 
‘Assyrian/Syriac way of life’ (Suryoyutho). Their conception of an 
‘Assyrian/Syriac way of life’ has developed in a Swedish context and is 
concentrated on a future in Europe. It has developed a dynamism born of 
the relatively intensive and active participation in Swedish society. This goes 
a long way towards explaining why they are less conservative and more 
receptive to newly encountered values. When referring to a ‘Swedish society’, 
I do not necessarily mean the interactions with the Swedish people. Instead, 
I refer to the Swedish context in which Assyrians/Syriacs are open to 
influences which are part and parcel of Swedish society. Often, the Swedish 
standards have become the new standards for the younger Assyrian/Syriac 
generations. They may also offer a clue to the differences which have 
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developed among the same generation of Assyrians/Syriacs living in other 
European countries. When Assyrians/Syriacs watch programmes on Suroyo 
TV and Suryoyo Sat, they often comment on the people they are watching, 
paying explicit attention to their attitudes and the fashions they affect. They 
claim to recognize in which country they live, simply from their appearance. 
 
5.5 Diaspora: The Hostages’ and Orphans’ Dilemma 
The mass settlement of Assyrians/Syriacs in Europe – allied with the 
consciousness that ‘the athro has become empty’ of Assyrians/Syriacs – has 
developed new reflections among them about the role of the athro in their 
life. The Syriac verb yitheb means ‘to settle’ (somewhere) (Audo: [1897] 1985). 
The term for foreigner, guest or settler is tawtobo and is derived from this 
verb. The mass settlement in Europe has turned them into ‘foreigners’; both 
from their own perspective, and from the perspective of the receiving 
societies. Especially in the beginning, they referred to the new areas of 
settlement as i nukhrayto (foreign lands). From their perspective, the new 
countries of settlement were ‘foreign’ to them since they identified their 
roots as being somewhere else: in the athro of their ancestors. This reflection 
indicates that they were very conscious of this geographical change and that 
it mattered to them. 
 Their mass settlement in Europe had three main consequences. First 
and foremost, they migrated from countries in the Middle East where they 
now reflect on their former position as being that of yasire (hostages). 
Undoubtedly, emigration has freed them from that position. Nevertheless, 
emigration has disconnected them from their athro; they have become 
uprooted from their homeland. It is from this perspective that they have 
begun to refer to themselves as having become yatume (orphans): ‘We have 
become dispersed in the world as orphans; indeed, we are orphans, what else 
are we? We do not have a country and we are foreigners everywhere’ 
(Mbarbezina khda yatume be britho; yatumena ma menna. Latlan athro u bkul duktho 
nukhroyena). 
 The third consequence is that their mass emigration has resulted in a 
great dispersion; even at family level. The close community ties between 
them have made them very much aware of this aspect. Among the older 
generation I heard the expression: ‘Khda yatume mbarbezina be britho; Khed lappe 
d-hemse d-bayzatla bi arho u kul habtho dezza l-khasra’ (‘Like orphans who have 
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been dispersed through the world; like a handful of peas which you throw on 
the soil, each of them rolling in a different direction’). Underlying this is the 
idea that the dispersion of the Assyrians/Syriacs all over the world has been 
caused by an uncommon occurrence, an event which should not have 
happened: peas (hemse) should remain together in the ‘hand’ (lappe) and are to 
be eaten and not to be thrown on the ground. Because the peas were not 
treated properly, an uncommon fate befell them. By analogy, the migration 
took place in a way which led to their worldwide dispersion; this has been so 
overwhelmingly significant that they feel yatume be britho (orphans in the 
world). They are no longer the close collective they used to be like a ‘handful 
of peas’ (lappe d-hemse). The aspect of dispersion is also expressed in terms of 
tayihina be britho (we fled and have become lost in the world). Tayihina is 
derived from the verb tyoho (to flee, to be expelled) in Suryoyo.479 Tyoho implies 
that its cause lies in a force outside the control of the person who flees – just 
like peas which are thrown on the ground and each of them disappears in a 
different direction – culminating in the mass dispersion of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs. It is also a reference to the emigration which occurred 
without planning or control; as if an external force sent them into ‘the four 
corners of the world’.  
 At this juncture, both the act of emigration and the act of settlement ‘in 
foreign countries’ (bi nukhrayto) are described by the same term golutho. The 
Syriac term golutho is derived from the verb glo480(to be taken captive) in 
Syriac (Audo [1897] 1985: 140). The term ethgalwi means ‘brought’ or ‘sent 
into exile’ (Ibid.). Both the terms galwoyo and goluyo mean ‘the one who is 
taken into captivity.’ In daily life, Assyrians/Syriacs use the latter term (goluyo) 
when speaking about a refugee. Although the traditional use of golutho means 
‘place of captivity’, in the modern use this idea of being captive in the golutho 
(diaspora) is absent. Instead, the modern idea of golutho (diaspora) implies a 
much greater dispersion of the people and a rupture with the athro, and 
therefore a state of being in (collective) exile. The use of the term golutho 
therefore expresses the implied strong connection to the athro and the strong 
sense of belonging of Assyrians/Syriacs as a collective. Moreover, it stresses 
that the current state of dispersion is not ‘normal.’ Nevertheless, the extent 
                                                 
479 When a woman in Tur ‘Abdin had a conflict with her husband, she would tell him angrily: 
‘Gtayhono minukh b-britho!’ (I will flee from you and disappear into the world!). 
480 In the Old Testament, these are the Syriac terms used to refer to the captivity of the Jews 
in Babylon. The definition that Audo ([1897]1985: 539) gives of the term glo is ‘when a power 
or people take another people into captivity and make them hostage’ (yasire). 
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of dispersion has not stopped the people from keeping in touch. They travel 
to attend baptisms, weddings and funerals – symbolic events in which they 
show their connection. Intermarriages between people from different 
continents help the maintenance of this contact.  
     
 
Illustration 8: The hostages and orphans dilemma is expressed in this drawing by the 
autodidact artist Sharro Malke. Photo: Naures Atto. 
In the first part of this chapter, I have shown that Assyrians/Syriacs have 
become aware that the future athro is going to be in Europe. Therefore the 
diaspora has become the main orientation in their lives. Becoming aware of 
this reality is accompanied by a strong sense of the eternal rupture with their 
historical athro. This culminates in the sense that they have become yatume 
(orphans). It develops into one side of what I call the Hostages’ and 
Orphans’ Dilemma (yasire u yatume). The other side of this dilemma is that 
they view their position in the athro as that of yasire (hostages). The main 
question in this dilemma becomes what situation should be favoured or what 
discursive track should be followed: to continue to live as ‘hostages’ in the 
athro or as ‘orphans’ in the diaspora? After experiencing this dilemma, 
Assyrians/Syriacs began to make up the balance for their ‘amo. Depending 
on their orientations, the elite have developed different approaches in 
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dealing with it.481 This dilemma has also been discussed in terms of fayda u 
khsara (gains and losses). In relation to the latter, the dispersion to the ‘four 
corners of the world’ is perceived as the first step towards extinction. Many 
Assyrian/Syriac elite members have referred to their situation in the Western 
diaspora as one in which assimilation lurks, saying: ‘Europe is a deep sea in 
which you get drowned, whether you want it or not’ (Aurupa yamo raboyo u 
gmehnoqat ebe; eb‘at u leb‘at). Realizing their relatively small, dispersed numbers, 
they refer to themselves as the little boat which could and which will sink in 
the future in this big sea which is Europe (sfitho na‘imto b-yamo rabo). The 
autodidact artist Sharro Malke in Gütersloh has expressed this in one of his 
paintings: fleeing from the dangers in the Middle East; ending by sinking into 
the deep European sea. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed the settlement process of Assyrians/Syriacs 
in Sweden. I have argued that the group has perceived Sweden as the ‘last 
stop’ in their exodus from the homeland. Consequently, Sweden has become 
the Assyrians/Syriacs’ new ‘home’; a shelter from their lesser-known 
persecution in their historical habitat. Therefore, in the process of their 
settlement, they have oriented themselves as permanent ‘settlers’. 
 To conclude, I want to emphasize three main points in relation to their 
settlement. Firstly, it has shown that Assyrians/Syriacs who have lived for 
hundreds of years in a subordinated position in their homeland have 
succeeded in establishing themselves relatively fast in an environment which 
is in many respects different from that in their homeland. The way they 
established themselves can be seen as the result of an interaction process 
between the discourses of the receivers and those of the new settlers.  
Swedish governmental discourses about the integration of immigrants in 
society have developed space for the new settlers: equality, partnership and 
freedom of choice. Assyrians/Syriacs’ strong desire to settle permanently in the 
new country and the will with which they have managed to build a new 
home has been very important in the achievements which the group has 
realized. 
                                                 
481 I shall devote a future article to the further handling of this dilemma. 
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 The second point is related to the discrepancy between the way in which 
the local authorities have portrayed the relatively dense presence of 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Södertälje and the achievements of this group in 
Sweden. I have illustrated that their ethnic enclave, New Midyad, in Södertälje 
has had a positive influence on their development as a group of people. This 
does not mean that there are no problems which remain challenges to be 
solved. What I consider to be more important is that they have managed to 
build up a community life with the resources provided by the Swedish 
authorities. This is characterized by the increase in their ‘capital’ in different 
fields of society (economically, educationally, politically and socially). This 
strong foundation will be of the utmost importance in the long term. I 
consider problems which can be detected within the group to be common to 
society and to be solved by the institutions in charge. 
 The last point concerns the impact of the dislocation and the settlement 
process on their identity discourses. As indicated, in this study emigration 
and settlement in the new country are defined in terms of dislocation. This has 
caused the need for a redefinition of the collective identity of their people, 
both conceptually and through the representation of a name. In order to 
understand this process of negotiating their identity in the discursive field in 
more depth, I shall devote the next chapter to the emergence of the 
discourses of umthonoyutho from a historical perspective. 
 
 
6 DISCOURSES OF UMTHONOYUTHO 
 
In the chapters about the emigration and settlement in the European 
context, I pointed out that these processes have caused many changes for 
Assyrians/Syriacs in the socio-political and economic fields. As a 
consequence of the high number of people emigrating from the homeland 
(about 300,000 live today in Europe), Assyrians/Syriacs have begun to 
perceive themselves as a diaspora community. This sense of being scattered 
grew into the idea of having become a ‘dispersed people’ (‘amo mbarbezo), 
approaching the concept of a ‘dispersed nation’ (umtho mbarbazto) who have 
become disconnected from the geographical homeland. In the previous 
chapter, in a broader context I discussed why and how Assyrians/Syriacs 
perceive this aspect of dispersion as something negative. 
 The dispersion of their people has obliged Assyrians/Syriacs to 
reformulate their survival strategies in the new socio-political context of the 
diaspora. Assyrian/Syriac activists have introduced new discursive strategies 
and mechanisms to promote the recognition and survival of their people. 
The activism resulting from the myth for survival can be understood in terms 
of the healing of this split subject. Activists stress and sustain the strong sense 
of collective belonging among Assyrians/Syriacs. In this context, the newly 
developed concept of the ‘Assyrian/Syriac nation’ (Umtho Suryoyto) has 
assumed the function of a basis for a new appeal: to be recognized nationally 
and internationally as a people and to be entitled to national rights in order 
to survive among other nations (emwotho). Different Assyrian/Syriac groups 
have begun to lobby national governments and international organizations to 
take the Assyrians/Syriacs into consideration in their policies. ‘National 
rights’ assume often cultural, linguistic and religious rights. In a few cases, 
depending on the context, this may also include the right for autonomy.482 
 In this chapter, I shall go one step farther in an attempt to understand 
the discourses of umthonoyutho from a historical comparative perspective. 
Progressive ideas about the ‘unity’ and ‘survival’ of Assyrians/Syriacs are not 
                                                 
482 See for instance the request of Archbishop Ephrem Barsaum at the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919 (Chapter 2) and the recent discussions about the need for autonomy in 
Iraq after the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003. 
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new. An examination of their origins and their development will help to 
comprehend the discursive practices in relation to the ‘identity question’ of 
Assyrians/Syriacs in the European diaspora. It is therefore important to look 
into early umthonoyutho (from the beginning of the twentieth century) and its 
relationship with the present-day discourses of umthonoyutho. I shall illustrate 
that there is both continuity and change in the discourses of umthonoyutho in 
the last century. In the following, I shall begin by conceptualizing the logic of 
umthonoyutho. Thereafter I shall proceed to look at the emergence and 
development of these umthonoyutho discourses from a historical perspective 
by touching on the ideas of early umthonoyutho put forward by such people as 
Naum Faik, Ashur Yausef, and others. I continue by discussing the 
emergence of the Assyrian Democratic Organization (ADO, Mtakasto 
Demoqratoyto Othuroyto) in the discursive field in Syria. In the last section, I 
deal with the hegemonic articulation of these discourses after emigration, 
particularly in Sweden. 
 
6.1 The Logic of Umthonoyutho 
Inherent to the logic of umthonoyutho has been the process of the rethinking of 
traditional concepts caused by such processes of modernization as 
secularization and democratization among Assyrians/Syriacs. Usually, the 
Suryoyo term umthonoyutho has been translated by the English term 
‘nationalism’. Perhaps this is because at the present time, umtho (the noun 
from which umthonoyutho is derived) is commonly translated as ‘nation’. 
Historically, the word umtho has been used since at least as early as in the 
twelfth century.483 Nevertheless, it is not clear what precise meaning 
Assyrian/Syriac authors throughout history have given to the term umtho. 
What is more important to this study is the use and meaning of umtho in the 
present-day context, which is close to the modern concept of nation.484 The 
two Archbishops Behnan of Mosul and Archbishop Matay of Mor Matay in 
                                                 
483 See further for the use of umtho in the twelfth century, Debié (2009). See also Kiraz (2005), 
who refers to the use of umtho in a colophon of a Phanqitho manuscript, scribed by patriarch 
Nuh the Lebanese in 1504. 
484 The reference to umtho is the result of self-ascription. In most cases, for outsiders 
Assyrians/Syriacs have remained a religious group; they have not been recognized in terms of 
a ‘nation’. The closest they approach this definition is the reference to them as an ethnic 
group.  In discourse theoretical terms, an ethnic group results from the objectivation of nodal 
points. See for two definitions of an ethnic group from two other approaches, Smith (1986: 21-
31) and Eriksen (1993: 12, 34).  
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Mosul approved the consecration of Patriarch Jacob II, saying ‘May the Lord 
make him a blessing for the umtho (Dolabani 1929 in Kiraz 2005: 4).  
Another example which illustrates the use of the term umtho in the 19th 
century is a letterhead (1 January 1875) of Patriarch Ignatius Peter III: ‘… 
Ignatius Patriarch of the Apostolic See of Antioch, who is Peter III, over the 
umtho d-Suryoye’ (Kiraz 2005: 3). During his stay in Tur ‘Abdin at the end of 
the nineteenth century, Oswald Parry ([1895] 2001: 345) observed and 
recorded, ‘The Syrian people – or nation – as they love to call themselves...’  
This statement leads to the surmise that he had communicated with the elite 
members of this group and made this observation in that context. 
Apparently, these ‘Syrian people’ (as Parry refers to them) communicated 
their sense of being a ‘nation’ very explicitly.485  
 Although I do translate umtho by ‘nation’, ‘ethnie’ or ‘people’, I find it 
problematic to translate umthonoyutho literally as ‘nationalism’ because this 
fails to capture the force of what umthonoyutho means among 
Assyrians/Syriacs in the contemporary context. Therefore I have attempted 
to arrive at a new definition of umthonoyutho and by doing so I aim to reach a 
broader understanding of this concept in order to be able to use it as an emic 
term in the rest of the thesis. My purpose in doing so is to grasp its meaning 
when Assyrians/Syriacs use it in everyday life or in the discursive field. 
Therefore, I have specifically asked my respondents what they mean by an 
umthonoyo (someone who follows the principles of umthonoyutho).486 On the 
basis of their answers, I have concluded that umthonoyutho means ‘to sense 
and express love (hubo) for the Assyrian/Syriac people and to dedicate one’s 
life to their care in a broad sense (language, culture, history, homeland and 
church)’. This presumes an ethno-national awareness because the focus is 
assumed to cut across denominations and, more specifically, to heal the 
‘people’ after a long period of dislocation as a consequence of having been 
organized into different church communities. The highly educated 
professional and activist Aho touches on this in his reference to the secular 
aspect of umthonoyutho: 
                                                 
485 A question that should be asked here is what term they used in the language of 
communication with Parry. If they communicated in Ottoman Turkish they may have used 
millet, which would mean a religiously based nation. But assuming that Parry was well known 
with this category one may expect that he would not have been surprised by this usage. 
Therefore they perhaps used a different term. 
486 The term umthonoyo (or its plural: umthonoye) is used more frequently than umthonoyutho. 
Therefore I expected it to be easier for them to define it. 
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If people are umthonoye, religion is set to one side. But, if religion is a very 
strong element, the umtho is far less important. For example, if you tell a 
religious Suryoyo person about the umtho, they say: “Oh, the most 
important thing is that Jesus saves us.” For my part as an umthonoyo, 
religion is less important. 
Generally, individuals who perceive themselves as umthonoye expect every 
Assyrian/Syriac to become an umthonoyo and to contribute to the betterment 
of the situation of their people, on the assumption that they have been 
‘wounded’ in some way or other, as one of my respondents said: 
When we come together, we should heal each other’s wounds [mdarmenina 
u kewo dehdode], we should help one another. Then our whole society, all 
our people will benefit. 
Several elite members explicitly said that umthonoyutho does not imply that a 
dislike should be taken to other people (nowadays often implied in the use of 
‘nationalism’). Some declared that they are not umthonoye themselves 
(meaning not actively involved in activism), but that they can understand and 
accept umthonoyutho among Assyrians/Syriacs. Abrohom, who is a very 
engaged activist in a broader leftist movement in Sweden, says:  
I am not an umthonoyo. But it is normal for a group of oppressed people to 
be umthonoye. However, if a very powerful country is umthonoyto, I regard 
this as a negative fact. But if weak people are umthonoye – they are 
oppressed anyway – in order that their own respect and their own 
psychological state are boosted, it is good to become umthonoye. 
Abrohom’s citation indicates that umthonoyutho has developed the meaning of 
the struggle for the rights and survival of Assyrians/Syriacs and consequently 
umthonoyutho is articulated in terms of a leftist discourse. In the 1970s, for 
example, it was a matter of course to see this leftist discourse expressed in 
the rhetorical discursive practices of the Assyriska Movement in Sweden. 
This was emphatically stated with the first publication of the magazine 
Hujådå on 1 May 1978; an event in which Assyrier activists seemed to 
consider that it was important to participate. In that same year, about 800 
Assyrier participated in the 1 May demonstration in Stockholm. They carried 
such slogans as:487 ‘Support the rights of Assyrians in the Middle East’, 
‘Assyrians need political asylum’ and ‘Assyrians show solidarity with all 
                                                 
487 My translation of the original in Swedish. 
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oppressed people of the world.’ On that day in 1979, the activist Gabriel 
Afram said in his speech (Hujådå, June 1979):488 
The Assyrian Worker cannot be excluded from the International Workers’ 
Movement. The Assyriska Workers’ Movement will never accept being 
rubber-stamped as nothing more than a religious minority; neither in 
Sweden nor in any other country; instead we shall struggle side-by-side 
with the Swedish and the International Workers’ Movement. 
This type of umthonoyutho approaches the definition of ‘patriotism’ (from the 
Greek patris), that is as ‘love for and/or devotion to one's country’.489 Among 
the ancient Greeks, patriotism consisted of ideas derived from language, 
religious traditions, ethics, law and devotion to the common good, rather 
than any pure identification with a nation-state (Laqueur 1997: 90). Similarly, 
the aspect of ‘individual responsibility’ to the common good (of the 
Assyrian/Syriac people) is central to the concept of umthonoyutho. As I shall 
illustrate, umthonoyutho has not always been explicitly communicated. Instead 
it can be understood to imply a certain attitude of devotion to the common 
good of the people. This is the reason why people are referred to after their 
death as having been strong umthonoye – in a reflection of what they did for 
the people in life. An example of an activist who has been seen as the 
ultimate umthonoyo is Dr Melek Besara. 490 After his death his friends 
published the book entitled Dr Melek: a life dedicated to the people. Umthonoyutho 
has developed a broader meaning which is not limited to the political sphere, 
as Hanuno illustrates in his example, it had incorporated activism: 
We began to see anything we did as fulhono [activism]. There were two 
friends who fell in love with each other, but neither set of parents would 
give their consent and raised objections to the marriage. We helped them 
                                                 
488 My translation of the original in Swedish. 
489 See for further reading about Patriotism Bar-Tal and Staub (1999). And for a philosophical 
discussion of patriotism, MacIntyre (1995). 
490 At that time Dr Melek’s family name was still the Turkish name ‘Kavakçioglu’, resulting 
from Turkish assimilationist politics and the imposition of Turkish names on all people living 
within Turkey’s territories. A few years ago, the family changed it to their traditional family 
name ‘Besara’. Dr Melek was born in Midyad, Tur ‘Abdin. He studied Medicine in Istanbul and 
as ADO member he became active in the local Assyrian/Syriac association MED Kültür 
Derneği. He continued his activism in Sweden where he died as the result of an illness in 1996. 
His friends and family founded the ‘Dr Melek Homeland Fund’ to commemorate his 
dedication to his people. The fund helps financially projects in the homeland. 
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to elope to Father Bedros491 who blessed their marriage. We wanted to 
demolish the old ideas and rules pertaining to getting married. Father 
Bedros said: “If they love each other, I shall bless their marriage.”  
In the light of the discussion above, umthonoyutho can be seen as a nodal point 
composed of all the ideas and activities directed towards the development 
and strengthening of the ‘amo Suryoyo.492 Bearing this use in mind, when I 
write about nationalism among Assyrians/Syriacs in this study, I shall use the 
English term ‘nationalism’. In conclusion, an umthonoyo can be a nationalist 
but not all umthonoye are nationalists in the modern sense of this term. 
Indeed, not all nationalists are necessarily considered umthonoye by the 
ordinary people; a nationalist project may not be advantageous to the cause 
of the people. 
 Eriksen (1993: 6) distinguishes nationalism from ethnicity in its 
relationship to the state. Where a nationalist argues that political boundaries 
should be co-terminal with cultural boundaries, ethnic groups do not 
necessarily demand the command of a state. This changes when political 
leaders of an ethnic movement do demand command of a state; a move 
which transforms it into a nationalist movement (Eriksen 1993: 6). In the 
light of this distinction, it is therefore necessary to say something about the 
discourses among Assyrians/Syriacs about this aspect. Overall, there is a 
strong tendency towards finding strategies for maintaining a national cultural 
distinctiveness and existence, no matter where they live. Hence, the focus is 
not on a political, geographical area but on cultural rights instead. This has 
become even more marked after their emigration to Western countries. 
Consequently, ethnic distinctiveness takes place mainly through culture and 
far less through a geography which binds a distinct culture together. 
Simultaneously, at times when elite members find the urgency for autonomy 
in order to survive as a national group, they may stress this wish, such as in 
                                                 
491 Father Bedros dbe Shushe was the first priest to serve in Germany and he shared the 
umthonoyutho of the Assyrians. 
492 In the last few decades, many of the umthonoye among Assyrians/Syriacs have identified 
themselves as ‘Assyrian’ (but not necessarily all). Initially, to identify as ‘Assyrian’ meant to 
adopt an explicit stance for something. The implication was to stand for the common good of 
the people (at least, from the perspective of the Assyrier). Therefore, at the height of activism, 
to identify as ‘Assyrian’ implied being an umthonoyo and devoting oneself to the common good. 
Nowadays, it is possible to observe that identifying as ‘Assyrian’ does not necessarily mean to 
‘devote oneself to the common good’. A person can be born ‘Assyrian’ and live an 
individualistic life, not necessarily explicitly choosing an ideology which is connected to this 
name and to the core of what this ideology stands for. 
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the present-day situation of post-Saddam Iraq. 
 In the above-mentioned definition of umthonoyutho (in the sense of 
patriotism), it is evident that the focus is directed much more towards the 
people (‘amo or umtho) than towards the motherland (motho).  In the Suryoyo 
language and in the Assyrian/Syriac cultural tradition, the term ‘fatherland’ 
does not exist. Instead, there is the term ‘motherland’. Nevertheless, the 
Suryoyo term for ‘motherland’ (motho) and the adjective derived from it for 
‘patriotism’ (mothonoyutho) are hardly ever used in everyday life except in 
poetry about the motherland.493 Love for the people incorporates or perhaps 
more specifically implies love of the motherland (motho), as one element of 
the whole. This is probably because Assyrians/Syriacs do not consider that 
they have hegemony over a country. More specifically, in everyday life they 
speak about the athro (homeland), which has a more abstract meaning than 
motherland. In poetry, the motherland is referred to as Beth Nahrin 
(Mesopotamia) or Othur (Assyria), a symbolic geographical home.494 
 In its more abstract sense, athro can be used with different meanings and 
can be different geographies simultaneously.495 In a nutshell, the use of athro 
in the contemporary context fits into or accommodates their worldwide 
dispersion in which Assyrians/Syriacs are denied a distinct national identity 
and status. The focus of activism has therefore shifted towards the dispersed 
‘amo in need, because the dispersion and its consequences are seen as 
negative, as endangering the ‘amo Suryoyo. Stressing this precarious position, 
elite members sum up this situation in terms of Seyfo di mardutho (‘sword of 
culture’; or, less literally: the ‘extinction of culture’).496 This phrase 
demonstrates and explains that the dangers they believe they encounter in 
the diaspora differ from those they once faced in the Middle East. In their 
historical geographies, they perceived themselves as an endangered entity 
politically because of the few human rights to which they were entitled as a 
people. 
                                                 
493 Lewis ([1964] 1994: 75) notes that ‘the first stirrings of the new loyalty in the Middle East 
took the form of patriotism, not nationalism. They were inspired by the example of Western 
Europe (particularly of France and England) where nationhood and statehood were 
combined...’ 
494 Identification with a specific geography is expressed in songs like Beth Nahrin at ithaik 
mothan (Mesopotamia, you are our motherland). 
495 See for a discussion about the athro a forthcoming publication of mine. 
496 Seyfo di mardutho is an analogy and reference to the Seyfo (here: genocide) of 
Assyrians/Syriacs during the First World War in Ottoman Turkey. 
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 Assyrians/Syriacs sense that the greatest danger they face in the 
diaspora is cultural extinction. They fear assimilation which could eventually 
be the equivalent to total extinction – the threat they once physically faced in 
the Middle East. This overwhelming fear of extinction is also referred to in 
the expression kalan qem nfoso da raghle (‘We are about to draw our dying 
breath’).497 Assyrians/Syriacs use this expression to express their fear: ‘We 
are on the verge of extinction’. This testifies to the fact that they do not want 
to give up their distinct existence as a people and fear their (cultural) 
extinction. It explains why the ‘amo or umtho is approached and treated as a 
‘sick individual’ in need of care. Umthonoyutho can be seen as the medicine 
which is believed to be the cure for this ‘sick umtho’. 
 To conclude, although the term umthonoyutho is used among 
Assyrians/Syriacs as a nodal point with a fixed meaning, in the field of 
antagonism it may at times also be a floating signifier and thus implying 
different meanings simultaneously. One of the archbishops in Sweden 
indicates this non-fixity and its relationship to the maturing of 
Assyrian/Syriac institutions: 
The Umthonoyutho of today will mature [gbeshlo] one day; and the sons of 
our people will grow up... Meanwhile our institutions still have to develop 
a great deal; they have ‘just put their pan of food on fire’. 
The temporary absence of a fixed meaning allows space for political 
discourses to compete for charging the meaning of what ‘for the common 
good of the Assyrian/Syriac people’ really is and therefore, what umthonoyutho 
means in a specific discourse.  
 
6.2 Umthonoyutho from a Historical Perspective 
To achieve an understanding of umthonoyutho in its discursive form in the 
Western diaspora, I shall commence by discussing the rise of the ideas on 
which it was built about a century ago. This historical aspect will allow a 
more comprehensive and comparative understanding of umthonoyutho, the 
discourses of nationhood and identity, and the antagonistic relationship 
between the present-day discourses. 
                                                 
497 Literally, nfoso da raghle means ‘death throes’ or ‘jerking feet’. In everyday life, this 
expression refers to the situation in which the feet of someone who is about to die begin to 
jerk uncontrollably. 
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6.2.1 Early Umthonoyutho  
Umthonoyutho, more specifically ethno-national consciousness, among 
Assyrian/Syriac elites as a contemporary modern concept must have been 
developed in some form in the nineteenth century.498 The English scholar O. 
H. Parry, who lived among the Assyrians/Syriacs for a short period at the 
end of the nineteenth century, describes them as ‘intensely patriotic and 
tenacious of their creed’. In the mid-nineteenth century, the American 
Protestant missionary Horatio Southgate ([1844] 2003: 80) made an 
observation about the Assyrians/Syriacs living in Kharput about whom little 
is known. He writes that the Armenians used the designation Assouri to refer 
to the Assyrians/Syriacs there in 1844: ‘I observed that the Armenians did 
not know them under the name which I used, Syriani; but called them 
Assouri, which struck me the more at the moment from its resemblance to 
our English name Assyrians, from whom they claim their origin, being sons, 
as they say, of Assour (Asshur)...’499 It was the era in which new ideas about a 
national identity were rapidly taking root in the geography of the Middle 
East. Until then, there was little need for identification along ethnic lines in 
the religious-based millet structure of the Ottoman Empire. In this 
burgeoning of their ethnic and national consciousness, the people in the 
Ottoman Empire had been influenced by nationalist ideas which had 
developed in old medieval empires and colonies and spread all over the 
world as new ‘imagined communities’. Buttressing what Benedict Anderson 
(1983) in his seminal work Imagined Communities points out as the role of 
newspapers and novels in the rise of ‘imagined communities’ as nations in 
the eighteenth century, the new discursive space was more or less shaped by 
educational and editorial activities. 
 In the rise of discourses of umthonoyutho among Assyrians/Syriacs, it is 
certainly possible to trace the role of the printing press and the 
accompanying educational role among especially the elite from about the end 
of the nineteenth century. Elite members developed a discursive path of 
umthonoyutho as a response to the developments in the socio-political context 
                                                 
498 The first name of Ashur Yausef, ‘Ashur’, is a name which was not at all common at a time 
in which people focused mainly on their religious identity. According to Agopian (2010) who 
studied a biography of Ashur Yausef in Armenian, by Ezekiel Maldjan 1921), Ashur’s 
birthname (1858) was ‘Abraham’. He may have changed it to ‘Ashur’ at an older age. 
499 ‘Sons of Assyria’ can also be read on the placard which is carried by Captain Abraham 
Yousef (who originated from Kharput) in the July 4th Parade in Worcester (Massachusetts) in 
1922 (see further Donabed 2003). 
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of a crumbling Ottoman Empire, which provided an open space for the 
articulation of new discourses. This is the moment for the rise of the 
national ‘awakening’ of different groups in the Empire. Assyrian/Syriac elite 
members began to translate books into their mother tongue, and published a 
whole gamut of magazines, newspapers and books, wrote articles about the 
history, unity, religion and church; they threw themselves into literature, 
wrote analyses of their people’s situation and so forth. It was a common 
practice among them to place a strong emphasis on the importance of their 
people’s education. In this sense, they assumed the position of malfone 
(teachers).  Likewise as snighre (lawyers), they struggled for their people’s 
rights. Unequivocally, the roles they assumed illustrate an obvious top-down, 
elitist (intellectual) activism. This activism among Assyrians/Syriacs is 
specific for this period. Later in this chapter I shall illustrate that due to 
dislocatory changes the umthonoyutho discourses have been picked up by the 
ordinary Assyrians/Syriacs in the European diaspora and transformed in the 
antagonistic discursive field. 
 The fact that Assyrians/Syriacs had space to run their own institutions 
in bigger cities of the Ottoman Empire allowed them to lay the foundation 
for this. In 1879, Assyrians/Syriacs in Diyarbakır had already established an 
organization which they called the Süryani Kadim Kardeşliği500 (Ancient Suryoye 
Brotherhood) (Gabriela Yonan 1985: 33). In 1881 they founded a grammar 
school of which Hanna Sirri Ceqqi was the director.501 Although he is not 
well known today, he is considered to be among the first umthonoye in the 
homeland. Naum Faik502 (1868-1930), who has become the symbol of early 
umthonoyutho and an example to his present-day successors, was one of the 
students at this school. In 1909 Naum Faik and other intellectuals founded a 
                                                 
500 This brotherhood organization was called after the name of their Süryani Kadim Millet 
(Ancient Suryoye Millet, established in 1882). ‘Ancient’ was added in order to make a distinction 
between this church community and the Süryani Katolik Millet (established in 1843). 
501 After eight years the school was closed for political and financial reasons. 
502 His original name was Naum Elias Yacob Balakh or Palak (as some spell it) and he was 
born in what is now Diyarbakır. He had a flair for languages: Syriac, Turkish, Arabic, Persian, 
Kurdish and English. From 1888 to 1912 he taught in Diyarbakır. In 2009, the Diyarbakır Sur 
Municipality Council decided (9 December) to change name of the street Pusucu 1. Sokak into 
Naum Faik Palak Sokak (in the Ziya Gökalp Quarter). In the same year, the Kurdish mayor of 
the Sur Municipality, Abdullah Demirbaş, who was responsible for this change, was sentenced 
to a two-years imprisonment for committing ‘language crimes’.  Demirbaş had published a 
booklet about Diyarbakır in different local languages with the idea to reach the people with 
the different backgrounds. 
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literary society Al-Intebah (Awake). His poem503 Ett‘ir bar Othur Ett‘ir gives an 
indication of his ideas at that time: 
 
Awake son of Assyria, awake. 
And see how the world is enlightened. 
The chance has flown [from us]. 
And time has ebbed swiftly. 
Awake son of Assyria, Awake! 
In enlightenment shall we take refuge. 
To exaltation shall we fly. 
If we do not awake we shall face misery. 
Awake son of Assyria, Awake! 
 
The emphasis in this poem is on the ‘awakening’ of the people, who 
resemble a slumbering body which assumes a need to be awakened. A 
second central point is articulated in the sentence ‘Rise up and band together 
to strengthen’. The myth of unity is formulated as a condition for gaining 
strength in relation to other already ‘awakened’ nations. 
 The goals of the literary society Al-Intebah were to spread these ideas 
among the people, to organize the church and to re-establish the grammar 
school. In the Zafaran Monastery (Mardin, Turkey), Naum Faik had the 
opportunity to dig deep into the literary works in the Patriarchal library and 
to use the press.504 The fact that in 1909 (up to 1914) the first 
Assyrian/Syriac magazine in America was published with the same name as 
that of the literary society – Al-Intebah  – is by no means an accident, as 
Gabriela Yonan (1985: 39) remarks. This is a pertinent clue to the 
continuation of their ideas and their relationships. The contents covered 
such themes as history, language, church history and general news. It was 
written in Garshuni (Ottoman Turkish in Syriac script). 
                                                 
503 The original was written in Syriac and appeared in one of the issues of Kawkab Madenho 
which was published between 1910 and 1912. I thank Michael Suroyo for his assistance in the 
translation into English. This poem was used for the lyrics of a song which was recorded by 
Elias H. Boyaji. 
504 One of the Patriarchs received this press from Queen Victoria (1819-1901) of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. 
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 Between 1910 and 1912, Naum Faik and Baschar Hulmi Boreji505 
published their first magazine named Kawkab Madenho 506 (Star of the East) 
(Yonan 1985: 35).507 The themes of the articles related to different aspects of 
the people: the church, literature, history, language, church history and news. 
After Naum Faik fled to America (Paterson, New Jersey) in 1912,508 its 
publication was stopped. Nevertheless, in America he continued his work by 
contributing to Al-Intebah. It was closed down after he began publishing two 
new magazines, namely Beth Nahrin (Mesopotamia) and Huyodo (Unity), 
between 1916 and 1929.509 Its name (Huyodo510) is probably an indication of 
his desire for the national unity of the Syriac Churches. After 1912, Boreji 
began publishing a new magazine called Shifura (Trumpet), which continued 
until 1915 when the Seyfo struck Diyarbakır and affected it so dramatically. 
Another magazine which was published in 1913 and 1914 in Mardin was Al-
Hikma (Wisdom). This was a church-oriented magazine whose editor was 
Michael Hekmat Ceqqi.511  
 Another early umthonoyo who continues to play a symbolic role today is 
Ashur Yausef (1858-1915).512  From 1910 to 1915 he published the monthly 
magazine Mürşid-I Âsûriyûn (The Assyrian Guide) mainly in Ottoman 
Turkish513. Ashur Yausef was among the first Assyrian/Syriac intellectuals to 
be assassinated in Kharput during the Seyfo. In the last letter he wrote in 
prison to his brother, Hanna Yausef in America on Monday 20 April 1915, 
he says:514 
                                                 
505 Instead of ‘Boreji’, the spelling of his name might have been Boyeji (painter). 
506 Another magazine with the name Kokhva (Star) had already been published in Urmia in 
1906. 
507 It came out twice a month and was spread mainly among the Assyrian/Syriac congregation 
in Diyarbakır. They used Garshuni (Ottoman Turkish in Syriac script). 
508 The Golden Jubilee publication of the Assyrian National School Association (1949) 
mentions that he emigrated in 1911. 
509 While in America, he translated many works into Syriac and wrote others, including poetry. 
Huyodo was produced in five different languages and three scripts: Eastern and Western Syriac, 
Arabic, Garshuni (Syriac in Ottoman Turkish) and English. 
510 The magazine Hujådå in Sweden is named after it. 
511 He used the press in the Zafaran Monastery to publish it. 
512 Ashur Yausef was born in Kharput, Turkey, in 1858. He was educated at the Central 
Turkey College in Ayntab and taught in different places, among them the American Euphrates 
College in Kharput, Amasia, Smyrna and Antioch (Donabed 2003: 113).  
513 See for a bibliography of Assyrian/Syriac periodicals in Ottoman Turkish, Trigona-Harany 
(2009). 
514 A section of the complete letter as appeared in Seffer (no date: 18-19). 
THE LOGIC OF UMTHONOYUTHO          275 
 
…for I know we will be cut to pieces when we leave here, though I do not know when 
and where. Do not worry over my death – it is God’s will – I am going to Heaven to 
protect the rights of the Assyrians at the presence of the biggest and greatest Judge. The 
books and the work I had started about our nation’s education remain unfinished… 
Leaving aside the heroic character of the letter, reading between the lines it is 
possible to discern the characteristics of the discourses of umthonoyutho at that 
time. A central idea in the letter is ‘I am going to Heaven to protect the 
rights of the Assyrians in the presence of the biggest and greatest Judge’. The 
strong emphasis on the education of the ‘people’ and the protection of his 
people’s rights are central elements to his discourse. It is essential that his 
ideas should be contextualized in the light of developments in relation to 
ideas of nationhood in the broader geography. 
 Another group which should be mentioned in this context is that of 
Assyrians/Syriacs who had fled to America from Diyarbakır in the period of 
the massacres of 1895 and 1896. In their new country they still concerned 
themselves with the cause of their people back home. In 1899 the 
Assyrians/Syriacs in the area of New York and New Jersey met at Sterling in 
New Jersey with the idea of establishing a social and cultural association. In 
1900 Gabriel Boyayji (Boyaji) had just arrived from Diyarbakır and had 
informed them about the situation back home. As a new member, he advised 
them to work to establish a school in Diyarbakır.515 At Boyayji’s suggestion, 
it was called the Assyrian National School Association (ANSA) (Kass-Elias and 
Safar 1999).516 
 The activities among the Assyrians/Syriacs in Adana (Turkey) are also 
important in interpreting the later developments in the diaspora. 
Assyrians/Syriacs who had established themselves in Adana around 1910 
took the initiative to establish a church and the school517 Terraki Medresse 
Süryaniye (TMS, Progressive Suryoyo School). It was probably the first modern 
                                                 
515 They agreed to raise money for the school. It is possible that the grammar school which 
was founded in 1881 and closed in about 1890 was re-opened then. After the Seyfo, the goal of 
the association broadened its scope to assisting needy Assyrians/Syriacs worldwide. The 
association realized that survivors had fled to safer areas or areas where they could make a 
living (see further Kass-Elias, Safar 1999). 
516 ANSA has played a considerable role in the education of orphaned Assyrian/Syriac 
children and others in need. Nowadays ANSA has been renamed The Assyrian Orphanage and 
School Association of America. 
517 From an interview with the son of a family who moved to Adana from Midyad around 
1910. Two rich individuals among them financed the school (Sa‘do Maqsi-Elyas and a 
member of the Dbe Shakkere family). 
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Assyrian/Syriac school in the twentieth century.518 During the Seyfo, 
Assyrians/Syriacs living in Adana were better off than their relatives in 
Midyad, where most of their population was killed.519 In 1919, just after the 
Seyfo, they enlarged the school by building an orphanage for the children who 
had lost their parents during the Seyfo.520 For political reasons, the school and 
the orphanage were closed down in 1921, to be re-established later in 
Lebanon.521 
 The monk Yuhanon Dolabani522 (the later Archbishop Mor Philoxinos 
Yuhanon Dolabani in Mardin, 1885-1969) was one of the teachers at the 
school in the period after the Seyfo until it was closed in 1921. According to 
Abrohom Gabriel Zsaumo (1988: 185), who was a student at the orphanage, 
the church hierarchy forbade Dolabani to express his patriotic ideas in 
writing after church representatives returned empty handed from the Paris 
Peace Conference (1919) and lost their hope for being able to do anything 
for their people in Turkey. Father Bedros Dbe Shushe (Germany) mentioned 
to a respondent of mine that Dolabani informed him that he had been 
excommunicated in that same period for six months, for the same reason as 
Zsaumo mentions. Another source which indicates this indirectly is the 
magazine Leshono d-Umtho523 in which Dolabani published some of his 
                                                 
518 It should be remarked that the original name was Arabic, while the abbreviation is 
pronounced in Syriac as Tau, Mim, Semkad (TMS). Besides theology, Syriac language and 
literature, physics, chemistry, maths, French, Arabic, and Turkish were taught. 
519 See further about the Seyfo in Midyad, Gaunt (2006) and Beth Sawoce (2006) for oral stories 
in Suryoyo (Surayt). 
520 Assyrian/Syriac orphans from different places in Turkey came to this orphanage and 
attended this school. The French High Commissioner and the Assyrian National School 
Association both financed the orphanage. 
521 France was planning to leave Turkey. Therefore Assyrians/Syriacs no longer felt protected. 
Since Lebanon still remained under French mandate, in consultation with Patriarch Elias they 
chose Lebanon as the new location for the TMS School. 
522 Dolabani was born in Mardin. He attended the local Turkish school. Afterwards he resided 
in different monasteries in Tur ‘Abdin and Mardin. In the Zafaran Monastery he continued his 
intensive study of Syriac. From the time he spent in the Zafaran Monastery, he made good use 
of the press to publish the works he wrote. In 2007, a biography of Mor Philoxinos Yuhanon 
Dolabani with the writings from his diary and some of his poetry was published by the 
Assyrian Youth Federation and the Assyrian Federation in Sweden (Dere and Isik 2007). 
523 Leshono d-Umtho was published between 1 February 1927 and 15 March 1933; the first six 
months it appeared monthly and later semi-monthly. According to Abrohom Nuro (1967) its 
publication continued until 1946. 
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umthonoye poems anonymous.524 Contemporary members of the elite praise 
him for his personal integrity as a spiritual man and for his umthonoyutho.525 
 Without going too deeply into the question of how Assyrian/Syriac 
elites identified with the ancient Assyrians and Arameans, it is useful to 
touch on it to sum up some of the main characteristics of this umthonoyutho in 
the early twentieth century. This is important in order to illustrate the 
historical change in the discourses of umthonoyutho. In 1910, Naum Faik 
(quoted in Trigona-Harany (2009: 126) expressed himself as follows in 
relation to an Aramean and Assyrian past in his magazine Kawkab Madenho: 
If those who do not trust in this truth examine our Süryânî [Suryoye] millet, 
then first of all they shall see a low, base and unimportant place in society 
for this people which derived from the stock of those once worthy of 
names Asûrî [Assyrians] and Arâmî [Arameans] and which later split into 
five groups – the Süryânî, Nestorians, Chaldeans, Süryânî Catholics and 
Maronites – out of ignorance and zealotry. 
One can also detect indications of identification with both Assyrians and 
Arameans526 in the poetry of Dolabani. Nevertheless, in the present-day 
Assyriska and Syrianska elite members often refer specifically to those 
writings of Archbishop Dolabani which fit in their ideology. The Syrianska 
activist Ken‘an refers for example, to Dolabani’s book Kthobo d-Yauno (1916), 
where he writes: ‘... Rhimo Oromoyo yadid’ (Dear beloved Aramean). For 
Ken‘an, Dolabani included ‘Arameanness’ in the concept of Suryoyutho and 
concludes thus that Dolabani identified as ‘Aramean’. In contrast, the 
Assyrier have recourse to references indicating Dolabani identified as 
                                                 
524 See for instance the poem Ulitho d-Motho u samo d-Haye (Lamantation about the nation and 
medicine of life) (Dolabani 2007: 309). This same poem was published anonymous in 
Hackverdi (1928). The first stanza is as follows (my translation from the original in Syriac): 
How can the sons of the nation be sent into exile?/How can they accept any form of 
oppression?/As if they were sons of foreigners. 
525 His assistant during 1953-4, Ilyas Shahin, mentioned two examples to me from which he 
drew the conclusion that Dolabani was an umthonoyo.  Firstly, when he heard that the magazine 
Sefro Suryoyo was about to be published in Aleppo, Dolabani had asked Ilyas Shahin to thank 
them for sending it, to congratulate them and to encourage them to continue its publication. 
Secondly, Dolabani continued to receive the magazine Asociacion Asiria (Hdonoyutho Suryoyto) by 
Farid Nuzha (Argentina), despite the fact that Patriarch Ephrem Barsaum had 
excommunicated Nuzha. 
526 See, for example, the first two lines of the first stanza of Dolabani’s (2007: 298) poem 
Neshono d-Othur (The splendour of Assyria) where he writes: ‘I am a brilliant Assyrian, I am a 
bright Aramean (Othuroyo no nasiho, w o Oromoyono sahiho).’ This poem was sung in the Assyrian 
Orphanage in Adana 
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‘Assyrian’. For instance, the teacher of Syriac Eliyo refers to a poem which 
Dolabani wrote when he was a monk: ‘My bones would stir in my grave if 
someone were to come to my last resting place and plant the flag of Othur 
on my sepulchre’ (Neq‘un garmai men qbur, kad tihe eman Othur). Another 
indication of the presence of identification with an Aramean past is the name 
chosen by Sanharib Balley for the magazine Savto527 d-Oromoye (Voice of the 
Arameans).528 Furthermore, Trigona-Harany (2008: 11) notes that the 
nineteenth century Ottoman Archive reveals the idea of an Aramean descent 
among the Assyrian/Syriac people.529In 1910  the use of  the name Arameans 
is also to be found in two poems (by Jacob Saka of Bartelleh and by Anton 
‘Abd al-Nur of Mosul) which were sent to Naum Faik to congratulate him 
with his magazine and which he published in Kawkab Mdenho (No. 2: 4) 
(Kiraz 2005: 8). 
 Dolabani’s biography (Dere and Isik 2007: 83) contains a photograph 
which shows the orphans in the orphanage in Adana and to the right of 
them a blackboard on which is written in Syriac: ‘Yatme d-Othuroye da b-
Qiliqi…’ (Assyrian Orphans in Cilicia, 11 April 1920).530 It is remarkable that 
even in Syriac language, instead of the commonly used name Suryoye, they 
presented themselves as Othuroye (Assyrians). This gives a clue to the way 
they identified themselves in that period at this school. Students from this 
school explained that ‘Assyrian’ functioned as the national name of their 
people, on the basis of the ideal of unity between the different Syriac 
churches. The late musician Gabriel Assad, who was one of the pupils at the 
school in Adana, is considered to be among the first who had already begun 
to compose secular music in the 1920s.531 In an interview with Gabriel 
                                                 
527 The pronunciation of the word Savto is Sawto, from the Arabic saut. 
528 See further Trigona-Harany (2008: 49). Trigona-Harany (2009: 153) mentions that some 
decades later Balley referred to this magazine in his personal notes as Savto d-Othuroye. MARA 
has one magazine with this latter name. 
529 See for the idea prevalent among the readers of Mürşid-I Âsûriyûn (1913) that the Suryoye are 
of Aramean descent also Trigona-Harany (2008: 90). See further about the idea that Suryoye 
are Aramean descent, Trigona-Harany (2009: 125-6). 
530 See for various images of the orphanage, the cover of this book. 
531 It is striking that around this time the same kind of patriotic songs were written, composed 
and sung among Assyrians/Syriacs in America. The three-page score Assyrian Patriotic Songs by 
Nimrud Ashur Hoyen (1924) is an indication of this (see further Donabed 2003 and 2006). 
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Afram for Radio Qolo in Sweden, he said that his umthonoyutho inspired him to 
make music:532  
In Adana, all our teachers taught us about the Assyrians; that we had a 
people, a country, a government, kings… and this influenced me. And, as 
you know, we were also cut down and slaughtered and we became 
refugees. This also left its mark on me. As soon as I had mastered music, I 
began to express my umthonoye ideas…533 
Students who had studied at TMS dispersed worldwide and were among the 
first Assyrians/Syriacs to share umthonoyutho discourses, strongly based on a 
national belonging as Assyrians. This explains to a great extent the dominant 
identification as Assyrian before it became to be fought by community 
members who alternatively expressed identification with an Aramean 
ancestry. 
To conclude this section, among others, Ashur Yausef and Naum Faik 
played a crucial role in the early twentieth-century umthonoyutho. Central to 
the ideas of umthonoyutho in this period was the national education of their 
people in order to awaken in them consciousness of their distinct ethno-
national identity among other peoples. As Naum Faik’s poem illustrates, the 
‘awakening’ and education should be seen in the discursive field of that time: 
‘Awake and see how the world has become enlightened.’ Later in this chapter 
I shall illustrate that present-day elites have built their identity discourses on 
early ideas of umthonoyutho. However, I shall show that the present-day 
antagonistic context has allowed space for elites to be selective in the 
elements which they chose to build on from early umthonoyutho, leading to the 
creation of particularistic discourses and paths. 
  
6.2.2 The Idea of ‘Unity’ 
The need to forge ‘unity’ among their people was a central nodal point around 
which the early discourses of umthonoyutho were organized and this has not 
changed. This is what the ‘awakening’ I pointed to in the section above 
referred to: the general development as a people, including the unity between 
                                                 
532 Interview received digitally from his son Sardanapal Asaad. It is also available in the 
Gabriel Asaad CD Collection ‘An Assyrian Pioneer’ (2006). 
533 Besides his own lyrics, he also used lyrics by Archbishop Yuhanon Dolabani and by the 
umthonoyo Yuhanon Salmaan. 
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the different Syriac churches534 under the umbrella name ‘Assyrian’ which 
would represent their people’s national identity in the new political arena 
emerging in the era of the crumbling Ottoman Empire. The denominational 
differences between the Syriac churches no longer mattered. Instead, they 
defined their shared cultural, religious, linguistic and ancestral background as 
the main characteristic of their ethnie. Keeping up with modern 
developments, they used the press to make their ideas known among the 
people. I shall illustrate further in this chapter that this primordialist 
approach has been picked up by the later generations. 
 The historian Trigona-Harany (2008: 86, 127 and 2009: 145-146), who 
studied primary sources by Ashur Yausef (Mürşid-I Âsûriyûn) and Naum Faik 
(Kawkab Madenho) in Ottoman Turkish, writes that (before 1915) when they 
used unity these authors limited the meaning to that between the Syriac 
Orthodox, Syriac Catholic and Syriac Protestant Churches. In addition, he 
argues that the principal function of this unity would be to strengthen their 
own millet in relation to that of the Armenians. Trigona-Harany states that 
the idea of broader unity had come from the Assyrians/Syriacs who had 
settled in America, where they began to develop contacts with the Assyrian 
Church of the East535 and with the Chaldean Church. According to him, this 
was the germ of ideas of creating unity between all the Syriac churches. 
Moreover, he argues that only after the Seyfo would Naum Faik’s focus have 
broadened to include the Assyrian Church of the East, the Chaldean Church 
and the Melkite Church. 
 Although I have not studied the works by these authors, which were 
published in Ottoman Turkish, I would question Trigona-Harany’s 
hypothesis that, prior to 1915, unity to Ashur Yausef and Naum Faik meant 
that of only the three mentioned Syriac Churches. They might have 
mentioned these churches specifically for reasons deriving from their direct 
context and local urgent aims. In relation to this, questions might be raised 
about how Assyrian/Syriac elite members who identified with an Assyrian 
ancestry could limit the identification solely to the Syriac Orthodox, Syriac 
Catholic and the Syriac Protestant Churches. If so, what role did the 
identification with an Assyrian ancestry play in the pre-Seyfo period? How can 
                                                 
534 The Assyrian Church of the East, the Chaldean, the Maronite, the Melkite, the Syriac 
Orthodox, the Syriac Catholic and the Syriac Protestant Churches. Although the further splits 
in the churches are not mentioned specifically, they are implied. 
535 Trigona refers to this church as the Nestorian church. 
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we explain that the children at the Assyrian/Syriac orphanage in Adana had 
already learned to identify with all the Syriac churches in the first three years 
after the Seyfo? And the same question can be asked about Naum Faik’s 
mission statement for his magazine Beth Nahrin in 1916 (Çikki536 2004 in: 
Trigona-Harany 2008: 100), which reads: 
Our goal is not to show how learned we are, but to serve our vatan 
[motherland537]… for all brothers of the Süryani to come together under a 
single umbrella. These brothers are Nestorians, Chaldeans, Maronites, 
Catholics, Protestants… I remind these groups that their past, their race, 
their blood and flesh, their tongue, their vatan are all that of the Süryani… 
We must work to exalt the name of the Assyrians… Our primary goal is 
to secure the rights of the Assyrians. 
Also Kiraz (2005: 9) indicates that the editorial of the fourth issue (1910) of 
Naum Faik’s Kawkab Madenho lists the names of several Syriac Churches 
under one umbrella. 
 Ashur Yausef and Naum Faik have continued to play a central role 
among Assyrian/Syriac umthonoye in the diaspora to the present day. Their 
ideas of unity have reached ‘the four corners of the world’ through the 
natural dispersion of their people. About two decades after Naum Faik’s 
death, the Golden Jubilee (1899-1949) publication of the Assyrian National 
School Association writes of him: ‘He served as advisor to the nation; and held 
the rank of archdeacon in our Church.’ This assumes his devotion to both 
the secular and religious aspects of the collective identity of their people. No 
doubt, the ideas of these two intellectuals have been reinterpreted and 
employed by the people in the different contexts (as I shall illustrate in the 
following chapters). At the one-year commemoration of Naum Faik’s death 
in 1931, the umthonoyo David Barsaum Perley538 gives his interpretation of 
Naum Faik’s (in the quotation: Naoum Palak) umthonoyutho (Perley in Jakki 
1936): 
                                                 
536 In some literature his name is spelled as Jakki. His name is pronounced as Chëqqe. 
537 The translation of vatan with ‘motherland’ is mine. Trigona-Harany translates it as 
‘fatherland’. 
538 Perley was one of the founders of the Assyrian American National Federation in 1933. The 
Simele Massacre in Iraq in the same year had inspired Assyrians in America to found it. On its 
official website it states: ‘The Assyrian American National Federation strives to unite the 
Assyrian Nation by protecting and promoting the progression of Assyrian culture, education, 
religion and humanitarian rights.’ 
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…The present five religious divisions of our nation may well be likened to 
the five fingers on one hand. Let each finger represent a single division of 
the nation. The fingers are not unrelated. They inter-depend and for 
forceful action they must be brought together into a unified whole that is 
called the ‘fist’. If we could produce an army dedicated to the practice of 
this principle and consecrated in the doctrine – whose chief exponent was 
Naoum Palak – that freedom of conscience in the matter of religious 
worship, and true loyalty to nationalism are ideas not in conflict with one 
another, we shall be able to build a new emancipated and intellectual 
Assyrian commonwealth. True that by an accident of birth, he was a 
Jacobite, but in his heart of hearts, Naoum Palak was a true Assyrian, as 
well. His loyalty to his church [Syriac Orthodox] did not interfere with his 
loyalty to his nation. Such was the philosophy of his nationalism [emphasis 
mine]. His whole life was a solemn proclamation of these principles. It 
was a militant effort to uproot the old and to re-fashion our new ways and 
ultimately to arouse in us a sense of national unity. Religion is personal 
rather than institutional, ethical rather than ceremonial, democratic rather 
than patriotic.  
Perley talks about Naum Faik’s umthonoyutho in terms of ‘nationalism’. It is 
unclear what connotation the word ‘nationalism’ had for Perley in the 1930s. 
He may have used it in the meaning of umthonoyutho (patriotism) or in a 
meaning closer to the contemporary interpretation of ‘nationalism’. 
Otherwise, Perley’s argumentation in this quotation speaks for itself. His idea 
of nationhood and that of ADO, which would arise in Syria approximately 
three decades later and establish itself in Europe in the 1970s, are fairly close. 
Central to the discussion is their cross-denominational approach for creating 
unity between the different Syriac churches in order to arrive at a national 
definition of their people. This proximity in discourse is an indication of the 
continuity of ideas from a historical perspective. 
 This idea of unity is also to be found in the writings of the umthonoyo 
journalist Farid Elias Nuzha (1895-1971) in Brazil. Born into a family which 
had migrated from Kharput (Turkey) to Hama in present-day Syria in 1760, 
he emigrated to Argentina at the age of seventeen in 1911 (Shapera 2003). In 
Buenos Aires he joined with other community members to found the Centro 
Afremico Asirio in August 1934. They also launched the publication of a 
monthly magazine Asociacion Asiria539, of which he became the editor.540 
                                                 
539It’s Syriac title was Hdonoyutho Suryoyto, which I would translate with ‘Unity of the Suryoye’ or 
‘Suryoye Association’. In Arabic it was called Al Jami‘ah Al Suryaniya. 
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Examining the title of this magazine, it seems he uses Suryoye synonymously 
with ‘Assyrians’. As Shapera (2003) notes, Nuzha had an inclusive approach 
to the denominational names used among the different Syriac churches. This 
reveals a rather tentative beginning to progress towards his goal: the unity of 
these churches. Therefore the inclusion of all the names of the different 
Syriac Churches and to call for unity could be interpreted as a strategic act. 
This situation is different from the present-day, more exclusive and 
particularistic approach taken by the majority of Assyriska and Syrianska 
activists in Sweden who choose for either Assyrier or Syrianer and reject the 
use of other names (although there are some changes and an increasing 
diversity in this). 
 I would like to refer to an article by Nuzha (1939541), written in reaction 
to a letter which he received from a member542 of the Syriac Orthodox 
Community in Mosul, in which the latter objected to the use of the name 
Asiria (Assyria): 543 
Once, one of our most honorable and ardent writers wrote to the editor 
of Asociacion Asiria saying: “Eliminate, correct or change the Spanish name 
of your magazine [Asiria], because this is an abhorrence to our country's 
government since it means Assyrian [Al-Ashori]”… He [Nuzha] said: “I 
would ask the honorable writer, even if your illustrious ruler dislikes the 
name Assyrian, does your nature and the dignity of your nation and 
church allow you to change this for something different, just for the sake 
of the gleam in your prince's eyes, to make him happy? What would you 
do if your dictatorial master said to you, tear down the cross from the 
door of your church and the Christian community is forbidden to ring the 
bells? What you would reply to him if tomorrow he were to say to you 
that Syriac teaching runs contrary to the official education system?” You 
are not expecting such disasters to happen! However, since you have 
submitted to him subserviently and in a cowardly manner that will 
encourage him to embrace immoderation in his oppression and 
absolutism. Tomorrow he will say to you “Hey you Syriacs544 …if you are 
faithful to your country and government, the only way in which you can 
                                                                                                               
540 Publication was initially only in Arabic. Later he included writings in Syriac and in Spanish. 
541 Asiria, 1939: 10, 5th year, No. 2. 
542 According to one of my respondents, this was Ne‘mat-Allah Danno. 
543 The English translation from the original in Arabic is by Shapera (2003). Corrections for 
English style are added by me. 
544 Shapera has translated Suryoye as Syrians. Throughout this thesis, I have translated Suryoye as 
Syriacs and therefore also in this citation. 
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show that you are loyal and obedient is to exchange your Syriac language 
for Arabic”. Then, what will you reply to your government? If Syriac 
means nothing more than a religion or a denomination, I can truly state 
that we have no further need of it. You, as a "great master, expert and 
defender of Syriac", must say that Syriac is a nation and ethnicity not a 
religion and denomination. A religion or faith can be shared by many 
nations, as our status is shared with Copts and Ethiopians, but there is no 
sharing ethnicity. If we deprive our people of their ethnicity, what is left to 
them? I am sure you will say: “Religion”. I say, they can obtain the same 
religion from somewhere else, from Egypt and Ethiopia and that what is 
happening is a consequence of your teachings. If we teach our people that 
Syriac is a real science, a name for our ancient nation and explain its 
historical nobility, you will see how much they will adhere to this name 
and they will be proud of it; no matter how critical the times and how 
deadly the conditions are. 
…However, if that choice of the name Assyrian refers to those who had 
rejected a merger with or coalescence with Arabism and resisted 
oppressive governments, so that they were consequently subjected to 
murder, persecution, looting and all kinds of injustice and horrors…545 
that is an exceptionally great honor for them. Future generations will often 
commemorate that martyrdom and will remember these disasters 
committed by the foes of God and humanity as long as there is still a 
human being on this earth.  
           Syriac Writer [Farid Nuzha]546  (Buenos Aires, February 1939) 
 
Nuzha’s reaction to the ‘honorable writer’ from his community in Mosul as 
the editor of Asiria expresses several elements which are central to his ideas 
about the identity of his people. Nuzha strongly rejects an attitude of 
compliance to the request by the Iraqi authorities not to use the name 
‘Assyrian’. In his argumentation, he indicates his fear that such an attitude 
might lead to the Arabization of his people – which he clearly opposes. He 
then continues by rejecting the idea that ethnicity can be equated with 
religion and, following from this, that identification with his people’s 
denomination alone is not sufficient to express a distinct collective identity, 
because it is not unique only to them as a group. He ends his letter by 
strongly advocating the use of the name Assyrian despite the danger of 
                                                 
545 This is a reference to the Simele Massacre in Iraq, 7 August 1933. See further Chapter 4. 
546 He did not sign his name to this piece, perhaps as an expression of humility. 
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persecution. He even goes as far as ascribing a heroic role to victims of such 
persecution. In short, he advocates a cross-denominational national identity, 
no matter whether the designation Suryoye or Assyrian is used. This indicates 
that he uses these names synonimously. In his eyes, the meaning imbued in 
these names is more important. The citation also demonstrates the 
involvement of Middle Eastern regimes – on which I shall elabourate in the 
next chapter. 
 
            
Illustration 9: The front and back cover of Farid Nuzha’s Asiria. 
The similarities between the ideas of the different elite members discussed 
are not accidental. There is a clear continuity in the myth of unity in order to 
survive as a people, which functions as a central nodal point. Unification 
assumes nation building. The dispersion of Assyrians/Syriacs from the 
territory of the former Ottoman Empire – both before and after the Seyfo – 
resulted in the natural dispersion of discourses of umthonoyutho and thus, the 
myth of the need for unity. It is possible to think specifically of the orphans at 
the orphanage school in Adana, but there were also other educated elite 
members who had absorbed ideas of umthonoyutho and settled elsewhere in 
the world and received each other’s magazines. Another indication of the 
relationship between discourses of umthonoyutho at the beginning of the 
twentieth century and today is that new magazines which have been 
published in the diaspora are called after some of the magazines which were 
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published in the homeland.547 Furthermore, early umthonoye are portrayed as 
the symbols of the Assyrian Movement or as the ‘nation’s men’. 
 
6.2.3 The Decree of Patriarch Ephrem Barsaum about 
the ‘Correct Name’ 
Despite the fact that there are still many gaps in the research into the early 
discourses of umthonoyutho and the ‘name use’, a strong preference for the 
designation ‘Assyrian’ in English is apparent until (at least) the beginning to 
the mid-twentieth century. That is, for example, expressed in the designation 
which was used to denote the official name of the Syriac Orthodox Church 
in Northern America at the beginning of the twentieth century. 548 Until the 
mid-1950s, the designation ‘Assyrian’ was used in the official name of the 
church and the community institutions (Aydin 2000, Donabed 2003: 8, 
Donabed and Makko 2009: 80). The Shorter Catechism of the Assyrian Orthodox 
Church, written by the then Archbishop of Syria and Lebanon, Ephrem 
Barsaum, in 1950 is another indication that the name ‘Assyrian’ was also 
used in the church (see Illustration 10).549 Kiraz (2005: 11) notes that the 
reason for the use of ‘Assyrian Orthodox’ in the name of the Church was 
due to the fact that the name ‘Syrian Orthodox’ was already in use by the 
Greek Orthodox Church (Rum) from Syria. The latter could not use this 
name because there existed already a Greek Orthodox Community from 
Greece. This illustrates clearly the relational character of group identities. In 
the second half of the twentieth century, it was Archbishop Samuel who 
went to court, requesting the Greek Orthodox from Syria to change their 
                                                 
547 Publication of Al-Hikma recommenced in Jerusalem (1927-1931) under the aegis of the 
brother of the first publisher, Murad Fuad Ceqqi. Its new sub-title was ‘A religious, literary 
and historical monthly review’. The same title, but this time in Syriac Mghaltho d-Hekhemtho 
(Magazine of Wisdom), was used by Archbishop Yuhanon Dolabani in Mardin in 1952. 
Another example is the monthly Hujådå (published by the Assyrian Federation in Sweden) and 
named after Naum Faik’s Huyodo. 
548 Aryo Makko (unpublished paper) mentions that the first Syriac Orthodox Church in 
America was established under the name Assyrian Apostolic Church of the Virgin Mary in 1907. 
Watson (1923) writes that in 1919 the Assyrian Jacobite Apostolic church was built in West 
Hoboken, NJ. See for an article about these events, the Quarterly magazine of the Assyrain 
Orthodox Church of Virgin Mary, winter 2011. In the abovementioned name from 1919, 
‘Assyrian’ functions perhaps as the national name, ‘Jacobite’ refers to the denomination and 
‘Apostolic’ to the historicity of this church. 
549 The cover of the publication mentions that it was published with the permission of 
Archbishop Yesuh Samuel. More research is needed to be able to say anything about the use 
of the other names, such as Syrian and Aramean in the American context in this period. 
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name so that his community could 
make use of the name ‘Syrian 
Orthodox’ again.  
 Reading through the writings 
published in two booklets by the 
Assyrian National School Association 
of America on the occasion of its 
Golden Jubilee in 1949 reveals 
that the emic name Suryoye is 
translated throughout by Assyrian. 
Only in three cases did this 
diverge. The former Director of 
the TMS orphanage in Beirut, 
Fawlos Gabriel (who had studied 
at this orphanage himself) refers 
to his people as ‘Aramean people’, 
although one can find strong 
identification with an Assyrian past and identification as Assyrian in his 
poetry which he published in the magazine Leshono d-Umtho  about two 
decades earlier in Beirut. This indicates a change in his ideas. In the series of 
the magazine Leshono d-Umtho, he published five poems and one article, in 
which he laments the great and glorious past of the Assyrian Empire and 
contrasts it with the present enfeebled position of his people. Nevertheless, 
he did not seem to have lost his faith that the situation of his people could 
be improved and urged them in his writings to unite and strengthen 
themselves in various ways. One example is taken from his article Othur 
ethmol yaumono [u]lamhor (Assyria, Yesterday, Today [and] Tomorrow) (Gabriel 
1929):550 O ye scattered sons of Assyria let us bind up the wound of fallen 
Assyria (O bnayo zriqe d-Othur tau nehsub mhutho d-Othur tbirto). 
 The two other cases concern the titles of the Archbishops who had sent 
in a message for publication: ‘Youhanna Dolabani, The Syrian Metropolitan 
in Turkey’ and ‘Athanasius Yesuh Samuel, Syrian Archbishop of Jerusalem 
and Transjordan, Apostolic Delegate to the USA and Canada’. Nevertheless, 
in the texts which they wrote, they referred to the people as ‘Assyrian’. These 
two examples give grounds for concluding that they used ‘Syrian’ in these 
two specific situations to refer to the church and that they use ‘Assyrian’ to 
                                                 
550 My translation of the original in Syriac. 
 
Illustration 10: Cover of ‘The Shorter Catechism
of the Assyrian Orthodox Church. Source: ARS.
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refer to the national identity of the people. In the other writings in this 
publication, the lay authors also refer to the church by the name Assyrian. 
The fact that Fawlos Gabriel specifically used Aramean in his text, whereas 
all the others used Assyrian, shows that there were elite members who used 
the designation Aramean as a national name in this period. Nevertheless, 
there does not seem to have been a strongly overt animosity between the 
two groups. This is another indication that early umthonoyutho had a far less 
antagonistic character, as is the case today among protagonists of both 
names. 
 In America and Canada especially, the use of the name ‘Assyrian’ began 
to be exchanged for ‘Syrian’ after a decree promulgated by Patriarch Ephrem 
Barsaum551 on 2 December 1952.552 Until 1952, there is no indication that 
Patriarch Ephrem Barsaum opposed the use of the name Assyrian.553 Earlier 
in 1952 Archbishop Mor Athanasius Yesuh Samuel had settled in America 
and became the Archbishop for America and Canada. Following up this 
patriarchal decree, he became instrumental in the name change. To reinforce 
this decree, Ephrem Barsaum published the article The Syrian Church of 
Antioch: Its Name and History (1952). The introduction to the article is written 
by an anonymous community member in America who indicates that a 
disagreement about the name of the community had arisen around about 
1951 and, as a consequence, Patriarch Ephrem Barsaum was approached to 
‘shed light on the path’ of his church members: 
…We had never thought that the day would come when we would have to 
prove to ourselves that our name is authentic and valid. However, it is 
fortunate that this proof has actually become necessary for our Syrian 
followers in a foreign land where they were isolated, and so not well-
furnished with true and well-based information about their own Church 
and community, its language and its history… 
The author of the introduction writes: ‘…he [Patriarch] is the authority and 
the only heir to possess the right to talk about his own Church.’ This 
                                                 
551 On January 30, 1933, he was formally elected Patriarch of Antioch, assuming the 
ecclesiastical name of Mor Ignatius Ephrem I. Barsaum. 
552  At present, with the exception of the Assyrian Orthodox Church of the Virgin Mary in 
Paramus (New Jersey), the names of all the churches have been changed. 
553 See further for the several occasions on which he had used the name ‘Assyrian’, the article 
by William Warda ‘Assyrian Heritage of The Syrian Orthodox Church’, available at: 
http://www.christiansofiraq.com/joseph/reply2.html 
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anonymous author approaches his community as a church in contrast to 
those community members identifying as Assyrian and whose starting point 
is a cross-denominational identity. Moreover, he clearly appeals to the 
Patriarch’s position or authority in the use of his preferential name for his 
people. 
 In this article, Patriarch Ephrem Barsaum commences with the 
sentence: ‘The Syrian Community was known from its beginning as the 
Aramean Community.’ It is striking that he makes his main antagonistic 
standpoint in relation to the use of the name ‘Assyrian’ at the very beginning 
of the article. He begins his argumentation by referring to different sources 
(Biblical, Syriac Orthodox, Assyrian Church of the East and Western). In his 
argumentation, his principal focus is on sources which equate ‘Syrian’ to 
‘Aramean’. In short, his thesis is that the ethnic descent of the ‘amo Suryoyo 
can be traced to the Arameans and not to the Assyrians. 
 Following Ephrem Barsaum’s decree in 1952, the names of the churches 
in North America were changed from ‘Assyrian’ to ‘Syrian’ in the years 
thereafter and, since the American census of 2000, ‘Syrian’ has begun to be 
changed into ‘Syriac’.554 It draws the attention that the ‘name change 
intervention’ was limited to the USA and Canada. For example, the marriage 
certificate of the Syriac Orthodox Church in the quarter Karaköy of Istanbul, 
continued to use in English ‘Old Assyrian Church’ until at least 1979.555 This 
first church intervention is one example which shows how important the 
role of the clergy has been in the debate about the name of the people. 
Representing the most institutionalized discourse among Assyrians/Syriacs, 
by this ‘decree’ the Syriac Orthodox Church made a studied hegemonic 
intervention and dislocated the dominant cross-denominational discourse 
about the identity of the people. Understanding the role of the Church or the 
clergy in the ‘name debate’ therefore constitutes a key element in reaching a 
deeper understanding of the identity of Assyrians/Syriacs as a split subject. In 
the next chapter I shall illustrate how the Syrianska elite has made use of this 
main initial intervention by the Church in the ‘name debate’ in Sweden. 
                                                 
554 Archbishop Clemis Eugene Kaplan and Archbishop Cyril Aphrem Karim directed a letter 
to their community members in the USA, informing them to spell the name of their people as 
Syriac and not as Syrian at the American census of 2000. 
555 This document is to be found in Beth Sawoce (2001, section in Turkish). See further for 
the use of the name ‘Assyrian’ in English in the Syriac Orthodox church context in Istanbul in 
the 19th century, Illustration 3  – ‘Pera the Assyrian Church of the Holy Virgin’. 
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While in the USA and Canada the name ‘Assyrian’ lost space to the 
use of the name ‘Syrian’ in the 1950s, in the same decade in Syria, the 
process was reverse. ‘Assyrian’ began to gain a symbolic political meaning in 
the healing process of the split subject after socio-political changes in the 
discursive field in Syria. In the next section I shall process with a discussion 
of the emergence of ADO in this new discursive field.  
 
6.3 The Emergence of the Assyrian Democratic 
Organization 
In any discussion about umthonoyutho it is impossible to overlook the role of 
ADO in the revitalization of umthonoyutho in the homeland and its 
consequent emergence in the diaspora. I shall begin with an overview of the 
emergence of ADO in Qamishlo in Syria. In many respects, Qamishlo is an 
important place which aptly illustrates the continuity of discourses of 
umthonoyutho after the genocide during the First World War. Originally, 
Qamishlo was founded as a refugee camp under the rule of France for those 
who had escaped persecution (see further Chapters 3 and 4). My respondents 
describe Qamishlo as an empty, desert-like area with only a few scattered 
houses when they moved there in larger numbers after the Seyfo at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.556 They explain proudly how since their 
settlement they have managed to develop this once barren area into a lively 
town. Under French mandate, elite members from such towns as Diyarbakır, 
Adana and Mardin took the initiative and established Assyrian/Syriac 
schools and churches.557 A central figure among them was Shikri Çarmukli 
(originating from the village of Çarmukli near Diyarbakır) who had graduated 
from a university in Istanbul. He was also one of the people who took the 
                                                 
556 Qamishlo used to be the outskirts of the town of Nsibin which is located in present-day 
Turkey. 
557 The people who had emigrated from the villages in Tur ‘Abdin had never had any 
experience of the setting up of modern institutions. Consequently they played a less crucial 
role in the foundation of these modern institutions. Respondents mention that at a certain 
period there were about fifteen schools teaching the curriculum up to the grammar school 
level (baccaloria). Besides the common national curriculum, they taught the Syriac language and 
religious classes. A song written by the late Archbishop Dolabani that was sung in the classes 
at that time was En shofron l-nosh sohrotho li, lo shofron akh madrashto (no matter how beautiful 
castles are, they will never equal the beauty of the school). I remember I also learned it in the 
madrashto (church school) in Mzizah. This song is recently published by the Assyriska 
Kvinnoförbundet (2008). 
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initiative for the foundation of the association Rafidayn in 1934.558 After 
having been shut down for some years, the Rafidayn association was re-
established in 1944. 
 My respondents speak with pride about the success of this association 
through the diversity of activities it established, for which it won a high 
reputation throughout Syria at that time: scouts, orchestra, sports club and 
others. The character of the early umthonoyutho in the Gozarto (which was 
expressed among other things in the activities above) changed when the 
French mandate of Syria ended in 1946. In this post Second World War era, 
many colonized countries became independent, either by waging a war of 
independence or through the withdrawal of the colonial powers. This 
process of de-colonization aroused an ethnic or national awareness, often 
expressed by discourses of nationalism. To speak in terms of discourse 
theory, de-colonization caused a dislocation and created an empty space for the 
emergence of new subjects.  For Assyrians/Syriacs, just as it happened in the 
dislocation after settling in Syria itself, this meant a new dislocation and therefore 
a new orientation in the socio-political context in which the different groups 
and ideologies could begin to compete for new positions in the social field. 
 Consequently, while umthonoyutho was expressed in cultural and 
educational terms at the beginning of their settlement in Syria, about four 
decades later (1960s) umthonoyutho begins to develop a political character with 
the foundation of ADO as an underground organization whose goal was the 
representation of Assyrians/Syriacs’ national aims.559 Given the political 
context, ADO might be designated a political organization. The 
circumstances would weight more heavily than its concrete activities, because 
the latter assumed rather a cultural character. In this discursive field, the 
Baath party which was founded on April 7, 1947 (one year after Syria’s 
                                                 
558 Rafidayn is the Arabic term for Beth Nahrin in Suryoyo and Mesopotamia in Greek. The choice 
of the Arabic version might be an indication that the Arabic language had not yet assumed an 
antagonistic status in relation to the Suryoyo language. 
559 At its website ADO states: 
‘The Assyrian Democratic Organization is a national, political and democratic movement 
having for objectives the safeguard of the existence of the Assyrian people and the realization 
of its legitimate national aspirations (political, cultural, and administrative) in its historic 
homeland. The Assyrian people is the living and uninterrupted continuity of the people and 
the civilization of Mesopotamia (Beth Nahrin) under its multiple denominations and through 
all of its historical periods: Sumerian, Akkadian, Babylonian, Chaldean, Assyrian, Aramean and 
Syriaque [Syriac]. All of these denominations are national denominations under which our 
people were known in Mesopotamia in the historical context peculiar to each one of these 
denominations.’ 
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independence, April 17, 1946) gained representation in the Parliamentary 
elections in 1954. After it became a member of the government in 1956, it 
had an instrumental function in merging Syria with Nasser’s Egypt in the 
United Arab Republic in 1958 (which came to an end already in 1961). 
 Discourses of Pan-Arabism and the politics of Arabization have 
increased, especially since 1963 under the rule of the Baath Party. In this 
policy, the Arabic language was accorded a central role. President Nasser of 
Egypt defined an Arab as anyone whose mother tongue is Arabic. Pan-
Arabism can be analysed as a new hegemonic articulation of nationalism in 
the post-colonial period. In practical terms, this could mean that, within a 
relatively short period of Arabization politics, all inhabitants in Syria could 
begin to be defined theoretically as Arabs. The hegemonic articulation of 
Pan-Arabism was based on the idea of the unity of these ‘Arabs’ (within a 
chain of difference) and of the exclusion of those who did not identify 
themselves as ‘Arabs’ (within the chain of equivalence). This new approach has 
exerted an extensive influence on the political, social and cultural life of 
Syria. Among other minority groups, Assyrians/Syriacs (as far as they 
opposed the assimilation politics) also found themselves caught in the 
constitutive outside and began to fear for their existence as a distinct group 
of people. The fact that in the three preceding decades (under French 
mandate) they had enjoyed a period in which they managed to flourish 
socially, culturally and religiously, they were now confronted rather abruptly 
with having to destroy what they had built up. Meanwhile, they were 
expected to begin identifying as Arabs. Aho, who was a young boy at that 
time, recounts his experiences: 
After 1957, when Syria and Egypt developed a close co-operation, the 
pressure on the Suryoye increased. Little by little we grew more afraid. Non-
Suryoye began to adhere strictly to their Muslim religion and their Arab-
ness... I was young, but I noticed at home, for example, that my family 
began to be afraid. They said: “If they [Mukhabarat] hear this, they will 
come and take us. The system of the Mukhabarat had just then been 
established. They [Assyrians/Syriacs] also became afraid for their 
language, religion and identity. At this point, thoughts that we should not 
forget our language and identity began to stir... 
In 1955, a year after the Baath Party gained representation in Parliament, a 
group of umthonoye founded the Committee for the Love of Church and Language 
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(Si‘tho d-Rehmath ‘Ito u Leshono).560 Several respondents mentioned that initially 
motho561 (motherland) was also included in the name of this committee.562 
But, for reasons of safety they excluded motho from the name because by 
‘motherland’ they obviously meant a geographical territory different to Syria. 
Sharro, who was involved, mentions that the committee was actually 
founded as a political activity but it was connected to the church in order to 
keep its character and principal aim secret. The patriotic poetry and songs 
which emerged from the activities of this committee in co-operation with 
other umthonoye supporters had a visible influence on the literature and music 
of Assyrians/Syriacs and their social life.  
 The struggle for hegemony between different political parties in the 
1950s also created the goal among Assyrian/Syriac students of doing 
something for their people to safeguard their existence in this new 
antagonistic field. This resulted in the foundation of ADO in Qamishlo on 15 
July 1957.563 The emergence of ADO can therefore be seen as a response to 
the hegemonic articulation of Pan-Arabism.564 A second-generation activist 
of ADO reflects: 
The first group consisted of about twelve youngsters who used to meet 
together. And there was also Shikri Çarmukli. We call him the “spiritual 
father of the umthonoyutho in the Gozarto” [babo ruhonoyo du renyo umthonoyo 
bi Gozarto]. Youngsters discussed their need for a party [gabo] with him and 
with one another... 
As a consequence of the vacuum in the form of any political organization of 
its own, ADO became known as The Organization (i Mtakasto).565 Among its 
                                                 
560 Among them were the poet Shabo Bahe and Yuhanon Qashisho, the composer Paul 
Mikhael, Hanna Ablahad and others. 
561 Some respondents said that it was the word umtho (nation) which they excluded from the 
title of this committee.  The reason might have been that motho is no longer used very often 
today. Instead, the term umtho is much more commonly heard. 
562 Based on this initiative, the poet Yuhanon Qashisho wrote the song of which the first 
stanza is as follows: ‘…Eras will come and go, all three will remain there until the end. / The 
church, the language and Beth Nahrin will be on the lips of children.’ (O rehmath ‘itan tobtho / 
Wam‘alyath l-darkho tobtho / Kmo d-hobrien d dore o-ethen / Tlothe l-‘olam kayomien. / ‘Ito, leshono u 
Beth Nahrin, / ‘Al sefotho dabnayo ho d-khirien). 
563 It set up branches in the cities Hasake, Aleppo and Damascus, and across the border in 
Lebanon and Turkey. 
564 See for an elaboration BarAbraham (1997). 
565 The fact that ADO gained the informal status of The Organization indicates that it did not 
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founders there were members of the Syriac Orthodox Church, the Assyrian 
Church of the East and the Chaldean Church. This was in acceptance with 
the aim to function as a national, hence cross-denominational organization. 
Although Assyrians/Syriacs had already established several educational, 
cultural and religious institutions of their own, these were not represented in 
a political discourse. In its 50th anniversary booklet ADO states (2007: 26):566 
The establishment of ADO in July 1957 was a response to a national 
necessity imposed by the political, intellectual and cultural activism 
prevailing among our people, and also as a logical development in the 
context of the national movement striven for by the Assyrian people, 
driven by the inspiration of the first pioneers [such as Ashur Yausef, 
Naum Faik and Farid Nuzha], who cultivated the idea of nationalism. 
Moreover, belief in the national unity of our people as well as the 
attainment of their national rights in the homeland has constituted the 
basic stimulus for the establishment of ADO. 
The explicit statement of the need for national awareness and existence has 
remained a nodal point around which ADO has continued its work. Central to 
its ideology is the reconciliation of the schism which developed in the Syriac-
speaking Christian community in the fifth century (see further Appendix 1). 
This is based on the concept that the members of the different Syriac 
churches can be considered the same people ethnically, or to put it a 
different way, that they share the ‘same roots’. Ethnicity refers to relationships 
between groups whose members consider themselves distinctive (Eriksen 
1993: 6). Taking this starting point of a shared ethnicity, ADO aims to 
‘awaken’ the members of the various Syriac churches so as to realize national 
unity and to struggle for the existence of their people’s distinctive identity 
and national rights in the new political arena bristling with antagonistic 
discourses. This builds on the assumption that the unity of the nation has 
been historically interrupted. Reflecting on the status quo so far among the 
ordinary people, one of the Syriac Orthodox archbishops in Lebanon said to 
me: ‘We as a people did have an umtho (nation), but the people were not 
bothered about it. They were more religious and spiritual.’ Similar to ADO, 
this clergyman speaks about the umtho in primordial terms. To ‘awaken’ the 
                                                                                                               
have many Assyrian/Syriac competitor organizations. This could be explained by the 
underground character and the political field in which it functioned. 
566 ADO explained its ideas in the booklet Iddihat l-fikriye. Unfortunately I have not had access 
to this publication. 
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ordinary people would mean to plant in them the seeds of the idea of a 
shared ‘primordial essence’ with members of the other Syriac churches. It is 
the first step for a further objectification of their national identity. Similarly, 
Gellner (1964: 169) refers to the awakening of nations to self-consciousness 
as the invention of nations where they do not exist. 
 After the Rafidayn association was closed down by the authorities in 
1962 and the same fate befell the primary and secondary Assyrian/Syriac 
schools in 1967, fear of what was going to happen in the future mounted.567 
These institutions symbolized the development of Assyrians/Syriacs on a 
secular basis, something which early umthonoye and the ADO had been 
advocating for. My respondent Aho says:  
...fear that the authorities would harm us and that we were likely to be 
deprived of our rights. Why? Because we placed our hope in the church. 
When the leadership of the church obeys the authorities and bows its head 
to them, our hope vanishes. 
From about the mid-1960s (in order to accommodate the new political 
situation), umthonoye began to assume the form of more intensive co-
operation under the aegis of the church to legitimize activities which were 
otherwise forbidden and formerly organized by the Rafidayn association. The 
church board had established several committees in different fields.568 
 As already indicated, although ADO considers itself a political 
organization and has employed a politically motivated discourse, especially in 
the first decades its activities have been rather of cultural character. One of 
the reasons for this may have been that, until the beginning of the 1990s, it 
worked underground, forced to do so by its illegal status. Since then it has 
not considered itself an underground organization; but neither is it a 
recognized organization by the authorities. A former member of ADO who 
now lives in Germany reflects about its character in the early years: 
At that time we did not know who the leaders of ADO were; there was a 
secret committee [si‘tho rozonayto]... When I was about 13 years old, around 
                                                 
567 At the beginning of the 1990s, Assyrians/Syriacs were permitted to open some primary 
schools and after 2003 some secondary schools. But in Damascus no schools have been re-
opened after they were shut down in 1967. 
568 Among them were: Committee Mautbo Umthonoyo (Patriotic Board), Committee Sefro d-Had 
Bshabo for teaching Syriac, Committee Ahutho for organizing cultural activities in the hall of 
the church, Committee for the Scouts, Committee for the Poor, Women Committee and 
others. 
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about 1964, I joined ADO. Each group of five people working together 
were grouped in a krulto569. This was safer than working in a big group, 
since ADO was illegal. I remember that we were very afraid… hahahaha 
[laughs], I don’t know why we were so afraid; we were young! They 
probably taught us to keep it top secret. What we learned in these groups 
was about such people as Naum Faik, about our Mesopotamian history, 
about our language. They made us proud of our people. Until that time, 
we probably identified ourselves predominantly as Christians. But they 
[ADO leadership] taught us who Ahiqar, Hammurabi and other kings 
were. 
Despite the difficulties arising from its illegal status, ADO managed to 
continue contributing to the cultural awareness activities (including the 
encouragement of art and language) and education: people began to teach 
Syriac more explicitly, invested in the development of modern secular 
music,570 poetry, theatre571 and folk dances (which they learned from the 
members of the Assyrian Church of the East and the Chaldean Church in 
the Khabur area at the beginning of the 1970s resulting from the closer 
cooperation following from a shared ideology), installed new national days, 
such as the celebration572 of the Assyrian New Year on 1 April  (Ha b-Nison) 
and the commemoration of the ‘nation’s distinguished men’, such as Naum 
Faik on 5 February. The efforts of ADO resulted in the first recording of 
folk songs, which in fact meant love songs, in the year 1968. Until then, the 
secular songs produced since the 1920s by Gabriel Asaad had been in Syriac 
and were of a rather classical and patriotic character. Gabriel Asaad was the 
only one producing music until his student, Paul Michael, joined him in the 
1950s. The people learned these patriotic songs during events taking place in 
churches, associations and schools. At the end of the 1950s they began to be 
recorded by Yusef Shamun and Evelin Dawud. Also the folk songs began to 
                                                 
569 Krulto in Suryoyo means ‘circle’. A krulto is a committee and in the case of ADO it consisted 
of five people. 
570 Until then it was very limited. Not much research has been conducted into the reasons for 
this. In modern times, it was common knowledge among Assyrians/Syriacs that it was ‘not 
done’ to sing secular songs in Suryoyo or Syriac because of its ‘holy, religious’ status derived 
from Christianity. For this reason, they had been inviting local singers from different 
backgrounds to sing at their weddings in languages other than Suryoyo. 
571 George Farag, today a theatre and film director, poet and singer, began to write the first 
plays in the Suryoyo language. 
572 The first celebration of Ha b-Nison in modern times was in Urmia (Iran) in 1956. See 
further about this tradition, Paulissian (1999a, 1999b). 
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be recorded in this period. In order to make them accessible to the ordinary 
people the initiators decided that they had to be sung in Suryoyo (instead of 
Syriac which was less accessible for the ordinary people). Habib Mousa was 
then a young boy who sang in the church choir where he was believed to 
have the best voice. Therefore he was chosen by ADO activists to sing the 
songs of their first musical production. Today he is referred to as the ‘King 
of the Suryoyto Song’ (U malko di zmarto Suryoyto) because of his influence in 
the field of secular music. 
 Some of my respondents also mention that besides identification as 
Assyrian there were also individuals who identified themselves as Aramean in 
the Gozarto in the middle of the last century.573 One of the early members of 
ADO (who lives in America today), explains about the initial process of 
building up this organization and about negotiating the name of their people 
and ancestry with different individual activists: 
I remember that when I was a member of ADO, we had a meeting with 
some people who had not yet become members. Nevertheless, we tried to 
attract them. They did not want to [join]. They said they wanted to 
establish an Aramean organization. They did not know that we were 
members of ADO. We even helped them to establish an Aramean 
organization. We replaced the name Assyrian with Aramean in the papers 
we had. We began to work with them. At least it was better than allowing 
them to be Arabized. A couple of years later, these people came to us and 
told us: “We are Othurmoye.” They combined both names, arguing: “We 
are both Othuroye and Oromoye, since we [Suryoye] are mixed and we are not 
able to say whether we are solely Othuroye or Oromoye.” After a while, once 
the activities [fulhono] became more politicized, those who called 
themselves Othurmoye became active in ADO. You can see that they went 
through different phases. But there were also people in ADO who had 
personal problems with some other members and left it for those reasons. 
They founded new Suryoye organizations. Others remained and continued 
                                                 
573 One of the members of ADO remembers, for example, that the two Chaldean 
Archbishops – Augin Manna and Tuma Audo – thought differently about this: the first 
identified with an Aramean ancestry, the latter with an Assyrian ancestry. Usually, those 
adhering to the name Assyrian were identified as the followers of the school of Shikri 
Çarmukli, while those who tended to identify with the Aramean name had organized 
themselves around the church of Mor Paulus. Although I have tried to gain more insight into 
the ideas of the people organized around Mor Paulus Church, I have not been successful. This 
might be a consequence of the fact that it was a smaller group or less well organized and 
determined. It certainly requires further investigation. Respondents mention that individuals 
adhering to the Aramean name emerged more visibly from the beginning of the 1980s, at the 
instigation of the Syrian authorities in opposition to those who identified as Assyrians. 
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to call themselves Oromoye. The Suri Qawmi party [Syrian Social Nationalist 
Party] made use of this and tried to convince people that Suryoye are of 
Aramean descent, because the Arameans used to inhabit Syria... 
Although ADO worked underground in Syria, it managed to open branches 
first in Lebanon574 (1960s) and later in Turkey (1970s), where the socio-
political context also had a highly antagonistic character. In Turkey, the 
discourses of umthonoyutho were drastically dislocated during the genocide of 
the First World War. Thereafter, the period until the 1960s could be defined 
as a period of ‘silence’ in political and socio-cultural terms. The discourses of 
umthonoyutho (at cultural level) were lived, expressed and articulated at the 
individual level, mostly under the roofs of monasteries. This changed in the 
1960s. The direct link with Qamishlo and the impact of the 1960s leftist 
movement in general encouraged Assyrian/Syriac students who were 
studying in the big cities in Turkey to organize themselves. More specifically, 
the institutionalized forms of umthonoyutho in Turkey were made visible after 
Assyrian/Syriac students in Istanbul had become members of ADO in Syria 
at the beginning of the 1970s. MED575 Kültür Derneği (their first association in 
the Turkish Republic), which had been founded as early as 1962, had 
functioned until then just as a social club. After ADO’s involvement, their 
activities were based on the idea of cross-denominational unity and the 
promotion of Assyrian/Syriac culture.576 After the coup d’état of 1980, it was 
shut down by the authorities. 
 As mentioned above, another group which would play a dominant role 
in the ‘collective identity debate’ of their people in the diaspora is formed by 
students from monasteries in Tur ‘Abdin and Mardin. Although as students in 
the monasteries they had less space in which to organize socio-cultural 
activities, they did have access to the political debates taking place in society 
through the media. Moreover, they were among the few who had access to 
both the ancient Syriac manuscripts and modern literature which functioned 
                                                 
574 Jem‘iye Athuriye Thaqafiye (Assyrian Cultural Association) was the first association founded 
by ADO in Lebanon in the 1960s. 
575 See further about this association, Oussi (1998: 13, 14), Akdemir (2009: 150, 151). 
576 They organized, for example, activities in the different Syriac churches in Istanbul to 
induce some exchange and awareness of unity among its members. Students who returned to 
Midyad from Istanbul founded the Midyat Kültür Derneği in 1970. Although it was shut down by 
the authorities after two years, its members had been influenced by ideas of umthonoyutho. One 
of its members published the magazine Qolo d-Tur Abdin (Voice of Tur ‘Abdin). He stopped it 
after receiving political threats and migrated to Sweden. 
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as a source of their inspiration in developing ideas of a distinct nationhood. 
Among their teachers were those who studied at Syriac Orthodox 
monasteries in Lebanon in the 1960s and 1970s. Although it was not part of 
the regular curriculum, secular folk songs also began to be taught and sung 
alongside the hymns.  Ilyas Shahin, a former student of the Zafaran 
Monastery and assistant to Archbishop Dolabani during 1952/3, remembers 
the students singing these songs, especially at each reception of the 
Archbishop Yuhanon Dolabani in the beginning of the 1950s: 
We did not learn anything [explicitly] about umthonoyutho. But we sang: Beth 
Nahrin at ithaik mothan, [Beth Nahrin, you are our motherland], ett‘ir bar 
Othur ett‘ir [Awake son of Assyria, awake]... We sang them but, because we 
were young, we remained unaware of their precise meaning. When 
Archbishop Hanna and the church board arrived [at the monastery], we 
sang to welcome them... At the end of the reception, with [the later] 
Archbishop Çiçek and another friend who had a very good voice and lives 
in Australia now, each of us stood on either side and sang antiphonally: 
ett‘ir bar Othur ett‘ir. The second person would answer him: ett‘ir bar Othur 
et‘ir.577 
A great number of these students at the monasteries and at universities in the 
Middle East settled in Western countries and became the intellectual elites of 
their people in the diaspora. Considering the rather relatively low educational 
level of the ordinary people (especially those in Turkey), their role as 
teachers, clergymen, university graduates or professionals became even more 
central. They were those who had had access to earlier writings of the 
umthonoye which I discussed earlier in this chapter. And thus, they were the 
ones who interpreted and disseminated ideas about the identity of their 
people. 
 
6.4 Discourses of Umthonoyutho in Sweden 
I shall commence this section with a discussion of the emergence of 
umthonoyutho in the European diaspora which has been closely modeled on 
earlier umthonoyutho in the homeland. This discussion is also important for the 
analysis of the antagonistic discourses which developed as a reaction to these 
earlier discourses of umthonoyutho – which will be dealt with further in the 
                                                 
577 See further for this poem by Naum Faik, Section 6.1.1. 
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next chapter. 
 In the light of the initial function of the first Assyrian/Syriac association 
(Assyriska föreningen i Södertälje) (see further Chapter 5), the majority of the 
individuals on the board were relatively young, had developed a rapid 
command of the Swedish language and often worked as interpreters.578 As 
board members, they functioned as the representatives of their people in 
dealings with the authorities. Considering the central role of the name debate 
in this group, their role has been crucial indeed to the development of it. In 
their position as interpreters, they commonly translated the emic term Suryoye 
as the Swedish Assyrier (Assyrians).579 Among the translators there were 
individuals who were members of or sympathizers with ADO; some of them 
were already members in the Middle East and some were new members. The 
dislocation which occurred after emigration and the inevitable changes it 
incurred necessitated the finding of new identifications in their presentation 
of themselves to the new others. Moreover, it was the right moment to 
introduce new ideas to the ordinary Assyrian/Syriac people. The commonly 
used term ‘amo (people, ethnie) began to be defined more broadly and to be 
used interchangeably with umtho (nation), fitting a more political discourse in 
the broader context after dislocation. 580 
 They presented themselves to the Swedes as a ‘stateless people’ and the 
introduction of the designation Assyrier to represent this ‘stateless people’ 
involved the ‘teaching’ of a whole programme of rethinking their 
denominational approach to their collective identity (differently from what 
they were used to and from what they were supposed to in the Middle East). 
In Europe, besides the elite, also the ordinary people were actively included 
in this process. As discussed in the previous chapter, identification as 
Christians could not function as a viable boundary between themselves and 
the new ‘others’ in Western countries. A secularly based national ideology 
                                                 
578 Up to the present day, there is no mistaking that individuals who were among the first 
interpreters have continued to play a central role in the community life. 
579 But, before them, as discussed in Chapter 4, the first group which arrived in Sweden was 
presented to the Swedish authorities as ‘Stateless Assyrians’ by Mr Sims (Acting Chief of the 
Resettlement Section, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees) in July 
1966. 
580 In everyday life, the term ‘amo in Suryoyo is used with the meaning of people or ethnie. The 
term umtho implies more explicitly defined boundaries than the term ‘amo; it has a more 
political connotation. As a newly introduced idea among the ordinary people, speaking about 
the umtho, people will have to make explicit what the boundaries of this umtho are (see further 
Chapter 9). 
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was needed to develop a new boundary of distinction between them and the 
Westerners among whom they began to live. This could be found in the 
cross-denominational Assyrian ideology (which had already had that function 
in Syria where it was a counterbalance to Arabism): in which the different 
Syriac churches are seen as daughters of an ancient nation. The purpose of 
their activism is to reverse the split which occurred about 1400 years ago in 
order to heal their nation which they firmly place in Beth Nahrin 
(Mesopotamia), a geographical area to which the first umthonoye had referred 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. This allows space for their claim to 
be a different people from the current majority populations who identify 
with the nation states in the Middle East. Thus, also in Europe the name 
‘Assyrian’ continued to function as a way to seek recognition as a people.581 
On its website, the Assyriska riksförbundet explicitly states that it strives to 
safeguard the use of the designation ‘Assyrian’ and that it works for the 
ethnic recognition of this people by Sweden and the United Nations. Scholar 
and ex-activist Marauge reflects about how he has been using the designation 
‘Assyrian’ – expressing both hope and disappointment: 
Therefore I use the designation Othuroyo [Assyrian] as a political name... as 
an umbrella name for the dispersed and separated people who call 
themselves by different names, such as Chaldeans, Nestorians, Suryoye and 
so forth. The idea was that the institution which would organize these 
people would be secular [‘amonoyto] and not religious.582 As soon as the 
chosen designation cannot cope with this function, there is no longer any 
need for me to use it... 
Marauge’s last remark is a reference to his disappointment in the success of 
the project of umthonoyutho among the people. Later in this thesis I shall 
illustrate the background to this disappointment. 
 
6.4.1 Establishing Associations 
Above I mentioned that some of the youngsters on the board of the 
Assyriska föreningen i Södertälje were members of ADO, whose aim was to 
‘awaken’ the people and give them some comprehension of a distinct 
national identity and help them to accommodate to the new society in such a 
                                                 
581 The Assyrian Universal Alliance is member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples 
Organization (UNPO). 
582 See further Chapter 10 where I have discussed this idea. 
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way that they do not run the risk of assimilation. They made use of the 
Swedish integration policy which is based on equality, partnership and freedom of 
choice – a structure which offered immigrants the opportunities to find own 
institutions that would meet in their needs (see further Chapter 5). In order 
to realize this, ADO has founded associations to educate and ‘raise’ the 
people – paying special attention to the younger generations.583 ADO 
members travelled especially through Sweden but also through Europe to 
establish institutions and develop a structure for the implementation of their 
ideology. But these institutions never became legal members of ADO. The 
members of ADO existed of individuals. In Sweden, all the institutions 
founded became members of the Assyriska riksförbundet, which was also 
founded by the ADO. Because of ADO’s illegal status in Syria, it also kept a 
low profile (and retained a mysterious character) for a long time in Sweden 
and it was even not registered until the 1990s. ADO began to recruit 
members secretly, not because it had anything to hide from the countries in 
which they established themselves, but as a reflex reaction because it had had 
to work as an underground organization in Syria until the beginning of the 
1990s. This may have been an important reason for why the established 
institutions were not strictly bound to the influence sphere of ADO. 
 A look at the kinds of organizations which they have established since 
their settlement in Sweden, leads to the inevitable conclusion that there is 
now an increasing diversity: Assyriska föreningen i Södärtälje (1971), Ninves sport 
club Assyriska (1974), Assyriska riksförbundet i Sverige584 (ARS) (1977), the 
magazine Hujådå585 (1978), Assyriska Ungdomsförbundet i Sverige (AUF, Assyrian 
Youth Federation 1991) and Assyriska Kvinnoförbundet (AKF, Assyrian 
Women’s Federation).586 In time, many new institutions with more specific 
or broader aims were founded, each enjoying a longer or shorter life. In 
2010, the Assyrian Federation has twenty-five member organizations and 
two sister organizations (AUF and AKF). In its statutes (2009), it explicitly 
states that it is politically and religiously independent. Furthermore, it is 
                                                 
583 Its bi-monthly magazine DARBO (Road) which was published between 1984 and 
somewhere in the 1990s appeared in reality far less regularly and does not seem to have had 
the role which its name suggests. 
584 ARS is a member of SIOS (Samarbetsorgan för etniska organisationer i Sverige; the Co-operative 
Group for Ethnic Organizations in Sweden). According to the website of SIOS, it has 9221 
members. 
585 Hujådå (Swedish spelling) is pronounced as Huyodo (‘unity’ in Syriac). 
586 See further for the Swedish context in relation to the right to found institutions Chapter 3. 
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adamant that it stands for a combination of community, national societal 
(Swedish) and European-related goals. 
 In contrast to favouring an illegal status as was common among the 
founders of ADO in Syria, many of its members in Europe could not agree 
that they should continue to work underground in the diaspora. As they saw 
matters, they had not done anything wrong and Assyrians/Syriacs from 
Turkey especially did not see why they had to fear the Syrian authorities if 
they were living in Europe. Because of this disagreement in combination 
with the abstract ideas and aims of ADO which were exhorted in strong 
rhetoric but with relatively little activity, many of its members in Europe 
cancelled their membership. Nevertheless, the European context was also a 
reason for ADO to develop a more concrete programme with which to 
work. Despite distancing themselves from ADO, ex-members often 
continued their activism, either within the Assyriska associations or at 
individual level. Therefore, the role which ADO played in the foundation of 
the Assyrian associations and the activities which evolved within these 
associations in Europe has been of great importance. 
 With emigration, ADO developed into a transnational political 
organization (although it has always taken a stand against the migration). 
This has allowed it to build up a mobile, ambitious and idealistic network, 
ready to dedicate time to the needs of its people. In Europe its members 
began to translate the rather abstract goals which were formulated in Syria 
into the European context and form more concrete aims to work with 
among the ordinary people. The Assyriska Odom reflects retrospectively on 
the shortcomings which he experienced: 
As you know, we came from a background with a very low level in any 
aspect of life: education, politics and so forth. We came together in 
associations with the level which we had achieved and ended in a crisis. 
There was such a need for the work [fulhono]... People who were politicians 
should have shouldered the responsibility. Real writers should have 
become the writers of the people and real teachers should have become 
the teachers of the people. Initially this did not happen. It was as if one 
had heard an SOS message [hawaryo587] and anyone went to help out with 
anything [which was to hand] – without even knowing how to help. 
                                                 
587 Hawaryo is screamed by someone in need of direct help, for example, when his life is 
endangered by drowning or when caught in a burning house. 
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Instead of help, sometimes it transpired that it [the work] was destructive. 
Despite of this, something was created. 
In the first place, the logic of umthonoyutho has attracted the (relatively more 
highly588) educated and the younger people; it has offered an ideology to 
people in need of answers to many questions in a new society. In the first 
instance, this made it an attractive ideology. Individuals who had arrived 
from different areas in the Middle East had plenty of time to reconnect with 
each other.589 Discussions about their identity and the new society took place 
in these new networks in the different European countries. While umthonoye 
activities which were organized by ADO in Syria were mainly underground 
of necessity, in Europe its members could work openly and hence more 
effectively. Odom, a teacher of Syriac, had lived in Germany for a few years 
before he settled in Sweden in the second half of the 1970s. In Germany he 
was involved in similar processes of ‘awakening’ and awareness, leading to a 
redefinition of the collective identity of his people. In the citation below, he 
gives an example of these early networks of umthonoye elite members who 
inspired each other and imbued their new experiences with meaning. For 
Odom as a person, this indicates the individual process he went through and 
what this meant to him: 
After I left the monastery [Mor Gabriel in Tur ‘Abdin] for Gemany, I 
encountered the Assyrian ideology [renyo umthonoyo] for the first time in the 
1970s. I came into contact with the monk Jesu‘ [the later archbishop for 
Central Europe, Julius Jesu‘ Çiçek] and the children of the Poli family 
[who later settled in Sweden]. At that time, the monk Jesu‘ was studying in 
a monastery in Würzburg… He was on friendly terms with the Poli family. 
One day he came to me and told me that they would soon learn more 
about the history of the Suryoye [makthabzabno d-Suryoye]. Apparently they 
had one book of [the series] Mardutho d-Suryoye which was published in 
Brazil.590 Archbishop Jesu‘ wrote a [new] preface to it and it was 
                                                 
588 As discussed in earlier chapters, the people who arrived from Tur ‘Abdin and other 
agricultural areas in the Middle East were either illiterate or had a very low educational level. 
Only few had an academic background or had studied at a theological seminary in one of the 
monasteries in the Middle East. 
589 This contrasts with places in which people have far less time for each other and where they 
have already developed a more individualistic lifestyle, especially in Sweden. 
590 See further Zsaumo (1967). 
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republished as an editon of about fifty books.591 They presented it as: 
“This is our history; this is our umtho”. We began reading this book [and 
concluded]: “Oooh, we are Assyrians; we are from Beth Nahrin.” We asked 
ourselves: “Where is Beth Nahrin?” We searched for it on the map and 
learned that Mor Gabriel [Monastery] could be found in the middle of Beth 
Nahrin. “Ahaaaa” – we were surprised: In Mor Gabriel we used to sing 
songs about Beth Nahrin and we did not know where it was! I can say [with 
certainty] that the youngsters [‘layme] in Germany began learning about 
umthonoyutho in this period. We began by getting together at the weekends, 
staged theatre, and the youngsters from ADO, like Dr Sanharib, Dr Yacob 
Yallo and Dr Youkhanna visited us too.592 They mingled with us and 
delivered lectures on “Who we are” [ahna manna]. Sem‘an and Merado Poli 
were also there and discussed ways of developing the Suryoyo language 
with the monk Jesu‘. They had the idea that if they did not do something 
we would become extinct as a people; that diaspora would lead to 
assimilation. 
...When we heard during the lectures [given by the students from Syria 
who were members of ADO] that we are a people, it felt really great: a 
people with a history, language, civilization and culture. Everything 
showed that we really are a people. Before that we had felt like orphans 
bereft of a family, but since then... It was as if an individual had been 
reborn and noticed that he had brothers, sisters and parents... It was fine 
to hear these things. Of course, the dream of a homeland [athro] is in 
everyone’s mind. Even if one can live with it like a dream, it is good... We 
gave each other hope: we are a people; our motherland is Beth Nahrin... 
Just as in Syria, ADO organized its members into krulyotho (committees). 
Together they were responsible for organizing such cultural and educational 
activities as folk dancing, Syriac language classes, lectures about the history 
of the Assyrians, Assyrian/Syriac music and other cultural matters. These 
krulyotho were organized in each city in which a considerable number of 
                                                 
591 The preface ‘Laymo Suryoyo by Jesu‘ Çiçek (9 June 1975) is written in the form of a poem, 
consisting of seven stanzas. In the first stanza he praises the ‘laymo Suryoyo for being being 
‘awake’ (conscious) and full of love for the Assyrians but asks also the question when he will 
begin to develop the Aramaic language. In the continuation of the poem he expresses his 
ideas about his love for and the importance of this language. In the final stanza he writes that 
he vocalized the text and reprinted the book. Later this brought confusion about the question 
as to who reprinted this book. According to Abdulmesih Barabraham (private 
correspondence, 2010) it was the Assyrian Cultural Group (led by Barabraham; among the 
members were Sem‘an Poli and Zuheir Gewriye) in Würzburg that took the initiative to do so. 
592 See further also Chapter 4 about the emigration of Assyrian/Syriac students from Syria to 
Germany. 
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Assyrians/Syriacs had settled. Even more important and central, were the 
associations which ADO established. But not every individual who was a 
member of such an association or who was active on its board was 
necessarily a member of ADO. In the beginning, it also focused heavily on 
spreading its ideas and recruiting members. Yausef talks about his early 
experiences with ADO and the work in associations. In this long citation he 
indicates the early path-shaping process he went though as a new member of 
an activist organization and how early disagreements resulted in the splitting 
off of new organizations with divergent ideas. Today Yausef is no longer a 
member of any of these institutions but continues working for his people 
educationally: 
When I began going to the association I heard people saying ‘We are a 
people’ [1976; ahna ‘amona]. Many people were arriving in Sweden at that 
time. We made acquaintance with Gabriel Afram593 and others... We 
cleaned and painted the new association in Ronna, which was in the cellar. 
At the end of 1976 they asked me to become a member of ADO; it was 
something for all people who were active… But I did not think the person 
who asked me was an upright man; he liked to talk but did not do much… 
The people from Tur ‘Abdin worked with an open heart and were the 
driving force behind much work.594 We opened associations for the 
umtho... In the end, after persistent entreaty I decided to become a 
member. I had to go to the house of one of the members... He brought 
me the statutes and requested me to promise in the name of Othur [Ashur], 
the land of Assyria – and I promised to work for my umtho and people... 
Soon discussions arose in ADO, because there were so many new 
members with different opinions and competition for power. Instead of a 
meeting every fortnight, the meetings were changed to every two months. 
At first we did not know what was going on at the top of ADO; it 
functioned top-down. As members we could not function properly as a 
result. Therefore, I resigned from ADO and began working intensively in 
the Assyrian association in Ronna [founded by ADO]. I launched a 
department of culture. I set up a section for the magazines of our people 
worldwide. Magazines created hope among those who happened to see 
them. In next to no time we attracted many young people to the 
association. We began publishing a magazine too and tried to get all the 
                                                 
593 Gabriel Afram has played a pioneering role in Assyrian activism in Sweden. 
594 This respondent, Yausef, is from Tur ‘Abdin himself. It is a common idea among people 
from Tur ‘Abdin that their community members who grew up in Syria and Lebanon are more 
‘talkative’ but far less dedicated to getting the work done. 
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people who came to the association involved. I tried to develop a 
collective atmosphere. We encouraged emotions [reghshe] among the 
people. The top of ADO did not like this and accused me of being a 
communist…595  
In the next chapter I shall elabourate in more detail on internal 
disagreements and their effects on the community life especially at 
institutional level. 
 
6.4.2 Activities in the Associations  
The Assyriska activists have tried to reach the ordinary people through 
different means and activities. Discussing the main activities which have 
evolved from the aims of the Assyrier is important for gaining an 
understanding of the aims and activities which have been developed later by 
the Syrianska organizations (see further the next chapter) and of the 
discursive character between the activities of these two elite groups. As 
already discussed, the central aims of the Assyrier have been the creation of 
national awareness among the people, so that they win recognition from 
outsiders as a nation and ensure national survival wherever they happen to 
reside. One of my respondents spoke of ways of survival, referring to an 
Assyrian/Syriac author in Brazil: 
One of our teachers, [Danho Ghattas] Maqsi-Elyas, who lives in Brazil 
said: “For us, the diaspora has assumed the character of rivers. If we let 
these rivers flow in their natural direction, one day they will dry up. But, if 
we manage to direct them all towards one big body of water, they will 
continue to stream. In Europe we can link activities to each other. We can 
create bridges in Europe [in order to survive]. 
As already indicated, in order to realize this, the Assyriska institutions have 
developed programs which have been devised especially with the younger 
generations in mind. In the local association, which brought them together as 
a family, they have been introduced to new ideas through lectures and 
seminars. Moreover, activists have taught each other and the ordinary people 
Assyrian/Syriac music and folk dances, classical Syriac and spoken Suryoyo, 
encouraged sports activities and begun publishing the magazine Hujådå (to 
be discussed in more detail below). The Assyriska riksförbundet organized a 
                                                 
595 At the time of the interview, about ten people were identified retrospectively as belonging 
to the core ‘communists’ by several respondents. 
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youth camp (mashritho) twice a year for children in the age group from 7 to 
15.596 These camps were places where the youngsters learned about 
Mesopotamian history, their history after conversion to Christianity and the 
new symbols of their people which had been introduced in modern times. 
Each morning they began by singing the national anthem Deshte d-Baquba.597 
The camps have also developed social cohesion between the youngsters of 
the same generation with shared experiences. Shabo, one of the founders of 
an association outside Södertälje, says about their initial aim: 
Our goal in the beginning was that we had to be able to take care of 
ourselves in the diaspora: language, culture, history, teaching the youth 
about the renyo umthonoyo and being instrumental in developing intellectual 
young people who would be proud of their past and who would continue 
their education. 
Anything learned in these camps (masheryotho) was also taught in the local 
associations, for example most of the folk dances which were new to the 
ordinary people. Dances598 which they saw as part of their culture began to 
be introduced among the people, just as the secular songs which they learned 
in their mother tongue (see further section below). Odom, a teacher of 
Syriac, reflects in more depth about the main function of the associations at 
that time:599 
We had come to a new country and, if we had not been conscious of it, 
we would have lost our language. We wanted them [the people] to be 
aware of their responsibility in this new country, so that they would 
educate themselves, learning more about the society, learning about what 
attitude to develop towards the society and our own culture [mardutho]. In 
                                                 
596 Nowadays these youth camps are organized by the Assyrian Youth Federation and its 
member organizations. 
597 I also experienced this at a study camp which was organized by the Assyrian Women 
Federation in Sweden in 2006. They had invited me to lecture to them about my research 
topic. In the mornings they commenced by raising the Assyrian Flag accompanied by singing 
Deshte d-Baquba. See further for the lyrics the publication by Assyriska Kvinnoförbundet (2008). 
Deshte d-Baquba is the Baquba valley near Baghdad, where the Assyrian refugees from Hakkari 
and Urmia fled to in 1918. 
598 In section 6.3 I mentioned that they had learned these from the members of the Assyrian 
Church of the East and the members of the Chaldean Church. 
599 In relation to their function, card-playing by men who wanted to spend their time in the 
association was forbidden in the Assyriska associations at that time. Later, the board of the 
association could not stop this development. Therefore, during daytime, the big hall of the 
Assyriska föreningen in Södertälje is often full of men who play cards, have a drink and socialize. 
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the first period of the establishment of our associations, you could find 
more love than in monasteries! When an ideology [renyo] is new, it is 
common [for people] to be enthusiastic about it; it was sacred, something 
amazingly good. Our goal was: our language, church, people, athro and 
culture. We were a great people [‘amo rabo]; we left everything behind and 
came here. We should like each other more than we do now [referring to 
internal antagonisms]. We have no one else except each other. We 
suffered nostalgia for the athro. We satisfied the emptiness we felt from the 
loss of the athro by being together. We did not talk about achieving our 
own country [athro], but what we did say was: “One day we shall need our 
athro, our villages again”.600 ...but is it really possible to go back? Despite 
this, we believed that we should not forget it [athro].  We might have to 
leave these countries one day and that it is impossible to become part of 
them [to be fully accepted]. We have used the Jewish people who suffered 
to the bitter end as an example. We should be careful that something 
similar does not happen to us [here] too. 
As Odom’s citation illustrates, associations have been important, formative 
platforms for ethnic awareness. The logic of associations is based on 
building a community, gathering and organizing individuals around certain 
goals and aims. The establishment of civil organizations alongside the church 
institutions is an important step towards modernity. The concept of the 
‘imagined community’ was formed, reinforced and implemented through 
these associations. 
 
6.4.3 National Symbolism 
Another dimension of the discourses of umthonoyutho is expressed at the 
symbolic level. Ethnic symbols have played a discursive role in the 
construction of contemporary Assyrian national identity. Despite setbacks, 
ADO has worked steadily on building a cross-denominational national 
identity in co-operation with activists, especially those recruited from the 
Assyrian Church of the East and the Chaldean Church. ADO became a 
member of the Assyrian Universal Alliance (AUA, umbrella organization for 
Assyrian organizations worldwide, founded in 1968) and, working in close 
co-operation with it, the organization introduced national symbols, heroes 
and above all myths, focused on aspects of a secular history in the present 
                                                 
600 Here again, the concept of athro is a region without clear boundaries; it is an open concept 
to be filled with meaning. 
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and for the future. Although I do not wish to digress into too much detail on 
the introduction of national symbolism into the discursive field, it is 
impossible to pass it over in silence, but I shall concentrate principally on the 
Assyrian flag. 
 It is striking that those Assyrian/Syriac individuals who have played a 
central role in the formation of a national identity or those who have 
defended it in the modern historical period have afterwards been elevated to 
the status of symbolizing the nation.601 They have become national figures 
and myths. For example, Naum Faik is commemorated worldwide on 5 
February. He symbolizes the value of umthonoyutho for the people and, by 
commemorating him, all those who have contributed to the people are 
esteemed. Another way this is expressed is through the Naum Faik Prize 
which the Assyrian Federation in Sweden or one of its member 
organizations grants annually to an Assyrian/Syriac who has achieved a great 
deal for the community (the voluntary aspect is often important). A similar 
idea of appreciation is expressed with the ‘Assyrian of the Year’ Prize which 
is awarded to individuals who have devoted themselves to their people. 
 The celebration of the Assyrian New Year on 1 April (Ha b-Nison) is 
another national symbol in which the distinctiveness of Assyrians/Syriacs is 
expressed, with the strong implication of building on an ancient tradition 
(see further also Chapter 8). On this day, the revival and renewal of nature 
was celebrated in ancient Mesopotamia. Nowadays, Assyrians/Syriacs have 
espoused this idea – communicating a primordial relationship with their past 
and revitalize this tradition to strengthen their people’s sense of nationhood. 
In the homeland (especially Iraq and Syria), Assyrians/Syriacs hold joint 
parties en masse in some place of natural beauty. In the diaspora, Assyrian 
organizations arrange parties and often it is an occasion on which a political 
statement is made concerning their people’s situation. A national day which 
allows space for sorrow and expressions of grief is Martyr’s Day (Yaumo d-
Sohde). It has been commemorated on two different dates: 7 August and 24 
April. The first is based on the Simele Massacre in Iraq (1933); the second date 
refers to the first killings of Christian members of the elite in the Seyfo.602 As 
their national anthem, the Assyrier in Sweden have used the song Deshte d-
                                                 
601 Examples are Naum Faik, Ashur Yausef, Farid Nuzha, Mor Shamoun Benjamin, Tuma 
Audo, Hanna Salman and others. 
602 They have taken over the commemoration of the genocide on 24 April from the 
Armenians. 
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Baquba, of which the first stanza is in Western and the second in Eastern 
Suryoyo. Nevertheless, this anthem has not become a nodal point, since there 
are other elite members who propose the use of other songs.603 
 
     
Illustration 11: The Assyrian flag (left) and the Sun God Shamash (right). 
 
A symbol which incorporates elements from the past and today is the 
Assyrian national flag which was introduced in 1974 (see illustration 11).604 
Before that, other symbols or flags were used for shorter periods.605 I shall 
base the interpretation of the symbols on the description provided by 
Homer Ashurian (1999).606 To a very large extent it is based on the 
Mesopotamian image of the Sun God, Shamash (see Illustration 11), and on 
the insignia used by the Assyrian King Sargon II, signifying the might and 
great civilization achieved by the Assyrians. The ancient Assyrian God Ashur 
is portrayed in this insignia. The centre of the four-pointed blue star (which 
stands for happiness and tranquility) is a golden circle which represents the 
                                                 
603 Among them there has been for example Lekh men dil shlomo o ar‘o d-sobay (I send you my 
shlomo oh ancestral land) by the author Abdulmesih Qarabashi. 
604 The flag which is used now was designed by the artist George Bit Atanus from Iran. AUA 
approved it at its sixth congress in Yonkers, New York in 1974. 
605 An example is the flag which is used by Assyrians marching in the 4 July parade in 1922, as 
displayed in a picture on the cover of Donabed’s book (2003). This flag consists of three 
horizontal stripes in the colors blue, yellow and red. It draws the attention that these are the 
same colors as that of the Armenian flag but in a different order (Red, Blue and Yellow). 
Many among the group of Assyrians walking in the parade were from Kharput (Turkey) where 
they had been living among an Armenian majority. It is therefore probably not accidental that 
they used the same colors. Another example is the ‘Ashur’ flag which has been used in the 
Rafidayn association in Qamishlo until the present day. But since the introduction of the new 
Assyrian flag in the diaspora (see Illustration 11) it has been used alongside this flag.  
606 There are slightly different interpretations of the meaning of the symbols. See, for instance, 
Pauline Jasim’s at: http://www.aina.org/aol/flag.htm. 
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Assyrian sun-god, Shamash. The wavy stripes symbolize the three major 
rivers flowing through Assyria: the blue Euphrates denoting abundance; the 
white Zab in the middle portraying peace; and Tigris coloured red 
representing Assyrian national pride. The stripes symbolize both the 
worldwide dispersion of Assyrians and express the hope of an eventual 
return to their homeland – represented by the centre of the star. 
 It is this flag which the Assyrier use as their cross-denominational 
symbol.607 It is remarkable that the artist has not included any symbol 
representing Christianity. Probably this is the result of an attempt to stress a 
cross-denominational national identity of the people. Since approximately 
2000, I have come across new designs by (mainly) Assyriska youngsters who 
have combined this flag or some of its elements with the cross or this flag 
with the Aramean Flag (see the next chapter for the latter). These were 
meant for personal use, expressions of artistic, patriotic thoughts and ideals 
of re-unification after the split among the people resulting from the ‘name 
debate’. The myth of unity is also expressed in the use of both flags but as 
two separate images on a poster; attempting to appeal to both followers of 
the Assyriska and the Syrianska ideology. 
 When activities are organized the Assyrian flag is the central symbol – 
representing the ideology communicated. In the first three decades of its 
existence, it was a favorite pendant worn around the neck of activists or 
worn as a button stuck into a lapel, stamped on a tie or T-shirt at cultural 
and political activities or drawn on a face (as a football fan of the soccer 
team Assyriska FF). A tattooed flag has also been popular among the 
youngsters. In activities related to the broader society, the use of the 
presence of both the Assyrian and the Swedish flag can be observed in the 
room where the meeting is held. In the Assyrian association in Gütersloh 
(Germany), I observed the Assyrian flag was stuck to a world map among 
the flags of the world; the expression of an idealized situation in the hope of 




                                                 
607 In some of the versions used, the symbol of the Sun God, Shamash, and the God Ashur 
are missing at the top of the flag; perhaps to keep the flag more abstract. See, for example, the 
Assyrian flag used on the cover of the magazine Hujådå and on the website of the Assyriska 
riksförbundet. 
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6.4.4 The Magazine Hujådå 
In 1978, a year after the Assyriska riksförbundet was established, it began to 
publish the monthly magazine Hujådå and since then it has been its main 
mouthpiece. In the early 1990s the editorial page of Hujådå stated that it was 
a continuation of the magazine Huyodo which was published in America by 
Naum Faik. Probably this was to stress yet one more time that their ideas 
were in line with those of the umthonoyo Naum Faik, whom they consider to 
be one of the inspirators for their movement. Hujådå carries articles 
discussing cultural, societal and political issues and it appears in Swedish, 
English and Syriac (formerly also in Arabic and Turkish). At its peak it had 
worldwide one thousand subscribers.608 In the 1980s especially, it was of 
considerable importance to those elite members who lived dispersed 
worldwide and who were interested in keeping up with news and 
developments pertaining to their people. Today the new media have pushed 
it in its original monthly version into the background and since 2006 a digital 
but different version of Hujådå has been appearing on Internet.609 It 
publishes daily news concerning the Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden and 
international news which might be of some interest to their people. 
 I shall limit myself to discussing a few central points relating to the 
paper version. Three main periods can be roughly distinguished in the focus 
of the topics discussed: 1978-1985; 1985-1990 and 1990 up to 2009610. In the 
first period, the language used revealed an engaged leftist discourse and 
rhetoric. The first edition was published on 1 May 1978; a day which at that 
time was imbued with a symbolic meaning in leftist discourse. Assyrier 
actively participated in the 1 May demonstrations, making a statement about 
what they stood for. The topics in Hujådå covered matters related to the 
identity discourse of the Assyriska Movement. Historical and cultural articles 
about the history of the Assyrians and Mesopotamia have had an educational 
role in the process of teaching its readers to identify with ancient 
Mesopotamian history (which was a closed book to the majority).611 The 
                                                 
608 It was sent to thirty-five countries but the majority of its members were Assyrians/Syriacs 
in Sweden and native Swedes. 
609 http://www.hujada.com/. Two earlier attempts were made to produce a digital version 
(1998 and 2000) but the people in charge could not keep up with updating it. 
610 The publication of the paper editon stopped after a decision taken at the annual meeting. 
In 2009 a quarterly paper version of Hujådå with longer articles appeared four times. 
611 In the first number of Hujådå (1 May 1978), the poet, author and activist Yuhanon 
Qashisho articulated his discourse about the identity of his people in the article Vi är Assyrier 
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importance of the Syriac language and the necessity of teaching it were given 
ample coverage. Lists of words in Syriac were published with a translation 
into Swedish and a transcription of the Syriac to make it accessible to the 
ordinary reader. This has been one of the many attempts of the Assyrier to 
teach Syriac to the ordinary people. Hujådå also published short articles 
about Syriac literature, in an attempt to raise the intellectual level of its 
readers. Nevertheless, such daily social problems as matters pertaining to 
seeking asylum (often on the front cover) were also paid important attention. 
 In the second period of its publication, its most outstanding 
characteristic is the disappearance of the hegemonic discourse of the Assyrier. 
This is also expressed in the articles which tend to deal mainly with internal 
issues relating to the Assyriska Movement and its activities. This introverted 
approach has changed in the third period, after the First Gulf War in 1991. 
The disruption of the status quo in Iraq made the Assyriska Movement think 
about negotiating new opportunities for its people.612 Ever since, this theme 
has been continued, including calling attention to the situation of its people 
in Turkey, especially those caught up by the struggle between the Turkish 
army and the Kurdish guerrilla, and recognition of the Seyfo.613 This 
internationalization of political interests among Assyriska activists has also 
been expressed at other institutional levels. Although initially attention 
tended to concentrate heavily on the creation of an institutional life and 
culture in the diaspora so as to sustain the ‘dispersed community’, later the 
athro and the emigration countries were also put on the agendas of Assyriska 
associations. One such initiative resulted in the foundation of Beth Nahrin 
Solidarity Committee and the publication of the magazine Saubo (meaning both 
‘university’ and ‘direction’). One of the founders argues: ‘These people are 
faced with a national question which cannot be solved in Sweden but in the 
athro. Therefore I thought that the bulk of our activities should be 
undertaken for the people in the athro.’ Another example of these initiatives 
                                                                                                               
historiskt, geografiskt, språkligt och kulturellt (We are Assyrians historically, geographically, 
linguistically and culturally). 
612 In October 1991, a special edition of Hujådå was published entitled Världen tiger om Irak – 
den Assyriska tragedin (The world is silent about Iraq – the Assyrian tragedy). A long article in 
this issue bears the title A unified Assyrian government. 
613 Drawing attention to the problems faced by their people in Turkey, the articles have 
mirrored political activities relating to this. These include an article about a one-day school 
strike, the occupation of the office of Amnesty International in Stockholm, the hunger strike 
in Södertälje in an attempt to request recognition of the Seyfo and so forth. 
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is the aid organization Assyrier Utan Gränser (2007, Assyrians Without 
Borders, based in Sweden). 
 
6.4.5 ‘Our Culture’ 
The approach taken to ‘their culture’ by the Assyrier is strongly motivated by 
their aim to ‘retain’ and create a distinct culture and identity in order to stave 
off assimilation. They have built on the approach to culture which was 
initiated by ADO in Syria in which Assyrian/Syriac songs and folk dances 
were promoted. This seeking of cultural roots has been accompanied by the 
development of both classical Syriac and the spoken mother tongue, Suryoyo. 
Music and dances have played an important role in the creation of a sense of 
living a distinct culture and thereby group cohesion. As discussed earlier, to a 
great extent, in modern times Assyrian/Syriac secular music still had to be 
developed and be introduced to the people.614 On 8 December 1979, more 
than forty Assyrian musicians gathered in response to a call from the 
Assyriska riksförbundet to set up a working group to improve conditions for 
the development of art and music which would engender a cultural revival 
and create better conditions for the development of new Assyrian artists.615 
On the foundation of these aims, the federation suggested to its local 
member associations (hudre) that they establish a section which could take up 
this cause. This initiative resulted in the Union of Artists in 1980. 
Coincidentally, the need for such music grew because of the increased 
numbers of Assyrians/Syriacs to be found across Europe by the early 1980s. 
The Nineveh Music Group (NMG, Gudo d-Ninwe) was among the few first 
groups which toured through Europe to fulfil in this need. The process 
through which NMG passed so as to be able to fulfil the need for music was 
fairly brief. Nowadays a scholar and activist, Sabro Garis reflects on how he 
and other family members learned Assyrian/Syriac folk dances and played 
music as youngsters newly arrived in Sweden: 
In Gothenburg we founded a dance group and I began to learn how to 
play music... At that time opportunities were few and far between. There 
was one music group – Ishtar – and such individual musicians as Habib 
Mousa and Joseph Malke who performed at parties. During their 
                                                 
614 This does not mean that there was no secular music in earlier centuries. It is rather an 
indication that there had been a break up with this music. 
615 See further the editorial article Bättre och Bättre (Better and better) in the magazine Hujådå 
(01 January 1980). 
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performances I developed an interest in playing music myself... 
Afterwards, I learned some and rehearsed at home; my brother Fikri did 
the same... My sister Nahrin took up singing. And my cousins and Shikri 
began to play too… Slowly we transformed the folk dance group into a 
music group... This was an essential move at the time because there was 
only one other group and there were many parties... In the beginning, as 
representatives of our people, our performances tended to be for the 
Swedish people… This commenced in about 1981 – our first 
performance... I remember that the people [Suryoye] were astonished when 
my sister began singing. We were severely criticized in the Netherlands, 
because many Botoye616 were living there. They told us that it was 
inappropriate to make music. It suffered from the same image as theatre; 
it had overtones of prostitution and so forth.617 This was a wrong picture, 
but it stemmed their innocence and they were not well educated; therefore 
they simply did not comprehend... After a while they understood that it 
was not a bad thing... 
In this quotation, Sabro Garis illustrates that dancing, singing and playing 
secular music were not self-evident activities and that it took some time to 
overcome ideas of sin and shame among the ordinary people. In fact, elite 
members had to create new space for cultural elements which had no longer 
had been given any room in Assyrian/Syriac culture. Departing from the 
cross-denominational concept of ADO that all Syriac churches belong to the 
same people, Assyrians/Syriacs in the Gozarto copied the folk dance 
costumes from the Assyrians (here: members of the Assyrian Church of the 
East) and the Chaldeans in the villages of the Khabur area in Syria. An 
important part of this ideology is the secular aspect, including secular songs 
and dances, as part of the group’s identity. In the modern period in the 
homeland, many clergymen objected to dances and the singing of secular 
songs in Suryoyo and Syriac. As a reaction to this, the idea of Assyrier activists 
has been to re-introduce these activities among Assyrians/Syriacs, to round 
off the identity of the nation. Stressing the ancient character of Syriac 
Church melodies, such elite members as Sabro Garis emphasize their value 
                                                 
616 People from Garis’ village Bote in Tur ‘Abdin. 
617 In the traditional societies of the Middle East, ‘theatre’ has to struggle against this image 
and status. When I worked for the theatre company ZT Hollandia in the Netherlands, I had to 
start up the project with musicians in Aleppo (Syria) in 2002. When an older generation 
Assyrian/Syriac man asked me what work I was doing in Syria, I explained my job for the 
theatre company. Then he whispered to me: ‘Do not tell others you are working for the 
theatre; it has a bad image’. 
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in the continuation of their use in the production of secular music 
(malushinanne lbusho ‘amoyo): 
...At last we would have something that we could be proud of and that we 
can also use outside the church. We and others with us have tried this in 
different projects. The project with Nuri Iskandar was one of them.618 He 
is steeped in the melodies of the church and he has the talent to imbue 
them with a secular character. What had actually happened earlier [at the 
time of Christianization] was that the melodies of the people were 
introduced into the church and assumed a religious character...  
This illustrates how elite members have endeavoured to develop secular 
music as a new alternative to church music. Ascribing an ancient heritage to 
their church music, these elites find it a useful vehicle to stress their distinct 
culture in society. The repertoire which NMG gradually built up illustrates 
that it was not just making music for fun. Its primary objective in playing to 
the people was to influence them through its music and lyrics. Its members 
launched themselves with their first cassette Hubo d-umtho (‘Love of the 
Nation’, 1984) which consisted of patriotic, folk and love songs. The 
bandleader Sabro Garis says:  
We expressed our love for the umtho. At that time we were still on a quest. 
Singing was a way to reach the people with our ideas; singing was a sort of 
method of schooling; the people could be taught things. The same could 
be said of the children’s songs; we wanted to teach the children [Suryoyo] 
vocabulary… 
The attention paid to the language was two-dimensional. One of the goals of 
NMG was certainly to teach children the spoken Suryoyo language and 
elements of their culture through children’s songs.619 However, it also 
introduced the mature audience to the Eastern Suryoyo dialect (besides 
singing in their Western Suryoyo dialect). Singing in both dialects has been an 
attempt to overcome language differences in the process of raising awareness 
for the unity of the people. And singing itself has become a means to 
promote the Suryoyo language among the people; Sabro Garis says: 
                                                 
618 The Assyrian/Syriac composer Nuri Iskandar was brought over from Aleppo to co-
operate. In 1991, this co-operation resulted in the release of the cassette Modern Songs, Church 
Music and Hymns. 
619 NMG released three cassettes with children songs, Nineveh Zmirotho d-shabre (1986, 1987 
and 1994). 
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However, our principle was that we wanted to sing in Suryoyo only... They 
will be able to hear other languages by listening to other music. However, 
if we do not sing in Suryoyo [both dialects are assumed], they will not be 
able to hear it anywhere else... 
This indicates that they saw themselves as saviours of a language on the 
brink of extinction. Sabro Garis recalls that for the ordinary people, Sureth, 
the Eastern dialect in which they had begun singing alongside their own 
Western dialect, was new: 
…Once I sang a song in Madenhoyo [Sureth] and people began dancing the 
shoulder dance to its music. I remember that someone came to me and 
said: “You sing very well in Kurmanji.”...I told him that it was Madenhoyo 
and not Kurmanji...620 
The production and release of songs in Suryoyo meant that Assyrians/Syriacs 
who had learned to dance the Assyrian folk dances (among them shekhane, 
bagiye and juniye) to the songs in the Eastern dialect Sureth could now dance 
them to newly introduced songs in Western Suryoyo (Surayt), their own 
dialect.  
 Determined to increase their repertoire and reach out to more people, 
Sabro Garis took the initiative to release a cassette (Assyrian Boys, ‘Layme 
Bethnahrinoye, 1992) with rap songs, a compilation of patriotic and folk 
songs.621 This cassette demonstrates that the discourses of the elite are being 
continuously expressed through the medium of their songs. By including the 
song Ha ‘Amona622 (We are One People), Sabro Garis aimed to bring the 
message in this song to the attention of the people: ‘No matter what name 
for the people is used, all these names are related to one people... if we do 
not unite [mihaydina], we do not have any chance [of survival].’  
                                                 
620 Kurmanji is a Kurdish dialect which is spoken in Turkey, Syria and some parts of northern 
Iraq. This confusion illustrates that Sureth, the Eastern Suryoyo spoken dialect, had become 
foreign to many Assyrians/Syriacs who spoke the Western dialect (Surayt, to which I also have 
referred in this thesis as Suryoyo). 
621 Initially he wrote and arranged the music for the song Ahna Tre Kutlena, which was 
performed at an Assyrian Youth Festival in Sweden. Because it was so well received by the 
young people, he came up with the idea of releasing a cassette. This is about a decade earlier 
than most of the rap songs produced in the last few years. In Germany especially, various 
youngsters have begun to sing a combination of Suryoyo and German rap songs. Among these 
rappers are: Noble M, Levent Acar, Ninjos de Dios, Mc Gabro & Salo, and Ben E, Svenji, Flo 
& Matai. 
622 The lyrics of this song are by the poet Tuma Nahroyo (1936-2002). 
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6.4.6 The Language Project 
From what has been said above, it is more than obvious that language has 
received an enormous amount of attention from the Assyrier. This project fits 
into the broader idea that this people is a nation with its own language which 
should be respected at all times; if not the language will vanish. Moreover, 
there is probably less likelihood that a people without a distinct language will 
be recognized as a distinct people. Besides their efforts to stimulate the 
people to continue speaking their mother tongue and to teach classical 
Syriac, they have also attempted to teach the ordinary people and each other 
to ‘cleanse’ (madenfi) their spoken language of ‘foreign’ terminology in order 
to ‘purify’ it. In their attempts, they have introduced either classical Syriac 
words into the spoken Suryoyo or they have coined new words in Suryoyo, 
eradicating the former ‘foreign’ loanwords from other languages or 
introducing new terminology to express modern aspects in daily life. In the 
long term, this ‘language innovation’ is very evident in language use among 
Assyrians/Syriacs.623 
 Specific language use among Assyrians/Syriacs says something about a 
person’s ideas concerning language, often related to a certain ideology – 
Assyrisk or Syriansk. To give an example of this, on one occasion in 
Södertälje when a young man asked me where I was from, I answered from 
Tur ‘Abdin (as I knew he was from Qamishlo in Syria). Upon hearing my 
answer, he jokingly said: ‘Ah, you are one of those who says masa, ‘araba…’ 
and he mentioned a few more loanwords which we were used to employ.624 
He then went on to tell me what had happened to him while he was waiting 
at a bus stop in Södertälje: 
…I asked an elderly Suryoyo man who was at the bus stop if he had a 
sho‘tho [watch] and if he knew the time. The man replied: “First you should 
speak Suryoyo and say sa‘a [watch] and only then shall I tell you the time.” 
No matter how much I tried, the man would not tell me what time it was. 
He was angry with me because I did not use the words he had been used 
to employ and could not understand that I was talking better Suryoyo than 
he did… 
Sho‘tho is the Syriac word for watch, whereas sa‘a is the Arabic word to 
denote the same. This old man had been used to the word sa‘a and had only 
                                                 
623 See further about dilossia and neologisms in Suryoyo, Tezel (2011: 18-19). 
624 Masa is Arabic for table and ‘araba is Turkish for car. 
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come into contact with sho‘tho through the Assyrian ideology expressed in the 
language use of my respondent, whom he considered to be the antagonistic 
other among his people. The language use of the young man has therefore 
also come to represent an ideology and may therefore be rejected for that 
reason. In the field I observed that those adhering to the Assyrian ideology 
have preserved their Suryoyo language use more than those who have been 
opposed to the Assyrian ideology, as opposition meant inherently also a 
stand against projects of the Assyrier. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the purpose with which I set out was to illustrate the 
discourses of umthonoyutho from a historical perspective in order to reach an 
understanding of the formation and antagonistic character of identity 
discourses among Assyrians/Syriacs in the present-day. More specifically I 
have aimed at an illustration of the emergence and development of ideas of 
umthonoyutho. 
 Looking at the breaking points in the development of the discourses of 
umthonoyutho, the reasons for the split in the collective identity of 
Assyrians/Syriacs are more readily understandable. The rise of umthonoyutho 
was grievously interrupted by the Seyfo during the First World War. Between 
this genocide and the 1960s, there was no umthonoyutho movement in Turkey 
(with the exception of a few individuals).  In Iraq, discourses of umthonoyutho 
were dislocated by the Simele Massacre (1933) and in Syria the greatest 
impediment was the rise of Pan-Arabism in the 1950s. The impacts of these 
dislocations are a topic for further research. What is important to my study is 
that the discourses of umthonoyutho have also been continuously dislocated in 
the diaspora. This dislocation has been one of the main sources of the 
emergence of yet another split among Assyrians/Syriacs. In the USA and 
Canada, the decree promulgated by Patriarch Ephrem Barsaum in 1952 
stipulating the ‘correct name’ of the people led to a split which has continued 
up to the present. In Europe, the split occurred directly after the 
commencement of mass emigration in the mid-1970s. 
 As an introduction to the next chapter, the umthonoyutho of the early 
twentieth century differs from that of today in its inclusive approach to the 
unity of the people. In addition, it tended to be more inclusive of the 
different names by which the Syriac churches were known and exhibited less 
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of a dichotomous character (which is characteristic of the umthonoyutho 
among Assyrier and Syrianer in Sweden as will be discussed in the next 
chapter). The early period was characterized by the raising of an awareness 
of a shared historical background and the need for a cross-denominational 
approach among the people. In time, this myth for the unity of the people 
grew more politicized and reached out to more people. It no longer 
remained a topic discussed only among a few intellectuals who lived 
scattered in different areas and disseminated their ideas through the 
magazines which they published. Inherent in this process has been its 
antagonistic character. A plausible analysis of this historicity might be that 
while the discourses of umthonoyutho place strong emphasis on the ‘unity’ of 
the people, the counter-discourses have exacerbated the differences and 
caused a rift in the community using the name-debate as a tool. I shall 






7 THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
ANTAGONISTIC DISCOURSES 
 
In the previous chapters I discussed the settlement of Assyrians/Syriacs 
from two perspectives. Unquestionably, the Swedish authorities have 
accommodated their settlement and certainly they have personally made 
strenuous efforts to establish themselves as fast as possible. The pace and 
extent of their institutionalization process have attracted a great deal of 
attention. The upshot of this process has been a specific discursive dynamic 
in the Assyrian/Syriac community and between it and the Swedish 
authorities. Outsiders have asked questions about how and why this 
immigrant group, the majority from an agricultural background and with on 
average a very low educational level, has managed to found so many 
institutions within such a space of time. This is related to one of the central 
questions in this chapter: ‘How is it that in the first decade of their 
settlement in Europe, Assyrians/Syriacs already developed strong, 
antagonistic discourses about their collective identity?’ 
 One answer is to be found in the extent of their dislocation after 
emigration which produced an internal crisis among them. Although ideas of 
umthonoyutho and identity were discussed among the limited group of the 
educated elite in the homeland, in Europe these ideas reached the ordinary 
people too. This is the reason that, since the mid-1970s, the discussion about 
the ‘correct name’ of the ‘amo Suryoyo in the Swedish language has taken place 
within each family and wherever Assyrians/Syriacs have assembled. Matay, 
who was a teenager at that time, says: ‘We asked any source we could find 
what we were and why we had this discussion.’ 
 The ‘name conflict’ incorporates different aspects of Assyrian/Syriac 
societal life in Sweden and outside Sweden. The choice of a certain name for 
their people in Western languages is not simply a product of a certain 
ideology. If it is to be understood properly, it is necessary to pay attention to 
the antagonistic formation of relationships between elite groups. In addition, 
such elements as the difference between town and village, the generational 
gap, the competition between the clergy (as a religious elite group) and 
secular elites and the competition between lay elites with different ideologies 
and orientations must also not be overlooked. Assyrians/Syriacs refer to ‘the 
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side of Syrianska and the side of Assyriska’ (i khasra d-Syrianska u i khasra d-
Assyriska). I have approached these two sides as representatives of two 
different ideologies.625 In their antagonistic relationship, they have placed 
each other in the constitutive outside. The symbolic expression of 
antagonism is visible at all levels in the discursive field. Especially in the early 
period (until about 1990), antagonistic ideas were fought out in places where 
they gathered – at soccer fields, in cafés, in the church and on the street. At 
certain moments, hegemonic struggle and triumph is symbolically expressed 
and consequently augments. For instance, this emerges quite clearly in 
momentous political activities, such as at the foundation of the two satellite 
TVs626 in Södertälje and the soccer derby between the competing teams 
Assyriska FF and Syrianska FC. To exemplify this, when Syrianska FC won 
against Assyriska FF in 2007, the Syrianska FC fans rang the church bells of 
the Mor Ephrem Church in Södertälje to express their triumph; everybody 
had to be informed about the victory of Syrianska FC over Assyriska FF. 
 In the rest of this chapter, I shall first discuss (Section 7.1) the storyline 
of the ‘name debate’. In Section 7.2, I shall analyse the emergence of the 
Syrianska Movement. Discursive strategies devised by it to weaken the 
Assyriska Movement will be dealt with in Section 7.3. In Section 7.4, I shall 
discuss the logic of ‘ashirto (extended family) and its role in the discursive 
field. The ‘name conflict’ cannot be understood if the involvement of Middle 
Eastern regimes is ignored and this will be discussed in Section 7.5. In the 
final section, I shall explore the emergence of the discourses about the unity 
of Assyrians/Syriacs. 
 
7.1 The Storyline of the ‘Name Debate’ 
For a better understanding of the present-day antagonistic discourses among 
Assyrians/Syriacs, I have studied the emergence and the development of the 
‘name conflict’ by examining the main formative dislocatory moments in 
their short history in Sweden. My aim was to identify the moments at which 
the old status quo has broken down and a new status quo has developed. I 
have defined six periods in the storyline of the split subject; each constituting a 
breaking point and a formative moment in itself: 
                                                 
625 Khasra (side) is also used interchangeably with gabo (party). 
626 Suroyo TV and Suryoyo SAT were founded in the years 2004 and 2006 respectively. 
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• 1967–1976: The hegemonic use of the designation Assyrier; 
• 1976–1980: the hegemonic intervention of the Syriac Orthodox 
Church and layelite members and the emergence of the name 
Syrianer; 
• 1980: The Noyan Affair – a dislocatory moment for the Assyriska 
Movement; 
• 1981–1983: The threat of excommunication of the Assyrier;  
• 1983–1996: Challenging the hegemony of the Archbishops; 
• 1996–Present: The establishment of a new status quo. 
 
7.1.1 The Hegemonic Use of the Name Assyrier: 1967-
1976 
From their settlement in Sweden in 1967 to the beginning of the extensive 
‘name debate’ in 1976-77, the name by which Assyrians/Syriacs referred to 
themselves in Swedish was predominantly Assyrier. The Swedish authorities 
also mainly used this designation.627 Consequently, their first secular 
institutions founded in the first half of the 1970s bore this name too. The 
fact that all interpreters initially adhered to the Assyrian ideology is important 
in understanding the initial mass use of this name in the Swedish language. 
When the newly arrived Assyrians/Syriacs applied for asylum in Sweden, 
they received help from young Assyrian/Syriac interpreters who were already 
living in Sweden and at least knew the Swedish language. They had also had 
time to acquire some social, cultural and political knowledge of Swedish 
society. These interpreters translated the emic name Suryoye628 into the 
Swedish Assyrier. Until about 1978, the majority continued to use the name 
Assyrier in daily life, without any vociferous opposition to its use. This does 
not mean that there were no stirrings of discontentment in the group.629 
                                                 
627 In the written communication about the idea to invite ‘Stateless Assyrians’ to settle in 
Sweden, the name ‘Assyrians’ was already used (see Appendix 7). 
628 Most probably the Suryoye from Turkey used Suroye instead of Suryoye. See further the 
glossary. 
629 Carragher (1978) mentions that, until his publication, the following designations were used 
by Assyrian/Syriac institutions: Assyrier, Araméer, Suryoyo, Syrianer and Süryanier. The Swedish 
authorities had also been using a diversity of names: Assyrier, “Assyrier”, s.k. [so-called] 
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Nevertheless, most of this discontent remained latent and did not lead to any 
strongly marked antagonisms. The opposition to the name Assyrier only 
began to be articulated with the introduction of alternative names at the 
height of the mass emigration, in the mid-1970s. 
 
7.1.2 The Emergence of an Oppositional Organization: 
1976-1980  
In 1976, the first serious opposition came from a church-based organization 
– the Suryoyiska kyrkoförsamlingen (Syriac Church Assembly); this church board 
was founded for the Syrisk-ortodoxa kyrkan i Södertälje where Chorbishop 
Gabriel Aydin (Bar Yawno) had been consecrated in 1975.  The Svensk-
Suryoyo föreningen630 (Södertälje, 1976631) was founded a year later and 
eventually it was to play an important role in the future antagonism created 
in the discursive field. Various reasons have been adduced for the 
foundation of this organization. Present-day Syrianska elite members hasten 
to explain that it was primarily the outcome of a disagreement about what 
the name of their people should be in Swedish. My informant Mousa 
Afram632 – a firm advocate of the use of the name Araméer – gives also this 
reason for his departure from the Hudro d-Suryoye b-Södertälje (Assyriska 
föreningen i Södertälje), which was founded in Ronna in 1971.  After he left the 
former association, he decided to establish the first Arameiska föreningen 
(Södertälje) in Sweden. He revealed that he had difficulty in convincing many 
other Assyrians/Syriacs to use the name Arameiska because they found it 
                                                                                                               
Assyrier, Syrianer and Syrianer-Assyrier. Carragher was the Project Leader of Projekt för vissa 
flyktingar från Libanon, Syrien och Turkiet (Project for Some Refugees from Lebanon, Syria and 
Turkey) on behalf of the Federation KFUK-KFUM (Kristliga föreningen av Unga Kvinnor – 
Kristliga föreningen av Unga Män; The Swedish YWCA and YMCA). He wrote several pro-
memoranda (PM) about the ‘name conflict’ and influenced the Swedish authorities’ policy 
towards the group. Note that the name of the project is descriptive, and does not mention any 
name of the group because of sensitivities within the group about the name of their people. 
630 Carragher (1978) and Beth Sawoce (2007) mention that the term Ortodoxa was included in 
this name and that hence the name was Svensk-Suryoyo Ortodoxa föreningen. Several of my 
Syrianska respondents have said that Ortodoxa was not included. 
631 Beth Sawoce (2007) mentions that Svensk-Suryoyo föreningen was established in 1977. 
632 Mousa Afram was among the first Assyrians/Syriacs from Lebanon who settled in Sweden 
in 1967. His parents were originally from Tur ‘Abdin. He was raised in Qamishlo (Syria) and 
worked for some years in Lebanon before he settled in Sweden. In Qamishlo he was active in 
the Rafidayn Association and was therefore known by the Aramean name, which was used 
among some of the activists. 
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awkward on the tongue, largely because they were unfamiliar with it.633 
Afram mentioned that in his attempts to convince the people to use the 
name Arameiska instead of any of the other versions which the opposition to 
Assyriska began to use, he encountered resistance and was the recipient of 
such remarks as the following: ‘Arameans were pagans, what does this name 
have to do with us?’ After Mousa Afram moved from Södertälje to Motala, 
the people who took over the association changed its name to Syrianska 
föreningen (see also Nilsson 1981: 29). In Motala, Afram also founded an 
association with the name Arameiska föreningen (1986/7-1990) and as had 
happened on the previous occasion, after he moved back to Södertälje three 
years later, the people who took over the association in Motala changed its 
name to Syrianska föreningen. In short, the name Araméer and (its adjective 
Arameiska) failed to raise much support among Assyrians/Syriacs in the 
Swedish context. 
 In contrast to the Syrianer, the Assyrier argue that the principal reason for 
the split within Assyriska föreningen i Södertälje was the competition for 
influence between the younger people and the more traditional (mostly) 
older members. Later, this struggle was articulated in the ‘name 
disagreement’. The Assyriska activist Shabo says: 
The conflict was about the fact that the older generation was unable to 
accept that the young people were taking over the board of the 
organizatoin [after new elections]. The older people left and wanted to 
establish a new association in which they could take their seat on the 
board and be influential... The name itself was of secondary importance to 
them. 
Something similar is stated by the editor of the magazine Hujådå (September 
1980), in the article En presentation av Assyriska riksförbundet. He claims that the 
representatives of extended families played a relatively dominant role on the 
first board of Assyriska föreningen in Södertälje, despite the fact that the board 
did not have the required skills (such as command of the Swedish language) 
to meet the needs which the mass emigration of 1975 brought in its train. 
This is how the elections in the summer of 1975 were instrumental in 
initiating the change in the influence of mostly older, lay elite members after 
the younger elites had taken over the board.634 Apparently, traditional elite 
                                                 
633 The fact that none of my respondents mentioned Arameiska föreningen perhaps says 
something about the little space and influence it had in the discursive field at that time. 
634 See further about this also Nilsson (1981: 28). 
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members did not accept this change and founded their own organization. 
 Another factor which may have played a role in the initial ‘name debate’ 
is the role of Chorbishop Aziz Günel (based in Turkey) during his 40-days 
visit to Sweden. Jan Beth Sawoce informed me that he had a talk with the 
late Sabri Dbe Tumaki635 (one of the former presidents of the Syrianska 
riksförbundet) after he had become non-active.636 Sabri informed him that he 
had joined Chorbishop Aziz often to the Turkish Consulate in Stockholm in 
1977. According to Sabri, the Chorbishop expressed to the Turkish consul 
that he would prevent anyone from talking negatively about Turkey. 
Subsequently, the consul suggested Chorbishop Aziz to try to understand 
what the Assyrier aimed at and asking him to help to fight them. And in order 
to fight them, he proposed to found similar organizations which could fight 
the Assyrier. Sabri explained that Chorbishop Aziz liked the idea and that this 
resulted in the foundation of the Svensk-Suryoyo föreningen in 1977 and that 
they began to collect the names of the members of Assyriska föreningen which 
they provided to the Turkish Consultate. 
 Although the 1975 change of the board of the Assyriska föreningen 
constituted one of the main reasons for the emergence of antagonisms 
within the community, it does not seem to have been the only one. At the 
beginning of the 1970s, disagreements had already arisen about the 
appointment of priests for the community. At the end of 1972, Patriarch 
Jacob III visited Sweden for the purpose of negotiating between his 
community members. Negotiations during this visit resulted in Father Yusef 
Said being relegated to a non-active position (originally from Iraq; had begun 
to serve in Sweden since 1970). My respondents said that among the 
Midyoye,637 there were families638 who opposed him.639 In 1975, these families 
welcomed the Patriarch’s appointment of Chorbishop Gabriel Aydin from 
Midyad warmly. Both Andersson (1983a: 91) and Nilsson (1981:30) mention 
that the internal relations between community members worsened with 
                                                 
635 Sabri Dbe Tumaki emigrated to the USA where he died due to a sickness. This is the 
reason why I could not communicate with him about this matter. 
636 Beth Sawoce is planning to publish the communication he had with Dbe Tumaki in the 
future. 
637 People originating from Midyad. 
638 I have made their names anonymous. Among them were board members who had been 
dismissed from the board of the Assyriska föreningen in 1975. 
639 Without elaborating on it, some respondents mentioned that they believed 
Assyrians/Syriacs from Tur ‘Abdin as mostly illiterate former farmers did not understand 
Father Yusef Said, who himself was a high educated cleric and poet from Iraq. 
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Father Gabriel’s appointment. My respondents mentioned that the Assyriska 
activists requested from him strong and fast modernist reforms in order to 
bring about a strong secularization process within the community in Sweden. 
Apparently Father Gabriel thought that their requests were too high to meet 
at the pace they required from him when considering the whole 
congregation. This allowed a group of lay elite members to strengthen their 
position with Father Gabriel at their side in the opposition to the Assyriska 
föreningen. The activist Shabo reflects on the seemingly paradoxical 
relationship of the clergy with the umthonoyutho of the Assyrier:  
It is necessary to understand that at the time the laymen did not know 
anything about umthonoyutho, the clergy discussed and propagated it.640 But, 
when the laymen tried to develop it, they [clergy] distanced themselves 
from this movement... This fight against the Assyrian ideology [in Sweden] 
began in about 1976. Initially it began among the priests. As far as I know, 
it commenced with the opposition led by Father Gabriel Aydin. Actually 
at first he was supportive of the Assyrian ideology, but he opposed it later. 
The same could be said of Archbishop Aboodi… But now, after opposing 
it for a while, Father Gabriel Aydin is supporting the Assyrian ideology 
again.641 
It was in the year 1976 that the number of new Assyrian/Syriac immigrants 
reached its peak. Their primary requirement was a space to pray. Some 
Syrianska respondents mentioned to me that the moment Assyriska activists 
put a board bearing the name Assyriska Kyrkan (instead of Syriska Kyrkan) on 
the church building of Mor Ephrem in the Geneta quarter in Södertälje in 
1977, those who opposed the name Assyrier pulled the board down and 
smashed it. And, that strong opposition to the Assyriska föreningen had 
commenced. In reality, Assyriska activists only discussed among themselves 
that the name of the church should not have been Syriska but instead 
Assyriska, in coherence with how they thought their national identity should 
be expressed. Nevertheless, they never changed the board with the name of 
the church, Syriska Kyrkan. 
 The tense atmosphere in this period resulted in several clashes; of which 
                                                 
640 Several Assyrier activists mentioned that they learned first about umthonoyutho at the 
madrashto (church school) in Midyad, where they had been taught Syriac by Father Gabriel 
Aydin (Bar Yawno). 
641 During my fieldwork, I visited Chorbishop Gabriel Aydin. Unfortunately his health did not 
allow him to discuss this subject. 
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the main one was in June 1976. A few months afterwards, Chamoun Ganno 
was dismissed from the board of the Assyriska föreningen. In that same year 
(1976) he founded the church board Suryoyiska Kyrkoförsamlingen together with 
others who opposed the Assyriska föreningen and became its first president 
(Andersson 1983a: 91). Both Assyriska and Syrianska respondents confirm 
that when the representatives of this second organization arrived at the 
municipality to register it, they did not yet have a name for it. In an effort to 
help them, a civil servant at the Labour Market Board (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, 
AMS) suggested the use of the name Suryoyo. This is also noted by Nilsson 
(1981: 13-14):642  
A civil servant at the Labour Market Board whom I contacted mentioned 
that, to a certain extent, she was responsible for the fact that one of the 
groups was given the name Suryoyo... The actual situation at that time was 
that one of the groups... definitely objected to being called Assyrier. At the 
same time there was no alternative suggestion for a name... 
This is how the name of the Suryoyiska Kyrkoförsamlingen was chosen.643 
Several of this people in the church board (Suryoyiska Kyrkoförsamlingen) were 
also on the board of the Svensk-Suryoyo föreningen which was founded in 1977. 
The naming of the latter secular organization has been crucial because of its 
function as a nodal point around which an antagonistic discourse has 
developed in relation to Assyriska föreningen as the first secular organization. It 
is evident that disagreements about the name were born of the politics of 
difference within the group. In about the same period, the Syrian föreningen in 
Motala was founded, using the name Syrianer.644 Thereafter many 
organizations which called themselves Süryani and Süryanier were founded.645 
                                                 
642 My translation of the Swedish original. 
643 A journalist who followed this period from close by, Stefan Andersson (Hujådå, 1999), 
discusses the difficulty they experienced in choosing a name which could easily be adopted to 
Swedish grammar. The fact that this name changed several times in the years thereafter is 
partly attributable to this reason. 
644 Nilsson (1981) mentions that in Motala this association was founded by families who had 
moved to this town from Södertälje and who had founded the Arameiska föreningen in 
opposition to Assyriska föreningen in Södertälje already in 1975. 
645 These names were based on the reference to this group in Turkish language. According to 
my respondents, they chose these names because the ‘outsiders’ in Turkey referred to the 
group as Süryani and Süryaniler. In a letter which was sent to the Synod of 1990 by the 
Syrianska riksförbundet, it is stated that the present use of Syrianer is based on the English 
translation of Suryoye into Syrian. This statement can be seen as a retrospective rationalization. 
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 The Syrian föreningen in Motala initiated a working group for the 
foundation of a federation. At their meeting in Norrköping (26 November 
1977), eighteen Süriani organizations participated with the main aim of 
changing the name of their people in Swedish from Assyrier, which had been 
predominantly used in the Swedish public sphere (Carragher 1978). These 
organizations and clergymen stated in a letter to the Swedish authorities and 
media that it was wrong to use the name Assyrier to refer to their people, 
because 90-95 per cent of those who were referred to as Assyrier were 
Suryoyo, Syrianer or Süryanier (Ibid.). They argued that the name Assyrier 
applied to the members of the ‘Nestorian Church’, and that some people646 
consciously translated their name Suryoye into the Swedish language wrongly 
as Assyrier. These statements illustrate that this oppositional group identified 
at the denominational level and that they searched for a name which could 
represent them as members of the Syriac Orthodox Church. In an attempt to 
enforce their ideas about the ‘correct name’ of their people, this oppositional 
group requested the authorities to intervene by means of a governmental 
decree prohibiting the use of the name Assyrier (Carragher 1978). This did 
not happen. Instead, the Swedish authorities attempted to solve this conflict 
through compromises. However, none of the groups was open to a 
compromise, because in the eyes of each of them a compromise was equal to 
a ‘defeat’. As the authorities were unprepared for the mass migration of 
Assyrians/Syriacs, they were not ready to deal with their internal problems. 
 What does the existence of the secular organization Svensk-Suryoyo 
föreningen signify? In a nutshell, a new antagonistic path was created at the 
institutional level with consequences which reached worldwide for 
community members. This institution now represents a new ideology in 
relation to the collective identity of the people. The increasing opposition to 
the Assyrier by the Svensk-Suryoyo föreningen in co-operation with the church 
board Suryoyiska Kyrkoförsamlingen can be considered a historical event, stirring 
up strong antagonism in the social field. Retrospectively, the years 1975/6 
can be seen as a central moment for dislocation: At Father Gabriel Aydin’s 
(Bar Yawno) installation, lay elite members organized themselves around him 
and founded the Suryoyiska Kyrkoförsamlingen (1976) from where organized 
opposition was initiated. In the same year Mor Themotheos Aphram Aboodi 
was installed as the first Syriac Orthodox Archbishop in Sweden. One of his 
                                                 
646 Here Assyrier interpreters are implied; they assisted the newcomers in the asylum process 
they went through. 
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aims was to resolve the existing conflicts as quickly as possible.647 These 
developments were certainly not coincidences; they were interrelated. In the 
same year of his appointment as Archbishop in Sweden, Aboodi made no 
bones about his disapproval of the use of the name Assyrier for his 
community, arguing that the Assyrian Church of the East already used that 
name and therefore the Syriac Orthodox Church should not adopt it. Note 
that he argues at denominational level. Father Aday, in those days a strong 
lay activist among the Assyrier, expresses his astonishment at the 
Archbishop’s stand: 
Archbishop Aphram Aboodi came here in 1969... I still have his cassette648 
[recording of the sermon] on which he said: “My blood, name and all else 
are Othuroyo [Assyrian]”...In 1976 he came here and stirred up a strong 
opposition to Assyrians; he almost excommunicated them at the altar of 
the church. My main question is: “How did these people [clergy] develop 
an anti-Assyrian attitude?” 
The Assyriska riksförbundet reacted strongly when Archbishop Aboodi tried to 
change the name of the people from Assyrier to Syrier. In the local daily 
newspaper, Länstidningen (henceforth, LT), the conflict between the groups 
was discussed and the president of the Assyriska Riksförbundent, Besim Soysal 
(Aho), accused the Archbishop of being an instrument of the Syrian regime 
(Hultkvist 1976).649  
 In 1977 the crisis resulting from the ‘name conflict’ heightened and 
reached such extremes that Patriarch Jacob III made a second visit to 
Sweden, attempting to negotiate among the different parties concerned. 
Most importantly, he tried to force the Assyrier to stop using the designation 
Assyrier and to stop promoting a national secular identity. Nilsson (1981: 29) 
mentions that a year earlier, in November 1976, the church had requested 
that secular organizations should stop all their activities and instead, anything 
organized should take place under the aegis of the church. This indicates an 
attempt to enforce the hegemony of the church within the community. It 
                                                 
647 Aphram Aboodi had been visiting Sweden since the mid-1950s, representing the Syriac 
Orthodox Church at Ecumenical Church meetings, after it had become a member of the 
World Council of Churches in 1955. 
648 Archbishop Aphram Aboodi’s speech was held in Arabic in the Mor Yacob Church in 
Södertälje. It is available at the archive of Radio Qolo in Sweden 
(http://www.sr.se/rs/red/ind_ass.html) and at www.bethsuryoyo.com. 
649 See further Section 7.5. 
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can also be seen as an attempt to stop the process of secularization at the 
institutional level. Upon arrival, Patriarch Jacob III sent a letter (20 June 
1977) to the director of Statens Invandrarverk (SIV, Swedish Immigration 
Board), Kjell Öberg, in which he expresses his ideas about the collective 
identity of his community:650 
There have been some discussions about the name of the church. Some 
say Syriac Orthodox [Syrisk Orthodox in Swedish]651, others say Assyrian 
Orthodox [Assyrisk Orthodox in Swedish]. The correct name of the church 
is Syriac Orthodox. This is the name both of the church and of the 
community, because our church does not belong to any specific nation, 
but to many nations…  
This ecclesiastical intervention in the ‘name conflict’ was not limited to 
Sweden. It happened throughout Europe although at different levels, but the 
centre of the conflict was Sweden.652 Returning to the visit of the Patriarch 
to Sweden in 1977, at one of the meetings he had in Sweden, the Patriarch 
threatened sixty members of the Assyriska föreningen with reporting their 
names to the Syrian Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat) and with 
excommunication if they were to continue to use the name Assyrian 
(Andersson 1983a: 93).653 My respondent, Eliyo claims that the Patriarch also 
expressed this threat of excommunication in Mor Ephrem Church in 
Södertälje and in a church in Tumba654 at the Sunday mass. Furthermore, the 
Patriarch required that they explicitly continue to identify at the 
denominational level. In an attempt to end this threat with 
excommunication, the Assyriska activists asked the Swedish authorities and 
the Frikyrkoråd (Free Church Council) to mediate between them and the 
Patriarch. Consequently, the Frikyrkoråd informed the Patriarch that a clerical 
threat like excommunication did not exist in Sweden and that it would harm 
the position of the Syriac Orthodox Church in Sweden if it were to be 
pronounced. Eliyo mentions that at the same point they decided to translate 
                                                 
650 My translation of the Swedish original. This letter is available at SIV archive (Ddnr. 174-
7714732). 
651 ‘Syriac’ is my translation of the Swedish Syrisk. 
652 In the 1950s, as discussed in the previous chapter, Patriarch Ephrem Barsaum made a 
similar intervention in relation to the ‘name question’ in the USA and Canada. 
653 In the American context Patriarch Jacob III had excommunicated reverend Elias Sugar 
(who served for the Syriac Orthodox congregation in West New York (NJ) for using the 
designation ‘Assyrian’ (Makko 2010: 71, 86). See for this declaration MARA. 
654 They gathered in a church which they hired from the Swedish church. 
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the introduction of Patriarch Jacob III’s book, History of the Syrian Church of 
Antioch (1953), in which he wrote the introduction in Syriac:655 
As a nation among the civilized nations of the first centuries, we were 
supreme. The ancestors of the Syriac Church were the Assyrians and the 
Arameans. They were the first who taught humanity art… 
In order to confront the Patriarch with his own written work from 1953, in 
which he referred to both the Assyrians and the Arameans as the ancestors 
of his church, they left a copy of his original introduction in his hotel room, 
accompanied by a letter in which they requested him not to excommunicate 
them. My respondent, Eliyo, believes that these interventions were the 
reason for the Patriarch’s relatively mild sermon during the Mass in 
Stockholm in 1977, in which he stressed ‘love and unity’ and stopped 
threatening the Assyrier with excommunication. 
 To conclude the period 1976-1980 – I have demonstrated that an 
antagonistic group emerged in what is known today as the Syrianska 
Movement. Although the Syriac Orthodox Church intervened decisively, the 
Assyriska Movement remained strong and continued to enjoy legitimacy in 
this period. As idealistic young people, the Assyrier believed that one day they 
would convince the clergy and the ordinary people of their ideology. 
Characteristic of this period is that the identity discourses of the Syrianska 
elite stress their church affiliation and through this, their identification at 
denominational level. They base themselves on the denominational schism 
which occurred in the Syriac Church in the fifth century, which is what led to 
the creation of a Western and an Eastern Syriac Church.656 The competition 
between these two main discourses in the social field continued with great 
hopes on both sides until the Noyan Affair pushed the leading role of the 
Assyriska Movement in this process into a decline. 
 
 
                                                 
655 My translation of the Syriac original. He wrote this book as Severius Jacob, Archbishop of 
Beirut and Damascus. Interestingly, the citation with reference to the ancestors of his church 
is missing in the English translation of the introduction of both publications (1953 and 1989). 
656 See further Appendix 1. 
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7.1.3 The Noyan Affair: A Turning Point for the 
Assyriska Movement 
Towards the 1980s, the tension between the two groups reached its highest 
level. In 1980 Nilsson (1981: 34) wrote about this tension: 657 
...The internal conflict among Assyrians/Syriacs flared up again in the 
spring of 1980. A fight about leadership at organizational level ended up in 
open, armed violence in Södertälje, in which some people were injured. A 
severe beating with a wooden stick led to the death of an individual [Aslan 
Noyan] in Botkyrka in September 1980... 
The killing of Aslan Noyan658 by members of Assyriska föreningen in Botkyrka 
(Stokholm) in September 1980 constituted a dislocation of the Assyriska 
Movement in Sweden and marked the beginning of its decline.659 The victim, 
Noyan, was an active member of ADO until 1977 and had held the position 
of president of the board of the Assyriska föreningen in Botkyrka for two years. 
After he left ADO, he became a member of VPK (Swedish Communist 
Party) and the newly founded Progressiva ungdomsrådet (1980, Progressive 
Youth Council; later its name was changed into Progressiva ungdomsföreningen, 
Progressive Youth Association). This association had about 150 members, of 
which about ten were former members of ADO who became critical of its 
policy. Noyan also began to publish the magazine Hirutho (Freedom), which 
was heavily influenced by leftist discourses. In Suryoyo, the members of the 
Progressiva Ungdoms föreningen (Progressive Young People) became known by the 
name Shushotoye. My respondent, Matay (who nowadays identifies himself as 
Syrianer), was a member of this association when he was a teenager: 
                                                 
657 My translation of the Swedish original. 
658 His Suryoyo name is Sham‘en ‘Abdiyo. Because the media used the name ‘Aslan Noyan’, 
which was in his official papers, I have followed their example in order to avoid confusion. 
659 Fifteen Assyrier were prosecuted. Apparently, the aim of those who caused his death was 
not to kill him but to assault him to teach him a ‘lesson’ in relation to the disagreements about 
how the organization of Assyriska föreningen should be run (Katrineholms Kuriren, 9 December 
1980; the name of the author not available in the digital archive which I used). After Noyan 
and his friends had been dismissed from the board of the Assyriska föreningen in Botkyrka, they 
regrouped in the same association and appointed a new board, two days before the killing. 
Meanwhile, they had requested police protection. The police closed the association after a 
fight between Noyan and his friends and the Assyrier members of this association. As a 
continuation of this conflict, the latter group decided to teach him and his friends a ‘real 
lesson’ or to punish them for their attitude as a warning to them. The provincial prosecutor 
reported that the Assyrier believed that nobody, neither the municipality and the police nor the 
Migration Board could resolve their internal problems. Therefore, they decided to take the law 
into their own hands.  
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We saw the survival of the Suryoye through Communism and we were 
more communists than umthonoye. Portraits of Marx and Engels hung on 
the wall. There were no portraits of Naum Faik or any other of our 
people. But we had a big poster of a woman sitting at a hand-mill [goresto]. 
We had another poster of a girl carrying grain on her shoulders. On that 
poster was written [in English] ‘An Assyrian girl’. After the association 
began to oppose the Assyrians, they cut that text off and left only the text 
in Syriac which read ‘laymtho Suryoyto [here: implying the meaning of ‘Syriac 
girl’ by the Shushotoye]… 
Before Noyan was killed, both the Shushotoye and the Assyrier had several 
times reported the existing tension between them to the police but they were 
not taken seriously. The police did not intervene (Öste 1980). Only after 
Noyan’s murder did the Swedish rikskriminal (State Police Department) 
investigate the Assyrier-complex, more specifically ADO, thoroughly. In this 
police investigation, the killing of Noyan produced another lead, namely the 
role of the so-called ‘bank man’ in the conflict.  It was a common idea that 
someone who had been referred to as the ‘bank man’ in the Swedish 
National Police Report was the brains behind the Shushotoye association 
(Nilsson 1981: 90-92), although the association existed already and he 
became a member of it later. In about the second half of the 1980s, the 
Shushotoye ceased to exist. One of the theories is that the disturbances had 
commenced with the appearance of ‘the bank man’ in Sweden in 1977 
(Andersson 1983a: 53). This mysterious man used to hold a high position in 
a bank in Syria. According to the same report, the ‘bank man’ was a former 
ADO member until he joined the Baath Party in Syria. After he was 
dismissed from ADO for this reason, he was among the founders of the 
Suryoye Democratic Organization (SDO) which became an oppositional 
organization to ADO in Syria. Complying with the Baath Party’s ideology, 
the aim of SDO was to reach the full assimilation of Assyrians/Syriacs in 
Syria and Iraq. The activities of SDO stopped as soon as ‘the bank man’ 
arrived in Sweden, indicating his central role in this organization. The reason 
for the visit of the ‘bank man’ to Sweden was discussed in detail in this 
report. The Assyrier speculated that the man concerned had been sent to 
Sweden to cause a split among the Assyrier there (Ibid. 92). 
 The killing of Noyan was also discussed in the Swedish national media. 
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Many publications focused especially on the role of ADO in this affair.660 It 
was alleged to be and portrayed as an ‘illegal’, ‘terrorist’ and ‘fascist’ 
organization which co-operated with the Maronite Phalanges, hence, Israel, 
in order to establish an ‘Assyrian state’ in the Middle East. All these 
publications robbed ADO and the Assyrier of a large slice of their legitimacy.  
Assyriska respondents mentioned to me that the media was not willing to 
present what they had to say. The killing of Noyan also meant that people no 
longer dared to say they were Assyrier. The majority of their activities stopped 
and they split up into different groups as a consequence of internal 
disagreements.661 People tried to identify each other in an antagonistic field 
by asking each other the question: ‘Are you an Othuroyo?’ Meaning – ‘do you 
adhere to the Assyrian ideology?’662 Even Swedes started to joke: ‘Be careful, 
there is an Assyrian behind you!’ 
 
7.1.4 The Threat of the Excommunication of the Assyrier 
in Sweden 
Patriarch Jacob III died (June 26, 1980) without having solved the name 
conflict of his community in Europe. His successor, Patriarch Zakka I Iwas, 
inherited this problem and offered somewhat milder solutions. By the decree 
of the Synod of 29 November 1981, the Syriac Orthodox Church attempted 
another intervention to find a solution to this question.663 In an Encyclical 
(29 November 1981, see Appendix 8) it made statements about which names 
could legitimately be used by the church members:  
                                                 
660 For example, the Swedish Communist Party (VPK) declared ADO a fascist organization 
and a murder clique; it interpreted the killing of Noyan as a conflict between ‘socialists’ and 
‘fascists’ (Gysing 1980). The year after, Birgitta Bergmark produced a documentary about the 
‘Noyan Case’ which was broadcast on the Swedish TV Channel 2 (LT, 18 March 1981). In 
January 1982, another documentary, Klyftan (The Gap) was broadcast on Swedish national TV. 
Klyftan caused a huge reaction among Assyrier. They considered the documentary an 
instrument to stigmatize the group, rather than being objective and informative. See, for 
example, the articles in the magazine Hujådå (March 1982) by Jakob T. (family name was 
anonimized in original) and Tezel. An updated version of the same documentary broadcasted  
on STV in January 2011. 
661 For example, a group of Assyrier left ADO and founded a new hudro with the name Ha 
Nison. Its membership was composed predominantly of Assyrians/Syriacs from Syria. They 
focussed predominantly on theatre and music. It existed for only a few years. 
662 In this context, this is similar to asking someone whether she/he was a communist (during 
the Cold War in some countries). The answer would decide future contact and attitudes 
towards that person. 
663 See for a discussion of the first intervention in 1977 by Patriarch Jacob III, Section 7.1.2. 
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The Holy Synod has paid special attention to the issue of the true name of 
our Church. The Synod is of the following opinion: …our Church is 
known as the Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch (‘Idto Suryoyto 
Orthodoxoyto Dantiokh), and its language is known as the Syriac language 
(leshono Suryoyo), and its people by the Syrian people (‘amo Suryoyo)…664 We 
do not accept any other name. 
 What appeared and appears contrary to this name is not only alien 
and foreign, but also a distortion, falsification and forgery of the historical 
truth. We, in our Apostolic power, declare our distress and disapproval to 
the new names which have appeared lately and which have been attached 
to our Church and our people such as 'Assyrian', 'Aramaean' and the like. 
These names aim at distracting the existence of our Church, dividing its 
children, destroying the landmarks of its glories, and annihilating its 
civilization and its spiritual and humanitarian traditions… 
In a nutshell, the decree accepted only the use of ‘Syrian’ for the names of 
the church and the people and ‘Syriac’ for the language. Although the decree 
states that the Synod disagreed with the use of both ‘Assyrian’ and 
‘Aramean’, it is clear that the principal aim was to end the use of the first 
name. This postulation is supported by the process which followed, in which 
the name ‘Aramean’ and identification as such was dominant in the 
discourses of clergy. At the end of the decree (Ibid.), the clergy are 
addressed, mobilized and granted legitimacy to take the disciplinary actions 
needed to enforce the decision taken by the community members, explaining 
the forceful action taken by some clergy: 
…Therefore, we warn all the faithful of our Church, especially priests and 
deacons, regardless of their hierarchical offices, against adopting these 
ideologies which are in opposition to the Holy Church and its faith, and 
which are disgraceful to its reputation. We notify you that our Holy Synod 
granted power to the heads of archdioceses to take the appropriate 
ecclesiastical actions to deter those who entice so that they return to the 
path of truth, especially in archdioceses in which these ideologies have 
started to appear and have become dreadful, turning into grave danger for 
the Church. 
Following this decree, Archbishop Aphram Aboodi asked the members in 
his archdiocese in Sweden to sign a document renouncing the use of both 
names ‘Assyrian’ and ‘Aramean’ in 1982. No time was lost putting this into 
                                                 
664 Text between squared brackets in original. 
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practice; in February 1982 the people were visited at home and requested to 
sign the declaration below: 665 
Hereby I do solemnly swear to obey and abide by the statute, rules and 
orders of the Syriac Orthodox Church.  
I accept the Patriarch of the Syriac Orthodox Church [Syrisk, in Swedish] 
as the principal leader of the church and the decision of the Syriac 
Orthodox Synod of 03-11-1981 and of 15-11-1981 which refuses and 
forbids the Syrianskt folk (Suryoye)666 any activity which might be organized 
under the designations Assyrier and Araméer. Herewith, I confirm by my 
signature that I do not belong to any of the above-mentioned Assyriska or 
Arameiska  associations; or else I am aware that I can be excluded from the 
church for this reason and herewith lose my church membership… 
Hereby I do solemnly swear to obey and abide by the statute, rules and 
orders of the Syriac Orthodox Church.  
It is remarkable that in this declaration, the church is referred to by the 
Swedish Syrisk and the people by Syriansk (here, in relation to the use of 
Syrisk, Syriansk assumes an ethno-national character). This can be seen as an 
attempt to hegemonize the name Syrianer in opposition to the name Assyrier. 
Later, also the Church is referred to as Syriansk by the discussed oppositional 
group (see further Section 7.1.7). The implementation of this decree in 
Sweden by Archbishop Aphram Aboodi was widely discussed in the Swedish 
public sphere and within the community. The decree was a direct threat of 
excommunication to all those who did not obey the Church rules about the 
use of the name of the church and of the people. In order to legitimize this 
act, the church declared to the Swedish authorities that this declaration was 
intended for its statistical administration (Andersson 1983a). People who 
refused to sign this document were not allowed to participate in the church 
rituals. Archishop Aboodi had requested his priests not to administer the 
sacraments to anyone who identified him or herself as Assyrier. This meant 
that the newborn were refused baptism, engaged couples were refused the 
solemnization of their marriage, the dead were refused a funeral service, 
deacons were no longer allowed to assist at the altar and even attendance at 
church sermons was obstructed. These are very strong symbolic moments in 
a discursive struggle. In this period, children of Assyrier were also turned 
away from the church schools (madrashyotho), where they had been taught the 
                                                 
665 My translation of the Swedish original (see Appendix 9). 
666 Syrianskt folk and Suryoye are used in the Swedish original. 
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Syriac language, hymns and liturgy, by the people in charge (often priests and 
teachers). Lucas, a Syriansk student, remembers such an occasion: 
We were in the madrashto [church school]...  of the Mor Ephrem Church... 
When about six of our friends no longer showed up, we asked for the 
reason. They [teachers in charge] said: “We do not want them to come any 
longer because they are Othuroye.” Apparently their parents had not signed 
the paper [to confirm their membership of the church]… It was as if the 
term Othuroyo was something highly disreputable and as if Othuroye were 
the enemy... 
At a different level, depending on whether someone signed this document or 
not, the Syriac Orthodox community was divided into two groups; practically 
this split could mean that suddenly one part of a family had been thrown out 
of the church. This is very unique in the history of the Syriac Orthodox 
Church: people who are baptized in the church and who are considered 
members are still required to sign a paper in order to confirm their 
membership. In this case it has nothing to do with any theological matter; 
there is a political aspect involved. 
 As a protest to this measure, many who identified as Assyrier refused to 
sign it, because they never resigned or left the church. Instead, they 
continued to struggle for what they considered to be their right: to be 
allowed into the church again. Both the clergy and the Syrianer presented the 
rejection of signing this document as a conflict with the theology of the 
church, instead of relating it to a political dimension. The punishment of the 
Assyrier also affected a few priests667 who recorded their objections to the 
decision of the Synod in a letter which they directed to the Patriarch. 
Consequently, Archbishop Aboodi dismissed them and replaced them with 
other priests; they were no longer allowed to serve their congregations. 
Despite their dismissal, these priests disobeyed the Archbishop Aboodi’s 
order to stop administering the sacraments to the Assyrier. In their opinion, 
the Assyrier were still members of their church because they had not been 
excommunicated. They were convinced that the order to stop serving in the 
archdiocese did not come from the Patriarch. Therefore, they continued to 
                                                 
667 These were the late Chorbishop Isa Nehman, Father Yusef Said and Chorbishop Munir 
Barbar. They wanted to stop administering them the rites if the Patriarch were to state that 
they were no longer members of the church which they served. In 2007, these three priests 
received a prize in appreciation of their stand from ADO on its fiftieth anniversary which was 
celebrated in Södertälje. 
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administer the rites to the Assyrier at home. This situation gave rise to a joke 
about the Assyriska activist and Deacon Ilyas Shahin told by Syrianer. It is said 
that people saw him with a baptismal tube over his shoulder, wandering 
along the houses of the Assyrier to baptize their children. The purpose of this 
joke was to ridicule the situation and with that, the Assyrier. At the same time, 
it was an attempt to weaken them by placing them in the constitutive 
outside. It is this context again to which people refer when they mention: 
‘That child is baptized but he/she is still unclean.’ They did not accept the 
baptism as they regarded it as still illegitimate. There are cases of children 
who remained unbaptized for some years; formally they were not members 
of the church community and therefore in the constitutive outside.668 
 At the height of this conflict, the Assyriska riksförbundet appointed a 
‘Peace Committee’ (Si‘tho du Shlomo) to deal with this matter. This Peace 
Committee travelled to Damascus in an attempt to negotiate with the 
Patriarch being allowed to participate in church services again. In 1982, the 
Director of the Statens Invandrarverk (Swedish Migration Board), Thord 
Palmlund, also visited the Patriarch in Damascus to express his reservations 
about the Synodical decree of 1981 and its consequent implementation in 
Sweden. The explanation which the Patriarch gave him was that Archbishop 
Aboodi had misinterpreted the decree and had therefore implemented it 
incorrectly (Andersson 1982). Following this direct intervention in the 
internal matters of the community by the Swedish authorities, a special 
Synod was organized on 6 July 1982. The Synod stated in a letter to the 
archdiocese in Sweden that Archbishop Aboodi had interpreted the 
Synodical decree of 1981 incorrectly. Going into more detail, it explained 
that church members were not excluded from church services, but that this 
ban only meant that individuals who identified as Assyrian and Aramean 
were not allowed to hold a position on the church boards. Another letter 
which was written by the patriarchate of the Syriac Orthodox Church (2 
April 1983) and directed to Archbishop Aphram Aboodi makes the same 
statements:669 
                                                 
668 Another country in which the situation escalated was Germany, especially in the parish of 
Father Bedros Dbe Shushe (Ögünç) in Augsburg (at that time part of the Archdiocese of J. J. 
Çiçek). In other European countries, the antagonism had not yet developed to such an extent. 
669 Citation is my translation from the original in Turkish, published in the Patriarchal Magazine 
(1983, No. 24).  
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…The paper which you used in your archdiocese to collect the statistics 
[of the archdiocese] contradicts the decisions of the Holy Synod. 
Therefore, it is not valid. In its stead, in February 1983, a new document, 
which was decided on by the Synod… is the legal, valid document. You 
should be aware that this paper bears no relation to the name of the 
church, language and the ‘amo Suryoyo… Besides church membership, we 
recognize the freedom to be a member of a social organization (by 
whatever name and identity they have), unless this should contradict the 
laws of the church and the country they reside in… 
It is striking that the tone of this letter is much more moderate and that it 
also refers to obeying the laws of the country of residence. This is an 
indication of the Swedish authorities’ influence in the matter. 
 In several ways this period constitutes a turning point for the Assyriska 
Movement. Although the Assyrier again had access to church services, this 
process was besmirched by the killing of Noyan, which can be seen as a 
dislocatory event that considerably weakened the Assyriska Movement; it lost 
its relatively hegemonic position in Sweden and with that the organizational 
power which it had had in the 1970s. Its members had been put under great 
pressure and were subjected to intensive inflammatory propaganda. Many of 
its members resigned, including former leaders.670  One impact of this 
dislocation has been that the representation level of the Assyrier was split and 
damaged. Since then it has attempted to heal itself but it never regained its 
initial strength. 
 
7.1.5 The Position of the Swedish Authorities in the 
‘Name Conflict’ 
Whether or not they wanted it, the Swedish authorities were dragged into the 
‘name conflict’; although initially they defined this conflict as an 'internal 
group matter' for which solutions should be sought internally (see, for 
example, Carragher 1978). Nevertheless, especially in the first period of 
settlement, the authorities did take several initiatives to lessen the tension in 
the group. One initiative was the Projekt för vissa flyktingar från Libanon, Syrien 
och Turkiet, of which the purpose was to organize a meeting between the 
three groups concerned (Assyrier, Syrianer and the Church), but it failed to 
                                                 
670 For instance, one of the main leaders of the Assyriska Movement in Sweden, Gabriel Afram, 
resigned from his position as the President of the Assyriska riksförbundet (Hujådå, November 
1980). 
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reconcile all the parties (Carragher 1978).671 As discussed in the section 
above, the authorities intervened more directly when clergymen threatened 
the Assyrier with excommunication; a punishment which was presented as 
unacceptable in Swedish society. The authorities have also made use of 
academic research672 and, in some cases, also of individuals673 who were 
assumed to be knowledgeable about the group in order to find solutions to 
the ‘name conflict’. This approach implies that historical and linguistic 
research would help to discover the historical ‘truth’ and that this could bring 
the groups concerned closer to a solution. 
 Throughout this thesis, I have aimed to show that the ‘name debate’ is 
not related to a ‘truth’ which is hovering out there, but that it is a cog in 
competing discourses which have developed different truths. The fact that 
the authorities later began to advise the use of a compound name indicates 
this too. Desmond Carragher (Project Leader of Projekt för vissa flyktingar från 
Libanon, Syrien och Turkiet) was the first to advise that the designation Assyrier 
(which is favoured by one group within the community) no longer be used 
but to adopt the compound name Assyrier-Syrier instead.674 His compromise 
approach is particular to Swedish public discourses. In 1980, Thord 
Palmlund (Director of the Swedish Immigration Board) announced that, 
from that time, besides the compound name Assyrier/Syrianer his institution 
                                                 
671 KFUK-KFUM began to co-operate with Assyrian/Syriac secular and religious institutions 
in 1971. The aim of the Projekt för vissa flyktingar från Libanon, Syrien och Turkiet (1976/77) was to 
help them with establishing themselves at the institutional level so as to represent their 
members’ interests properly in Sweden. 
672 Two examples of studies directly related to the name debate are by Knutsson (1982) and 
by the Department of Sociology at the University of Gothenburg (1977). The name debate is 
referred to both explicitly and implicitly in the first research publications about 
Assyrians/Syriacs. Ornbrant (1981: 6) defends her choice to use the designation Assyrier in her 
book, since until that time this designation had mainly been used in Sweden. Because it was 
problematized afterwards, she used the name between quotation marks in her work. 
Björklund (1981) solved the issue for himself by using the emic name Suryoye and Andersson 
(1983a) makes explicit that he had sympathy for the case of the Assyrier and for that reason he 
chose to use that name. 
673 In the beginning of the 1980s, Ingmar Karlsson, who was working at the Swedish embassy 
in Damascus, had been asked for advice about different questions in relation to 
Assyrians/Syriacs, also in relation to the question about the ‘correct name’ for the group. His 
decision to reject any national identity of the people whom called themselves Assyrier resulted 
in heavy discussions between him and the group concerned. See further about his role, the 
article Olle Wästberg blickar bakåt! (Name of author was not mentioned. Hujådå, September 
1999). 
674 Syrier is the Swedish translation of Syrian. And Syrianer, which was later implemented as 
one part of the compound name, is a new name in Swedish for translating Syrian or Syriac. 
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would use the designation Syrianer specifically for those who identified 
themselves as such, specifically mentioning the Suryoyo riksförbundet and the 
Syriac Orthodox Church (Ny i Sverige, 1980).675 He also recommended that 
other authorities and the media did the same. Since then, the local authorities 
in Södertälje have mainly used the compound name. Journalists have been 
using different names, depending on their personal contacts with the group. 
Initially, both Assyrier and Syrianer were dissatisfied with the authorities’ 
decision to use the compound name and rejected its use. Although both 
groups have attempted to convince the authorities of their particularistic 
stands, they have not been successful.676 Initially, the Assyrier saw the 
activities resulting from the authorities’ attempts to solve the ‘name conflict’ 
as a way of driving a wedge into the community. However, in the 1990s, 
especially those identifying as Assyrier began to use it on some occasions. For 
instance, when writing official documents in which their purpose was to 
include all the people whom they consider to belong to the ‘amo Suryoyo or 
when they aimed at reaching all their people, no matter what ideology they 
have. The Syrianer continued to be dissatisfied and requested a ‘governmental 
decision’ which would forbid the use of the name Assyrier. Moreover, they 
still reject this alternative, seeking the use of the name Syrianer as the only 
solution. 
 
7.1.6 Challenging the Hegemony of the Archbishops 
The installation and dismissal of Syriac Orthodox Archbishops has been 
greatly influenced by the socio-political character of the social field; laymen, 
clergy, younger and older generations and activists have all been involved. It 
is therefore necessary to look more deeply into these processes. By the 
decree of 1983, the Assyrier regained access to church services, while the 
Syrianer began to negotiate their position in relation to that of the 
Archbishop(s). 
  
The Dismissal of Archbishop Aphram Aboodi 
Following the Synodical decision of 1983, Archbishop Aboodi allowed the 
Assyrier to participate in church services again and requested the members in 
his archdioceses no longer to discriminate against them. The church board in 
                                                 
675 See further about the use of the compound name by the Swedish authorities, Öste (16-12-
1980). 
676 See further about this aspect, Carragher (1978). 
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his archdioceses did not accept this change in his attitude towards the 
Assyrier and dismissed him the same year. The contradictions rose to a level 
at which the opposing parties began to discuss this matter in the media. In 
an article in the Swedish daily LT (Andersson 1983b), Archbishop Aboodi 
claimed that the church board had not been democratically elected and 
demanded new elections. In response to these claims, Ilyas Urunveren 
(President of the Syriac Orthodox National Church Board in Sweden) said in 
the same article: ‘He [Archbishop Aboodi] does not have the right to 
demand new elections. The board is democratically elected. We are his 
employer [arbetsgivare] and, since he disagrees with the board, we shall not pay 
his stipend.’ Furthermore, the Archbishop was also accused of being 
despotic, embracing the Assyrier and of accepting support from the 
communists (in this instance the Progressive Young People or Shushotoye) 
(Kücükaslan 1983). This disagreement illustrates the initial competition 
between the hegemony of the clergy and that of the traditional Syrianska elite. 
These laymen made use of discourses of secularism to counter the claims 
and demands of Archbishop Aboodi. As a solution to the heightened 
tension, the Patriarch appointed Archbishop Aboodi to an archdiocese in 
Australia (1983) and installed the monk Brother Abdulahad Gallo Shabo as 
the new Archbishop Mor Julius Abdulahad Gallo Shabo for the archdiocese 
in Sweden (1987).  
  
Archbishop Abdulahad Gallo Shabo: New Negotiations in the 
Discursive Field 
The installation of Archbishop Abdulahad Gallo Shabo in 1987 seemed to 
show that the aim of the Patriarch was to solve the crisis in the Swedish-
based Syriac Orthodox archdiocese. From the outset, Archbishop Gallo 
Shabo adopted an inclusive approach towards all the members of the 
archdiocese, be they Assyrier or Syrianer. This can be seen as his approach to 
heal his community in crisis – the split subject. In order to do so, he received 
several delegations from the secular organizations and church boards in 
Sweden. Apparently, some of these delegations complained to the 
Archbishop that the financial management of the Syriac Orthodox Church in 
Sweden was not sufficiently transparent.677 As soon as the Archbishop asked 
the church board for clarification, he was requested not to listen to those 
who asked these questions, because they were believed to be Assyrier whose 
                                                 
677 It is not the aim of this study to discuss this claim in any detail. 
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purpose was to harm the church. Eventually, the Archbishop’s interest in the 
financial aspects of the board was one of the major reasons one part of the 
community, the Syrianska representatives, no longer wanted him as their 
Archbishop. This reason was also broadcasted through the Swedish media. 
The church board claimed that the conflict began when the Archbishop 
wanted to establish his power over the church board and its financial affairs 
(Elworth 1990). In the same article, Elias Halef, the President of the 
National Church Board states:678 
…[Archbishop Gallo Shabo] is a person who wants to decide about 
everything. His position is costly for the church members. Therefore they 
should decide what sort of Archbishop they want… An Archbishop 
should adjust himself to Swedish law and culture… 
It is obvious that the secular discourse which Halef employs has been used 
instrumentally in the competition for hegemony and that it delves deeper 
than what is being communicated superficially. Eventually, the church board 
dismissed the Archbishop on the basis of the contract they had signed with 
him at his installation. In this contract, it was stated that the church 
employed the Archbishop whose tasks were to be limited to the religious 
sphere. This implied that the financial aspect of the church was not part of 
his duties; a conclusion with which he did not agree. It is important to note 
that signing such a contract was something new in the Syriac Orthodox 
Church; it can be interpreted as an attempt by lay elites to share in the 
leadership of the people, by dividing the tasks according to the religious and 
the secular sphere. 
 Archbishop Gallo Shabo continued his archdiocese with those church 
members who accepted him. The majority of the members in his archdiocese 
identified themselves as Assyrier. Therefore, among the ordinary Syrianer he 
began to be identified as the Archbishop of the Assyrier. The fact that the 
Assyrier happened to be organized under the aegis of a church which 
accepted them, no matter how they identified themselves, increased their 
legitimacy among the ordinary people in relation to the earlier period in 
which their position had been more marginalized. They were no longer seen 
only as ‘those who fight the church and who are against the church’. The 
focus changed to the allegations made about the assumed ‘incorrect name’ of 
their people. It is from this perspective that they began to be referred to in 
                                                 
678 My translation of the original in Swedish, Ibid. 
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terms such as ‘false Assyrier’. The ‘real Assyrier’ are considered to be the 
members of the Assyrian Church of the East. 
 
7.1.7 The Establishment of the New Status Quo: Two 
Archdioceses 
After the dismissal of Archbishop Gallo Shabo by the established Syriac 
Orthodox National Church Board, the Syrianska elite requested the Patriarch 
to consecrate a new archbishop for those church members in Sweden who 
had distanced themselves from Archbishop Gallo Shabo.679 After a long 
period of negotiations, the Patriarch agreed to their new candidate – Brother 
Benjamin Atas, a monk, – and consecrated him Archbishop Patriarchal Vicar 
Mor Dioscoros Benyamin Atas on 11 February 1996.680 Since then, besides 
the existing separate structure of secular institutions along the Assyriska and 
Syrianska ideology, there is a new dioscesan structure based on two 
archdioceses in Sweden; both based in Södertälje. Since this time, each town 
has had at least two churches, each of them connected to one of the 
Archbishops.681 The new discursive status quo is based on the stabilization 
of the split within the community in Sweden. Each archdiocese has 
attempted to run its own affairs independently of the other and has based its 
activities on the politics of difference, which is strongly expressed at 
symbolic level.682 It is important to note that community members identify 
each of the archbishops with a different ideology. Or, in other words, 
Assyrier and Syrianer have each organized themselves around one of the two 
Archbishops. The consequences of this process have been expressed in daily 
life, for instance, at soccer matches between the teams Assyriska FF and 
Syrianska FC. The two Archbishops attend mostly activities of the group they 
                                                 
679 In the period in which they had no Archbishop, hierarchically these church members were 
managed directly by Patriarch Zakka I Iwas in Damascus.  
680 In 2009, the Archdiocese of Archbishop Mor Dioscoros Benyamin Atas numbered twenty-
two priests. 
681 The town Eskilstuna, which is located 100 kilometres west of Stockholm, is perhaps the 
only town with only one Syriac Orthodox Church. It does have two associations: one Assyrier 
and one Syrianer. But, as illustrated in this chapter, identification with a certain name is not the 
only reason for founding new institutions. It is also motivated by the interest of certain social 
networks, in which extended families (‘ashiryotho) play a central role.  
682 Their independent position in relation to each other is expressed in the choices they make 
in the organization of their archdioceses. For instance, during my fieldwork I experienced a 
situation in which the two Archbishops decided differently about the ‘exemption’ from a 
fasting day. The members of the archdiocese complained about this difference, because it 
caused chaos and questions in relation to the matter of whether they had to fast or not. 
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represent. The relationship between the secular ideology of the Assyrier and 
the Syrianer and the two archdioceses in Sweden evolved in the use of two 
different names in Swedish for the church: Syriska Kyrkan continued to be 
used by the archdiocese of Archbishop Gallo Shabo and the new 
archdiocese of Archbishop Benyamin Atas began to use Syrianska Kyrkan. 
The latter is clearly the result of the institutionalized translation of Suryoye 
into Syrianer by one part of the community. 
 To conclude this section, it is obvious that the Syrianska elite members 
have taken a lead in running affairs in relation to the dismissal and 
installation of Archbishops for the Swedish-based Syriac Orthodox 
archdiocese. Although this elite gained its hegemony (initially in competition 
with the Assyrier) in co-operation with the church, over time the space which 
the church offered the same elite group became an advantage for its 
position, from which they began to compete with the clergy for hegemony. 
At the same time, this space has enabled them to continue the competition 
with the Assyriska Movement from a stronger position. 
 
7.2 The Syrianska Movement 
As illustrated in the storyline, the development of the Syrianska Movement 
passes through four main periods. The foundation of the church board 
Suryoyiska Kyrkoförsamlingen (1976) and the Svensk-Suryoyo föreningen (1977) 
marked the start of the first period which continued until approximately 1980. 
In this period, a group of lay people launched an opposition to the Assyrier in 
close co-operation with the clergy and fought against a national identification 
as Assyrier on the basis of a cross-denominational definition.683 What bound 
these laymen and clergy is that they opposed the Assyriska Movement (for 
partly different reasons).684 In their preferred identification, they based 
themselves on a religiously defined identity and thereby defined the group as 
                                                 
683 It is worth mentioning that from the earliest period some individuals, such as the late 
malfono Esmer Al-Khouri, expressed identification as Arameans, but this did not arouse much 
interest from people outside a small circle around him. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the 
influence of this circle has remained visible, for instance, in the St Peter and St Paul Church in 
Norsborg. In this respect, one can also mention the Arameiska föreningen (Södertälje, 1975). 
684 For instance, Archbishop Aboodi and the President of the Suryoyo riksförbundet signed a 
letter addressed to the Swedish authorities in which they requested them not to use the name 
Assyrier when referring to their people and language (Bahro Suryoyo, November 1979; see 
Appendix 10). 
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a church community. The second period (1980-83) was relatively short. The 
Syrianer gained relatively more space as the hegemony of the Assyrier 
declined. In the third period (1983-1996), the Syrianska elite opposition 
gradually developed into a movement with ethno-national aspirations. In the 
fourth period (1996-present), commencing with the installation of Archbishop 
Benjamin Atas, the Syrianska Movement gained its present hegemonic status 
in relation to the Church and the Assyrier. It is crucial to identify the nodal 
points around which the discourses of the Syrianska Movement have 
established and developed. Although these features (nodal points) have a core 
value, they are not static, as the different phases the Syrianska Movement 
went through illustrate. 
 The Syrianska Movement developed its present name, ideology and 
institutional structure gradually and in strong opposition to the Assyriska 
Movement. The character of the relationship between the Assyrier and the 
Syrianer can be explained from the perspective that the first group already 
had a cross-denominational national ideology from the beginning of their 
establishment in Sweden. Assyrier took the lead and promoted the concept of 
umthonoyutho among Assyrians/Syriacs. In contrast, the ideology of the 
Syrianska Movement developed after an initial confrontation with and 
consequent opposition to the Assyrier and thereafter, in relation to the 
ideology of the Assyrier. Consequently, in the first place the necessity for an 
alternative ideology evolved from the need for an ideology to compete with 
that of the Assyrier (who had a federation with thirteen associations in 1977). 
The oppositional character meant not simply the denial of what the ‘others’ 
have presented as the ‘truth’, but it also needed to develop an essential space 
for an alternative ‘truth’. This has taken concrete form in the foundation of 
Syrianska institutions, publications, socio-cultural and political activities. The 
Syrianska Movement began to intervene in all spheres of the community and 
made symbolic interventions in an attempt to position itself as an alternative 
ideology to the Assyriska Movement. In one of his latest presentations in 
2009,685 Johnny Messo (President of the Syriac Universal Alliance, SUA) 
spoke about Oromoyutho, der Schlüssel zur unserer nationalen Einigung und 
fortbestand (Oromoyutho, the key to our national unity and survival). As does 
Othuroyutho (Assyrian ideology), Oromoyutho (Aramean ideology) offers an 
ideology for the unity and the survival of their people. The title of Messo’s 
                                                 
685 ‘Vortrags abend über das Aramäertum und die syrisch-aramäischen Identität’, organized by 
SUA, 13 December 2009, Gütersloh, Germany. 
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presentation indicates very explicitly the development of the Syrianer from 
identification at denominational level in the 1970s, to identification at cross-
denominational level in the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
 The foundation of the first main Syrianska organization in 1977 – the 
Svensk-Suryoyo föreningen therefore had a pioneering function, resulting in a 
rapid increase in Syrianska institutions. In the same year, the soccer club 
Suryoyo SK was founded. In 1986 its name was changed to Syrianska SK and 
since 2002 it is known by the name Syrianska FC. In 1978, the Suryoyo 
riksförbundet (SRF) was founded. The youth board of the Syrianska 
riksförbundet (established in 1982) was transformed into a youth federation – 
the Syrianska Ungdomsförbundet (SUF, in 2010 its name was changed to 
Syrianska-Arameiska Ungdomsförbundet - SAUF) in the year 1992. In its statutes, 
SRF is defined as an independent and democratic umbrella organization with 
thirty-four Syrianska associations and a total of 18,923 members in Sweden. 
The main aim of SRF is described as ‘the protection and representation of 
the interests of the Syrianska people in Sweden ethnically, culturally, 
linguistically and socially.’686 At the international level, SRF is represented by 
the Syriac Universal Alliance (SUA687) and it is a member of the Swedish-
based Co-operative Group for Ethnic Associations (SIOS). The Syrianska young 
people also run a church-related national organization, Syrisk Ortodoxa 
Kyrkans Ungdomsförbund (SOKU – the Syriac Orthodox Church Youth 
Union), which was founded in 1996 by youth members of the churches in 
the archdiocese of Archbishop Benjamin Atas.688 Recently, in 2006, the 
Syrianska Movement founded the satellite TV channel Suryoyo SAT; two years 
after the TV channel Suroyo TV689 was founded.690 The aim for the 
                                                 
686 The other articles in its statutes are more or less similar to those of other civil organizations 
founded on the basis of the Swedish legal rulings and dominant discourse (such as equality 
between men and women, the emphasis on democracy and so forth). 
687 The Syriac Federations worldwide have been organized under the umbrella organization of 
the Syriac Universal Alliance (SUA) since its foundation in New Jersey on 16 June 1983.  At the 
moment, it has its headquarters in Södertälje.  In 1998, a daughter organization of SUA was 
founded: the Syriac Aramaic European Youth Committee (SAEYC). Its purpose is to attract 
the young people. In 1999, SUA was formally recognized by ECOSOC (the Economic and 
Social Council of the United Nations) as an NGO and was granted a special consultative 
status. 
688 In 2007, it had 25 member associations throughout Sweden, with a total membership of 
9596. It aims to reach out to Syrianska youngsters religiously, culturally and socially. 
689 The satellite TV channel, Suroyo TV, was founded in Södertälje by the Dauronoye (Gabo d-
Hirutho d-Bethnahrin, GHB, Mesopotamia Freedom Party) in 2004. The channel broadcasts 16 
hours a day and can be watched in 85 countries.  
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establishment of a second TV channel for Assyrians/Syriacs has been 
explained by its founders in terms of the need for the production of 
programmes from a specific perspective, which is seen as the ‘correct one’. 
At the introduction of this channel to the audience, the founders stressed 
that it is a TV ‘for the ‘amo Suryoyo and from the ‘amo Suryoyo’. This implies 
the idea that the earlier channel was not ‘from the people’, as they thought it 
included some ‘foreign elements’ such as the inclusion of the designation 
‘Assyrian’, which did not fit in with their ideology. It is important to note 
that the existence of both channels has created another public sphere for an 
exacerbation and growth of antagonisms. This is similar to the antagonistic 
space which was created by the existence of the two soccer teams (Assyriska 
FF and Syrianska FC) in the same town in the 1970s. 
 
             
Illustration 12: The Syrianska flag on the flagpole of  
       the St Peter and St Paul Church in Norsborg.  
Photo: Naures Atto. 
                                                                                                               
690 Earlier, Assyria TV had been founded by GFA (Furqono, Assyria Liberation Party) in 2000, 
but it did not last long because of a lack of financial resources and it closed down in the same 
year. All three channels have been financed mainly by donations from community members 
worldwide. 
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In the process of institutionalization, the Syrianska institutions have 
developed a specific relationship to the church. In their antagonistic 
relationship with the Assyrier, initially the Syrianer made use of the hegemonic 
position of the church to strengthen their position in the discursive field. 
Only later have the Syrianska institutions sought to develop a more 
independent position from the church organization. Nevertheless, a 
continued close relationship between the latter and the church can still be 
observed.691  
The change in the relationship to the church can also be observed in the 
name changes which the Syrianska institutions have undergone. The name of 
one of their first associations, the Svensk-Suryoyo föreningen, (1977), was 
changed to the Syrianska föreningen in 1981. Their federation, the Suryoyo 
riksförbundet692 (1978), was changed to the current name Syrianska riksförbundet 
during a congress of the federation in 1981.693  At the time of writing in 
2009, although the board on the building reads Syrianska/Arameiska 
riksförbundet, in the statutes its name has remained Syrianska riksförbundet. The 
inclusion of Arameiska in its name on the board indicates the stress on a 
cross-denominational national identity, even though the name Syrianska is 
supposed to send the same message. In the process of developing a secular 
national identity, the Syrianska Movement has followed a process similar to 
that of any other national movement: the re-invention of a past and the 
construction of symbols (flag, martyrs, heroes, national days and so forth). 
This process is also expressed in the discursive rhetoric used in the Syrianska 
riksförbundet’s monthly magazine, Bahro Suryoyo.694 
                                                 
691 Another indication of the initially closer relationship between the Syrianska associations and 
the church is that they have often been physically located either in one of the rooms or halls 
of the church, or beside it. Today, the Syrianska riksförbundet has a physically independent 
office in the centre of Södertälje. This is in contrast to the associations of the Assyrier which 
have had their independent locations throughout Europe from the beginning. 
692 In Suryoyo, the name of the federation was Qentronutho d-hudre Suryoye b-Eswed. The choice 
not to call it huyodo (another word for ‘federation’) may have had something to do with the 
name of the Assyrier magazine Hujådå (pronounced as Huyodo) and the already existing 
Assyrian Federation – Huyodo Othuroyo. 
693 The Syrianska activist Benjamin remembers that they also had a discussion among 
themselves about the name of the Federation: ‘Those who came from Tur ‘Abdin wanted to 
use Suryoye and those who came from Qamishlo wanted to use Syriani [Arabic for Suryoye]. 
Finally it became Suryoyo riksförbundet.’ 
694 For instance, in 1994, SRF announced a competition for a national anthem (Bahro Suryoyo, 
April 1994). In the article Kyrkan behöver ändra riktning, the Syrianska riksförbundet urged the 
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Illustration 13: The folkloristic dance group of Arameiska föreningen in Södertälje (1975). 
The Arameiska flag which hangs on the wall was inspired by the flag which was used in 
the association Rafidayn in Qamishlo (Syria). Source: Mousa Afram. 
 
7.2.1 The Syrianska Movement and the Aramean 
Heritage  
The Syrianska ideology builds on the idea that Suryoye are of Aramean descent 
(see further Chapter 8). In the process of the antagonism with the Assyrier, 
this ideology about an Aramean heritage has grown more pronounced over 
time and has been increasingly put into words in the discourses employed. 
This process can be traced in the articles about the history of the ‘amo Suryoyo 
which have been published in Bahro Suryoyo. In the first numbers (1979), the 
series of articles Historia, approached the history from a religious perspective; 
firmly placing the ancestral history of the Arameans in the genealogy of 
Adam and Eve. Later, as Nordgren (2006: 82-90) also noted, the emphasis 
turned to the more recent pre-Christian history of the Arameans.695 
 In need of books about ‘the history of their people’ in order to raise 
new generations with this consciousness, the Syrianska riksförbundet has begun 
                                                                                                               
church to be more transparent (Bahro Suryoyo, November 2002). The Seyfo question has 
featured prominently in Bahro Suryoyo since the mid-1990s (see further also Nordgren 2006). 
The article Våra Syrianska martyrer – våra hjältar utmanade livet och döden (Bahro Suryoyo, August 
1998) focuses on their martyrs who are referred to as heroes. 
695 An example is the series of articles Arameisk gren [Aramean Roots] (Anonymous, Bahro 
Suryoyo 1986, No. 1). 
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to translate696 and produce books about the Aramean heritage of the people. 
In 1983, a point at which the name debate was intense, the Syrian Organisation 
in Middle Europe and Sweden re-published Patriarch Ephrem Barsaum’s (1952) 
article The Syrian Church of Antioch: Its Name and History in which he assumes 
Aramean and not Assyrian ancestry for the ‘amo Suryoyo. He had published 
this in the American context in 1952 and accompanied it by an admonition 
to stop using the designation ‘Assyrian’ and to adopt instead the use of the 
name ‘Syrian’. His clarion call was to identify with an Aramean ancestry. 
About thirty years afterwards, in addition to the English translation (and the 
Syriac and Arabic original), the article was also translated into German and 
Turkish. A new introduction was added by the late Archbishop Julius J. 
Çiçek (the Netherlands), written from a new perspective in the discursive 
field of the 1980s but with the same message (see Appendix 11). At that time 
he fiercely opposed the Assyrian Movement. Çiçek explains the crisis which 
had arisen among the people, which he ascribes to the rise of the Assyrian 
political Movement. He accuses the latter of corrupting the name of the 
people. Furthermore, he encourages the reader to consult the book 
personally to lean about the history of the names Suryoye and Oromoye without 
being led astray by any specious argument. 
 One publication which is presented with pride by the Syrianska 
Movement is ‘The Hidden Pearl: The Syrian Orthodox Church and its 
Ancient Aramaic Heritage’ (Brock et al., 2001). The Syriac Universal Alliance, 
in co-operation with the Syriac Orthodox Church in Europe, financed this 
project. Consisting of three volumes and three videos, it focuses on the 
Aramaic-speaking culture of the Syriac Orthodox Church. This exclusive 
focus has been a point of vociferous controversy, especially after Assyrian 
activists complained about church involvement in the financing and the 
publishing of such a project, which excludes other elements of pre-
Christianity, such as the Assyrian culture. In the light of the present-day, it 
meant that the Assyrian identification among Assyrians/Syriacs was ignored 
in this publication; the identification as Arameans taking pride of place.  
 Although the Syrianska ideology assumes an Aramean heritage, this is 
not expressed in its name. The early path-shaping discourse of being Syrianer 
and not Assyrier also partly explains why the name ‘Aramean’, as introduced 
by a few Syrianska members, was not adhered to among the ordinary Syrianer 
                                                 
696 An example is Dupont-Sommer’s Les Araméens (1949), which has been translated into 
Swedish. 
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(see also Section 7.1.2). The academic activist Nahir reflects about the time 
he was the president of the Syrianska Youth Board: 
...At that time I was a strong believer in the Aramean ideology... We tried 
to change the name of the Syrianska riksförbundet to Arameiska. To some 
extent we were successful but, from the very outset the designation Suryoyo 
was spread among the people, it [Arameiska] was not adopted because it 
did not find wide acceptance among the ordinary people.  
One explanation for the rejection of the adoption of the name Arameiska is 
that identification as Syrianer has been reinforced by its antagonism to the 
name Assyrier.697 In fact, this reinforcement was carried to such heights that, 
the moment Syrianska activists introduced the name Arameiska among their 
members, the majority of them refused to accept it and its use remained 
therefore limited to a small circle of people. The Syrianer might consider the 
use of different names as a way of yielding space to the Assyrier. Any such 
weakness could lead to a weakening of their hegemony by undermining the 
name Syrianer; the symbol for the main antagonism in relation to the 
Assyriska Movement. That is why the name has always been used in a very 
strict sense in the discourses of the Syrianska Movement.698  
 
7.2.2 The Syrianska Flag 
The present-day Syrianska (Arameiska) flag (see Illustration 15) has gone 
through different stages of design on the initiative of people in Sweden. The 
flag which Arameiska föreningen in Södertälje has used since 1975 (see 
Illustration 14, centre) was based on the flag of the Rafidayn association in 
Qamishlo (Syria, see Illustration 14, left). The Rafidayn logo seems to have 
                                                 
697 Retrospectively, the use of the designation Syrianer is argued to have been for other 
reasons, namely, that the Syrianska riksförbundet followed the orders of the Synod of 1981, in 
which the use of both of the names ‘Assyrian’ and ‘Aramean’ was forbidden to Syriac 
Orthodox Church members. This argument is stated in the letter which the Syrianska 
riksförbundet sent to the Patriarch and the Synod of 1990: Kadasetli Antakya Kürsüsü’nün 
Saygıdeğer Lideri Mor Ignatiyos Zakka I Iwas ve Muhterem Sen Sinod Meclisi Üyeleri (Bahro Suryoyo, 
August 1990). This letter was written in the context of the conflict between Archbishop Gallo 
Shabo and the church board. The Archbishop was accused of favouring the Assyrier at the 
cost of the Syrianer. The argument for not having used the designation ‘Aramean’ can 
therefore be understood as a way to win the sympathy of the Synod for the Syrianska 
Movement. 
698 The strict identification as Syrianer also differs from those who identify themselves as 
‘Aramean’ in other European countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands. 
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been inspired by an image of the ancient Assyrian God Ashur (see 




Illustration 14: The Rafidayn logo in Qamishlo (left) painted by Hazqiyal Toros (1961). Source: 
MARA. The stamp of Arameiska föreningen (centre). Source: Mousa Afram. The logo of the 
Assyrians Students Union in Lebanon (1974) (right).699 Source: Archive Hanna Hajjar 
  
Different variations of the Rafidayn symbol (all with short wings) have been 
used by Assyrians/Syriacs both in the Middle East700 and in the diaspora701. 
Although Arameiska föreningen introduced the torch logo already in 1975 in 
the Swedish context, this design was not used by the Svensk-Suryoyo föreningen 
and the Suryoyo riksförbundet (1978) (the later Syrianska riksförbundet). Instead, 
representatives of the Svensk-Suryoyo föreningen asked the artist Hanna Al-Haek 
(Södertälje) to develop a symbol – two hands holding a flame  aloft – to be 
used on the cover of the magazine Bahro Suryoyo, published for the first time  
in January 1979 (see Section 7.2.3, Illustration 16, left). A year later (January 
                                                 
699 In the handwriting above the logo, Archbishop Athanasius Ephrem in Lebanon 
congratulates the students with their association, wishes them much luck and blesses their 
work. 
700 See for instance the symbol (the circle between the wings has been left empty) on the back 
cover of the book Qoruyo 2 by Yuhanon Qashisho (1956); the symbol used in Qamishlo 
during music festivals such as the Syriac Song Festival where a harp is situated in between the 
wings; the symbol used in Lebanon where often a cedar tree has been placed between the 
wings (for example that of the the Syrian League, 1977 and that of the Hudro d-Suryoye b-
Lebnon); the logo of the Assyrian Students Union in Lebanon (in Syriac it was named Hudro 
d-yolufe Suryoye, 1974) used the symbol which Qashisho (1956) placed on the back cover of 
his book but this time with a flower in the circle (see Illustration 14). 
701 Besides the version of the flag with the flame which Syrianska organizations have used, 
there are several logos where instead of the flame, a torch in between the wings has been 
used. Nevertheless, commonly, people see it as the same symbol and refer to it as the nuro 
(fire) or bahro (light). Examples where the torch has been placed between the wings are the 
logo of the Syrianska-Assyriska föreningen (2005) in Linköping, the logo of the Suryoyo Trollhätten 
föreningen, and the logo of the Suryoyo föreningen in Norsborg (later renamed Arameiska-Syrianska 
föreningen in Norsborg). It has also been placed on the cover of the music cassette of Fuat Ispir 
(1986) and that of Samaan Zakaria (1986). 
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1980), a new symbol was added on the back cover of Bahro Suryoyo: two 
wings with a circle in the middle, in which the letter ‘S’ (representing the 
name of the people, Suryoye) was placed (see Illustration 16, right). The wings 
used are longer than those of the logo as used by Arameiska föreningen and this 
is the symbol which became the basis of the future Syrianska flag (Illustration 
15, left). 
 In January 1981 this symbol was placed in the upper left corner of the 
cover page of Bahro Suryoyo, in combination with the ‘two hands holding the 
flame’ (still in the centre of the cover). In January 1982 these two symbols 
were replaced by a new symbol, the present-day Syrianska flag, which was 
designed by Abdulmesih Hanna (originally from Qamishlo). Since 1983 it has 
been used by the Syriac Universal Alliance and all its member institutions 
worldwide.702  
 
          
 Illustration 15: The Syrianska (Aramean) flag (left) and Gilgamesh between two Bull-
 men who support a winged disk, representing the sun (right). 
 
The Syrianska flag has been based on a relief which was excavated at Tell 
Halaf, Syria (see Illustration 15, right).703 It represents ‘Gilgamesh between 
Two Bull-men’ who supports a winged disk, representing the sun. In the 
Syrianska flag, the sun (as the symbol of the pagan god) is replaced by a flame 
which symbolizes the Holy Ghost (see Illustration 15). This change has 
transformed the identity of this symbol into a Christian one. The red 
background represents the blood spilled in the Seyfo during the First World 
                                                 
702 In practice some member organizations may use the symbol with the shortwings and the 
torch in its centre, because of assigning the same meaning to both symbols. 
703 This description is based on the information provided by the folder Syrianer; en nation i 
förskingring (Syrianska riksförbundet, 2004). 
358                                            CHAPTER 7 
 
War. Yellow was chosen to express the hope of achieving their own 
country.704 The Syrianska flag plays a central symbolic function at discursive 
moments, representing the Syrianska ideology. In a similar manner to the use 
of the Assyriska flag, it has been used as a tattoo on the shoulder, as a print 
on t-shirts, as a lapel-pin on suits and it has also become an object of art. On 
the Internet, it is possible to find images which are the result of creative 
expressions of living the Syrianska flag. It is used intertwined in images of the 
people, their past and in their hope for the future. It has come to represent 
an ideology with a path-shaping character for their people. 
 
7.2.3 The Magazine Bahro Suryoyo 
The first three numbers of the magazine Bahro Suryoyo (Suryoyo Light)705 were 
published by the Suryoyo föreningen in 1979 before SRF took over the 
responsibility for its publication in the period thereafter. When plans 
developed to found the TV channel Suryoyo SAT as a new medium of 
communication SRF stopped its printed version in the beginning of 2006.706 
Since March 2009, Bahro Suryoyo appears as an Internet magazine, of which 
the purpose is to reflect the development of the Syrianska people in society 
and to act as a platform for its members to air their views on socio-political 
issues.707 Until recently, Bahro Suryoyo functioned as the main mouthpiece of 
the Syrianska Movement; playing a role similar to that of Hujådå in the 
                                                 
704 It is remarkable that the colours of the Syrianska flag are also those which are used in the 
logo representing the Syriac Orthodox Church. Retrospectively, it will be hard to find out 
whether this is a coincidence. As already mentioned, the Syrianska flag is inspired by the flag 
of the Rafidayn association in Qamishlo. The pictures (from mid-1970s) of the first soccer 
teams, both Assyriska and Syrianska in Södertälje, reveal that the colours used for their 
uniforms were also in different combinations of red and yellow (Syrianska combined also the 
colour black with red and yellow). In the same period, these colours dominated also in the 
folkloristic costumes of the dance group of Arameiska föreningen (see Illustration 13). The 
commonly used colours red and yellow indicates at least that they had been inspired by the 
same sources at the beginning of their establishment. Another plausible explanation is that 
they started off in the same organization and that only after they distanced from each other, 
they began to choose for different colours which began to express their existence at symbolic 
level. 
705 Bahro Suryoyo can also be translated as ‘Light of the Suryoye’. 
706 The first numbers were written mainly in Turkish with some articles in Swedish, Syriac and 
Arabic. In the 1990s, articles in English were added and the number of Swedish articles 
increased. Nordgren (2006: 78) also noted this increase. He compared the language use in 
Bahro Suryoyo and Hujådå and concluded that the use of the Swedish language had increased in 
both cases: Bahro Suryoyo shows an increase from 6 per cent in 1979 to 41 per cent in 2004. 
Hujådå showed an increase from 15 per cent in 1979 to 35 per cent in 2004.  
707 See further www.bahro.nu  
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Assyriska Movement. It communicated its particular ideology about the 
identity of their people to the dispersed community worldwide. For instance, 
in the first publication of Bahro Suryoyo (January 1979), the editor writes about 
the aims of this magazine (Appendix 12): 708   
…to develop solidarity, love and unity within the community, to put 
forward the aims and responsibilities of the Suryoye and at the same time 
to reveal the truth…  
Since then, the discursive ‘truth’ has begun to be communicated to its 
readers, but first and foremost to the Assyrier.  
 
       
   Illustration 16: The front and back cover of the first issue of Bahro Suryoyo (1979) and the      
back cover of the first issue in January 1980. 
 
From the beginning, in almost all numbers of Bahro Suryoyo, at least one 
article has appeared which has been related to the ‘name debate’.709 Articles 
                                                 
708 My translation of the original in Turkish. 
709 A selection of examples are: Antakya Süryani Kilisesi Adı ve Tarihi by Patriarch Ephrem 
Barsaum (summary of his book from 1952, October 1982); Syrianerna/Assyrierna, Kaldeerna och 
Nestorianerna är Araméer till härkomst, article series by Aram Baryamo, February 1996; 
Benämningen Syrianer i Arabiska källor – Syrianska studier, article series by Assad Assad, April 
1989; Begreppet “Assyrier” förr och nu by Bertil Persson, October 1991; Vårt namn, vår historia, 
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or ideas which have been considered central to the ideology of the Syrianska 
Movement have been published several times throughout the years. The 
present-day digital version of Bahro Suryoyo also devotes a special section to 
the identity and the name of the people. 
 
7.2.4 The Antagonistic Orientation of the Syrianska 
Movement 
The fact that both Assyrier and Syrianer have designated the magazine of the 
‘others’ with an antonym indicates their image of each other. The Assyriska 
Father Aday remembers that Assyriska activists used to refer to Bahro Suryoyo 
as ‘Utmo Suryoyo (Suryoyo Darkness), because of (what he calls) the ‘curses’ 
called down on the Assyrier in its articles. In their turn, the Syrianer have been 
known to refer to Hujådå (meaning ‘unity’) as the magazine of flighutho 
(disunity). In an interview in Bahro Suryoyo (1983, No. 1), the President of 
SRF argued along the same lines and called upon every Assyrian/Syriac to 
fight actively against the Assyriska Movement:710  
…Actually the term Hujådå is the Syriac word for unity. The magazine 
Hujådå is an instrument of an organization which is the reason for the 
fragmentation and separation among our people and the church and its 
goal is to eradicate Suryoyutho [Süryanilik, in Turkish, meaning ‘Suryoye way 
of life’]… To fight against such kinds of organizations is the task of 
everyone who has noble Syriac blood in his veins… 
This perception of the Assyriska Movement as the main antagonistic other 
and as the main danger to the ‘amo Suryoyo is expressed in many of the articles 
and statements produced by the Syrianska Movement. To take another 
example, in a letter from the Syrianska riksförbundet to Patriarch Zakka I Iwas 
and the members of the Synod, the first request from the Synod was to take 
an active stand against and to punish the followers of the Assyrian ideology. 
In the first place, the letter was concerned with the problem between 
Archbishop Abdulahad Gallo Shabo and the Church Board (Bahro Suryoyo, 
August 1990):711 
                                                                                                               
Ephrem Barsaum (summary of his book from 1952), January 1981; Les Araméens article series 
by Dupont-Sommer, November 1991; Den Syrianska nationens namn, article series by Barsaum 
(summary of his book from 1952), September 2003. 
710 My translation of the original in Turkish. 
711 My translation of the original in Turkish. 
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…In order to solve the Assyrian problem and cleanse the Assyrian 
ideology within the Syriac Orthodox Church, the decisions taken by the 
Holy Synod so far should be implemented… 
Nahir, an ex-member of the board of the Syrianska Ungdomsförbundet, notes 
that initially he did not realize that the antagonistic aspect played such a 
central role in the organization he represented: 
…Finally, I understood that the present-day Syrianska Movement is not 
based on umthonoyutho but that its stance is oppositional… When I learned 
this, I asked myself: where are we going? And the [Assyrian/Syriac] young 
people with whom I worked did not refer to themselves as either Othuroye 
or Suryoye. They felt lost. We [Syrianer] were so busy with our opposition 
that we did not pay heed to the fact that the young people seeking 
oblivion in drugs, alcohol and so forth. What was my gain? I noticed that 
there were no young people joining the movement. We could not even 
manage to convince them join our [Syrianska] ideology. What had we 
achieved? What I did notice was that we had developed a karaha [hostility] 
against the Assyrier... 
In contrast to Nahir, who experienced the internal antagonism purely in 
negative terms, several Syrianska elite members who do recognize the 
antagonistic character of their movement take pains to stress what it had 
produced. Benjamin, a former board member of the Syrianska riksförbundet, 
says: 
...In a way I think that it was good that the problem which arose was 
about the name and not about anything else. Competition about the 
question of who we are has been good, because it has pushed people to 
search for their own history. If this had not been so, we would probably 
have end up in competitions between the different villages… The 
question about who we are brought us closer to the questions which 
concerned our people as a whole: we began to ask about the rights of our 
people in Turkey... 
Benjamin implies that ‘competition’ within the community is inherent in its 
character and that the internal struggle has indeed tended to favour the 
question of the people. The assumption is that if Assyrians/Syriacs had not 
have had the name discussion, they would have found something else to 
disagree about. In Chapter 10, I mention that it is a common idea among 
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Assyrians/Syriacs that each of them likes to be in charge of a ‘chair’ (for 
reasons of personal gain) and that this is the reason for disunity.712 
 The antagonistic relationship between the Assyrier and the Syrianer is also 
visible in the cultural field. The right to exhibit one’s culture in Sweden also 
developed into a space for giving voice to lived antagonisms. For instance, 
Syrianska elite members have forbidden the dances which the Assyrier have 
begun to perform since their settlement in Sweden.713 The Syrianska elite 
have attempted to stop this process because anything which is related to the 
cross-denominational ideology which the Assyrier developed is considered to 
be ‘foreign’. Especially in Sweden – more than anywhere else – such dances 
as the bagiye, sheikhane and the khasade have been forbidden by the organizers 
of Syrianska parties. 
 The same can be said of music and songs; whereas the Assyrier have 
tried to introduce the singing in the other dialects of the Syriac churches 
(besides their own), the Syrianer have opposed this development. The upshot 
of this antagonistic relationship is a process in which Assyrier and Syrianer 
have developed different music repertoires and dances; a fact which is visible 
at their weddings and parties. Assyrier invite specific singers who are 
ideologically close to their parties; the Syrianer do exactly the same thing with 
those who support their ideology. Artists have therefore played a central role 
in the shaping of culture as the expression of the cultural entertainment of an 
ideology. This starting point has assumed that artists protect ‘this culture’, 
whichever it might be. Syrianska and Assyriska artists have produced songs in 
which they express their particular discourse about the identity of their 
people. Music is used to express a specific discourse and has functioned as 
an identity marker. 
 An Assyrisk respondent gave me an example of this political dimension 
of culture. Saro, who had not often attended Syrianska parties, experienced 
what she thought was the ‘censorship’ of music and dances at the two 
Syrianska weddings which she attended. Although the band did not play and 
                                                 
712 See further the discussion in Chapter 2 for different views of ethnicity. For instance, 
countering the primordialist view, Brass (1991) presents a theory of ethnic identity formation 
and mobilization in terms of elite competition. Brass (1991: 15) writes: ‘The cultural forms, 
values and practices of ethnic groups become political resources for elites in competition for 
political power and economic advantage’. The problem with this view is that it takes elites as 
givens, rather than attempting to analyse their formation process. For a fruitful discussion 
about the power aspect in the ethnic identity formation, see further Wilmsen and McAllister 
(eds. 1996). 
713 See further the previous chapter about these dances. 
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sing the music which she favoured to dance the dances of her choice, she 
nevertheless managed to dance a few dances to the melody of the music 
being played. When the singer noticed she was dancing Assyriska dances, he 
changed to new songs several times and finally he asked her explicitly to stop 
these dances. To take another example, Habib Mousa, the singer who is 
considered to have been the most important musician in Assyrian/Syriac 
music in the second half of the twentieth century, has experienced how both 
groups have tried to link him exclusively to its own ideology. This 
competition in relation to Habib Mousa especially marked the 1980s. He 
believes that his unwillingness to align exclusively with one group or the 
other made them ‘punish’ him by not inviting him to their parties; he was no 
longer perceived within their chain of difference, the in-group.  Instead, he 
began to be approached as a member of the ‘others’, the antagonistic chain of 
equivalence (here: either Assyrier or Syrianer): 
Neither side accepted me because of my stance… I told them: I am an 
umthonoyo. I did not want to take sides here… An umthonoyo to me means 
that I accept the history of this people and all these names of our people. I 
did not want to make a difference between people.  
In an attempt at negotiation, he introduced the song Aykone a gabore d-nafiqi 
me Beth Nahrin? (Where are the heroes who have come from Mesopotamia?). 
Because the name Assyrian did not intrude in this song, it was also accepted 
by the Syrianer. Nonetheless, usually Syrianer do not invite him to perform at 
their festivities because he is identified as an Assyrier. 
 A similar competition has taken place over Assyrian/Syriac individuals 
who are appreciated for their work and ideas and who have been 
transformed into symbolic figures. Two examples are Archbishop Yuhanon 
Dolabani and Naum Faik. For a long time, the Assyriska Movement has 
assumed they were closer to its ideology, especially because Naum Faik 
functions as one of its founding fathers. Especially in the last decade, the 
Syrianska Movement has also begun to refer to the importance of these 
figures to its ideology. For instance, in the article Den arameiska journalistiken 
och dess högaktade principer, the author Bar Daysan writes (Bahro Suryoyo, August 
1999): ‘Naum Fayeq should be celebrated as Aramean, not as an Assyrian. The 
national ideology of Naum Fayeq is Arameanism.’ With this demand by 
Syrianska activists, the symbolism of Naum Faik for the Assyrier is contested 
and assumes a floating character. The contestation of such symbolism can be 
seen as the antagonistic struggle over the hegemony of national symbolism. 
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 To conclude, although in the course of the last thirty years the ideology 
of the Syrianer has developed a notion of collective identity where it adheres 
to a cross-denominational definition of their people, in their institutional 
policy and in their daily practices this has been given little space. In the 
process of establishing their organizations in the discursive field, both the 
relationship to the church and to the Assyriska organizations has changed. In 
the relationship of the Syrianer with the church, over time they have 
attempted to function independently of the church. If the Syrianer began 
merely as an oppositional movement, it is important to understand how it 
has been possible for a movement to gain the hegemony which it has today. 
This can be explained by the different discursive stages it passed through. 
Although initially it purely and simply represented opposition; later it 
acquired other reasons for its existence. Noting this is of importance to 
understanding its antagonistic character and to understanding what it stands 
for today. 
 
7.3 Discursive Strategies in the Weakening of the 
Assyriska Movement  
In order to arrive at a deeper understanding of how the Assyriska Movement 
has been weakened by the alliance between the Church and the Syrianer, I 
shall examine this relationship and the discursive strategies which were used. 
As discussed in the storyline, in the mid-1970s the Church combined forces 
with a group of lay elite members and began to use its influence to dislocate 
the hegemony of the Assyriska Movement. Since then, this coalition has 
attempted to fix the name of the ‘amo Suryoyo in Swedish through a different 
discourse. In this oppositional discourse, the name of the ‘people’ has 
functioned as a nodal point; socio-political life and frontiers have been 
organized around it. The initial starting point for fighting the discourses of 
the Assyriska Movement was based on the discourse that Suryoye are not 
Othuroye (Assyrian). The main antagonism has therefore been built on the use 
of the designation Assyrier by the Assyriska Movement. Initially, what other 
name the antagonistic group would choose was less of an issue, because it 
did not yet have a project of national identity for the healing of the split 
subject. At this stage, it merely disagreed to the strategy which the Assyrier 
brought to the healing of the split subject. This explains why the Syrianska elite 
members introduced and used different names before the present one 
(Syrianer) gained its particular hegemony after some time. The Syrianska elite 
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working with the clergy managed to mobilize the majority of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden against those people who identified as Assyrier. 
Since then, they have placed the Assyrier in the constitutive outside. 
 It can be assumed that the church could not have succeeded in 
opposing the ideology of the Assyrier if it had not received help from lay elite 
members. Unquestionably, it is through the channel of the church that the 
Syrianska elite members have managed to consolidate their hegemony among 
the ordinary people, for instance, through their presence on church 
boards.714 The aegis of the church has functioned as an instrument for 
legitimating their oppositional ideology against the Assyrier. Therefore, the 
involvement of the clergy in the secular sphere cannot be ascribed solely to 
their own efforts.715 The antagonistic relationships between lay elites play a 
role in the specific position of clergy in the social field. Realizing that the 
clergy have continued to have a major influence on the ordinary people, 
secular elites – both Assyrier and Syrianer – have attempted to mobilize clergy 
for their main aims. 
 At this point I shall proceed with the main strategies which the clergy 
and the Syrianska elite used in their attempt to weaken the Assyriska 
Movement by looking at two dimensions of the discursive strategies used. 
First, I shall deconstruct the negative attributions used for defining the ‘others’. 
This deconstruction will provide insights into the self-ascription of the 
Syrianer and the clergy. After this I shall discuss the religious dimension of 
the strategies used. As I shall demonstrate below, these discursive strategies 
have been used to ascribe a distorted image to the Assyrier and to diminish 
their legitimacy among the people. 
                                                 
714 In Europe, especially in Sweden, positions on church boards began to be taken by men 
most of whom belonged to extended or influential families. Often, to be a member of an 
extended family also means to have influence. Consequently, people without such a network 
would not have a chance or would have been voted off the board at the next possible 
opportunity, despite the fact that they would have been more experienced or more highly 
educated. Although the functioning of church boards (as traditional, conservative and non-
democratic) has increasingly become a matter of criticism during the last forty years of 
settlement in Europe, the community has not managed to achieve any drastic changes. These 
boards have not managed to attract younger, especially highly educated people, on to the 
boards. While the younger generation denigrate the functioning of such church boards as 
backward, I have heard individual members of these boards expressing with pride that they 
have served on the church board for twenty or twenty-five years. 
715 See further also Chapter 10 about leadership in which I have shown that people experience 
a vacuum in leadership positions. A natural consequence of this is that it makes it easier for 
the clergy to retain their ‘leadership role’. 
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7.3.1 Labelling the Others 
The labelling of the ‘others’ is essential to achieving the definition of the 
‘inside’. Inherent in this process is the attempt to strengthen the chain of 
difference (‘us’) and to weaken the ‘others’ who have been assigned to the chain 
of equivalence. An early example of a negative attribution of the Assyrier was the 
reference to them as Taudikat – the Suryoyo diminutive for the Syriac word 
taudi for ‘thank you’.716 This requires a more detailed explanation. The 
umthonoyutho of the Suryoye with the Assyrian ideology implies among other 
matters the care and preservation of their mother tongue. Therefore, in their 
activism they have attempted to replace loanwords from other languages 
which are used in their mother tongue, Suryoyo, with terminology from their 
classical Syriac language; an action which is the product of the idea that their 
mother tongue has suffered from its minority position. In the 1970s, for 
instance, Assyriska activists began to replace the loanwords for ‘thank you’ in 
Turkish, in Arabic or in Kurdish (respectively teşşekürler, shukran and 
sahatkhuash) with the classical Syriac taudi in their spoken mother tongue 
Suryoyo. 
 The ordinary people’s reference to the Assyrier as Taudikat indicated a 
new-ness or a dislocation in terms of their language use. For the Assyrier, the 
use of taudi was part of their project in the healing of the split subject. For 
those opposing them, the reference Taudikat was one way to express 
disagreement with their ‘project of healing’ and a way to ridicule them, 
showing that they did not take them seriously. Nevertheless, the Assyrier were 
considered to be a ‘disturbing element’ among them – saying and doing 
things which were strange to the ordinary people. Their attribution as 
Taudikat was also an instrument to isolate them and to weaken their 
influence in the social field. This attribution as Taudikat continued to be used 
until about the mid-1990s, the time when all Assyrians/Syriacs began to use 
the term taudi for ‘thank you’. At that juncture, Taudikat stopped to exist as a 
specific reference to a group of people among Assyrians/Syriacs. 
 Father Aday also remembers other references to them from the time he 
was a lay assyrisk activist. Two such remarks were ‘orphans of the 
monasteries’ (yatume da dayre) and ‘who are these [people] from the villages 
who give us orders?’ (mannani da qeryawotho d-ko m-amri  a‘layna?). Both 
                                                 
716 This was already the case in Istanbul, when the oppositional group referred to the students 
of the association MED Kültür Derneği as Taudikat. 
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references have a derogatory connotation. The reference to ‘orphans’ implies 
that historically orphans often ended up in monasteries. It is a direct 
reference to the present-day activists who have been educated in these 
monasteries. Hence, in this usage, living in a monastery assumes a person 
who has no home and therefore a lower social status. In reality, students who 
have graduated from monasteries in the last few decades were often the sons 
of well-to-do families who could either afford to send their sons to the 
monastery for their education or who were born to parents who valued 
education highly. The reference to the ‘village people’ implies that those 
using it were from urban areas; in this case from Midyad. This visibility of 
villagers among activists who managed to pick up social roles in the 
discursive field explains the remarks of the Syrianska elite members who 
referred to Assyrier as ‘village people’. Inherent to this remark is the fact that 
they do not accept the hegemony of villagers; their rejection of the Assyrier 
implies class competition. 
 The first Assyriska elite members were also referred to as devils (shide), 
especially by the older generation: ‘those who studied in the monasteries 
have all become devils’.717 Usually they had studied at one of the monasteries 
in the Middle East and in contrast to the ordinary people, they had enjoyed a 
higher education.718 The reference to devils implies the idea that Assyrier 
constitute a danger to their people, especially because the Assyrier were fairly 
actively attempting to convince the community members of their ideology 
which they perceived to be a national necessity. An ex-member of the 
Syrianska Ungdomsförbundet confirmed this hypothesis. He explained this as a 
consequence of a low self-esteem on the part of the Syrianer and that 
therefore their strategy was to avoid debates or discussions with the Assyrier. 
Above all that they should not co-operate in common activities: 
When I was on the board of the Syrianska Youth Section, I tried to 
organize a meeting with the Assyrier party, but the Syrianska Federation did 
not allow me to do this. One of them said: “...they will convince you, they 
are like devils.” This lifts the tip of the veil on their complex... one reason 
for not entering into a discussion with the side of the Assyrier was that they 
                                                 
717 The reference to an intelligent or smart person in terms of ‘devil’ is also common in other 
contexts, using the expression: Shidoyo, adnee ko remshie (He is a devil, his ears are moving). 
718 This explains why most of the teachers (malfone) in the early period adhered to the Assyrian 
ideology. The late Malfono Esmer Al-Khouri (from Syria) was among the few teachers who 
actively opposed the Assyrier and was also among the first to express an explicit alternative 
national identification as Aramean.  
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felt weak in relation to them… I said: “You do not believe that we can 
convince and change them? He said: “No”... 
In their relationship with the Syrianer, the Assyrier have been far less in 
opposition and much more on the defensive right from the beginning of 
their life as a movement in Europe. The former Syrianska activist Lucas 
mentioned that, when he visited the Assyrier in their hudro in the 1990s, he 
learned that they had developed a set of ideas about the Syrianer: hard-
headed, not learned, aggressive in their communication, conservative, 
religious and so forth. In contrast, Assyrier perceived themselves as: modern, 
learned, secular and civilized. This attitude, which many of the earlier 
generation Assyrier characterize as ‘arrogant’, is said to have been present 
from the beginning. The Assyrier activist Aho who was raised in Syria says: 
As Assyrian youngsters [‘layme Othuroye] we developed arrogance; that we 
were intellectuals and knew better than all the others of our people. That 
we should stand with other oppressed people against oppression and that 
we should, with other minorities, try to develop democracy in the counties 
of the Middle East we lived in. 
The Assyrian Movement (as discussed in the earlier chapter) began as an elite 
movement among the students and highly educated people in Syria. Their 
top-down approach lengthened the already existing distance between them 
and the ordinary people. In the long term, this elitist attitude was used 
against them. To take one example, the Assyrier have been very explicit about 
the idea that, besides the existing religious leadership, Assyrians/Syriacs 
should have a secular leadership (see further Chapter 10). This idea implies 
the need for the distinction between religious and secular spheres of 
influence and that religious tasks should be the province of the clergy and 
secular tasks that of the laity. Besides stressing this distinction, Assyriska 
activists have openly criticized the clergy at moments of disagreement about 
the way they have handled the religious affairs of their people. This critical 
attitude towards the clergy was something very unusual and uncommon 
among the ordinary people.719 Therefore, the Assyriska activists gained the 
image of being ‘anti-church’ (mqabel di ‘ito). In the mobilization of the 
ordinary people against them, the clergy utilized this critical attitude against 
the Assyrier.  
                                                 
719 In the present-day it has become very common among all generations and ideologies to 
criticize the clergy openly. 
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 This conflict can be analysed in terms of power relations. The church 
did not accept the stand of the Assyrier and therefore explained it in different 
terms in the discursive field. In reality, the Assyrian ideology was not an 
alternative at a theological level, but at the secular, political level and with 
that an attempt was made to take over the leadership of the people in 
representing Assyrians/Syriacs to the new ‘others’ from the church. This 
discourse has been presented in both the media of the Assyrier and their 
everyday discourse. Although the present-day Syrianska Movement has 
developed a similar stand in relation to the position of the church, it has 
retained a relatively closer relationship with the clergy than the Assyrier have 
done. This is because since the opposition to the Assyrier began, the majority 
of the clergy have commonly favoured identification as Arameans to 
identification as Assyrians.720 I shall now examine how religious discourses 
have been employed in the discursive struggle.  
 
7.3.2 The Instrument of Excommunication 
In the storyline I have broadly discussed how the Assyrier had been 
threatened with excommunication if they did not obey the stipulation of 
Archbishop Aboodi that they stop using the designation Assyrier. The 
purpose of this discursive strategy was to put a full stop to the Assyriska 
ideology. ‘Excommunication’ is formulated as one of, if not the direst 
punishment in religious discourses. It assumes the exclusion of the person or 
the group concerned not only from the Eucharist but also from salvation. 
Consequently, as an instrument it is mostly used to threaten the ‘inside’ by 
excluding them from all their former social ties, and positioning them in the 
constitutive outside; a severe form of dislocation. Since the clergy and the 
Syrianska elite were well aware of the deep religiosity of their people, they 
used this instrument to isolate the Assyrier from the community.  However, 
the extreme implementation by Archbishop Aboodi returned on him like a 
boomerang. 
 The intervention of the Swedish authorities was most probably the 
reason for the decision of the Synod on July 1982 to withdraw this threat of 
excommunication. Another reason was that this instrument of 
                                                 
720 For instance, the St Peter and St Paul Church in Norsborg uses the Syrianska flag alongside 
the amblem of the Syriac Orthodox Church on the flagpoles at its front door. The same flag 
decorates one of the inner walls of the church hall which is located on the same premises, 
despite the Synod’s decision that ‘political’ symbols are not permitted to be used within the 
church (see illustration 12). 
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excommunication was not very effective because the ordinary people 
considered it fairly harsh, despite the fact that many of the older generation 
did not understand the logic of umthonoyutho among the Assyrier. The 
outspoken opposition of the church confronted the people with a new 
experience – the exclusion of church members from church rituals. The 
activist Shushan explains: 
...when the clergy refused to hold a funeral service [lewoyo] for one of the 
members of an Assyrisk family, it therefore had to ask a Swedish 
clergyman officiate. Many of our elderly people were disappointed with 
our clergy and distanced themselves from the church.721 ...The older 
people thought that the church had gone too far in opposing the 
Assyrians. After these kinds of incidents, the older people [in Shushan’s 
direct social environment] no longer criticized us for our Assyrian 
ideology.  
At the present time, clergymen have continued to make use of 
excommunication as an act of power by which to secure their hegemony. 
During my fieldwork, I attended a Sunday Mass in the area of Södertälje. At 
the sermon, I took some pictures until I heard the hundreds of people in the 
church murmuring. Since I was concentrating on taking pictures, I missed 
what the priest had said. The lady next to me looked at me her eyes wide 
with horror and, putting her hand in front of her mouth, she whispered in 
my ear: ‘He says that there are people spreading gossip that the church board 
has misappropriated large amounts of money which was meant for the 
building of the church. From now on, anyone keeps spreading this rumour 
will be excommunicated!’ During breakfast, the people I visited that day 
expressed their disagreement with the priest’s pronouncement. They thought 
it was as way to stop his community from thinking and to make them 
acquiesce in any mistakes he and the church board might make. No matter 
how seriously people take the threat of excommunication, the fact that this 
threat is used shows the degree of the problem experienced.722 
                                                 
721 The person had died in a car accident. The family held the funeral service in a Swedish 
church. An Assyrier activist who refused to be thrown out of the Syriac Orthodox Church 
managed to convince one of the priests who did not oppose the Assyrier to attend the service. 
722 Excommunication became reality when the Syriac Orthodox Archbishop in Belgium 
pronounced it on a member in the community who had a disagreement about the way he was 
running the affairs of the Church community in Belgium. This drew the attention of 
Assyrians/Syriacs worldwide after it had been discussed in several TV programmes on the 
community channels. The common reaction was to reject the act of excommunication. In 
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7.3.3 The Religious Argument 
As a starting point, besides leaning on the legitimacy of the clergy among the 
ordinary people, those opposing the Assyrier had played another gambit. The 
cross-denominational approach of the Assyrier was fairly new to the ordinary 
people. In reaching out to the ordinary people and developing antagonism 
against the Assyrier, the clergy presented the designation Assyrian (which 
Assyrier used as an umbrella name at the cross-denominational level) as the 
name related to the Nestorian Church (Assyrian Church of the East) from 
which their church had distanced itself at the Synod of Ephesus in 431.723 In 
other words, the clergy’s point of departure was identification at the 
denominational level. This was also the common identification among the 
ordinary people; consequently the church and the Syrianer had an advantage 
in the competition with the Assyrier among this group. Moreover, by 
connecting the name Assyrian to the Nestorians,724 they assumed this would 
be effective in their strategy of fighting the Assyriska Movement, because 
historically there has been ‘theological disagreement’ and friction between 
the two churches.725 The Syrianska student Matay remembers how Syrianer 
talked about the cross-denominational approach of the Assyrier: 
                                                                                                               
2008, Jakob Ruhyo and Özcan Kaldoyo discussed it extensively in their TV programme Qolo 
Hiro (Free Voice). Suryoyo Sat and Suroyo TV also paid attention to this. The general criticism 
was that the Archbishop used excommunication as a means to shut critical community 
members up and that this was not a democratic method to be used in a modern society. 
723 This argument was also explained to the journalist Andersson (1983a: 100) when he visited 
Patriarch Jacob III in Damascus and asked him about his opposition to the use of the 
designation ‘Assyrian’. 
724 I remember that, in Tur ‘Abdin, the term Nasturnoyo was used to curse someone. Not 
necessarily because there was a specifically antagonistic relationship with the Nasturnoye at that 
moment, but it was probably a remnant from earlier times. It could also have been used by 
analogy; to call someone a Nasturnoyo might have meant to excommunicate someone (here in a 
less literal sense but nevertheless with the meaning of a bad wish ‘may you be 
excommunicated’ – howat mahermo!). 
725 When Chorbishop Aziz Günel (from Istanbul) visited the community in Germany 
(Augsburg, 1977), he devoted his sermon to refraining from identification as Assyrian. He also 
used the argument that the Assyrian ideology would strengthen the Nestorians who had been 
declared heretical by the Syriac Orthodox Church (earlier in the history) (see further section 
7.5). Much earlier, already in 1947, Patriarch Ephrem Barsaum used the argument that ‘…The 
Nestorians are followers of a heretical sect excommunicated by all Christian communities of 
the East and the West…’ in order to convince his community members in America to refrain 
from the use of the desgination Assyrian (Makko 2010: 69). The strong reaction of Patriarch 
Ephrem Barsaum against the use of the designation ‘Assyrian’ draws very much the attention 
because a few decades earlier he used this designation himself in certain contexts (see further 
Chapter 3). Another example of the friendly relationships between two Patriarchs of these 
churches is given by his predecessor, Patriarch Elias III, who seems to have enjoyed good 
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…There were ideas such as: “Their goal is different; there is the issue of 
Beth Nahrin, they want a country, they collect money for that aim and they 
send it to Chicago where they have their party [AUA] and so forth. 
Chicago had developed a very negative image. Some of these older people 
did even not know that Chicago is the name of a city in America. Some of 
them thought that it was a bad man who could come and destroy the 
church... 
These ideas about Chicago726 – as some kind of Assyrian centre – were 
confirmed by a respondent who was a former member in the church board 
of Mor Ephrem, who explained the difference between themselves (Syrianer) 
and the Assyriska activists at that time as follows: 
...The people in Sweden were divided into Assyrisk and Syriansk. Syrisk 
Orthodox worked for their church and the Assyriska people had a case. 
They worked together with those in Chicago and sent their money to 
Chicago. The Suryoye built many churches, because we do not have a 
qawmiye [‘nationality’ in Arabic727]. Our qawmiye is the church, the language 
and the people altogether – it is one.  Assyrier say: “We are Assyrians but 
our church is Syriac Orthodox.”  
Another element which the church used and which became popular among 
the ordinary people was the argument that the Assyrians (in BCE) were 
pagans. A question uppermost in the minds of the ordinary, devout 
Christians, was therefore: ‘How could we ever refer to ourselves as 
Assyrians?’ Speaking about this, the Syrianska student Matay explains the 
process he went through in opposing the use of the name Assyrian in the 
early 1980s: 
…So, in the beginning we called ourselves Assyrier. After sometime had 
passed, the question was raised of whether this was the correct translation 
of the designation Suroye or Suryoye… Personally it began to dawn on me 
                                                                                                               
contacts with Patriarch Mar Eshai Shimun of the Assyrian Church of the East. According to 
Patriarch Elias’ secretary, Zakaria Shakir (1972), during the time the Patriarch spent in Mosul 
(1927-1930), he was visited regularly by Mar Eshai Shimun and his aunt, Lady Surma d-beth 
Mar Shimun. During these meetings, Patriarch Elias used to stimulate him to see to the 
benefit of his church community. 
726 Chicago is home to a great number of Assyrians (here: mainly members of the Assyrian 
Church of the East and the Chaldean Church) and the office of AUA is based in Chicago. 
727 This respondent was raised in Lebanon and used some Arabic loanwords when speaking in 
Suryoyo. By qawmiye, perhaps in this context he meant a national identity; in this case the lack of 
a distinct national identity which is represented by a distinct nationality. 
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that Assyrier is the translation of Nestorian. I probably had this idea 
because I was influenced by the church. At that time, I often went to 
church. Our teacher ... probably explained it to us this way. We asked him 
questions about it. He explained to us who Nestorius and the Nestorians 
were... Also that he [Nestorius] was declared heretical. Therefore I 
concluded that the name Assyrier refers to the followers of Nestorius. 
Therefore we should not call ourselves by that name… If we changed our 
name, we would have had to change our church too. This is how we 
understood it initially. We thought that they worshipped winged bulls and 
so forth and that we worshipped God. They had necklaces with the winged 
bull around their necks and we had the cross around our necks. I know 
someone who said: “I would rather become a Muslim and pray to 
Muhammed728 than become an Othuroyo and pray to an animal.” This is 
how he understood the issue. Later I learned more about this question and 
understood that they [Assyrier] were not members of a different church at 
all and that they also did not worship winged bulls. 
The scholar Shushan was a young girl and among the most active young 
people in one of the Assyriska associations. She explains how her parents 
were influenced by their social environment and questioned their adherence 
to the Assyriska ideology: 
They [parents] did not know what it was all about. They heard others 
saying that we were worshipping the winged bull. My cousin made a copy 
of the [Assyrian] sculpture of a winged bull which we all had in our 
houses. My mother told them that she did not see us worshipping the 
winged bull. The older people told her: “They worship the bull when you 
are not at home.” Therefore both of my parents were afraid that we had 
become pagans and consequently we often had discussions about this. We 
told them that this was not true. My father believed us but my mother was 
still too much influenced by other people... 
Shushan indicates that her parents could not understand the new approach 
to their identity and their identification with and appreciation of a cultural 
historical past predating Christianity. In the eyes of the Assyrier, the winged 
bull expressed the height in their pre-Christian cultural civilization. Despite 
all, the children continued to do their work. The parents seemed to have 
accepted the activities of their children passively. The Assyriska Odom, a 
                                                 
728 In that context, the comparison with Muhammad was the most antagonistic there could be 
and therefore the strongest metaphor for antagonism he could use in explaining his stand. 
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teacher of Syriac, reflects on the relationship of this older generation to the 
name: 
The older people found it very hard to accept the designation Otuoroyo. 
Their acceptance of this designation was compelled by necessity [mi 
majburiye]. They just could not understand why we should call ourselves 
Othuroye. They said: “We are Suroye Mshihoye” [Suroye Christians] that is how 
we know ourselves’. “What does Othuroye mean?” they asked. Many could 
just not accept it. [Of] those who did accept it... It was often because their 
children were active in the association... They did not have the heart to 
begin to fight it after all that their children’s work... It did not help, no 
matter what reason you put forward. When we mentioned the umtho 
[nation] or Beth Nahrin, they did not know what we were talking about. It 
was difficult for the elderly to grasp. Those who liked us did not comment 
about us when we said we are Assyrians. But those who did not like us 
told us that we had become Nestorians. They constantly confronted us 
with that. Or they said that we worshipped winged bulls.  
Odom mentioned an anecdote, which illustrates that many of those who 
opposed the designation Assyrian had indeed not understood what the 
Assyrian ideology was about. Some of these prejudices have continued to 
exist among the people up to the present-day. One of the reasons might be 
that the ordinary people did not learn about this issue in a social field free of 
antagonism. The discussion of those who objected to the designation 
Assyrian often did not include what the ideology was really about. Instead, 
the discussion was filled with arguments of rejection, full of prejudices which 
were not apposite. In Odom’s citation below, he illustrates the prejudice and 
myth about worshipping the winged bull:729 
There was a time we had a couple of elderly people; among them Father 
Aho.  They often visited me at home, but nevertheless he [the priest] did 
not like me. One day his wife went through the house and even checked 
the bedrooms, going as far as to investigate the walls. She asked: “Where 
is it?” I said: “What?” She said: “He!” I said: “Who is he?” She said: “The 
                                                 
729 The controversy about images of animals also reached Assyrians/Syriacs in Tur ‘Abdin. 
When I visited the Mor Gabriel Monastery in 2005, I observed the new wrought iron gate that 
was decorated with the image of two lions on each side of the gate. A nun remarked that 
some people from Sweden had criticized the inmates of the monastery for having embraced 
the Assyrian ideology because of the two lions on the gates. Rejecting their criticism, the nun 
said that the inmates of the monastery wanted to honour the lions because they guarded the 
monastery in the times at which it had been emptied of nuns and monks. 
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one you are worshipping!” I said: “Who do we worship?” She said: “The 
one whom you worship as Assyrians.” I could not believe my ears! I went 
back to the sitting room and asked her husband: “Father, do you think the 
same way as your wife does?” He said: “Yes, I do.” Then I said: “So, you 
believe that I would leave Jesus and worship a winged bull instead? He 
said: “Yes.” Then I said: “If you share her opinion and really believe that 
we [Assyrians] worship winged bulls, we are in difficulties. If you think 
this way, who has the role of enlightening his people?”... When our less 
well-educated [buree] people heard things like this about us, they began to 
dislike us intensely… And they influenced the younger generations. 
The rejection of the winged bull as a cultural symbol of an Assyrian 
civilization by the Syrianer has come to symbolize the fight against the 
Assyriska ideology. The artist Hanna Al Hayek mentioned to me that 
Syrianska elite members objected to the choice of the municipality of 
Södertälje to hang one of his paintings portraying a winged bull in the 
council hall. For the moment, their objection resulted in the exchange of a 
painting for one with a more ‘neutral image’. Such actions can be seen as 
expressions of the struggle for hegemony in the discursive field. 
 To conclude, these discursive strategies have contributed to the 
weakening of the hegemony of the Assyrier, to their isolation and to their 
marginalization. Simultaneously, they have set an antagonistic path for the 
discourses of the Syrianska Movement and its institutional life. 
 
7.4 The Logic of ‘Ashirto 
During my fieldwork respondents often referred to the role of the ‘ashirto 
(extended family, lineage or clan)730 in decisions taken at community level, 
invariably in a negative sense: ‘Oh, well, it is all the work of the ‘ashirto!’ An 
Assyrian/Syriac politician who resides outside Södertälje reflects on the 
situation of his people in this town and points to what he considers a 
structural problem: 
                                                 
730 The primordial relationship between the members of a ‘ashirto is implied by the use of ‘dbe’ 
between the first name and the family name, such as in Nisho dbe Atto. ‘Dbe’ is the 
shortened form of ‘from the home of’ (d-beth) which is commonly used in Suryoyo when 
identifying family members. Here ‘home’ is used as an equivalent for ‘family’ or ‘extended 
family’. But, not every family is identified as a ‘ashirto. As indicated in the text, a family must 
possess some kind of power which it uses in order somehow to dominate in society, more 
specifically in the community. 
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...A second problem is that the ‘ashiryotho [extended families] rule in 
Södertälje. They do not accept foreigners [here: non-‘ashirto members] 
intervening in and joining the institutions. In the first place, they are 
known as a ‘ashirto, they are extended families, they have plenty of money. 
And money gives them enormous influence [hekm]… The ‘ashirto can ally 
themselves with others to consolidate and expand their influence. They try 
to grab the majority of the votes. This is how it works… 
Several such statements attracted my attention to this aspect, which is also 
expressed in the ‘informal names’ which developed among the ordinary 
people for two of the churches in Södertälje. These churches are sometimes 
called after the ‘ashiryotho (extended families) who are believed to wield 
considerable influence in the church organization. For example, the church 
of Mor Ephrem is called after family X and the church of Mor Gabriel is 
called after family Y.731 This designation need not necessarily be used in a 
negative sense; broadly speaking it expresses a strong relationship or the 
involvement of a certain family in a certain church. 
 One day I sat in on a meeting with Assyrian/Syriac entrepreneurs 
(whom I had never met before) when one of them asked me what my 
research was about. In my answer I also explained that ‘I am interested in 
expanding my knowledge of the functioning and the influence of the ‘ashirto 
in the community in Sweden.’ Unaware that the concept of ‘ashirto had 
developed such a negative image, I was surprised when the man sitting next 
to me turned to me angrily, surprise written all over his face, and said: 
‘Which ‘ashirto! Is there a ‘ashirto?’ Carefully, I answered: ‘Well, I heard that 
there are different ‘ashiryotho in Sweden which play a role among the people.’ 
The man opposite me enjoyed this unexpected dialogue and explained with a 
smile (to make the atmosphere friendlier and to inform me about where the 
former remark had come from): ‘Naures, he is a member of the ‘ashirto X.’ 
Doing my best to hide my ‘panic’ about the reaction of the ‘ashirto-member, I 
introduced a new topic. Since then I have become conscious that the term 
‘ashirto is much more ‘value-loaded’ than I had expected.732 This 
confrontation with a member of a ‘ashirto was an even greater incentive to 
delve deeper into this aspect. I no longer assumed that all members of a 
                                                 
731 I have kept the names of these families anonymous for reasons of confidentiality. 
732 This is perhaps because I grew up in the Netherlands where the ‘ashirto has played a far less 
dominant role than in Sweden. In the Netherlands, there is a bigger diversity of people from 
different villages in Tur ‘Abdin and different areas in the Middle East. This differs from the 
situation especially in Södertälje where extended families from Midyad dominate in numbers. 
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‘ashirto wanted to be associated with it. 
 It is essential to discuss the background of the concept ‘ashirto so as not 
to confuse it with its equivalents in Arabic and Kurdish.733 Although 
linguistically the term ‘ashirto in Suryoyo is the equivalent of the Kurdish 
‘ashirat734 and the Arabic ‘ashira (tribe), there is a difference between the 
traditional concept of ‘ashira(t) as used among Arabs and Kurds and the 
concept of ‘ashirto as it is used in Sweden by Assyrians/Syriacs. Van 
Bruinessen (1992: 51) notes that the Kurdish ‘ashirat (lineage) is based on 
kinship through the same ancestors along the patrilineal line. Over time, real 
kinship has become less important than actual political allegiance to a 
lineage. Political alliances with non-lineage members were essential in the 
tribal part of the society in the Middle East, where people in a certain area 
had to ally themselves with any of the ruling aghas. By doing so, they became 
part of a tribe or ‘ashirat. To maintain itself successfully, the ‘ashirat wielded a 
whole system of rewards and punishments to control the people who were 
allied with it. At the local political level, people were organized through at 
least two oppositional tribes. Assyrians/Syriacs were forced to participate in 
this structure (as were other inhabitants of the area) and hence also took 
oppositional stands with one another. When referring to the ‘ashirat in a local 
political context, people in Tur ‘Abdin also used the term ‘band’ (something 
similar to the concept of ‘political party’). The term band refers to the 
oppositional aspect in relation to another band. In Tur ‘Abdin, each band is 
dominated by a certain lineage or clan. 
 It is this oppositional character to which my respondents refer when 
talking about the negative role of the ‘ashirto among Assyrians/Syriacs in 
Europe. It is assumed that members of large families manage to hegemonize 
their interests by mobilizing their large network in opposition to other large 
families; for example, by creating places for the ‘ashirto in the main 
Assyrian/Syriac institutions and exerting influence through these places. To 
reach this goal, they compete with each other by making use of berberiye735 
(informal, internal local politics). Now, the concept ‘ashirto has assumed a 
negative connotation. It refers to the dominance of a certain family in the 
                                                 
733 See further about the traditional concept of ‘ashirat, Van Bruinessen (1992: 50, 51, 59-64). 
734 Van Bruinessen (1992: 62) notes that the term ‘ashirat refers primarily to the warrior aspect 
of the tribesmen. Only later did it refer to the units into which the tribesmen were organized. 
735 Berberiye can be defined as an antagonistic relationship between two or more involved 
individuals or parties. Consequently, people who are berber are in a competitive relationship 
with each other. 
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discursive field. The berberiye can engineer the consecration of a new priest, 
the building of a new church, the foundation of a new association, soccer 
club, music band and so forth. For example, the recent history of 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Europe has shown that an individual who wants to 
become a priest needs people behind him if he is to be consecrated. Those 
who stand behind a candidate and request his consecration must be strong, 
because there is usually not a perceived need to have a second, third, fourth 
or fifth priest in the same town. It is a remarkable fact that priests are often 
ordained at times of strong antagonism between competing groups, rather 
than being ordained as a result of a communal need at that specific moment. 
Often, the ordination of each priest therefore has a very specific history in 
the discursive field of the church community. 
 Despite the fact that conceptually the term ‘ashirto differs from the 
Kurdish ‘ashirat, Assyrians/Syriacs have no new term for the new concept of 
‘ashirto as they use it in Europe. Provisionally, I propose the following 
definition: A ‘ashirto is a network of extended family members who are 
believed to use their influence undemocratically or unfavourably in relation 
to other Assyrians/Syriacs or in relation to the common needs of the people. 
The reference to large influential families as ‘ashirto is a metaphorical 
reference to some forceful or undemocratic aspects which they associate 
with the traditional Kurdish ‘ashirat in Tur ‘Abdin. It is this condemnation of 
influence which developed the new concept of the ‘ashirto among 
Assyrians/Syriacs. Hence, it now means something different to the Kurdish 
‘ashirat. Assyrians/Syriacs have begun to refer to the influence of large 
families as ‘the ‘ashirto at work’, since the undemocratic aspect often implies 
the ‘existence’ or influence of the ‘ashirto. Extended families with no such 
influence are not referred to in terms of ‘ashirto. 
 The concept of ‘ashirto as used among Assyrians/Syriacs in Europe is 
probably based on the structure of family relations in Midyad (before heading 
to Europe), when the majority population of this city consisted of 
Assyrians/Syriacs. They developed a specific social structure in which the 
dominant families in Midyad competed with each other for influence. 
Nevertheless, these family relations cannot be spoken of in terms of 
‘ashiryotho (plural form) in the classical sense as these exist among the Kurds.  
As a consequence of their affiliation with Islam, the Kurdish ‘ashirat were in 
the position to use coercion in order to rule. For Assyrians/Syriacs as 
Christians in a Muslim majority society, it would not have been legitimate to 
hold a dominant position in relation to Muslims and likewise they were not 
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in the position to enforce power, especially not in relation to Muslims. With 
the emigration of many Assyrian/Syriac families from Midyad to Sweden, 
especially to Södertälje, they have continued specific relationships which are 
built on their former relationships in Midyad. Often, families who were 
influential in Midyad also developed an influential role among 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden.736 
 The extent of the influence of the ‘ashirto is a question beyond the scope 
of this study. Nevertheless, the influence of extended families in the 
institutionalizing process of Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden is undeniable and, 
as a consequence, their voices are very much to the forefront in the ‘name 
debate’. People who are critical of the influence of extended family networks, 
criticize their activities as backward, undemocratic and as something alien to 
the ‘Assyrian/Syriac culture’ (mardutho Suryoyto). Wielding these arguments, 
elite members who do not belong to a ‘ashirto or who do not use its network 
pro-actively attempt to weaken their influence and criticize them openly. 
This is also understandable as an element in the competition for hegemony. 
For instance, ADO claim to want to put an end to the influence of extended 
families and to increase the influence of young intellectual umthonoye, 
independent of their background or status in society. It is presented as an 
attempt to promote democracy among Assyrians/Syriacs. This critical 
discourse, which began principally among the educated elite, has been taken 
over by the ordinary people. In 1979, the theatre director and actor George 
Farag wrote the theatre play Darbo d-kubo (The Thorny Path) in which he 
criticizes the influence of the ‘ashirto. 
 
7.5 The Role of Middle Eastern Regimes in the Name 
Conflict 
The ‘name conflict’ cannot be understood without studying the involvement 
of Middle Eastern regimes which seem to have had a significant interest and 
involvement in this question; a claim which is backed up by official reports 
and studies. My respondents also expressed fear of the involvement of these 
                                                 
736 The reports and studies conducted by the Swedish authorities and scholars also emphasize 
the role of the family system among Assyrians/Syriacs. For instance, in his PM, Carragher 
(1978) points out that this family system is well preserved in Sweden and sees this as an active 
driving-force behind the conflicts during 1976-1978. The extended family networks also drew 
the attention of the Swedish authorities (National Police Report, 1981). 
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regimes.737 In 1978, on the occasion of the 11th World Congress of the 
Assyrian Universal Alliance (AUA) in Sydney, the Iraqi regime was accused of 
being responsible for the poisoning of nine of the forty participants.738 In 
1979 it became public that a high-ranking Swedish policeman had spied on 
Iraqi immigrants for the Iraqi Intelligence Service. As I discussed in the 
storyline, the Swedish National Police Report of 1981 assumed a relationship 
between the ‘bank man’ and the Syrian Baath regime and consequently of the 
role which the ‘bank man’ played in the ‘name debate’. More recently, the 
Swedish radio station Ekot revealed a new case of espionage after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein in 2003.739 At least six people in Sweden spied on 
Assyrians/Syriacs and their movements in Sweden. 
 Both in the previous chapter and earlier in this chapter, I showed that 
high-ranking clergymen who had identified as Assyrians earlier in their lives 
began to repudiate this identification later in their careers.  The change in the 
discourses of the last three Patriarchs of the Syriac Orthodox Church 
(Ephrem Barsaum, Jacob III and Zakka I Iwas) has especially drawn the 
attention of Assyriska activists: while they were Archbishops, they also 
expressed their identification as ‘Assyrian’. Only after their consecration as 
Patriarch did they vehemently begin to oppose this identification.740 The 
present Patriarch Zakka I Iwas has gone as far as to make a very explicit 
political statement about the identity of his community, which he referred to 
as part of the ‘Arab nation’ in his presentation at a conference held in 
Damascus on 24 January 2000:741  
                                                 
737 Andersson (1983a: 84) already indicated that Assyrians/Syriacs had feared the Iraqi 
intelligence services since the arrival of Archbishop Aphram Aboodi in Södertälje. They had 
the idea that they danced to the tune of the regimes in the Middle East. See further also 
Hultkvist (1976). 
738 AUA website (www.aua.net) mentions that the five-member delegation from Iraq had 
brought sweets poisoned with mustard gas which were offered to the other delegates of the 
Congress. 
739 Report by the journalists Boström, Kino and Nordberg. Documents found in one of the 
buildings of the regime reveal detailed espionage information about Assyrian individuals in 
Sweden and that one of their main tasks was to cause a split in the community. 
740 Compare, for instance, the publications of Patriarch Jacob III from 1953 (History of the 
Syrian Church of Antioch) and 1974 (The Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch, [1974] 1985), a lecture 
which he delivered at Göttingen University in 1971. In this lecture he implied Aramean 
ancestry (1985: 1-2), while in the publication of 1953 he refers to both Assyrian and Aramean 
ancestry. 
741 On the basis of this presentation, Patriarch Zakka I Iwas published the article ‘Islam and 
Christianity are the two elements which complete each other in the formation of Arab 
civilization’ in the Patriarchal Magazine, Nr. 191-193, January-March 2000. Gabriel Afram 
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Today, as Muslims and Christians we should take our Muslim and 
Christian ancestors who fought together against intruders as an example in 
order to rescue the Arab homeland and boundaries, in order to spread 
national awareness... We are thus one and the same Arab nation.  We 
should strengthen our national unity in the Arab homeland in order to 
hold the flag of Arabism fly high. 
An obvious explanation for the change in the attitude of these high-ranking 
clergymen and their strong opposition to the identification of their church 
members as ‘Assyrian’ is related to the change in their position in the 
religiously organized community in the countries of the Middle East. 
Historically they have been accounted responsible for the ‘correct attitude’ of 
their flock. Although statements like the citation made by high-ranking clergy 
in the Middle East are explained by Assyrians/Syriacs in terms of keeping 
the authorities satisfied in order not to arouse animosity towards 
Assyrians/Syriacs as a minority residing in those countries, these statements 
are still very critically received and discussed among themselves as basically 
unacceptable acts. Being critical of this development himself, one of the 
Archbishops in Lebanon expressed his anger:  
When Patriarch Ephrem Barsaum was an Archbishop, he represented the 
AssyroChaldeans in demanding the rights of the Suryoye. After he became 
Patriarch, he began opposing the Othuroyutho [Assyrian ideology] and the 
designation Assyrian. What happened here? Did he receive a message 
from God? No, this [what he did] was not very wise. He, whom we 
respect very highly, did this. He is just like any other human being... 
Statements such as that of Patriarch Zakka I Iwas have also given rise to 
ideas among the Assyrian/Syriac elite in the diaspora to remove the 
Patriarchate of their church to a Western country in order to free its clergy 
from the pressure to identify according to the wishes of Middle Eastern 
regimes. 
 The involvement of Middle Eastern regimes sometimes happens directly 
and sometimes through individuals within the community (often clergymen) 
who have had an influential role in their community. For instance, I 
mentioned earlier the example of Chorbishop Aziz Günel (Istanbul). On the 
                                                                                                               
discussed this article in Hujådå (September 2000) in his article Açık Mektup (‘Open Letter’; 
translation of this article into Turkish by Said Yildiz). 
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basis of his own diary and letters and of my respondents’ accounts, it seems 
that he had ‘good’ relations with high-ranking officials in Turkey.  Moreover, 
it is very obvious that he articulated official Turkish arguments in the context 
of the ‘name debate’. At the height of the wave of emigration, he made two 
long trips to several European countries in which Assyrians/Syriacs had 
established themselves and remained in Sweden and Germany for a 
particularly long time during his 1977 trip. In one of his recorded sermons in 
the Syriac Orthodox Church in Augsburg742 (Germany) in 1977, he focused 
on what he considered to be the disturbing work of Assyrian activists. After 
a short introduction about the regular religious administrative aspects, he 
continued with the main topic of his sermon in which he explained how 
historically the Syriac Orthodox Church had been weakened because its 
members had begun to join other churches. He then arrived at the point 
which he really wanted to discuss more in-depth:743 
Eventually, a sickness for which there is no cure... cancer; again, they want 
to make another group [within the Syriac Orthodox Church] join the 
Assyrian Church... The question is ‘What are the gains and losses if we say 
we are Assyrians?’... When the cat sleeps, it dreams of eating mice... in 
their dreams our young people conquer Mesopotamia... They do not pause 
to think about the wide swathe of the politics which the use of the term 
Assyrianism [Othuroyutho] among the people [around them] brings in its 
train... Mesopotamia does lie in the centre of its boundaries with Iran, 
Iraq, Kurdistan, Syria and Turkey... how are they going to achieve this? 
...A person like Erbakan [Necmetin Erbakan744] can give the order “Go 
and kill them” and within an hour this might happen... If you [Assyrian 
activist] are such stalwart [gawro], why did he [you] flee here from Turkey? 
That is where he should go; the cock should crow on his own dunghill and 
not on the dunghills of others. If they are truly startwarts [gawre], they 
should go there and proclaim their message!..  you have no idea of the 
difficulties in which we live. Our young people [Assyrian activists in 
Europe] are the reason we have lost what little strength we had... The 
Suryoye community may encounter difficulties and lose a huge amount 
because of the senseless ideas [of Assyrian activists]... If God permits 
[Aloho d-sobe], I am planning to visit the Patriarch and inform him about 
                                                 
742 At that time Augsburg was one of the main centers of Assyrian activism in Germany. 
743 This is my translation of the original in Suryoyo, published by Beth Sawoce (2001). 
744 In the 1970s, N. Erbakan was leader of the National Salvation Party (MSP) which took 
several times part in coalition governments. The party was well known for its Islamist political 
agenda. 
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the situation you are in. And there is another place which should be 
informed about your situation; about which I cannot tell you... 
However, what is the main reason for the interest of these countries in the 
name question? Why have they opposed identification as ‘Assyrian’? In the 
first place, the use of ‘Assyrian’ in the modern historical context implies a 
national awareness and a distinct national identity, not just identification at 
denominational level. Furthermore, it has assumed a political connotation 
because under this name Assyrian activists have begun to demand their 
cultural and political rights as a people in the Middle East since the First 
World War. This process is considered by Middle Eastern regimes as a threat 
to their national existence and defined as such. On the basis of this 
discourse, the ‘Assyrian question’ is securitized. The discourse itself 
functions as a legitimation for measures taken by these regimes, no matter 
whether the threat is real or not.745 
 Another question which I would like to address is why Middle Eastern 
regimes have continued to be interested in this group despite the fact that 
the majority has continued to live in the diaspora. A very explicit example of 
this interest (besides the examples earlier in this section) was given by an 
Assyrian/Syriac reader in Mosul of Farid Nuzha’s magazine Asiria (published 
in Argentina and dispersed among the Assyrian/Syriac educated elite 
worldwide). This reader touched upon this aspect in the letter (1939) which 
he sent to Nuzha: 746 
…Eliminate, correct or change the Spanish name of your magazine 
[Asiria], because this name does not please the government of our country 
because it means Assyrian [Al-Ashori]… 
It also draws the attention that the author Fuat Çikki (1936) removed the 
term ‘Assyrian’ or changed it into ‘Aramean’ in the writings of Naum Faiq 
already in 1936, three years after the Simele massacre in Iraq.747 
                                                 
745 See further about the securitization theory, Waever (1995). 
746 See further about Farid Nuzha and his magazine Asiria, Chapter 6. 
747 Kiraz (2005: 12) mentions for example Faik’s writing ‘It is necessity that enticed us to 
publish this national Assyrian newspapers’ which was changed by Çikki into ‘… publish this 
newspaper’. Çikki also changed Faik’s ‘We began this project because of… national Assyrian 
racial passion’ into ‘… racial passion.’ Also Hanna Hajjar observed changes between the 
poems of Naum Faik which Hanna Hajjar’s father (Yaacoub Hajjar, 1923-2005) scribed in his 
handwriting at TMS in Beirut after learning them, and which later appeared in a changed 
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 Middle Eastern regimes are aware that Assyrians/Syriacs, although the 
great majority live today in the diaspora, are not cut off from their 
community members who have continued to live in the Middle East. The 
latest technology has increased their interconnectedness. Ideas developed in 
the new countries of residence are fairly pertinently related to the position of 
their people in the Middle East. Although the Western diaspora has resulted 
in a more extensive dispersion of Assyrians/Syriacs geographically, it has 
simultaneously also made them more visible. In contrast to their 
subordinated status as a non-recognized group of people in their homelands, 
Assyrians/Syriacs have made use of the opportunities offered them in the 
diaspora. This role of the diaspora explains why these regimes have 
continued to influence Assyrian/Syriac discourses of identification in the 
diaspora.  
 
7.6 New Discursive Attempts for Unity 
Around 1990, the conflict between the Assyrier and the Syrianer reached its 
height. There are three factors which prevented a further escalation of this 
conflict.  First and foremost, both groups have been living in the same public 
space, speak the same language, have close family relations and intermarry. 
Altogether, this has enabled continuous social interactions and has 
functioned as a counter-balance to the negative consequences of the 
antagonism between the groups. In this period, people also began their own 
businesses and new family problems appeared which required attention. 
Secondly, the attention of activists was drawn more than ever before to the 
international issues of their people, especially in the homeland. Thirdly, the 
‘name debate’ has been paid less attention because both the ordinary people 
and many former activists in both competing groups have become weary of 
the level of discussion, which had not brought them much farther forward 
towards a solution. 
 As I discussed in the storyline, the 1990s in Sweden was the era in which 
the ‘politics of difference’ among Assyrians/Syriacs became more 
institutionalized and constituted a discursive status quo. Besides the early 
split at secular level, since 1996 (with the installation of Archbishop 
                                                                                                               
version published by Çikki (1936). See further for Yaacoub Hajjar’s scribed documents of 
Naum Faik’s poetry in Ottoman Turkish: 
http://www.cavemanart.com/osroene/turkoassyrian.htm. 
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Benyamin Atas) it has also been possible to speak of a split in the 
archdiocese of the Syriac Orthodox Church in Sweden: The Syrianer are 
found mainly in the archdiocese of Archbishop Benyamin Atas and the 
Assyrier mainly in the archdiocese of Archbishop Gallo Shabo. This deeper 
institutionalization forged along the ‘politics of difference’ has reinforced the 
alienation between the Assyrier and the Syrianer, and the deadlock in the 
‘name conflict’ has yielded space for the articulation of new political 
discourses.748 Under these circumstances, the idea that neither the Assyriska 
nor the Syrianska Movement has been successful in the healing of the split 
subject, has gradually taken hold among the ordinary people and hence their 
legitimacy began to be questioned. For instance, an elite member informed 
me about an older man who believed that he had communicated with Jesus 
about the crisis his people were experiencing as a result of the name matter, 
because he believed it had reached unacceptable proportions: 
One day I said to Jesus: “Please come down and preach to this people 
since they are doing very bad things.” Jesus answered to me: “I came 
down once and they crucified me. I shall not do that for a second time. 
You should go and preach to them yourself. I shall not come down 
again.” 
More than ever, the state of disunity which the ‘name debate’ caused began to 
be seen as the main problem affecting the people. This was the moment at 
which discourses of unity began to be articulated more visibly in the field of 
discursivity. From discourse analytical perspective, unity as an empty signifier 
has no content of its own. Its meaning is constructed in relation to a state of 
disunity. Therefore, its emptiness (or its mythical space) allows space for the 
hegemonic articulations of political discourses. 
 Although outsiders tend to see Assyrians/Syriacs as a strong collectively 
organized group rich in institutions, Assyrians/Syriacs themselves generally 
think that the high number of institutions illustrates their internal disunity and 
consequently, their weakness rather than their strength. For example, this is 
expressed in the commonly used expression: ‘We have only a few people and 
we do not leave each other alone’ (Kulan arb‘o prite na u khilan qar‘e dehdode). It 
is a reference to the idea that they are in a miserable situation: although they 
are few, nevertheless they are not united and compete with each other for 
                                                 
748 For instance, the emergence of the Dauronoye and GFA (Furqono) can be explained by the 
political vacuum in the European context. Because of the limitations of this study, I shall not 
deal with this furthering depth here. 
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the representation of the people. 
 They are convinced that this does not contribute; indeed it detracts, 
from their strength in society. Commonly used expressions among 
themselves illustrate that Assyrians/Syriacs assume they have a weak position 
in relation to other people in society.  The following saying conveys this 
sense strongly: ‘In relation to each other we are like wolves, but in relation to 
the outside world we are like sheep’ (lehdode khda dewena u laf larwal khda 
‘wonena).749 Using these sayings, they criticize their internal disagreements 
about different issues affecting their people, assuming that hitherto they have 
suffered greatly from being disunited. People who are critical of this disunity 
often point out the negative consequences to their common aims as a people 
at the local,750 national and international level. At national and international 
levels, they believe that they could come closer to achieving their socio-
political claims as an unrecognized group seeking recognition and enjoying 
certain rights. This is why the unity of the ‘amo Suryoyo has assumed a central 
position in the public discourses and has become a popular and common 
demand of the ordinary people, as in the case of the ‘name debate’. This 
basic demand is expressed in terms of: ‘We are all the same; there is no 
difference between us!’ (Kulan ‘aynina, layt furshono baynothayna!). Furthermore, 
they usually express themselves in normative terms: ‘We should unify!’ (Glozem 
mihaydina!) and ‘Our leaders should co-operate to achieve the common goals 
of the people’ (A rishonaydan glozem felhi ‘am hdode lu nisho du ‘amo). It is 
assumed that certain future aims of their people will be realized as soon as 
the people ‘unite’. 
 Inspired by the articulation of the need for the ‘unity of the people’ (i 
hdoyutho du ‘amo), several discursive attempts to achieve unity have been 
initiated to heal the split subject which resulted from the ‘name conflict’. Some 
of the Assyriska activists especially began to approach the discussion about 
the name differently in an attempt to find new grounds for unity. They began 
                                                 
749 This saying first began to be used in a Muslim majority society in the Middle East where 
the ‘others’ were the Muslims. In the diaspora, the ‘others’ have become a diversity of groups 
in society. At least two other versions of this saying exist: ‘Towards the outside world we are 
like chickens and towards each other we are like cocks’ (laf larwal khda gyothena, u lehdode khda 
dike na) and ‘Among ourselves we are like wolves but when we are with foreigners we become 
like small locusts’ (bayne hdode khda dewena u inaqlo dkowina ‘am nukhroye kowina khda qamse). 
750 Some of my respondents mentioned that the municipality of Södertälje has sometimes 
used the name conflict to make certain decisions in its own favour. Before making a decision, 
the municipality usually requests the agreement of both groups. Because of the antagonism 
between both groups, they usually fail to come to an internal agreement. 
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to build on and refer to the discourse about the collective identity of the ‘amo 
Suryoyo among the Assyrian/Syriac elite in the beginning of the twentieth 
century, which included both Assyrian and Aramean ancestry.751 This 
developed less particularistic and more relative stands about the ‘name 
question’. Elite members, who have played a central role in both groups, 
have appeared in public and expressed the need for co-operation and unity. 
As the monk Hanna Aydin752 said in a TV programme on Suroyo TV (2005): 
‘I am very happy to attend this meeting with my ‘Assyrian brothers’ 
(ahunonaydi a Othuroye) who I have been opposing for a long time.’ The 
ordinary people have usually received such messages positively. Nevertheless, 
in the new attempts at ‘negotiations’, Syrianska elite members have generally 
rejected any connection with the name Assyrian. The Syrianska activist 
Shlemun, on the board of the Syrianska riksförbundet, confirms that in the 
annual meeting of 2005 there were indeed only a couple of individuals who 
thought that the name Assyrier should be tolerated. The general idea has 
continued to be that co-operation with those identifying as Assyrier should be 
avoided. Shlemun mentioned only one project so far in which the Syrianska 
riksförbundet had invited the Assyrier to participate, because it did not want to 
lose face with the Swedish authorities.753 There, they presented themselves as 
the representatives of one people. 
 In contrast to the Syrianer, besides continuing the use of the name 
Assyrier, the Assyrier have generally shown more willingness to accept the use 
of the name Syrianer in some form. Several attempts have been undertaken to 
negotiate and find compromises for the introduction of new names (in 
Western languages) by which to refer to the ‘amo Suryoyo. One example from 
the beginning of the 1990s is, for instance, that in an open letter the Assyriska 
Ungdomsförbundet (AUF) invited the youth section of the Syrianska 
riksförbundet (SRFUS) to enter into a dialogue (Hujådå, December 1991):754 
                                                 
751 An example is a group of people from Germany, who mainly split from the Aramean 
organizations in Germany and founded the Föderation Suryoye Deutschland in 2007 (Huyodo 
Suryoye d-Almanya, HAS, with 22 member organizations). On their website they indicate that 
they embrace the diversity of names in use among their people and they make use of both the 
Assyrian and the Aramean flag. 
752 On 18 February 2007, he was consecrated Patriarchal Vicar Mor Julius Hanna Aydin for 
the Syriac Orthodox Church in Germany. 
753 The project concerned is SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency); it grants money to poor countries. 
754 My translation of the Swedish original. 
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...The aim of the meeting with SRFUS is not to solve the name conflict. 
This can only be resolved by those who created this problem or after the 
generation which created this problem is gone. The primary purpose of 
the meeting is to break down the meaningless isolation among the 
Assyriska and Syrianska youth movements in Sweden and to discuss what 
can be done about the mounting youth and assimilation problems in 
Sweden... 
It is remarkable that, despite the big gap between both groups, AUF tried to 
bridge it in the first year of its foundation by focusing on what it perceived 
to be ‘the common need of the people’ – urgent problems which were 
essential to solve if the split subject were to be healed. Attempts to achieve 
unity were also initiated at highest organizational level. The Assyriska activist 
Abgar reflects on such an attempt: 
At the beginning of 1996, I was one of the representatives of the Assyriska 
riksförbundet who met the representatives of the Syrianska riksförbundet. The 
goal was to reach an agreement about establishing a Con-Federation with 
the name Huyodo d-Beth Nahrin which would cover both federations. All 
the different denominations would be the ‘sons’ of this federation. Each 
of us would continue to use the designation of our choice. I was surprised 
to see something so positive emerge during this meeting. After a couple of 
weeks, they replied in a letter that they did not wish to co-operate with us 
as long as we used the name Assyrian... This showed me that there are 
people who want to nurture this division and that it is not only the 
designation which they cannot agree upon. We had the meeting with the 
most responsible people on the Syrianska side. In the first instance, they 
showed plenty of interest in unity within a new Federation. I do not 
believe that they really want unity... 
Furthermore, Abgar explained that at other moments he had proposed that 
activists learn from the Jewish example. They call their language Hebrew, their 
religion Jewish and their country Israel. Abgar proposed: ‘Like them, we can 
call the language Aramaic, the people Assyrian and the church Syriac. The 
negative answer to this proposal signified to Abgar that the Syrianer just do 
not want to unite – as in the earlier example. 
 Students especially have attempted to find new compromise names to 
bridge the internal disagreements. But, they could not always reach all the 
students. Syrianska students who could not agree on the inclusion of the 
name Assyrier rejected the new alternatives. One example of such a rejection 
is the students in Örebro at the end of the 1990s, among whom there were 
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some who wanted to use the compound name Assyrier/Syrianer. This did not 
come to fruition because Syrianska students rejected the name and did not do 
so lightly. Leaving the Assyriska students on the outside, they established a 
student organization with the name Syrianska/Arameiska Nationen. Although 
a similar discussion took place among the students in the area of Stockholm, 
they could nevertheless find enough members to found the Syrianska 
Assyriska Akademiker i Sverige (September 2001). The debate was about both 
the use of a compound name and which name should be mentioned first. As 
a compromise, those Syrianer who wanted to co-operate with the Assyrier 
requested that ‘their name’ – Syrianska – should be mentioned first. This is 
how both groups compromised on the foundation of this organization. 
Those Syrianska students, who did not want to compromise on the name, 
founded their own student organization in 2002: the Syrianska/Arameiska 
Akademiker föreningen (SAAF).755 Another initiative was taken by the 
Assyrian/Syriac students in the medical sciences. Some of them took the 
initiative to find a compromise name and proposed Assyrianska 
Läkarsällskapet – combining Assyriska and Syrianska. Nevertheless, some of 
the Syrianska students objected to the name because of the first two letters 
and did not become members. Another example is the Syrianska-Assyriska 




Illustration 17: An expression of a discourse of ‘unity’. Source: www.auf.nu 
 
                                                 
755 Mid-2009, the members of both organizations numbered about 1300 each. SAAF is no 
longer a föreningen but a förbundet. 
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To conclude, a relatively small group of activists, intellectuals and clergymen 
have dominated the ‘name debate’ at institutional level and have continued 
to compete for hegemony among their people. Despite several attempts by 
individuals who have articulated discourses of unity, there is still relatively 
little co-operation to be seen between them. Meanwhile, as indicated, this 
theme does no longer occupy the ordinary people on a daily basis. A 
common discourse among Assyrier activists is that Syrianska activists do not 
want to unite because they fear losing their influence among the people 
rather than having anything to do with the ‘name issue’. 
 
7.7 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have analysed the conditions under which the ‘name 
conflict’ emerged among Assyrians/Syriacs in Sweden from a historical 
perspective. I have explained how an antagonistic relationship between 
different political discourses has developed and institutionalized around the 
‘correct name’ of their people in Western languages. Two main ethno-
national discourses (Assyrier and Syrianer with some internal variations) have 
been identified and one religious discourse, represented by the Syriac 
Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, this third discourse has not succeeded in 
imposing itself on the community; it has not institutionalized after it was 
expressed by the Synod in Damascus. The reason for expressing this 
discourse may have been a formal or symbolic act and based on 
requirements from Middle Eastern regimes to identify as a religious 
community instead of an ethno-national group. 
 The clergy have played a very central role in the ‘name debate’. I have 
illustrated that the majority of the clergy has shared the discourse of the 
Syrianer, throughout the process of change to which it was subjected. A 
minority of the clergy has stood with the Assyrier and at certain times, 
especially in the present-day, some clergymen have softened their attitude in 
favour of a more neutral stance. However, the most important conclusion to 
be drawn here is that the formal stance of the Syriac Orthodox Church has 
opposed national secular identification and proposed instead identification at 
the denominational level. Therefore, in the discursive field, the Assyrier and 
Syrianer identity discourses have represented the national identification of the 
people, whereas the church has stood for identification at the 
denominational level. 
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 In its competition for hegemony, each political discourse has 
endeavoured to hegemonize the ‘naming’ of its people, which has functioned 
as a central nodal point. This is how the name of the people (as a nodal point) 
became contested and transformed into a floating signifier. Similarly, in their 
attempts to hegemonize the ‘naming’ they have also aimed to fix the 
meaning of such elements as symbolic and cultural capital around particular 
nodal points (such as the Assyriska or Syrianska culture and the Assyriska or 
Syrianska history). Although since the mid-1990s new discursive attempts 
(based on the discourse of the need for unity) have been initiated in order to 
heal the split among the people, these have so far not been realized by a long 
chalk. Instead, antagonistic relationships, especially at the institutional level, 
have grown farther apart. 
 My conclusion is that the ‘name conflict’ should be understood in 
relation to the changes which occurred as a consequence of the dislocation 
after emigration and the emergence of the split subject in the diaspora. In the 
healing process of the split subject which resulted from the identification crisis, 
different elite groups have been competing for hegemony and have made use 
of the socio-political vacuum they encountered. The process of identification 
is inherently antagonistic. From discourse theoretical perspective, 
identification processes are the result of hegemonic struggles between 
different political discourses. In the diaspora context, some elite groups have 
had to cede space to new elite groups which have emerged. Clergymen and 
informal traditional leaders (often referred to as ‘ashirto) have often stood 
opposed to secular, young and educated elite members. 
 Upon its settlement, the goal of the Assyriska Movement was the healing 
of the crisis of identification which the split subject experienced. It tried this by 
adopting a cross-denominational approach upon which it based the national 
identity of its people as Assyrier. Joining with the clergy, lay elite members 
(later to be known as representatives of the Syrianska Movement) fought this 
approach and initially offered a denominational alternative, identifying as 
members of the Syriac Orthodox Church. Thereafter, in the discourses of 
the Syrianska Movement, the Assyrier have been identified by their ‘non-
being’ in a pure-particularistic way. In opposition to the name Assyrier, after 
several name changes, the name Syrianer was established as an alternative in 
the discursive field. In the beginning, the opposition focused on the dis-
identification as Assyrier and the cross-denominational ideology which this 
name assumed. The Aramean ancestry, which the oppositional ideology of 
the Syrianer assumed for its people, played a background role. More recently, 
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this ancestral alternative to the Assyrian option has played a role at content 
level and not only at the level of the representation of names. Another 
change in the oppositional ideology of the Syrianer is that, in a period of 
approximately three decades, it has developed into what I have called the 
Syrianska Movement with an alternative cross-denominational national 
identity as an alternative to that of the Assyriska Movement. Nevertheless, 
this approach has remained mainly at the ideological level and has been far 
less visible in practice. 
 In explaining the character and the extent of the antagonism between 
the Assyrier and the Syrianer, I have argued that the involvement of Middle 
Eastern regimes should be considered. Without the interests of the latter in 
the identification of Assyrians/Syriacs, the position of clergymen (or the 
church) and their identity discourses might possibly have been different. The 
same can be said about the level of antagonism shown by those opposing 
identification as Assyrier. This would have allowed less space for the 
opposition to the Assyrian ideology which has been represented by the 
Syrianska Movement. In contrast to the role of Middle Eastern regimes, the 
Swedish authorities have indirectly played a unifying role in the ‘name 
conflict’. Their compromise stance in deciding not to choose one of the 
competing names but to introduce the compound name Assyrier/Syrianer 
instead has offered an alternative since the beginning of 1980s. 
 
8 THE LOGIC OF NAMING 
 
It is a known fact that elites – representing different political discourses – 
have functioned as the vanguard of their groups in taking upon themselves 
the duty of translating the varied experiences of their people into general 
terms. And the vanguard is never unified or of one mind. While this may be 
so, the very fact that a clash of discourses is experienced presupposes there 
must also be some common ground. Therefore this chapter will focus on the 
discourses adduced by the Assyrian/Syriac elites about the ‘correct name’ of 
their people in Western languages and, as an inevitable corollary of this, the 
discourses explaining their ancestry and their collective identity from a 
present-day perspective. On a cautionary note, it should be borne in mind 
that these discourses have been abstracted from interviews which I 
conducted in 2004/2005 and that they should be studied in their context. 
Respondents mentioned that, since about the end of the 1990s, they have 
had enough of the name discussion and wish to seek compromises in order 
to develop more unity among the various ideologies by accepting the 
different names in use among their people. Nevertheless, this chapter also 
inexorably demonstrates that there are still elite members who refuse to 
abandon their exclusivist approach and show this by rejecting the idea of the 
use of a diversity of names. They can be considered as the gatekeepers of the 
Assyriska and Syrianska ideologies in times in which they want their particular 
ideology to win itself some recognized space in the status quo. The very 
existence and the employment of the arguments which they use should be 
understood in relation to the competition between the Assyriska and 
Syrianska organizations (as explained in Chapter 7). When arguing about the 
‘correct name’ of their people, they are very aware of the external 
environment in which the designation concerned is employed – although this 
is not often mentioned explicitly. The main point they consider to be 
important in the context of the external environment is that other people 
should learn about who the Assyrians/Syriacs are and recognize them as a 
distinct people. This can also be taken as one of the main reasons for why 
the discussion about the ‘correct name’ of their people actually commenced. 
 In analysing the arguments employed in the politics of naming of the 
Assyriska and Syrianska elites, I shall demonstrate that these are not 
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monolithic constructions but are actually internally diverse. To render the 
pattern of internal diversity more discernible, I make a distinction between 
primordially and situationally used arguments as a framework to analyze the 
deployed discourses. In doing so, it is important to bear in mind that these 
are not ‘the laws of the Medes and Persians’ but that different political 
discourses often make use of both types of arguments (although they may 
not be aware of their conflated approach). The study of ethnicity 
distinguishes between two main approaches: primordialism and situationalism 
(and a diversity of other groups). As discussed in the theoretical Chapter 2, 
primordialist approach to ethnicity assumes primordial ties (such as culture, 
religion, language, bloodline and so forth). All these elements are viewed as 
deep-rooted phenomena in society. The essentialist attitude inherent to the 
primordialist approach gives a large space to a ‘static’ and ‘naturalistic’ view of 
ethnicity. And, thus, it leaves little space for the changes in identities, the 
overlapping character of identity formations and the role of power 
relationships. As has just been touched upon, the discourses about the 
choice of a certain name imply underlying discourses about the ancestry of 
the ‘amo Suryoyo. This approach as represented by the elites is of itself 
primordial. Their premise is that their name should reflect their primordial 
ancestral ties. Nevertheless, I have made a distinction between primordial 
and situational arguments from the perspectives of those employing the 
arguments. By primordial I mean to say that my respondents believe that they 
have a primordial relationship to the ancient Assyrians or Arameans, be this 
genealogically, culturally, or linguistically. It could therefore be said that the 
idea of objectivity is also inherent in the use of the primordial argument.  
 Unlike the primordial approach, the situationalists understand ethnicity as 
‘a social, cultural and political resource for different interest- and status 
groups’ (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 8-9). Hence, the formation of 
identities is associated with the logic of ‘elite competition for resources’ and 
with the manipulation of symbols (Brass 1991, Cohen 1974). In the case of 
situational arguments, the elite members are aware that they are employing 
the argument on the basis of temporality to attain the ‘improvement’ of the 
situation of their people at the moment they are using it, although they may 
not express this explicitly. The early constructivist Frederick Barth (1969) 
focuses on the ‘relational’ and ‘processual’ aspect of ethnicity. Barth’s 
approach constitutes a shift from the ‘content-based’ approaches of ethnicity 
to a ‘relational’ understanding of ‘ethnic boundaries’. That is why Barth 
defines ethnic identities as a category of ‘ascription’, namely an empty space 
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which is formed in relation to another group. This contrasts the primordialist 
approach to ethnicity, which reifies ‘culture’. At this point, it is important to 
mention the critique of Berger and Luckman ([1966] 1991: 106-107) as two 
early constructivists about the reification of social reality: 
...reification is the apprehension of the products of human activity as if 
they were something other than human products – such as facts of nature, 
results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will. Reification implies 
that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world, 
and, further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his 
products is lost to consciousness... 
Adopting this perspective, primordially based arguments used in the 
negotiation of the collective identity of their people by a contemporary 
group produce the reification of this same collective identity. ‘The collective 
identity’ is institutionalized within the boundaries of the ‘collective’ and 
presented as the objective truth, ‘born’ of past and the present (and ought to 
survive in the future). In other words, a ‘collective identity’ can be born and 
can die. It is ‘naturalized’ as something supernatural, attained without the 
interaction of the human intervention of the elite members. Berger and 
Luckman ask the valid question of whether man, as the producer of this 
‘objectivation’ of social reality, is aware that he is the author of it and 
whether he is aware that it can be remade. At the moment elites resort to the 
use of situational arguments, they must be aware of this process of defining 
the collective identity of their people. The source of legitimacy for the 
chosen names is usually derived from the history. However, it is still the 
reinterpretation of history according to specific discourses. Nevertheless, 
from a certain collection of elements they choose those which they still 
consider to be primordial to their identity. In their efforts they allow 
themselves the freedom to reframe the arguments on the basis of which their 
identity is built. They do this in the present-day context and they are 
conscious of what they are doing. 
 In discourse analytical terms, the name of a people is a nodal point around 
which other elements are organized. From discourse theoretical perspective 
the ‘naming’ of a people is a relational, contextual and processual 
phenomenon. Naming is an identification process in which the constitution 
of the self is formed in relation to the others, resulting in the temporary fixation 
of meaning. Thus, naming is a political act and cannot be researched without 
taking into account the power relationships. Through naming one charges 
396                                        CHAPTER 8 
 
something with a particular meaning, something to be understood in its 
socio-historical context. As I illustrated in the two previous chapters, in the 
Assyrian/Syriac case, the meaning and the name of the ‘amo Suryoyo has not 
been fixed by a hegemonic identity discourse. The meaning of it, whether 
ethno-national or ethno-religious has not gained a hegemonic fixation. It 
continues to be questioned by both insiders and outsiders. Unlike the 
situation of Assyrians/Syriacs, in the present-day for instance, we do not 
discuss and question the national name of Swedish or Dutch people. Rather, 
we accept the names of these ‘imagined communities’ as something which 
have always been out there and as something ‘natural’. However, the 
majority of the minority groups who have not been recognized as a national 
group, but who have attempted to gain this status have been questioned. 
Since these minority groups lack an institutionalized and hegemonized form 
of a national identity, the act of naming for these people assumes enormous 
significance. Naming is a political act and a decision in itself: it is a gesture of 
defiance and a way of historicizing their experiences. This step is a way of 
telling the world and themselves who they are, who they are not, what they 
have experienced, and what they want. The Assyrians/Syriacs are no 
exception. Importantly, the fact that I use a compound instead of a single 
name to speak about one people is indicative that naming is not an 
unequivocal matter.  
 Among the Syrianer, there are relatively fewer people who are actively 
involved in the ‘name debate’ than among the Assyrier. Except for adopting a 
uniform position against the use of the designation ‘Assyrian’, they are not 
actively involved in living and expressing the broader (theoretical) ideology 
of their stance. Rather, it is a latent position which is expressed only at 
certain times, as a response to the external environment (for instance, 
Swedish institutions) or to the Assyrier. To exemplify, in the eyes of the 
Syriansk scholar Rabi ‘the discussion between the Assyrier and Syrianer has 
become an academic question; it is a conflict about the interpretation of 
[their] history by the same people’. And his attitude reveals that he is not 
greatly bothered by it. An important reason for his stance and that of other 
Syrianer for whom this issue remains ‘an academic question’ at a distance 
might be that theirs was not an active decision to adopt this position. In 
contrast to them, the first generation Assyrier did make a conscious decision 
to adhere to the Assyrian ideology. The position the scholar Rabi takes is 
comparable to that of the second generation Assyrier who have been born 
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into an Assyrisk family. Depending on the depth of their interest, they may or 
may not decide to take an active role.  
 In what follows, I shall commence by giving a thick description of the 
primordial arguments (etymological, geographical, genealogical, cultural 
continuity and linguistic) and shall continue by examining the situationally 
used arguments in the ‘name debate’ between the two groups.  
 
8.1 Primordial Arguments 
8.1.1 Etymological Argument  
Most frequently, Assyrier field an etymological argument to argue the case for 
the designation Assyrian.756 Two theories have been devised to argue that the 
term Suroyo (and indeed Suryoyo, which is perceived as a synonym of Suroyo) is 
etymologically derived from the term Asuroyo (Assyrian). In the eyes of these 
elite members, the term Suroyo is the historical continuation of the term 
Asuroyo and hence a new living reality of which they have grown aware and 
which fulfils their need. It should be said that the names Suroyo and Suryoyo 
have traditionally been used in respectively Suryoyo (also known as Surayt or 
Turoyo)757 and in classical Syriac. Among the Assyrier, the academic elite 
especially refer to such scholars as the Finnish Assyriologist Simo Parpola758 
and the German Semitist scholar Theodor Nöldeke759 whom they consider 
defenders of this theory. Nevertheless, often they do not mention names of 
specific authors when they employ this etymological argument. One reason 
might be that they have only heard that there are authors who argue this 
without having read them personally. Another reason might be that they feel 
they do not have any detailed knowledge to sustain their arguments and that 
they only referred to these authors to vindicate their stance. 
 The argument adduced by elite members is that when the Greeks began 
to rule the Assyrians/Syriacs, they commenced calling them ‘Syrios’ instead 
of ‘Assyrios’. The reason they had done so was that the alpha ‘A’ in ‘Assyrios’ 
disappeared and resulted in the new term Syrios (Syrian). This Greek use is 
                                                 
756See further  for a critical approach of any relationship between present-day Assyrians and 
the ancient Assyrians (Fiey 1965). 
757 See further for the use of the terms Surayt and Turoyo, Appendix 2. 
758 See further Parpola (1999, 2004). 
759 See further Nöldeke (1881: 443–68). 
398                                        CHAPTER 8 
 
said to have been taken over by the Assyrians/Syriacs themselves, when 
speaking their mother tongue Suryoyo. Hence, Asuroye (Assyrians) was 
changed into Suroye (Syrians – today: Syriacs) and Assyria into Syria. Parpola 
(2004) has a different theory; he mentions that the Assyrians themselves 
dropped the A and not the Greeks. 
 Among those who have espoused the primordial point of view, there is 
a constant need to find new arguments to bolster their perceived truth. Let 
me furnish an illustration. In 2007, after I had completed my interviews, 
from several respondents I received a new article, The Terms ‘Assyria’ and 
‘Syria’ Again, by Robert Rollinger (2006) in which this issue is discussed. 
Rollinger argues that the Luwian inscription found in Çineköy (Turkey) 
proves that Luwians used to pronounce ‘Assyria’ without the initial aleph. He 
argues that this is evidence that this abbreviated form was already current in 
the eight century BCE and that the original linguistic and historical context 
was neither Greek nor Assyrian, but the multi-lingual milieu of southern 
Anatolia and northern Syria at the beginning of the Iron Age. Among the 
Assyriska elite who learned about this article, this new insight was the 
ultimate evidence of their Assyrian descent; it strengthened their conviction 
that the contemporary reference to their people using the term Syrian is 
merely an abbreviation of the term Assyrian. As an aside, I must add that, in 
relation to this argument, in this context a few Assyriska elite members 
mentioned that an etymological relationship between the terms Suryoye and 
Oromoye (Arameans) is absent and hence the Suryoye are less probably of 
Aramean descent. 
 Some elite members also mentioned that the etymology of the Suryoyo 
language supports the claim that the term Suroye is a shortened version of the 
term Asuroye. This theory is mostly fielded by those elite members who have 
been educated in the classical Syriac language. They assert that the omission 
of the olaf A in Asuroyo produced Suroyo. An olaf which is not followed by a 
vocal character is voiceless in Syriac, and consequently has no function.760 To 
strengthen their argument, they mention examples of this use in personal 
names in which the olaf has been dropped as in Ahiqar which changed to 
Hiqar or Esrael which changed to Srael.  
                                                 
760 Some mention that because of this, the olaf has a low significance; no matter which vowel 
is used in combination with it, the olaf will assimilate that sound. Besides the olaf, two other 
characters are referred to as ‘sick’ characters (othwotho krihotho), namely the yuth and the waw. 
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 Commonly, the Syrianska elite reject the etymological argument of the 
Assyrier who aver that the terms Suroye and Suryoye are derived from Asuroye 
(Assyrians). For instance, the Syrianska student Matay does not place much 
value on the etymological argument on which the Assyrier focus. He 
mentions examples of other people which demonstrate that being called after 
a certain people does not necessarily mean that there is a historical 
relationship to those people:  
This may be [etymologically] correct with regard to the name but it does 
not mean that the Suryoye are descendants of the ancient Assyrians. There 
are etymological examples of other people. Romanians are called after 
Rome and the Indians in America are called after India. But it does not 
mean that present-day Rumanians are of Roman descent or that the 
Indians are originally from India. 
Matay did not feel obliged to provide an alternative explanation for the 
relationship between Suryoye and Asuroye. Nonetheless many other Syrianska 
elite members did find this an important item for discussion.761 Attempting 
to undermine the etymological argument of the Assyrier, the scholar George 
says that the terms Suroye and Suryoye are not related at all. He says that Suroye 
should be written with the Syriac letter sode and Suryoye with the letter 
semkad.762 Having established this, George defends the alternative theory that 
the term Suroye developed from the name of the city Sur (Tyre) in Lebanon: 
It is said in the Bible that the disciples of Jesus went there to preach. And 
that after the people there converted to Christianity they were called 
Suroye. The assumption is that the city Sur takes its name from this 
religion. Jerome is the first to have stated this in the fifth century. 
A third theory which Syrianska elite members often use when opposing any 
relationship between Suryoye and Asuroye is that which argues that Suryoye is 
derived from the Persian King Cyrus. The Assyriska opponents of this theory 
state that this cannot be valid since the name of King Cyrus is pronounced 
Kurosh in Syriac and that therefore, no etymological relationship can be 
                                                 
761 In the mid-1980s, Assad Sauma wrote a series of articles in Bahro Suryoyo (published by the 
Syrianska riksförbundet) in which he discussed the different theories under the title Syriac Studies. 
The title implicitly seeks legitimation because it assumes a scholarly approach. 
762 Grammatically what he is stating is not correct in relation to the historical spelling of the 
terms; both should be written with the character semkad. But the present-day pronunciation of 
this name in (spoken) Suryoyo allows space for the spelling of Suroye with the letter sode. See 
further Tezel (2003: 24, note 13). 
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drawn between Suryoye and Kurosh. Father Ishaq explains why he personally 
finds this theory the most convincing:  
Most of the authors say that Suryoye is derived from Cyrus the King. Bar 
Salibi763 who wrote Bible commentaries, says that we are called after 
Cyrus... They [Suryoye] had to call themselves after Cyrus. The Assyrian 
Kingdom collapsed and the Arameans had very little power left to 
maintain their kingdoms. [In the rest of his argumentation, he seems to 
mix his theory with a different Syrus or Suros who is also mentioned by 
Melek; see below]. This was about 700 years before [after] Moses. King 
Syros was one of the three brothers: Syros, Punicus and Kilikos. Their 
father was an Aramean king. When their father died, the three brothers 
fought as the Assyrians, Arameans and Chaldeans [do now]. [He projects 
the current name discussion among the people today onto the history]. 
Each of them wanted to secure the leadership… Finally, the three 
brothers decided to divide the land of their father into three pieces and 
each of them would rule one piece. Such authors as Michael the Great and 
others say that Syros commenced ruling the land Syria, here meaning the 
Suryoyto land or that the designation Suryoye is derived from Syros. Kilikos 
began to rule Cilicia [in Turkey]. And Punicus went to the area which we 
know today as Lebanon. The Phoenicians are called after him.  
Somewhere else in the interview, Father Ishaq contradicts himself in relation 
to his first argument, stating that the term Suryoyo already existed but that it 
became more widely known through Cyrus: 
We also know the name Suryoyo from Nehman Suryoyo, one of the 
military leaders of an Aramean king in Damascus who was suffering from 
a sickness and went to the Prophet Elisha to be cured. The term Suryoyo 
was known at that time, but not yet very well. But, after they [Suryoye] were 
called after Cyrus, its fame began to spread. 
A fourth theory which the Syrianska elite employ in the etymological 
argument is that the name Suryoye derives from King Suros or Sauros. Melek 
locates this king in one of the central areas in which the Assyrians/Syriacs 
have been living the last few centuries: 
Historical accounts write about an Aramean king who lived in the area of 
Nsibin [Nusaybin], Mardin and Tur ‘Abdin. His name was Suros or Sauros. 
                                                 
763 Bishop Dionysius Bar Salibi lived in the twelfth century (d. 1171). Bar Salibi mentions a 
mythical King Syros or Suros and not the Persian King Cyrus. 
THE LOGIC OF NAMING                                             401 
 
A Suroyo [assuming Suroyo and Suryoyo are synonyms] is someone from the 
kingdom of Suros. [Interviewer: Are you referring here to the Persian 
King Cyrus?] No, Cyrus is a different person, a Persian who came about 
500 years after him [Syros]... He lived in about 1600 BCE. This name was 
used among the people. When the Greeks came into our area… they 
learned that these people called themselves Suroye. Therefore they called 
the area in which we lived the land of Suri. 
All these arguments are characterized by a strong temporal dimension. 
Unquestionably, elites use different etymological explanations in order to 
historicize the name Suryoye from their discourse about the descent of their 
people. With this, they attempt to construct the ‘truth’ and prove their 
distinctive arguments. Consequently these etymological explanations 
transcend the history of the words; they attempt to re-write the history from 
the present-day context. 
 
8.1.2 Linguistic Argument 
Historically, language has been a central nodal point in the formation of 
identity discourses. This is not strange, as it is through language that 
individuals communicate and form social links and so produce groups of 
people. Not being able to communicate keeps individuals at a distance from 
each other. Despite the central role of language, it does not mean that it is 
something static and unchangeable. People may begin to speak other 
languages because of several reasons.764 
 The Assyriska elite, in contrast to the Syrianer, do not accord a central 
role to language in constructing arguments about their descent at the level of 
the discussion about the ‘correct designation’ of their people. They assume 
that it is obvious that the shared language(s) of the Syriac churches has been 
Syriac and Suryoyo. Instead, their focus tends to emphasize the closeness of 
the different dialects of Syriac; implying the historical unity of ‘their people’ 
(although in a state of dispersion today). Several elite members mentioned 
that the existence and use of the terms Madenhoyo (Eastern) and Ma‘erboyo 
(Western) in Syriac – in reference to the two dialects of Syriac language – are 
proof that the dialects have one foundation and so consequently do the 
                                                 
764 As a group of people, Syriac-speaking Christians (especially Melkites, Maronites but also 
Chaldeans and members of the Syriac Orthodox Church) whose mother tongue became 
Arabic (partly as a consequence of assimilation politics and partly perhaps because of other 
processes) began, for example, to be referred to as Arabs. See for the role of language in the 
Middle East also Masters (2001: 189-199). 
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people who speak these dialects.765 This idea fits well into the more general 
argument of the Assyrier that all the Syriac churches are part of one family 
which should be re-united under one umbrella name Assyrian. The historical 
existence of the terms Madenhoye (Easterners) and Ma‘erboye (Westerners) – 
leaving out Suryoye (as in Suryoye Ma‘erboye) – in itself is used as an argument 
that it concerns the same group of people. Father Aday says: ‘The spoken 
dialect is called Sureth by the Madenhoye and Chaldeans and Surayt by the 
Ma‘erboye.’ Only the pronunciation differs slightly, he argues:  
In the monastery we read the Bible in both Madenhoyo and Ma‘erboyo. We 
even made jokes about also being able to read the Bible in Madenhoyo.  
Furqono for salvation became purqana. Often we changed only the ‘o’ at 
the end of a substantive into an ‘a’. 
Assyrians/Syriacs generally consider the Suryoyo language to be one of the 
Aramaic dialects. The difference in relating to it is expressed by a focus on 
certain aspects. Today, Assyrier who like to refer to the language they speak 
as Assyriska are keen to assert that Suryoyo is an Aramaic dialect and, in the 
first place, the dialect which is specific to the Assyrians/Syriacs. By doing so, 
they tend to keep its Aramaic aspect in the background and therefore 
consciously refer to the language as Suryoyo. This might be a reaction to the 
use of the ‘Aramaic language’ argument by the Syrianer when they seek to 
identify with an Aramean past. In contrast to those Assyrians/Syriacs who 
believe they are of Aramean descent, the Assyriska elite argue that speaking 
an Aramaic dialect does not mean that Assyrians/Syriacs are of Aramean 
descent or that speaking this language has changed their Assyrian descent. 
They take pains to point out that, besides Aramaic, the ancient Assyrians 
continued to use their own Assyrian Akkadian language. In this way, the 
ancient Assyrian language is used by some as an element which connects 
present-day Assyrians/Syriacs with the ancient Assyrians. 
                                                 
765 The distinction Suryoye Madenhoye and Suryoye Ma‘erboye is used when referring to the 
members of respectively the Assyrian Church of the East (East Syriacs, as the term conveys, 
or Nestorians in some sources) and to the members of the Syriac Orthodox Church (West 
Syriacs or Jacobites in some sources), mostly by activists or elites who have been educated in 
classical Syriac. Historically, West Suryoye sources have referred to the East Suryoye as both 
Nasturnoye and as Suryoye Madenhoye. The ordinary people among the West Suryoye, especially 
the elderly, tended to refer to the Suryoye Madenhoye as Nasturnoye and khalat (especially in Tur 
‘Abdin) and Ashuriye in the Arabic-speaking countries (where they lived in a more mixed 
environment). In the present-day in Europe, this group also refers to them as Ashuriye in their 
mother tongue, Suryoyo. For some West Suryoye, this is an ideological distinction made to 
distance themselves from them. It is not clear where the reference khalat comes from. 
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 Even assuming that Assyrians did not continue to speak their own 
language but adopted an Aramaic dialect, many Assyrier still believe that 
Assyrians/Syriacs have retained many loanwords from ancient Assyrian into 
the new Aramaic dialect which they have continued to speak. This is another 
reason for them to call the language they speak today – Assyrian. ‘The fall of 
Nineveh and Babylon leads to a gap in knowledge of about 400 years’, 
Father Aday says. Nevertheless, he points out that many Assyrian words are 
still to be found in the Syriac language. Besides academic articles766 written 
about this aspect,  proponents of these arguments place lists of words on the 
Internet which can be found in either Assyrian or Akkadian and in Syriac.767 
This idea is also reflected in the title of the dictionary compiled by Gabriel 
Afram (2005): Svensk - Assyrisk ordbok (Swedish – Assyrian dictionary).768 In 
the first instance, the reader is given the impression that the language 
concerned is ancient Assyrian. This idea is strengthened by the use of 
cuneiform script on the cover (instead of using the Syriac Aramaic script 
which corresponds to the language used in the dictionary). Only after 
opening the dictionary does it become clear that it is a dictionary of what has 
traditionally been called Syriac (Suryoyo). The fact that Gabriel Afram paid 
particular attention in the introduction of his dictionary to his conscious 
choice of the way he wanted to refer to the Syriac by the designation Assyrian 
shows that he was aware that such a discussion was very probably bound to 
flare up between the Assyrier and the Syrianer on publication.769 The latter 
group opposed the reference to Syriac under the name Assyrian. Gabriel 
Afram has defended his choice with the argument that he identifies his 
people as Assyrians. Consequently, he believes that he has the right to refer 
to the language they speak by the name Assyrian; independent of the 
question as to whether the language which the people speak today is the 
same as the ancient Assyrian language. 
 Among the Syrianska elite, it is a commonly accepted idea that ‘Aramaic’ 
– as the mother tongue of the Assyrians/Syriacs – is proof of their Aramean 
                                                 
766 See for example Khan (2008).  
767 See for example: http://www.aina.org/articles/akkadianwords.html. 
768 Among the Syrianska opponents of the Assyrian ideology, there has been heavy criticism 
since the publication of this dictionary. Although this disagreement is not new, it becomes 
more serious when it is expressed in serious works. In the primary schools in Sweden where 
Syriac is being taught, this discussion about the name has also taken places. And it is not 
solved yet. 
769 See for a discussion, for example, the article by Messo (2006) who argued strongly against 
Afram’s reference to the language. 
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descent. ‘The language proves what roots a people have. Therefore, the most 
important characteristic of a people is the language that they speak’ says the 
Syrianska academic activist Melek. Although they refer to this argument, 
respondents do not elabourate on it. Perhaps because it is assumed it is 
obvious that the linguistic argument is on their side and not on the side of 
the Assyrier. ‘Aramaic, the language of Jesus’, functions as an instrument to 
make themselves known to outsiders as Father Bedros explains: 
If we use the term Syrisk, they won’t understand us. When we tell them 
about the language of Jesus – that I talk Arameiska, they will understand 
us. Therefore I shall have to go back to the time of Jesus when they called 
the Suryoyo language Aramaic, shan’t I? 
In this approach the focus is the Aramaic aspect of their mother tongue, not 
its Suryoyo aspect; namely, Suryoyo as a dialect of Aramaic. It can be said that, 
in the process of positioning themselves in relation to the ‘others’, not only 
did a shift take place in the use of the designation for the people (from 
Suryoye to Oromoye). This was accompanied by a shift of focus in the name of 
the language: Syriac (Suryoyo) was more frequently referred to as Aramaic 
(Oromoyo). Father Bedros already mentioned, outsiders are better acquainted 
with the term Aramaic than Syriac. Another reason is that Aramaic is 
perceived to enjoy an important and respected status as an ancient language. 
Furthermore, for many Assyrians/Syriacs it exudes a Christian character, 
especially through its connection with Jesus, because He spoke an Aramaic 
dialect.770 Language becomes a nodal point of the deployed identity discourse; 
the institutionalization of a particularity. Approaching ‘language’ as a 
primordial quality ignores changes in language use. 
 
8.1.3 Geographical Argument 
The geographical argument is related to the formation of an ‘imagined 
community’ in time and space. Geographical boundaries can change or be 
constructed in the identity discourses either according to the historical past 
or to the present-day needs. The concept of ‘homeland’ is often taken as a 
pre-given geography that has fixed boundaries. Nonetheless, as I shall 
illustrate below the boundaries of the homeland depend on the discourses 
deployed. 
                                                 
770 Among some of the older generations Assyrians/Syriacs there is the idea that in the 
Hereafter people will be speaking Syriac with each other.  
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 ‘Even though we are not asking for an athro (here: state), the name we 
choose to use represents the name of the athro. Therefore, we have chosen 
the designation Assyrian,’ says the Assyriska Odom, a teacher of Syriac. The 
politician Ken‘an says: ‘Because we need roots.’ Such roots are located in the 
Golden Age of the Assyrians, the time they wielded enormous political 
power and ruled the vast Assyrian Empire. Modern Assyrians/Syriacs are 
juxtaposed with a group of people in the history of Mesopotamia and with 
the geographical core these people once ruled. The strength of the 
geographical argument for the Assyriska elite is derived from the historical 
strength of the Assyrian Empire, the Golden Age when this Empire held 
sway over a vast, far-flung territory.  
 Forty-five year old Shabo (a graduate of the Zafaran monastery in 
Mardin) states that, in its distance of a mere 50 kilometres, Tur ‘Abdin is 
much closer to the Assyrian capital city Nineveh than it is to the Aramean 
Kingdom in Damascus 1000 kilometres away. The assumption is that the 
closer the present-day Assyrians/Syriacs live to the Assyrian heartland, the 
greater the chance that they are related to the ancient Assyrians and not to 
the Arameans. It is striking that a starting point for this argument is the 
present-day geographical area Tur ‘Abdin, one of the last populated centres of 
the Assyrians/Syriacs in the Middle East, and not any of the other areas once 
populated over the last 2000 years. They fail to consider the geographical 
mobility of the people through centuries. 
 The geographical argument was discussed extensively by two prominent 
members of the Assyriska and the Syrianska elites in Sweden: respectively, 
Yuhanon Qashisho and Alchouri Asmar in the magazines Hujådå and Bahro 
Suryoyo. In my interview with the Syrianska Father Ishaq, he referred to the 
writings of Yuhanon Qashisho, saying that he thinks that the author duped 
his readers by what he wrote, namely: ‘That Tur ‘Abdin is much farther away 
from the kingdom of Aram in Damascus than it is from Nineveh.’ Again, it 
is important to note that Tur ‘Abdin is one of the central geographical areas 
in which Assyrians/Syriacs continued to live into modern times. Damascus 
and Nineveh are respectively identified as Aramean and Assyrian areas. 
Father Ishaq continues with his argument as follows: 
The closest Aramean kingdom to Tur ‘Abdin was the Kingdom of 
Khozane in present-day Ras El‘Ain [in Syria]. It is also called Aram Al 
Nahrain; Aram of the Rivers Khabur and Euphrates. This kingdom is in the 
vicinity of Mardin [in Turkey]. In Omid [Diyarbakır, Turkey] and other 
areas, there were also Aramean Kingdoms: in Nsibin [Nusaybin], 
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Karkamish, Urhoy [Urfa], Zinçirli, and so on. In Beth Nahrin 
[Mesopotamia], between Urhoy and Tur ‘Abdin, there were five Aramean 
kingdoms… The capital of the Arameans was Damascus. The cities 
Hama, Homs and Aleppo were also Aramean. 
The Syrianska Melek locates the history of the Arameans in the area of Beth 
Nahrawotho (literally: [land] between the rivers). As is a common practice 
among the elites, when Melek locates the ancestors of the ‘amo Suryoyo in Tur 
‘Abdin, he fails to take into account any geographical mobility of the people 
in the area to which he is referring. Moreover, in his attempt to strengthen 
his argument that the inhabitants of Tur ‘Abdin were Arameans, he argues 
that the surviving Assyrians were assimilated among the Arameans: 
Assyrian [historical] sources have proved that there were Arameans living 
in the area of Tur ‘Abdin and Syria. Tiglatpilesar I lived – if I am not 
mistaken – in about 1162-1126 BCE. In one of his clay tablets in the 
British Museum, he says: “I waged war against the Akhlamu people 
twenty-eight times.” The Akhlamu were an Aramean tribe… “Twice, did I 
cause them to flee unto the other side of the Euphrates, until they reached 
Qarkamesh,” – which is near Raqa in Syria. And they fled as far as 
Tadmur and unto Babylon. Therefore we can prove that at that time the 
area of Beth Nahrawotho [land between the rivers] was inhabited by 
Arameans… But the Arameans could not exercise strong rule. The 
Assyrians became a strong power in about the seventh and eighth 
centuries BCE, but this does not prove that they were there in great 
multitudes. History proves that the Assyrians decreased in number... 
Therefore they lost; they were assimilated among the Arameans. We 
cannot say that they became extinct… The Arameans lived in the large 
Kingdoms of Damascus, Gozane [Tur ‘Abdin], in Hama(t) and in Apad 
[Syria]. In Turkey, there was the Kingdom of Shamal. In the Torah, the 
Arameans are mentioned as the people living in Paddan Aram…  
Although it is a putative hypothesis, the argument that ancient Assyrians 
were assimilated among the Arameans has assumed a central role in defence 
of the argument of not being of Assyrian descent. The starting point of the 
collective identity of the Syrianska elite is the presumed moment the 
Assyrians had already been assimilated among the Arameans – not earlier; 
since this is the moment that Assyrians are assumed to have become extinct. 
This assumption allows those elite members who share this idea to adopt an 
exclusionary approach. But, only when they are discussing the ‘right’ descent 
of the ‘amo Suryoyo. Otherwise, they may refer to other periods of the 
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Aramean past, the time in which the Arameans lived in Aramean kingdoms 
and ‘fought with the Assyrians’ as some elite members state. In this latter 
case, the differences in the historical past are used to express the perceived 
contemporary differences between (as Syrianska elites sometimes tend to 
refer to them) the ‘real Ashuriye’ (meaning members of the Assyrian church 
of the East), and the Suryoye (here: members of the Syriac Orthodox Church). 
I shall discuss the construction of the boundaries of the ‘people’ in the 
following chapter.  
 
8.1.4 Genealogical Argument 
Assyrian/Syriac elites who have been educated in the West do not use the 
genealogical argument explicitly in arguing their historical continuation. 
Often, they have made explicit their idea that groups of people have mixed, 
making it difficult to prove genealogical continuity. Besides this, they have 
demurred that it is racist to talk about genetics. Consequently, in their 
current discourse they think it is less important to focus on the genealogical 
element. Instead, they believe that it is their right as a group of people – 
(independent of their past) – to be recognized as a nation and to enjoy 
certain rights of which they are deprived at present.771 Although they do not 
use the genealogical argument, it is still possible to detect traces of 
essentialism: ‘We are mixed but we still know how to distinguish the ‘amo 
Suryoyo.’ Here both continuity and change are implied; change from a 
historical perspective and continuity from a present-day context. 
 Assyriska elite members who were educated in the homeland and who 
had not been exposed to any high education in Western countries do use the 
genealogical argument more specifically. A popular idea among those who 
are fed up with the ‘name debate’ is that ‘Ashur and Aram were brothers and 
the descendants of each of them developed into a distinct people’: 
respectively, Assyrians and Arameans. They use this putative historical 
brotherhood of the sons of Shem to encourage closeness among the 
Assyrians/Syriacs essentially separated by the two different ideologies to 
restore the division which has been caused by the discussion about the right 
designation. They base themselves on Genesis 10:22: ‘The descendants of 
Shem: Elam, Ashur, Arpachshad, Lud and Aram.’ This historical example is 
                                                 
771 See further a forthcoming article of mine about the Seyfo. 
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used to explain the disagreement about the name of their people and to 
resolve it by showing that in the end Ashur and Aram were brothers. 
 Among the mass of the Assyrians/Syriacs, the genealogical phenotypical 
closeness tends to be assumed implicitly and expressed by the metaphorical 
term admo (blood).772 It is a concept which was already prevalent in the 
homeland. Such sentences as ‘u admaydan ha yo’ (we share the same blood)773 
tend to be heard when elites criticize the various ideologies which are 
perceived to be the cause for disunity among the Assyrians/Syriacs. Or, 
when talking about the various Syriac churches: ‘Although we have 
developed into different church communities, we are brothers (ahunone)’ can 
often be heard. Another phrase which stresses the genealogical aspect and is 
used among the ordinary people is the phrase ‘Suryoye abre da Suryoye’ (Suryoye 
sons of Suryoye). 
 The genealogical phenotype774 is expressed in more informal settings in 
jokes about typical big ‘Assyrian noses,’ but not during the interviews with 
elites. Nevertheless, a couple of respondents did mention during their 
interview that the gwino (the bridge of the nose) of the Assyrians/Syriacs is 
typically Assyrian. In 2004, while attending the annual Assyrian convention, I 
joined an excursion of Assyrian/Syriac youngsters from Europe to the 
Mesopotamian Museum in Chicago.775 I observed how eager they were to 
have their picture taken with the Assyrian sculptures as if they were standing 
                                                 
772 Genealogy was also implied in ideas of the Assyrians/Syriacs in Tur ‘Abdin. When they saw 
a beautiful Kurdish girl with fair features, they would remark: ‘Adma da Suryoyeyo; legshebho la 
Taye’, (she looks like Suryoye, she does not look like a Muslim). Here, Muslim refers to the local 
Kurdish population. Implicitly they meant to say that her mother or grandmother must have 
been a Suryoyto who was kidnapped by Muslims. Since many beautiful Assyrian/Syriac girls 
and women were abducted by Kurds and Turks during the Seyfo, this reference implies 
especially a specific event. Assyrian/Syriac girls were often not protected against such 
kidnappings during the course of history, at a time in which they were in a powerless position 
in society. Socio-political boundaries were strongly maintained by such references. Even after 
a few generations people knew that a certain woman had been kidnapped and how that 
happened. Living in the same geographical area reinforced this. 
773 Literally: ‘Our blood is one’ or ‘We share the same blood’. 
774 In the first part of the twentieth century, travellers and authors writing about the Middle 
East did write about the phenotypes of the people they met. Also Helga Anschütz (1985: 32) 
makes reference to authors who characterize the race of the Assyrians/Syriacs in Tur ‘Abdin as 
‘Assyrian’, ‘Oriental,’ or ‘Armenian’. See also Fletcher (1850: 188). 
775 This museum was an initiative of Dr Norman Solkhah, an (Eastern) Assyrian from Urmia. 
It has been under his management since its foundation. 
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beside their grandparents who had been resurrected from the dead.776 Thirty-
year-old Shlemun from Sweden could not wait to have his hooked nose 
immortalized in a picture beside a portrayal of the Assyrian King on the 
stone tablet so as to display the similarity between them with pride. In 
Germany, the Assyrian/Syriac singer Simon Kaplo did the same in a picture 
which he used for the cover of his CD Haye d-Umtho (Life of the Nation, 
2001). 
 In contrast to the assertions of the Assyriska elite, none of their Syrianska 
counterparts mentioned the phenotype argument in attempts to stress their 
Aramean descent during the interviews. One reason for this was perhaps that 
there are far more Assyrian sculptures available than Aramean ones. It is 
therefore less easy for Syrianer to develop such an argument, although not 
impossible. It may also be surmised that it might not have been considered a 
core argument to contest with the Assyrier. All the arguments discussed here 
are basically used in relation to the ‘others’ – either Assyrier or Syrianer. 
 The Syrianer do stress a genealogical connection with the ancient 
Arameans. However, for the Syrianska academic activist Melek, what matters 
more are the aspects shared among ‘present-day Suryoye.’ The Aramean past 
plays a symbolic role only. Melek uses different sets of logic to include and 
exclude people from what he considers to be his people. He assumes 
Aramean roots for the Suryoye. Nevertheless, the (putative) division from 
other Arameans such as those in contemporary Malula (Syria) is thought to 
have happened too long ago for a proper connection to be sought with them 
today. He sees Suryoye as being distinct from other Arameans:  
Those who speak Aramaic in Syria are Arameans. Nevertheless, I cannot 
say they are Suryoye as we are. We should stare truth in the face. When a 
group of people splits from mine, we distance ourselves from each other. 
We become two different people. 
Although Melek identifies himself as an Aramean, the role of the Aramean 
element has become latent; it is used at certain moments as a means to 
connect to ‘a past’ with a high symbolic value. As already mentioned, it is an 
aspect which is used in presenting the Suryoye to the external environment. 
                                                 
776 The historian Helga Anschütz (1985: 50) refers to the year 1966 when she visited the 
monastery Mor Gabriel in Tur ‘Abdin. As abbot of the monastery at that time, the late 
Archbishop Julius Jesu‘ Çiçek, had asked her to look at his silhouette and whether it did not 
look the same as that on an Assyrian relief. 
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Moreover, it is used into the framework of the discussion with the Assyrier: 
Suryoye have distant historical roots and Suryoye are not of Assyrian but of 
Aramean descent. The first aspect is needed in the external environment and 
the second aspect (‘Suryoye are not of Assyrian descent’) in the internal Suryoye 
environment. 
 As shown before, the Syrianska teacher of the Syriac language Shem‘un 
stated that people with a different background had joined the Christian 
church in the Syro-Mesopotamian area. Notwithstanding, he contradicts this 
statement in his quotation below, in which he remarks that Suryoye have 
Aramean roots. He defends his stance by his interpretation of the Bible and 
Suryoye sources. Referring to the church as ‘ito barth Oromoye (church, daughter 
of the Arameans), he clearly assumes a genealogical line between the church 
and the ancient Arameans: 
In all our [Suryoye] books it is said: “ito Barth Armoye or Aramoye” [church, 
daughter of the Arameans]. The disciples went out to preach in the lands 
of the Oromoye and the first church was composed of Oromoye. In the 
Biblical Book of Acts I, it says that the first Christians were in Antioch…  
Referring to the Syriac Orthodox Church as the ‘daughter of the Arameans’ 
metaphorically suggests a genealogical link between the members of the 
church and ‘Arameans.’ 
 The Syrianska Father Ishaq assumes such a link with the Chaldeans and 
the Assyrians only at the distant collective level of being Semites: 
As for our descent, we can trace it back to the time of Sem and therefore 
we can call ourselves Semites.  We form part of one people with the 
Assyrians and Chaldeans. They were like brothers, and each brother had a 
family. Arameans are called after Aram, the Assyrians after Ashur and the 
Babylonians who later came to be known as Chaldeans. As Semites, I 
accept that the Oromoye, Ashuriye, Babylonians and Chaldeans are one 
people. But later, as we went further, each of these brothers developed 
their own family and their own people.  
Although his starting point is similar to that taken by the scholar George 
(both imply an Aramean collective identity), he diverges from George’s 
approach by saying that only the Assyrians (Ashuriye, here meaning members 
of the Assyrian Church of the East) have Assyrian descent. In his argument, 
George states that the Ashuriye are also of Aramean descent. Father Ishaq is 
using a genealogical argument to differentiate between ‘the brothers’ (as he 
calls them) and he proposes to continue this differentiation into the context 
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of the present. He goes back to a historical past in order to define his 
descent. But, although he identifies ‘his brothers’ – he does not claim one 
collective identity for them today. Whereas those Assyriska elite members 
who mention ‘the brothers’ use this genealogical argument in an attempt to 
unite the various groups today. This is a clear example of how elites wield 
certain arguments as their point of departure differs in the present-day 
context. 
 
8.1.5 Historical Sources 
To strengthen the arguments that their people are the lineal descendants of 
the ancient Assyrians or Arameans, elites who have (often) been educated in 
the Syriac language (frequently graduates of one of the monasteries in Tur 
‘Abdin) refer to commonly respected Assyrian/Syriac authors777 as historical 
sources. The majority wrote some centuries ago. Rather than discussing the 
whole argument adduced by such an author, they select those passages which 
fit with their current discourse on the collective identity of their people, and 
studiously leave those which do not fit unmentioned. This ‘filtering’ of 
sources may not always be the result of a constant conscious process. 
Individuals may not invariably be aware of the whole set of ideas suggested 
by the author they are citing because the ‘filtered’ information may have 
already reached them in this form, from those who took the initial step. 
 Several Assyriska elite members referred to the twelfth-century World 
Chronicle by Patriarch Michael the Great.778 Eliyo, graduate from one of the 
monasteries in Tur ‘Abdin and teacher of Syriac, says: 
In his book Michael the Great mentions that the Romans [Byzantines] 
disdained us and told us we never had kings, we did not have an ancient 
civilization, and that no one knew about us. Therefore, Michael reacts to 
the Roman allegations and says: “Our kings were the Kings of the 
Assyrians: we ruled the Kingdoms of Babylon and Nineveh.” 
                                                 
777 These authors were often churchmen and produced ecclesiastical literature. Relatively 
fewer purely secular works have been written, or if this were indeed the case, not many have 
survived to reach us. Debié (2009) writes that, after Jacob of Edessa (640-708), Syriac 
Orthodox scholars began writing history as large chronicles in two separate parts, one 
ecclesiastical and the other secular, either as two separate books or in two or three columns. 
An example is the World Chronicle by Michael the Great. 
778 Michael the Great (1126–1199) was a Syriac Orthodox Patriarch and historian who wrote 
the famous World Chronicle. For studies about this work see further Weltecke (2003) and Van 
Ginkel (forthcoming). 
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Furthermore, he also mentions all our other achievements. He writes 
about these with pride. Another of our writers, Severus Sebokht,779 writes: 
“If you say Suryoyo you mean Chaldean and Assyrian”... 
Michael the Great and other authors in the tradition of the Assyrians/Syriacs 
are mentioned alongside Western scholars780 to show that ancient Assyrians 
did continue to exist as a people after the fall of Nineveh in 612 BCE, as 
shown by what Eliyo says:  
It is written in the history books that, when Babylon attacked Nineveh, 
the people of Nineveh fled into the mountains of Izlo. If the people of the 
area were not obliterated, why should only this people have been 
extirpated? …The people of Nineveh were scattered throughout the area 
and reached the Izlo Mountains. 
Most Syrianska elites refer to Assyrian/Syriac authors as historical sources 
when arguing their standpoint that the ‘amo Suryoyo are not of Assyrian but of 
Aramean descent and that, historically, they have been known by the name 
Suryoye. The scholar of Syriac Studies, George, also resorts to the status of 
academic research to give his viewpoint more weight:  
I base myself on academic research… The majority of the Suryoye have not 
read the books by Bar Hebraeus, Bar Salibi, and others. Therefore they are 
unaware of their contents and what they [authors] called their umtho 
[nation]. Therefore they [Suryoye who do not read these authors and who 
hold different opinions to George] also devise other truths when they 
think about their identity. But the truth can be found in the books. 
As George sees it, the collective identity of their people is a matter which can 
be decided upon objectively. Although he refers to what he calls academic 
research, he still uses sources by filtering what tallies with his ideology from 
the present-day perspective. It is his interpretation of what these authors 
wrote – doing the same as any other elite member. George continues his 
argument saying: 
                                                 
779 Severus Sebokht was Bishop of Qenneshrin (d. in 667). He is regarded as one of the most 
important precursors and teachers of Jacob of Edessa. 
780 They refer for example to the work of the Assyriologist Simo Parpola (1999). 
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What have the Suryoye [authors] called themselves up to the present day? 
They have referred to themselves as Suryoye and sometimes Suryoye Oromoye 
or Oromoye. Until 400 years ago, the different churches of our people, also 
the Rum [Melkites, Greek Orthodox], the Maronites, the Chaldeans and 
the Madenhoye [members of the Assyrian Church of the East] called 
themselves Suryoye. After that, it [term Suryoye] began to be used less 
frequently. The reason was conversions to new churches… 
 
George’s line of argument is that the different Syriac churches share one 
Suryoye past. Following from his approach that the name Suryoye can be used 
synonymously with the name Arameans, he places the roots of all these 
churches in an Aramean past. In their interpretation of the historical sources, 
some Syrianska elite members who are active in the Syrianska organizations 
attempt to distance the ancient Assyrians and Arameans from each other. 
The active creation of a distance between them functions as an instrument to 
reinforce the assumption that the ‘amo Suryoyo is of Aramean descent. In their 
reading of history, they focus on and especially ascribe negative 
characteristics to the Assyrians and other more positive (from the modern 
perspective) characteristics to the ancient Arameans, as does Father Ishaq: 
 
The Assyrians desired to conquer the Aramean kingdoms… And generally 
the Assyrians liked to fight and were very fond of waging war… The 
Arameans were not very keen on venturing into war; they only wanted to 
protect themselves. Therefore they did not squander time on wars. They 
spent their time on education, trade, arts, music, and architecture; there 
are still many of their castles and buildings in the kingdoms they ruled.  
 
Above I have illustrated that one can read history from different 
perspectives. Antagonistic narratives are applied to the history in order to 
prove the present-day arguments. Hence, history becomes a resource for 
different discourses. For instance, if the ‘unity’ is popular in the present-day 
context, both the Assyrier and the Syrianer choose selectively historical 
narratives that demonstrate ‘unity’. 
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8.1.6 Cultural Continuity Argument 
We wanted to check whether or not those [Suryoye] who call themselves 
Othuroye [Assyrians] are correct. We went to libraries to study the history 
of Mesopotamia. We became convinced that we belonged to these 
[Assyrian] people... When we read about Ishtar,781 and other Assyrian 
myths, we recalled that many of our older people had told us similar 
stories and had used similar sayings. After studying the history, we 
strengthened the Assyrian ideology which we had begun to cultivate as 
soon as we arrived in Sweden. 
           Martha, an Assyrisk scholar 
Martha is among the young educated people who began to study her 
Mesopotamian past ‘in search of her true roots’.  Educated Assyriska elite 
members especially tend to focus on the cultural continuity between them 
and the ancient Assyrians in their argument that their people are of Assyrian 
descent. Elite members were eager to tell me about the similarities they 
found between their contemporary culture and the Mesopotamian culture 
they had read about. The academic Na‘im, born in Qamishlo and studied in 
Lebanon, gave me various examples of this cultural continuity which are also 
used by other Assyriska elite members: 
When the Suryoye converted to Christianity in the first centuries of the CE, 
we introduced different rituals into the Syriac Orthodox Church and 
imbued them with a Christian meaning. An example is fasting… there was 
a time in which the kings of Nineveh had no grain left in the silos. Nor 
were there many animals they could consume. Therefore the kings made 
the people fast for three days. Since that time, they have continued to fast 
for three days so that the reserves would not be exhausted. The Nineveh 
fast782 which we observe each year dates back to that time… 
 We also continued using the sacerdotal clothes used in Mesopotamia 
in the CE… The [pre-Christian] priests of Babylon wore clothes which 
resemble those of our priests today. The same can be said about the kings 
of those times… And we have continued to use the same type of altar as 
was used in Babylon. We also had rituals to exorcise evil spirits. The sensele, 
flabella [used at the altar], has existed since pagan times.783 We also 
                                                 
781 The myth of the Assyrian Goddess Ishtar is based on the Sumerian version of the Goddess 
Inanna. See further about this myth, Wolkstein and Kramer (1983).  
782 The Nineveh Fast (three days) starts twenty days before Great Lent. 
783 See for a recent study on flabella, Snelders (2010). 
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believed in one supreme God. In the CE we have continued to believe 
that there is one God.  
 We also still celebrate on 1 Tammuz, July… This celebration of 
resheesh784 in July is actually when we want to re-welcome Tammuz to the 
Upper World… We break jars [sharbe] and plates [sahne] outside to exorcise 
the evil spirits [tawrina u shar]. Suryoye have also incorporated this ritual into 
their wedding ceremony; after the solemnization in the church, the bride is 
escorted to her new home. Family members throw a sharbo [jar] before her 
on the ground to break it. The shar is everything which is not good; the 
machinations of Satan. Breaking the piece of pottery symbolically 
represents the shattering of the evil spirits, the shar. This should be 
understood in the belief in the difference between good and evil, white 
and black, kher [positive news785] and shar [bad tidings]. Therefore breaking 
the shar will allow Tammuz786 and [his lover] Isthtar to find happiness 
together, to rejoice together until December… In December he has to go 
back to the Underworld again.  
 In the current era, in that same month [December], we have 
continued to celebrate the hasho, the Passion Week in which Jesus was 
crucified and buried. When we were Christianized we drew a comparison 
between the Passion Week of Jesus and the departure of Tammuz to the 
Underworld. This is because in that week of December, we usually 
experience a period of sadness: we grow melancholic anticipating about 
the departure of Tammuz; our whole world is swathed in black. The king 
was not happy, no one was allowed to get married and so forth. Even 
today, we still retain that ritual, which we have incorporated into our 
Christian tradition. The logic they used was that in December everything 
grew very somber, the days grew very short and cold. This signified that 
Tammuz no longer had a role in December. Tammuz is the one who 
brings the light, the warmth and happiness with him back when he 
emerges from the Underworld. Therefore, in December, when he is sent 
back to the Underworld, we mourn him; the hasho [Passion Week] starts, 
                                                 
784 The celebration of Pentecost, 50 days after Easter: commemoration of the descent of the 
Holy Ghost on the Apostles. On this Sunday people splash each other with water. Among the 
members of the Assyrian Church of the East, this ritual is referred to as Nusardil and is 
celebrated on the seventh Sunday after Pentecost. Although the members of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church celebrate it as a Christian feast, those of the Assyrian Church of the East 
has kept it as a celebration outside the church. 
785 Today, when Suryoye pick up the phone, they ask the caller: ‘Ma kher yo?’, asking whether 
he/she has positive news or at least it expresses the hope that it is positive news. It is a polite 
way of asking why the person is calling.  
786 After the Sumerian deity Dumuzi, the God of fertility and new life. See Wolkstein and 
Kramer (1983) for the myth on Inanna and Dumuzi. 
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until he comes back in Tammuz, July, when we begin to celebrate his 
emergence from the Underworld… 
 The preparation of the rozune787 is also a pagan tradition which we 
have continued as a Christian tradition in our church… This shows the 
links we have with our ancient history…  
 At the beginning of April, we all used to go into the fields and we 
washed our faces with the dew there. April was the month in which the 
new season commenced: the spring…  
The exchange of these ideas and knowledge often takes place among friends 
but it is also published in such Assyriska magazines as the Sweden-based 
Hujådå and on the internet. In daily life, the recognition of this argument for 
cultural continuity has developed a more generalized interest in studying 
Mesopotamian history. This is evolving in both new academic publications 
by people who have begun to study Assyriology or Semitic languages and in 
the implementation of certain symbols and rituals from the past. One 
example is the celebration of the Assyrian New Year on 1 April. In modern 
times, as far as is known today, before the foundation of the Assyrian 
Movement in modern times, this celebration was not common among 
Assyrians/Syriacs. In Tur ‘Abdin, the Assyrian/Syriac farming population did 
accord a special meaning to this day in their agricultural life. My respondents 
who are not acquainted with the modern 1 April celebration of the Assyrian 
New Year did, however, affirm that in Tur ‘Abdin the girls went into the 
fields and bathed their faces with the dew. They believed that the dew of 1 
April was blessed and was therefore supposed to endow them with a 
beautiful countenance. Moreover, on this day they also used the dew as 
coagulant for making yoghurt. 
 During my fieldwork, I observed that it has become kind of a sport 
among the Assyrier to spot and to lay down new relations between their 
contemporary culture and that of the Mesopotamian past. One day, I was 
given a lift by the young academic professional Ninos to attend a seminar 
about the proposed membership of the EU of Turkey which had been 
organized in Södertälje. After he asked me a question, I answered ‘asher lo 
kud‘ono’ (‘asher I do not know’). Ninos grew very excited and said: ‘Do you 
realize that we still use the name of the God Ashur in our Suryoyo language 
even today?’ ‘What do you mean Ninos?’ I asked. Ninos continued 
                                                 
787 In the Syriac Orthodox Church today, the tradition of the Rozune is related to the Forty 
Martyrs of St Sebastian. 
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explaining ‘We use the term asher instead of the term aloho (god) which stands 
for the Christian God; it is out of respect for the Christian God that we do 
not want to use His name when we say something ‘in the name of God’ 
(koyomina b-Aloho).’ 
 I took a moment to reflect on the way I had used the term asher. In my 
family it was indeed the tradition not to use the name of God in ordinary 
conversation, since His name is considered sacred. Instead, we had learned 
to use ‘haimen’ (‘believe [me]’) or to use the term asher. The latter utterance is 
also used in a similar sense as ‘haimen’. It is a way of telling the listener that he 
should be confident that I was speaking to him honestly. I remember that, 
when I visited people from my village Mzizah living in Germany and they 
heard me using the term ‘asher’, they grew nostalgic and reminded me with a 
smile that from my language they could hear I was a daughter of the Atto 
family, since our family never used the name of God ‘disrespectfully’ in our 
communications, in contrast to the Assyrians/Syriacs in the shwitho da Suroye 
(quarter of the Suroye) in Mzizah who often used the term b-Aloho (in the 
name of God) and bu-Slibo (in the name of the Cross). After this quick 
reflection, I answered Ninos that the term asher could have some connection 
with the God Ashur. Nonetheless, to avoid jumping to any over-hasty 
conclusion, it was important to learn more about all its different meanings. 
 The linguist Aziz Tezel says that the relation Ninos draws is a folk-
etymology.788 Narratives seeking to connect the past with the present-day are 
more common among the Assyrier. This is related to their strong emphasis 
on the importance of national awareness in the formation of a national 
identity. From this perspective ‘national awareness’ can only be achieved 
through the knowledge about one’s own history. Therefore, an increasing 
interest for the history, archaeology, mythology, culture and traditions and 
the re-invention of the past become more central in their identity discourses. 
Before continuing with the situational arguments used among the elites, I shall 
first outline more specifically the strong line of argumentation among the 
Syrianska elite members for being Suryoye. 
                                                 
788 In a personal correspondence, the linguist Aziz Tezel writes: ‘ ... ashir is related to shrolo, 
itself from Classical Syriac shroro by dissimilation. However, to a greater degree than ‘shrolo’ 
and ‘shroro’, the term ‘ashir’ is to be related to the verbal stem ma:shir- for example ‘lo-ko-
ma:shir-no’, ‘I do not believe.’ And ‘ashir’ is an imperative of this verbal stem ma:shir-, with 
the meaning ‘to believe,’ that is ‘ashir,’ which became “a filler” in the spoken language with 
the meaning of ‘believe!,’ and in classical Syriac ‘ashar(r).’ See further also Tezel (2003: 81). 
The Free Online Dictionary indicates that Ashir is a chief god of the Assyrians.  
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8.1.7 ‘Suryoye’ for 2000 years… 
Some Syrianer regard the designation Suryoye as an ethno-national term. 
Others use it as an ethno-religious term in which the point of departure for 
the collective identity of the ‘amo Suryoyo is the Christianization of the people. 
A brief examination of the ethno-national use of the term Suryoye reveals that 
a very small minority among the Syrianer perceives this term to be an ethno-
national term dating back to the time before the current era. In contrast to 
them, Ken‘an (educated in one of the monasteries in Tur ‘Abdin) does date 
this name back to those times. When explaining how he uses the designation 
Suryoye, he acted as if he represented the ideology of the Syrianer as a 
collective: 
Among us [Syrianer], the designation Suryoye is a hiyutho [identity] – [here, 
implying collective identity]; it is a nationality, the name of a ‘amo [people]. 
The term Suryoyo existed before the Syriac Orthodox Church was 
founded… Since we did not have a country, it [term Suryoye] did not 
develop into an ethno-national name. 
In Ken‘an’s eyes the designation Suryoye defines a ‘amo (people), not just a 
church, since it was already in existence before the current era. In his 
perception, the translation of the term Suryoye (with an ethno-national 
meaning) is Syrianer in Swedish. Nevertheless, when dealing with the 
argument which the Assyrier defend, he takes the position that the ‘amo 
Suryoyo has Aramean roots: 
Our authors: Mor Ephrem who lived in the fourth century, Mor Yacob d-
Urhoy in the seventh century, Bar Salibi in the tenth [twelfth] century and 
Bar Hebreaus in the thirteenth century always used Suryoyo or Oromoyo. 
They all mention the term Suryoyo Oromoyo. Some of them do this in the 
introduction to their works. Mor Yacob d-Urhoy and Bar Hebreaus 
specifically discuss the assumption that the roots of the Suryoye go back to 
the Arameans. 
Ken‘an’s example reveals the latent role the Aramean descent plays in his 
life. It might have been expected that there was no need to refer to the 
Arameans, since Ken‘an uses the designation Suryoye as an ethno-national 
name. One explanation for this anomaly might be that the reference to 
putative Aramean ancestry should be understood in relation to the 
discussion about Ken‘an’s implied idea that the designation Assyrier is 
wrongly used. From the stance he has adopted, he refers to the Arameans as 
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the true roots of his people. 
 The second way in which the term Suryoye is used is as an ethno-religious 
designation in which the starting point for a collective ethnic identity is 
found within the bounds of the ‘ito Suryoyto (Syriac Church). Traditionally, 
this has been the main method of collective identification adopted in the 
Middle East – a society in which religious affiliations played a dominant role 
in demarcating collective identifications. As I shall show in this section, 
individuals may use different arguments to defend their espousal of this 
approach. The first example is that of the student Matay. When he was in his 
early twenties, he tried to go as far back as possible in the history of his 
people in order to identify a collective group who might be identified as 
Suryoye. His point of departure was the modern concept of nation or people. 
Matay expounds on his ideas: 
I asked myself “When did the ‘amo Suryoyo develop a collective 
identity?”…I read our Suryoye authors and tried to understand what they 
say about our identity… I looked, for example, through the whole book of 
Bar Hebreaus. I could not understand what stance he had adopted in this 
matter. I looked into Michael the Great’s [Kthobo] Makethbonuth Zabno, in 
which he does talk about geographical areas, but I could not find an 
answer to my question. Moreover, we have such other writers as Eusebius, 
who lived in about 300 in the CE. He wrote makethbonuth d-zabno... It is a 
very interesting book, but I did not find anything which could help me in 
my quest… I also looked into Josephus, Strabo, Herodotus and others. I 
could not find an answer, but I did begin to think in a certain direction. I 
concluded that it is a real conundrum. What I wanted to do then was to go 
back into the historical roots of the Suryoye and see where I would end. 
The authors of the Suryoyto church trace its roots back to the very 
beginning of Christianity. However, such an authority as Ephrem Barsaum 
writes in his book, Berule Bdire789, that our roots go back to the 
Arameans.790 But this book is recent. If he had written that this had been 
an idea of our [early] Church Fathers, I would have been convinced. This 
omission shows that it is his personal modern idea.  
                                                 
789 The late Patriarch Ephrem Barsaum’s al-Lulu al-Manthur (1943) was translated into Syriac 
under the title Berule Bthire by Mor Philoxinos Yohanna Dolabani and published in Qamishlo in 
1967. It has been translated into English by Matti Moosa (2003) under the title: The Scattered 
Pearls: History of Syriac Literature and Sciences. The Patriarch’s name in the English edition is 
spelled as Aphram I. Barsoum. 
790 In the position of Archbishop, Ephrem Barsaum had also produced writings in which he 
referred to an Assyrian past of his people. See, for example, the Memorandum presented at 
the Paris Peace Conference, dated 2 April 1920. 
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 As a consequence, I changed my question. Asking about the roots of 
the people will lead us nowhere. Therefore I have now focused on the 
geographical area from which the people come... Syro-Mesopotamia. 
When we look at the history of the geography, we learn more… Which 
people lived in the area? The Persians. Outside the agricultural area, there 
are references to the Saraqoye [people living in tents] in Syriac; by whom 
they meant the Arabs. The Jews were known as a distinct cultural 
community. And there were the Greeks. No one talks about the existence 
of the Suryoye, Oromoye or Othuroye as a distinct group of people. What they 
do say is that the locals spoke different dialects of Aramaic… Hence, there 
were peoples who were known as collective identities and the rest was the 
mass of ‘Aramaic-speaking peasants.’ They had more localized identities, 
linked to their villages. I wanted to find writings which demonstrate that: 
‘Here is the ‘amo Suryoyo’. Maybe they called themselves Suryoye, Othuroye or 
Oromoye, or maybe all three at the same time. But I did not find any 
evidence of this… Certainly, we are the descendents of those local 
peasants. Since I did not manage to identify a collective group of a 
separate people, with the exception of those whom I mentioned, the 
inference has to be that there were no Suryoye people, in the sense of a 
collective group of people who were known by other people as such. If 
there were indeed people with such a collective identity, they may not 
have been able to have themselves recognized as such by other people… 
 What point in time then marks the starting point of the formation of 
a ‘amo [people] in the sense of an ethnicity, ethnic category and later ethnic 
group? In the era after Christ, a group of people called themselves by the 
name Suryoye and were also known by others as Suryoye. They are known 
because of their institution of the Syriac Orthodox Church of Antioch… 
People from different backgrounds were included in this category, among 
them Persians, Greeks, and Jews. 
Matay is among the few who has searched for the historical collective 
identity of his people and has still attempted to preserve a certain distance. 
He adduces a more elabourate, personal idea about the history of his people 
– something which does not interest many elite members to bother to delve 
into or who are perhaps incapable of undertaking such research. The layman 
Shem‘un, who has had a career as a teacher of Syriac, argues along the same 
lines (but somewhere else he states that the ‘amo Suryoyo is of Aramean 
descent). Shem‘un’s reason for not using the designations Arameans or 
Assyrians is that his people do not have a country; hence he is satisfied with 
continuing to use the designation Suryoye, of which the meaning for him 
extends beyond that of his church: 
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When the Arameans accepted Christianity, they even burnt their pagan 
books and when they converted to Christianity they accepted themselves 
as Suryoye. The Assyrian Empire fell in 612 BC. With its collapse, the 
position of its people [Assyrians] was drastically weakened. After they 
converted to Christianity, they no longer called themselves Oromoye or 
Othuroye, but Suryoye. There were also many Jews who became members of 
the [Christian] church. Mor Esa‘jo is said to have baptised 1200 Jewish 
people on the feast of the Pentecost… And other people who lived in 
Mesopotamia also converted to our church… They all became members 
of the ‘ito Suryoyto [Syriac Church]. Nevertheless, they [Suryoye] did not 
become a State... Had they had a country, they would probably have 
chosen one of those pre-Christian names. But [today] I have only a 
church. 
It is a cause of great satisfaction to many Syrianska elite members to be able 
to commence their history ‘2000’ years ago. This is the time in which they 
assume the designation Suryoye began to be used. Symbolically, ‘2000 years’ 
stands for the existence of Christianity and, consequently, for indicating that 
they were among the first people to convert to the new religion. They 
express their strong connection to this period in several ways. As mentioned 
earlier, the politician Hobel has opted for the use of the designation Suryoye. 
Although somewhere else in the interview he defends the stand that the ‘amo 
Suryoyo is of Aramean descent, below he explains that it is impossible to 
know truly whether they are of Aramean or Assyrian descent: 
We have already been living as Suryoye for 2000 years and for 2000 years 
our priests have taught us we are Suryoye! It would be like saying that I had 
not been touched by the Seyfo and to conclude that it never took place. But 
my grandfather experienced it and got hurt!.. How else can I better prove 
it to him than telling him that we have been using the designation Suryoye 
for 2000 years already? 
Hobil’s metaphorical reference to the Seyfo is heavily impregnated with 
symbolism. He is conscious that the Seyfo is accepted as an unequivocal fact 
among his people. For many Syrianska elite members, to have been raised as 
Suryoye and their connection with Suryoyutho (Assyrian/Syriac way of life) is of 
the utmost importance. They talk about it with tremendous engagement, as 
for example the female Syrianska activist Warde who is in her thirties: ‘I am a 
Suryoyto; I have grown up in the Suryoyto church. At the same time, I know 
that my roots are Oromoye.’ Although the identification and focus is clearly 
the church, she assumes Aramean roots. Being raised in the Syriac church 
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legitimizes the use of the designation Suryoye for her. She is against the use of 
the designation Aramean only, because ‘This would mean I am leaving my 
church which I do not want to do.’ Since her point of departure for the 
national identity of her people is the church, the adoption of the pre-
Christian Aramean name would mean that she is not loyal to her church. 
Perhaps she connects the Aramean name with paganism which does not fit in 
with her identification as a Christian. Meanwhile, she is demonstrating that 
she is not identifying with an Assyrian but rather with an Aramean past. This 
latter aspect should be understood in relation to the environment in which 
she was raised and in relation to the Assyrian Movement which was opposed 
by the same environment in which she grew up. The academic young 
professional Yacob who was born in Lebanon has a similar attitude: ‘I call 
myself a Suryoyo. Aramean was the name of our people BCE. Right now, I 
am not an Aramean but a Suryoyo’.  
 
8.2 Situational Arguments 
At this point in my account of the situational arguments, I shall illustrate 
more specifically that the ‘name debate’ depends heavily on the contextual 
elements of time and space. As I illustrated in the previous chapter, the 
discursive arguments deployed have had different characteristics in different 
periods of their settlement in Sweden. Some arguments frequently employed 
in the 1970s are no longer in use today. Initially, Assyrians/Syriacs in Europe 
chose whether or not to adhere to the Assyrian ideology. Today, the children 
of the first group are born into a family which adheres to the Assyrian 
ideology. Consequently, they identify as Assyrians, without necessarily having 
made a conscious individual decision. This is perhaps comparable to a 
situation in which someone is born into a specific religious family. Only 
when they are older they may develop a different discourse and take a 
different discursive position.  
 Elite members who have been raised in an ‘Assyrian family’ and who 
identify themselves as Assyrian attribute less importance to their ‘true’ 
historical descent – as they refer to it. Their dominant idea is that they are 
not sure whether their ancestors were Assyrians, Arameans, Babylonians or 
Chaldeans. The Assyriska Ninos says: ‘Maybe those who call themselves 
‘Arameans’ today are actually the descendents of the ancient ‘Assyrians’ or 
the other way around.’ This approach often ends with the conclusion: ‘No 
matter what designation we use, we are all the same people.’ It is an inclusive 
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approach which attempts to ‘heal the wounds’ resulting from the discussion 
about the ‘right designation’ of their people. The ‘wounds’ refer to the 
divisions among the people. Therefore, among the Assyrier, over the last few 
years there has been a tendency to shift towards more situational based 
arguments in favour of the designation Assyrian. They now contend that 
primordial arguments are of secondary importance. In the new strategy 
towards building unity, two main approaches stand central: (1) the use of the 
compound name Assyrier/Syrianer (in Sweden); (2) The use of the designation 
Assyrian as an umbrella name, covering all other designations used by the 
members of the umtho Suryoyto (Assyrian/Syriac nation). 
 Among the Syrianer, the recognition of a mixed descent allows them 
space to distance themselves from identification as ‘Assyrian’. Educated 
Syrianska elite members especially stress the mixture of the Suryoye past and 
concomitantly the impossibility of proving Assyrian descent. Nahir, 
theologian and activist says: ‘The Suryoye are a mixture of the peoples of 
Mesopotamia and hence we cannot say that we are genealogically Assyrian. 
When the Empire of the Assyrians fell in 612 BC, the Assyrians were 
dispersed. Therefore it is impossible to prove anything about Assyrian 
descent.’ The politician Hobel adds: ‘Even if we are Othuroye [genealogically], 
for the last 2000 years I know for sure that I have been Suryoyo; I have [at 
least] this historical knowledge [that I am Suryoyo]. We have no real 
knowledge of what our background was before 2000 years ago.’ Earlier I 
discussed the fact that somewhere else in his interview he defends the 
position that the historical roots of the Suryoye are Aramean. Many Syrianska 
elites share Hobel’s idea. The way they express themselves is as if they, as 
individuals, have been alive for two thousand years already: ‘I know myself 
to have been a Suryoyo for 2000 years.’ This implies individual connection 
with the ‘collective Suryoye past’ and through that collective they feel part of 
today. This example shows very clearly how an individual’s discourse about 
his identity connects him to the ‘historical past of a group of people’ – as if 
the individual today represents the collective past. The main situational 
argument adduced is that it is impossible to prove whether Suryoye have 
Aramean or Assyrian roots. Even the Syrianska politician Hobel no longer 
finds it hard to say: ‘We cannot check the DNA of people and say who is an 
Othuroyo and who is an Oromoyo. What we can do is to use the designation 
Suryoye, which is inclusive of both names, for the current era. And we can 
exclude the designations Oromoyo and Othuroyo from before the current era.’ 
Hence they opt for the use of the designation Suryoye (in Swedish Syrianer) as 
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mentioned earlier. Many of the respondents who stated this also expressed a 
stronger assumption of their people’s Aramean descent. Probably because 
they adhere to the Syrianska ideology. From their position one can learn that, 
in the first place, Suryoye are not of Assyrian descent. Secondly, if they have 
to mention distant roots these are stated to be Aramean. This position is not 
a matter expressed very openly or in passing. It is stated only after a more 
profound conversation. I hazard a guess that people with the Syrianska 
ideology would not have expressed this idea fifteen years ago – a time when 
both the Assyrier and the Syrianer had assumed very rigid oppositional stands. 
 The political situation of the Assyrians/Syriacs today is discussed more 
explicitly in the context of the situational-based argument; it has become the 
point of departure. Perhaps the most dominant situational argument is the 
one mentioned by the twenty-five year old student Yauno: 
I think that it is very hard to go back 4000 years into history and say that 
we are genetically Assyrian. The people are Assyrian, Babylonian, 
Chaldean and Aramean. Assuredly we are a mixture of all these peoples, 
but the last empire which ruled these people was the Assyrian Empire into 
which all these people assimilated and were called Assyrian.  
In his choice of one of the names of this people, Yauno selects the name 
which carries the most political significance for his people from present-day 
perspective on the classification and recognition of people. Today, people 
who have their own State are recognized as a people; they usually take the 
name of their State and are guaranteed a say in the political arena. If others 
are to be recognized, they may need to attract attention by other means. 
Hence, the choice for the name Assyrian, and not for the other names 
existing among their people, is thought to be the most functional at present. 
They copy the modern Western concept of nation and apply it to their 
people with the ‘ingredients’ available to them. This is very characteristic for 
the situationalist approach in which ethnicity is seen as a ‘resource’. 
Consequently, although some Assyrians/Syriacs do say that they are 
probably a mixture of the ancient Mesopotamian population, they believe 
that the use of the designation Assyrian is more legitimate in contemporary 
society, which is based on political entities. The counter-argument to the use 
of the designation Aramean or the focus on the Aramean past in this respect 
is that the Arameans had only small kingdoms and lived a nomadic life 
devoid of political significance compared to the influence exerted by the 
Assyrian Empire. They state that, if the Arameans left their mark on the 
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Assyrian Empire, this is also valued, but as part of the Assyrian Empire 
instead of a distinct political entity of Arameans. 
 In short, the use of the designation ‘Assyrian’ is believed to be a solution 
to their recognition as an ethno-national group of people who should be 
granted certain rights today. Assyrians/Syriacs upholding the Assyrian 
ideology do not believe that the use of the designation Syrianer in Sweden will 
be of much help to them in obtaining such rights. The reasons they reject 
this designation will be discussed later. A very common idea among Assyriska 
activists is that the authorities in Syria reinforced the use of the designation 
Aramean among Assyrians/Syriacs as a means to combat the Assyrian 
Movement which strove for recognition and rights as a people in Syria. 
Although the name Aramean is a secular concept of a collective identity, 
especially initially it was not a politicized term and bore a closer relationship 
to the stance of Assyrian/Syriac religious leaders who fought the designation 
Assyrian and concomitantly the political concept it implied. Therefore, 
introducing an alternative name for their people which had not yet been 
politicized, served as a means to deny them ethno-national rights. 
 A more practical argument fielded by the Assyriska elite in favour of the 
use of the designation Assyrian is that it is much more familiar to 
Westerners. The use of the other (lesser known) designations which are 
current among their people is believed to raise too many questions and 
confusion. For instance, the Swedish term Syrian to refer to the ‘amo Suryoyo 
would confuse them with the modern inhabitants of Syria. The use of the 
compound name Assyrier/Syrianer is unique to Swedish society.791 As shown 
in the preceding chapter, this was born of the ‘name discussion’ among the 
‘amo Suryoyo in Sweden. Many elite members who share the Assyriska ideology 
have no problem using the compound name Assyrier/Syrianer in Swedish. It is 
an attempt to regain unity, bringing together those who choose to use 
Assyrier and those who choose to use Syrianer. The compound name 
functions as a unifying concept. This clearly shows how the use of 
designations can be understood from a situational point of view – here with 
the goal of unity. Among the Assyrier, an alternative to the use of the 
inclusive approach of the compound name Assyrier/Syrianer is the use of 
‘Assyrian’ as an umbrella designation for the different Syriac churches. The 
intention is to replace the different designations which the Assyrians/Syriacs 
                                                 
791 In France, it is mainly the members of the Assyrian Church of the East and the members 
of the Chaldean church who use the compound designation Assyro-Chaldeans. 
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use. This ‘new’792 approach and interpretation of the designation Assyrian in 
Europe stresses the present reactive consequence of the increasing 
dichotomy between the Assyrier and the Syrianer. Father Aday ascribes his use 
of this name and his Assyrian ideology (renyo Othuroyo) in connection with 
Naum Faik and to the Mtakasto (ADO):  
The renyo [here: ‘ideology’] of the Mtakasto [ADO] is a blessed renyo in my 
eyes. It has given the designations of our people equal weight and 
importance. We have different names, among them Babylonian, Chaldean, 
Aramean, Assyrian, Syriac, Syrian and Phoenician. All these names are part 
of our civilization; each of them is a margonitho [diamond] for us. We 
should not insist on choosing one name only. In modern times, the use of 
the designation Oromoyo [Aramean] has appeared on the scene in 
opposition to the designation Othuroyo [Assyrian]. It is this [oppositional] 
aspect what I do not like about it [the Aramean approach]. Otherwise, I 
accord both of them the same value. It is wrong to use these names in 
competition. Each should be respected. We should do this until we are 
finally able to choose one of them, or when we have our own country one 
day. Until that time, we can use all these names. They are all ours… This 
means that when we say Suryoyo, we mean also Othuroyo [Assyrian] and 
Kaldoyo [Chaldean]. And if we say Kaldoyo, we also mean Suryoyo and 
Othuroyo. It is one people, one umtho [nation]... 
Although assuming primordiality, Father Aday stresses the possibility to 
make use of different names for his people, clearly departing from a context 
in which the agreement about their use has caused divisions. Similarly, 
umthonoye Assyrians/Syriacs search in what their authors have written as well 
as in other publications about the ‘true identity’ of their people, combined 
with its strength in present-day society. An example is the Assyriska Jacob: 
Anyone who asserts that the Umtho Suryoyto, Othuroyto, Kaldoyto is one 
[united], is considered by us to be an author who expresses our ideology. 
Those authors that do not express this ideology in their books are not 
thought of as umthonoye by us. We are looking for sources which can help 
us furthering our quest. If Patriarch Ephrem Barsaum states that we are 
Othuroye, this is not a minor matter – despite the fact that he changed his 
mind afterwards. The norm is our own current ideology. If we find the 
same ideology in certain books written 800 years ago, we feel satisfied. 
                                                 
792 It was a new approach in Europe, building on the Assyrian Movement which was initiated 
by the ADO in Syria; see further Chapter 6. 
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In his citation, Jacob shows that the choice of a designation depends heavily 
on the presumed political strength for realizing the unity of the imagined 
Assyrian/Syriac nation (umtho Suryoyto). The importance of this approach is a 
matter the Assyrier especially stress. Jacob continues: 
In my opinion, a political name for our people under the designation 
Assyrian is better. In the course of time the ‘amo [Suryoyo] became divided 
and used different names. For our people who live in different countries, 
the designation Assyrian is more inclusive [maletmono]. The names Turoyo, 
Jacobite, Nestorian and the like are not unifying enough. They refer to one 
part of our people only. Depending on the success of the designation, we 
should choose one particular designation to use. If the Chaldeans were to 
collect the people in a certain place and be able to manage all the other 
people under their political ideology, or if the Oromoye or if the Othuroye 
should manage to do this, we could use any of these names. Today, all 
these names are in the process of creating an umthonoyto793 movement. But, 
Suryoye who have been using the designation Oromoye [Arameans] have 
been active only in church circles. It is of no importance to me whether a 
person is religious or not. Religion should remain a matter between the 
individual and God. Therefore I have not been attracted to the 
designation Oromoye… I am convinced that the ‘amo is Othuroyo [Assyrian]. 
However, if the Suryoye who use the designation Chaldean or Arameans 
achieve greater success, I might agree to use one of those designations. If 
we unite, manage to put all our historical divisions aside and achieve a 
country, I do not mind using any name! The most important thing is the 
consumption of the fruits! 
In such an inclusive approach, the assumed shared historical past and the 
recognition of church divisions among the ‘amo Suryoyo is used to legitimate 
the contemporary existence of a diversity of names. From this perspective, 
the diversity and existing disagreements about them are regarded as natural 
phenomena; attempting to put matters into perspective in the context of the 
‘name crises’ among the Assyrians/Syriacs. 
 
Situational arguments are also used among the Syrianska elite in order to put 
the meaning of the designations and their importance into a perspective for 
the people. Benjamin, a teacher of Syriac and activist in different Syrianska 
organizations, says:  
                                                 
793 See for the use of the term umthonoyutho Chapter 6. 
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Historically the Arameans and the Assyrians also fought; they were two 
different peoples. But, in the end we are both the offspring of Adam and 
Eve and therefore brothers. All our problems are then solved. We have 
come here to Sweden and tomorrow our children will say they are 
Swedish. 
Benjamin solves the problem by talking about an imagined shared past and 
future. By stating ‘tomorrow our children will say they are Swedish’, he 
minimizes both the importance of the discussion about his people’s 
collective identity today and the meaning he gives to the descent of his 
people. This approach intimates that the meaning and importance of a 
designation can change and disappear relatively fast, depending on the 
circumstances. During my fieldwork, I observed that the ordinary people 
declared they had enough of the ‘name debate’ and that it is only fuelled by 
individuals who hold positions in Assyriska and Syrianska organizations. This 
often means that these individuals employ certain norms in their ideology 
and they expect their members to observe them. These relate to the norms in 
other Assyrian/Syriac ideologies in a certain way. 
 A final example which I want to discuss is the approach of the artist 
Michael (raised in Syria). He has developed different identifications with the 
cultural past of Mesopotamia. Michael expresses his identification through 
the cultural interests he has developed. He explains how he had interest in 
and felt identification with an assumed Assyrian past; how he moved away 
from this and began to focus on an Aramean past; and, finally, how he 
developed an inclusive approach and focus on the ancient civilizations of 
Mesopotamia as a whole, through the use of the designation Suryoye. Michael 
thinks that the term Suryoye covers Assyrians, Arameans and more. In 
contrast to the Assyrier, he does not make vigorous attempts to show how 
the Aramean cultural past has continued until today. He has studied and used 
the Aramean cultural past at a cultural level and expressed it in theatre, songs 
and poems: ‘I felt comfortable [thnihoyo] with the name Oromoyo and 
especially with the kingdom and the time of Tadmur and Queen Zenobia...’ 
Michael developed this cultural interest specifically for the Aramean past 
because of a break with the Assyrian Movement. It can therefore be seen as a 
reaction to the Assyrian Movement. Meanwhile, he does not consider it a 
political stand or to be part of the Syrianska ideology. He says explicitly that 
he does not feel any sympathy for the present ideologies of either the Syrianer 
or the Assyrier. He claims his interest is related only to the Suryoye Oromoye 
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cultural civilization and goes as far as to divide the geographical area of 
Mesopotamia into an Aramean and an Assyrian part:  
I feel close to the [assumed Aramean] civilization which developed on the 
banks of the Euphrates more than to the [assumed Assyrian] civilization 
which flourished along the banks of the Tigris. Why? I feel that these 
[Arameans] are closer to my roots. On the Tigris, the only civilization 
which evolved was Nineveh. But a number of Aramean kingdoms grew 
up along the Euphrates: Karkamish, Zinçirli, Çarablus, Urhoy, and when 
you go down into Syria, Mari – which was founded by both the Sumerians 
and the Amorites. 
Since my attention was caught by Michael’s reasoning, I asked him why he 
picked out only part of the Mesopotamian geographical area as his cultural 
interest and source of inspiration – specifically that part which he identifies 
today as Aramean. From his answer it becomes clear that a disappointment 
and conflict with the Assyrian Movement resulted in his disidentifiation with 
anything known as ‘Assyrian’: 
I tell you honestly. Probably it is the Harake Othuroyto [Assyrian 
Movement] itself which is the cause of this. When I was young, I did not 
regard it in this way; this is what I have reflected on it so far. In 1972 I was 
a young man and poet. I went to Nineveh in Mosul in the company of the 
present Archbishop Hanna794 of Aleppo [who was a monk] at that time, 
Yacob Deresh who also used to be a monk, Yacob Gergis, the late singers 
Jan Karat and Jalil Ma‘ilo, the present priest George Chachan who played 
the guitar795 and a folkloristic dance group… We paid this visit to Nineveh 
on the occasion of the celebration of the cultural rights which were 
granted to the Syriac-speaking people by the Baath regime in 1972. We 
celebrated this during a two-day party in Mosul. 
 We visited the door of Nergal, the God of Hell. There were two taure 
[winged bulls] at this door… One of the guards at the door of Nergal said: 
‘This was a civilization which had reached high levels and once ruled 
supreme, but it has gone now.’ I replied to him: ‘Hopefully it will rise 
again, since we are her sons.’ That is what I said there. At that time our 
feelings were not as they are now [opposing Assyrian identification]. After 
reading the mythology of Beth Nahrin [Mesopotamia], I felt that it is all one 
and interrelated… Even later – at the time of the Arameans and later of 
                                                 
794 Archbishop Mor Grigorios Hanna Ibrahim. 
795 George Chachan was known for playing the violin. 
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the Suryoye, – I began to construct for myself the conclusion that they are 
all one. I brought aspects of the history and from our daily life together. 
 [Interviewer: Can you give examples?] In the beginning I thought 
that Ha b-Nison [1 April, celebration of the Assyrian New Year] was 
something belonging only to the Assyrians. After I read about it, I felt that 
it was something which belonged to all these people of Beth Nahrin; from 
the Sumerians to the Suryoye. They all celebrated it but all in different ways.  
His latest inclusive approach may have been heavily influenced by the 
inclusive approach of the channel Suroyo TV, where he has been working. 
From the perspective of Suroyo TV: the Syriac churches are composed of one 
people – ha ‘amo. Moreover, often, especially in the first two or three years of 
broadcasting, they used the compound name Suryoye/Othuroye/Kaldoye 
(Syriacs/Assyrians/Chaldeans). The use of the compound name was a 
construction to keep the members of the three churches satisfied about the 
designation used. This approach is also found in the situational approaches 
of the Assyrier. Although Michael uses the designation Suryoye at the cultural 
level, he has nevertheless developed an inclusive approach: 
On television [here: Suroyo TV], I use only the designation Suryoye. There I 
am talking about the culture of the Suryoye, which entails Assyrian, 
Aramean and Chaldean elements... These people have appeared under 
different names. In the period before the current era, they bore the names 
Assyrian, Arameans and Chaldeans. In the current era, they were all 
known by the name Suryoye [at the beginning of the current era]. Both 
Othuroye and Oromoye adopted the designation Suryoye. We were united 
under one name Suryoye, for about 500 years. But, when [Archbishop] 
Nestorius appeared, we suffered a division and became known as Suryoye 
Madenhoye [Eastern] and Ma‘erboye [Western]. However, the culture is called 
mardutho Suryoyto [Suryoyo culture].  
The starting point for constructing a common ground in the current era has 
been the mardutho Suryoyto, assuming the combination of elements from 
before the time of Christ. Consequently, he sees Suryoyutho as the new 
denominator for the assumed ancestry of the Assyrians/Syriacs in the period 
before the current era. 
 As I have illustrated, characteristic for the situationalist arguments is that 
ethnicity is seen as a ‘resource’. While elite members make use of different 
discursive arguments, they have also been affected by the changes in the 
employed arguments. Therefore, the Assyriska and Syrianska elite groups 
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cannot be seen as ‘static’. In the antagonistic field of discursivity they are 
continuously under the influence of change. 
 
8.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have given an account of the oppositional arguments of the 
Assyrier and Syrianer about the ‘correct name’ of their people. It has clearly 
emerged that an elite member may use different arguments to defend the 
choice of a certain name. The choice of a designation has become part of the 
discussion of what the ancestry of the ‘amo Suryoyo is: Assyrian or Aramean? 
The discussion is not just about their ancestry; it concerns the historisization 
of a few thousand years of history. In their attempts, the collective identity of 
their people is put in relation to their history from their present-day 
perspective about their past. It is a whole composite of reading, publishing, 
re-reading, re-discussing and ‘awakening’ as elites refer to this process which 
they have been going through. 
 In this discussion, the Syrianska elite concentrate on the argument that 
Suryoye are not of Assyrian descent, more than on arguing that they are of 
Aramean descent. This point is important for understanding the 
development of the discourse about the ‘right designation’ among the 
Syrianer. I have argued that, initially, the rejection of the name Assyrier led to 
the establishment of a new name, Syrianer. In the discussion between the 
adherents of these two names, the Syrianer initially also questioned the 
necessity to refer to a pre-Christian past. That is an important reason the 
name Syrianer gained great support and developed a strong position among 
the majority of the ‘amo Suryoyo in Sweden. They had rather an ethno-
religious understanding of identity in line with the discourse of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church. As shown in the previous chapter, they have gradually 
developed an ethno-national understanding of the identity of their people in 
the process of forming a competing alternative ideology. Only later in the 
process of the name discussion, did a serious interest in an alternative 
identification with a pre-Christian, namely an Aramean descent, evolve. 
Historically, the idea that Suryoye have Aramean ancestry is not new. 
However, the arguments negotiated in Sweden have been mobilized very 
much in the Swedish context. 
 Nevertheless, among the majority of the Syrianer the Aramean past plays 
a minimal, latent role in their lives, even among those people by whom the 
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Aramean past is implied. A relatively small group of Syrianska elite members 
in Sweden, especially people who are active in secular organizations and the 
majority of the clergy, make stronger statements, averring that the ‘amo 
Suryoyo has Aramean roots. They are convinced that an Aramean past has 
become relevant and this is especially urgent in relation to the use of the 
name Assyrian among members of their people and in professional 
communications with external institutions, for instance, when discussing 
their collective rights.  
 Assyrian/Syriac elite members espousing the Assyrian ideology are 
usually more aware that this is an ideology with an instrumental function 
rather than a solely primordial historical approach. They have a political 
discourse; the arguments they use are politically based and function as such 
in the modern discourses of the formation of a national identity. This will 
recur in Chapter 9 about the boundaries of the ‘amo Suryoyo. It is therefore 
not surprising that Assyriska elite members make use of both primordial and 
situational arguments with greater flexibility. Syrianska elite members tend to 
reject the name Assyrier and defend what they perceive as ‘holy’: Syrianer as 
the correct translation of their name Suryoye. 
 In the following chapter, I shall more specifically discuss the 
construction of the boundaries of the ‘amo Suryoyo in present-day discourses. 
This will illustrate how the boundaries between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ are 




9 THE BOUNDARIES OF ‘OUR PEOPLE’ 
 
Assyrians/Syriacs commonly lament the fact that they are now dispersed all 
over the world. To express their sorrow they use the term mbarbezina (we 
have become dispersed). This implies that this state of affairs is not how a 
people should be. It also explains why, despite their worldwide dispersion, 
Assyrian/Syriac individuals retain a strong self-identification with their own 
people, or to borrow Anderson’s phrase, with their ‘imagined community’. 
Who is this ‘imagined community’? Ineluctably answers to this problem must 
include the discourses from which boundaries of ‘sameness’ (chain of difference) 
and ‘otherness’ (chain of equivalence) are defined. The presence of the 
‘imagined’ aspect, the fact that they do not live in a clearly defined 
geographical area as a closed community (Gemeinschaft, in terms of Tönnies), 
strengthens the importance of their sense of belonging to this group even 
more. This still does not answer the question of who constitutes this 
‘imagined community’? 
 In daily life, they refer to themselves as a ‘amo, ‘a people’ and more 
specifically as the ‘amo Suryoyo. The word ‘amo does not carry the connotation 
of any specific boundary. In the Tur ‘Abdin region before the mass 
emigration began, local people used the expression u ‘amaydan (our people), 
especially if they wanted to convey implicitly that they were speaking about 
members of the Syriac Orthodox Church, (‘ito Suryoyto).796 Therefore, in Tur 
‘Abdin, the phrase ‘amo Suryoyo was imbued with an ethno-religious 
connotation. The term for a nation in the modern sense (umtho) was not part 
of the everyday vocabulary. Nevertheless, umtho is not a new term as it is 
already found in ancient Syriac manuscripts.797 If it has had such a long 
history, what did it mean in those times? How is it used today? In order to 
understand more about the use of these concepts in daily life, it is necessary 
to deconstruct these terms. The rub is that, since we do not know how umtho 
was applied a few centuries ago and since the present definition of nation 
expresses a modern idea, our starting point must be that the Syriac term 
                                                 
796 The educated elite (who could be found mainly in the churches and the monasteries) may 
have had a different, broader concept definition of the ‘amo Suryoyo. 
797 See further for an early example Debié (2009). 
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umtho as used in the past described a concept which differed from the 
present idea of umtho or nation. What we do know about the concept of 
umtho is that it is a reference to a collective, but how this collective was 
delineated has to remain an unanswered question, at least for the moment. 
 At this juncture I should reiterate that in the societies in which 
Assyrians/Syriacs lived in the Middle East, the ‘amo was defined along 
confessional lines. As a consequence, cultural differences between different 
groups of people were understood in religious terms. All an individual had to 
do to change his community affiliation, or his membership of the group of 
people to which he belonged, was to convert to another religion.798 The 
same categories were used by both insiders and outsiders to define where 
they belonged. Language and cultural characteristics were relegated to a 
secondary role.  
 I discussed the diversity in designations in use among the 
Assyrians/Syriacs and how they have come to the conclusion that this is an 
unnatural situation, as Shem‘un, the Syrianska teacher of Syriac explained: 
 
Shem‘un: To be honest, it saddens me greatly to see our church dispersed 
as it is now. Although they all have different names, I know in 
reality that they [the members of the different churches] are my 
brothers. I know that we share the same ghenso [ethnicity] and 
tauditho [religion]. It does not matter that they have now changed 
their names; I still regard them as brothers…  
Interviewer:  Do you perceive them as one ‘amo? 
Shem‘un: Indeed I do. I see them as one umtho [nation], u haukhayoste [and 
that is the truth]. We refer to the Rum799 by the name Malkoye 
[followers of the king] because they changed their allegiance to 
the church of the king [of Byzantium]. But they are Suryoye. We 
                                                 
798 Until a few decades ago, in Tur ‘Abdin, Syriac Orthodox who had converted to the Syriac 
Protestant Church were no longer perceived as ‘Suryoye’ by many members of either church 
and thus no longer considered to be part of the chain of difference, the inside. The Protestants 
began to look down on the Syriac Orthodox and set about building a strong identity with their 
new denomination. The Orthodox perceived the new converts as those who had caused the 
secession. The fact that family members began  to be excluded from the definition of Suryoye 
or Suroye (as used most often in Surayt in those times in Tur ‘Abdin) shows how the 
designations Suroye and Suryoye were interwoven with the Syriac Orthodox Church in daily use 
among the people. Over time, the change in religion could lead to a change in the language 
and cultural characteristics of the new group of affiliation.  
799 The Syriac-speaking members of the Greek Orthodox Church who traditionally lived in 
the Syro-Mesopotamian area. 
BOUNDARIES OF ‘OUR PEOPLE’                                       435 
 
have called them Malkoye because we were upset that they chose 
to adhere to the religion of the king. They do not call themselves 
Malkoye…  
 
Shem‘un stretched back to the early centuries of the ‘ito Suryoyto (Syriac 
Church); but did not go beyond the existence of the ‘ito Suryoyto into the 
Aramean pagan past, although somewhere else in the interview he did 
indicate that he assumed Assyrians/Syriacs were of Aramean descent. 
Apparently, what was more important to him was the shared background in 
the Syriac church of the early centuries in the CE. 
 In this chapter my objective is to illustrate that the definition of their 
people’s boundaries has broadened after some decades of life in the secularly 
based societies in Europe. I shall map out the different boundaries used 
when the Assyrian/Syriac elites define ‘our people’ (u ‘amaydan). My starting 
point is that boundaries are not hegemonically fixed, and that they are empty 
signifiers waiting to be defined in the discursive process with the ‘others’. This 
results in the ‘imagined map of boundaries’ of the ‘amo Suryoyo, showing the 
variations in proximity and distance between different groups of people, all 
perhaps somehow related to each other or not, but definitely all part of the 
discourses about who ‘our people’ are. As I do so, I shall point out what 
characteristics are considered to be important to define the boundaries. In 
the process it will also become clear that the same designation can be used 
for setting different boundaries. As I discussed in the theoretical chapter, 
discourse theory put a particular emphasis on boundaries, namely on the 
relational formation of identities. Identities are formed, institutionalized and 
gain meaning in relation to the construction of a constitutive outside in the 
antagonistic field. This happens through the exclusion of a series of identities 
and meanings. This ‘outside’ is necessary for the construction of the identity 
of the ‘inside’. But at the same time, the ‘outside’ constitutes a constant 
threat for the ‘inside’ and it prevents the full constitution of it. That is why 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) define it as the symbol of my non-being. The 
‘outside’ is inherently negatively attributed in terms of what the identity is 
‘not’ or which groups are excluded and where the boundaries are drawn. For 
the analysis of the formation of these internal frontiers, DT makes use of the 
logic of difference and the logic of equivalence. While the logic of difference 
(sameness) aims to lessen the existing group differences by setting up 
alliances through the emphasis on commonalities, the logic of equivalence is the 
chain or space where the excluded identities are juxtaposed. In this chapter, I 
explain how the two logics are formed according to different discourses 
436                                       CHAPTER 9 
 
deployed. This will also illustrate the boundaries between the excluded and 
included people. 
 To contextualize this chapter among the others in this thesis, it is 
necessary to remember that ethno-national identification has evolved among 
the ordinary Assyrians/Syriacs in the diaspora and not in the homeland. In 
this new context, identity discourses about the boundaries of their people, as 
is the topic of this chapter, are not autonomous but have been created 
discursively in relation to outsiders and different groups of insiders. 
Assyrians/Syriacs from different areas in the Middle East who have settled in 
Western Europe rethink their common traditional boundaries in this new 
antagonistic context within the already existing or newly emerged discourses. 
They reflect with a heightened awareness on their distant historical past 
which they date back to pre-Christian times, to the first era of Christianity 
and to the new confessional communities in the Middle East. 
Notwithstanding this most recent aspect, their life in different geographical 
areas in the Middle East, as discussed in earlier chapters, also caused to 
develop distance among Assyrians/Syriacs. Their mobility in a dispersed 
Western world today allows them space to negotiate the differences and 
commonalities between them from a modern perspective. 
 This chapter will also serve as an illustration that new forms of 
identification among the Assyrians/Syriacs in the golutho (as discussed in 
other chapters) have lead to the re-definition of the collective boundaries of 
the ‘amo Suryoyo. The ‘imagined map of boundaries’ which I illustrate here is 
the outcome of a patchwork of different identity discourses that have been 
articulated by elites. These are of course derived from the concepts to be 
found in the discourses of their social groups and observed in their media 
(TV, radio, magazines and Internet) and also in all kinds of material which 
they produce. In the first section I shall discuss the discourses of my 
respondents after I had posed my initial question: ‘Who constitutes the ‘amo 
Suryoyo?’ The answers to this question should not be taken as necessarily 
representing the boundaries used daily for defining this people. As will be 
revealed in my attempt to deconstruct their discourses, individuals are apt to 
take different aspects into consideration when defining these boundaries, 
which reveal an attempt to approach the complexity of negotiating these 
boundaries in everyday life. In order to contextualize their new boundary 
definitions, it is important to read the historical context of the groups 
discussed in Appendix 1. 
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In the second section I discuss the narrow definition of the ‘amo Suryoyo; 
the core of the chain of difference. In the last section I present the discourses 
about the potential enlargement or reduction of the boundaries of the ‘amo 
by looking at two groups which might be perceived as insiders or as 
outsiders, depending on the discourse applied. Looking at these two groups 
will help me to locate the outlines of this ‘imagined map of boundaries’ in 
the discursive process of the inclusion and exclusion of people from the 
collective definition of ‘our people’. Inclusion of these groups would allow 
an expansion of the boundaries beyond the traditional confines and beyond 
those already discussed among the ordinary people. The first group consists 
of the Mhalmoye800 Muslims who live in Tur ‘Abdin. After their conversion to 
Islam, traditionally they have been regarded as belonging to the ‘others’. 
From a traditional perspective, the second example I look at is composed of 
people who have been regarded as ‘insiders’:  the members of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church in India. It is important to draw attention to the fact that, in 
this section, I have explicitly asked my respondents about these respective 
groups in order to learn more specifically about how they relate to them. 
Therefore, there may sometimes be parts which overlap with the first section 
in the discussion. It is important to note the differences between discourses 
before and after I asked specifically about the Mhalmoye and the members of 
the Syriac Orthodox Church in India. The first section illustrates their 
common discourses about these respective groups and in the second section 
I deal with more hypothetical cases, since I had to ask about them, instead of 
the elites themselves raising the subject. 
 
9.1 Who is801 the ‘Amo Suryoyo? 
It is important to remember that the discourses presented in this section 
follow directly from the initial question: ‘Who constitutes the ‘amo Suryoyo 
and which people do you include in this concept?’802 When I asked this 
question, some elite members in turn asked me: ‘Do you mean the ‘ito 
                                                 
800 Mhalmoye are considered to be Assyrians/Syriacs who converted to Islam at the beginning 
of the seventeenth century. 
801 In Suryoyo, the word ‘amo for ‘people’ is singular. Therefore I have used the form ‘is’ instead 
of ‘are’. 
802 During the interview, I used the term ‘amo, because it has a more general connotation 
which is open to interpretation as to whether I asked for a denominational or an ethno-
national definition of the group. 
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(church803), or do you mean the umtho (nation)?’ ‘Use the definition you 
always use when you say ‘amo Suryoyo’, I replied. Their question shows that 
even members of the elite continue to attribute a double meaning (religious 
and ethnic-secular) to the term ‘amo. Despite the fact that today the Assyriska 
elite has formed an ethnic concept of the designation Suryoye, there are still 
individuals among them who relate the designation Suryoye to the ‘ito (church, 
here: Syriac Orthodox Church) when they use it among themselves in daily 
life. This is the most traditional way of using it. When they choose to use 
Suryoye as a national name for the various Syriac Churches, they do so 
consciously as part of a political discourse. Consequently, the designation 
Suryoye can mean different things simultaneously. I shall illustrate this first by 
giving two examples in the use of designations discursively before I continue 
with and answer on this question based on the data from all my respondents. 
The first example is that of the Assyriska young professional Martha:  
When I use Suryoye, I refer to the members of the Syriac Orthodox 
Church. When I use Assyrier in Swedish language, I include the 
Madenhoye804 [members of the Assyrian Church of the East] and 
Chaldeans.   
Besides this use, somewhere else in the interview Martha mentioned that she 
uses the designation Othuroye when communicating in Suryoyo to refer to the 
collective of the different Syriac Churches. As she says in the citation above, 
she reserves the term Suryoye to refer to the members of the Syriac Orthodox 
Church only. This latter use is the traditional use of the term Suryoye once 
found in the homeland. Martha believes that distinguishing between the 
terms Suryoye and Othuroye is a way to separate her denominational group 
from her national group. Her attitude fits in with the political activist 
discourse of the Assyrier. 
 Her approach is interesting for two reasons. Earlier in the interview, she 
had mentioned that as she saw it, the terms Suryoye and Othuroye were 
synonymous. Therefore, she translated the term Suryoye by using the Swedish 
term Assyrier. Nevertheless, when she uses the two terms Suryoye and Othuroye 
in her mother tongue Suryoyo in her daily life, she sometimes continues to 
attribute different meanings to them, despite the fact that she perceives them 
                                                 
803 By ‘church’ they mean the whole church community. 
804 Madenhoye is short for Suryoye Madenhoye (literally Eastern Suryoye, in contrast to the Western 
Suryoye). The latter are the members of the Syriac Orthodox Church. 
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as synonyms. This still leaves the question of why she chooses to translate 
the term Suryoye with the Swedish term Assyrier, since she uses different 
definitions when using both of these in Suryoyo. There is one possible 
explanation for her reason for translating the term Suryoye into Swedish as 
Assyrier. In her understanding, the Suryoye are a ‘amo (ethnie) or umtho 
(nation). The narrower definition implied by the term Suryoye today has a 
denominational connotation for her. 
 This means that she has to opt for the term Othuroye when speaking in 
Suryoyo, if she wants to express her ideas about the broader boundaries of her 
people. Therefore, it would appear that she translates the term Suryoye in her 
mother tongue into the Swedish term Assyrier so as to use the same broader 
definition of the term Suryoye; namely that which is used for the term Othuroye 
in Suryoyo. Furthermore, it is irrelevant to her that the term Othuroye is 
translated with the term Assyrier. The translation process simultaneously 
functions as a vehicle to transform ideas. Martha translates and transforms 
her concept of the ‘amo Suryoyo – and extends the boundaries she draws for 
this ‘amo –, by using the terms Othuroye in Suryoyo and Assyrier in Swedish. 
Since her concept of ‘amo extends beyond the members of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church, the term Othuroye is used as a national designation to 
express the discourse that Assyrians/Syriacs are an umtho. The Swedish 
language functions here as a mediating instrumental resource for the 
mobilization of her Assyrian ideology in a Swedish context. Language is not 
neutral. It bears ideas. Over time, ideas can influence linguistic expressions. 
Ideas (signifier) and language (signified) are interactive. The meaning given to 
names (signified) has a relational, contextual and processual character. And 
thus, they are not fixed. The meaning the Assyriska Martha gives to the term 
Suryoye should be understood in relation to her definition of the term 
Othuroye. 
 As the discussion in Martha’s example reveals, generally the Assyrier use 
the terms Suryoye and Othuroye synonymously. Nevertheless, there is a (very) 
small minority who use a narrower notion of the term Suryoye; one example is 
the scholar Marauge. When he refers to the ‘amo Suryoyo, he is speaking about 
the members of the Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholic and Syriac Protestant 
churches. Although he has used both terms (Suryoye and Othuroye) as 
synonyms in the past, after some disillusionment with the Assyrian 
Movement, he has had a change of heart. He now argues that ‘the other 
churches of our people’ (Assyrian Church of the East, the Chaldean Church, 
Maronite Church and the Melkite Church) have distanced themselves from 
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the national identity of the Suryoye, especially from identification on the basis 
of the designation Suryoye. The churches he now excludes from the national 
identity of the ‘amo Suryoyo, he calls ‘the other churches of our people.’ This 
indicates that he does identify them as Suryoye if they identify themselves as 
such. Since he believes that this self-identification with his people is absent, 
he personally no longer feels it is correct to refer to them as Suryoye.805 Since 
he took this decision, he now uses Suryoye as an ethno-national term referring 
to only three Syriac Churches. Marauge’s present-day use of the term Suryoye 
differs from the use adopted by all the other Assyrier respondents. He 
represents the small minority among the Assyrier who opt for a narrower 
definition of the designation Suryoye, but still as an ethno-religious term. 
Moreover, he does use the ethno-national term Othuroye at the times at which 
he wants to make a statement about the ethno-national collective identity of 
the group. Marauge’s use of the term Suryoye also shows the variation in the 
use of definitions of terms. This exemplifies how the choice of a certain 
designation can either expand or contract the boundaries of a group of 
people, depending on the meaning attached to it. This indicates that even 
among the Assyrier who have the most elabourated discourse on the umtho, 
there are variations in the delineation of the umtho Suryoyto. In contrast to the 
Assyrier, the Syrianska elite show less variation in the use of designations. 
I shall now return to the answer to the central question (‘Who is the ‘amo 
Suryoyo?’) of this section in relation to all my respondents. In their answers to 
my question, almost all Syrianska and Assyriska elite members stated that they 
include all the ‘Suryoye churches’ (‘itotho Suryoyotho). The main difference 
between them was that the Assyriska elite often stipulated that those 
churches should first take the step of identifying themselves with the ‘amo 
Suryoyo, before they would include them. After observing that a few Syrianska 
elite members had never heard of the Rum [Melkites] and Maronites, and I 
had answered their question: ‘Who are they?’ with ‘In the early centuries of 
Christianity they followed the same denomination’ – they all replied 
positively about the inclusion of these two groups. This seems to indicate 
that, having shared an element in the history of the Syriac Church at some 
point in history seems to be sufficient grounds for inclusion today. 
                                                 
805 In reality the members of the Assyrian Church of the East and the Chaldean Church do 
use the names Suryaye, Athuraye and Kaldaye interchangeably when speaking in their mother 
tongue Sureth. When they speak a foreign language like English, they translate these into 
respectively Assyrian and Chaldean. 
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 A larger number of the Syrianska than of the Assyriska elite refer more 
explicitly to the inclusion of the Maronites. This identification should be 
understood on the one hand against the background of the revival among a 
part of the Maronites of ‘their Aramean ancestry’, besides their interest for 
such shared elements in the Syriac church and cultural tradition as the 
language. And on the other hand the influence of religious discourses among 
Syrianer give space to the consideration of the active inclusion of Maronites 
within the chain of difference (sameness) as a potential alliance, sharing the same 
religion in the Middle East and roots in the same (early) Syriac church. Since 
the early 1990s, the official title of this church is ‘Ito Suryoyto Marunoyto d-
Antakya (Syriac Maronite Patriarchal Church of Antioch).806 Cogently, this 
interest in a shared Suryoye past functions as a way to distance its members 
from a putative Arab ethnicity as speakers of Arabic are commonly identified 
to be of Arab descent.807 The message of the Assyriska elite seems to imply 
that the Maronites share a Suryoye past and that they ought to be included if 
they identify themselves with this history. 808 Therefore, among the Assyrier, 
the interest among Maronite elite members in an Aramean identification 
plays less of a role, in contrast to the Syrianska activists, for whom this is the 
main reason to pay great attention to some Maronites’ identification with an 
Aramean past. 
 A few Assyrier and Syrianer include the Mandeans809 in their concept of 
‘amo, without any further explanation. This idea is frequently raised in 
cultural and political meetings called by Assyrians/Syriacs. The connection 
which is made is through an assumed common past or roots in 
Mesopotamia. This idea is kept at an abstract level and it does not seem to 
be felt necessary to go into details, as it has almost no practical consequences 
                                                 
806 This name was introduced after the publication of the Code of Canon Law for Eastern 
Churches in the early 1990s. 
807 In 2001, the Coalition of American Assyrians and Maronites sent a letter to the Arab-
American Institution to protest about its reference to Assyrians and Maronites as Arabs 
(http://www.aina.org/releases/caamletter.htm): ‘We the undersigned, speaking on behalf of 
over 2.2 million Assyrians, including Chaldeans and Syriacs, and Maronites living in America 
herewith assert that Assyrians and Maronites are not and have never been Arabs – contrary to 
the claims of the Arab American Institute.’ 
808 The former ADO representative Abgar Maloul was among the first Assyrians/Syriacs to 
establish relations with the Maronites in attempts to encourage their awakening to their Suryoye 
roots. On the basis of these contacts, the Maronite politician Imad Shamoun was invited to 
the US and later to Europe to give presentations about the Syriac roots of the Maronites. 
809  See further about the Mandeans, Drower (1937); Mead (1900). See about the Mandaic 
language, Drower and Macuch (1963); Macuch (1965, 1989, 1993). 
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today; the Mandeans are of no political interest as their position in the 
homeland is considered to be weaker than that of themselves. The greatest 
significance of this identification is perhaps that it serves as a means to swell 
the numbers of their people by aligning to people with an assumed shared 
past; somehow or other. This indicates also the expansion of the chain of 
difference through putting forward the commonalities. 
 A few Assyrier and Syrianer acknowledge the Mhalmoye in their people’s 
definition of Suryoye, and said so before I had the chance to ask them 
explicitly. I shall discuss this more thoroughly later in this chapter. Only two 
Assyriska activists to whom I talked included the Yezidi810 (Çalkoye) people, 
since they believed that in the period BCE they were part of one ‘amo and 
that therefore, in the future, they can once again become part of the 
Assyrian/Syriac nation.811 
I have identified three important elements in relation to the definition of the 
boundaries of their people, which I shall discuss further for a more in-depth 
understanding of the boundaries employed: (1) Name of ‘our people’, (2) 
Self-identification and (3) Discourses of Suryoyutho. 
 
9.1.1 The Name of ‘Our People’ 
As I illustrated especially in the previous two chapters, there is a significant 
divergence between the discourses of the Assyrier and the Syrianer about the 
ancestry of the ‘amo Suryoyo and the way they negotiate their present-day 
boundaries in discourses about the origins of their ancestry. The Assyrier find 
their roots in an ancient Assyrian ancestry from before the Christian era. The 
Syrianer set their foundations in the ‘ito Suryoyto, which goes back to the first 
centuries of the current era. It is very usual for people to use the expression 
‘2000 years’ to refer to their Christian heritage. ‘Two thousand years’ has 
                                                 
810 See further about the Yezidi, Kreyenbroek  (1995). 
811 In Sweden, this idea was mobilized especially by the the Assyria Liberation Party (Furqono). It 
developed good contacts with the Yezidi Prince Anwar Mahwya, who lives in Germany. After 
the fall of Saddam Hussein, he attended The Amsterdam Conference (organized by the AUA, 
2003) with Assyrian/Syriac institutions from around the world in an attempt to redefine the 
political boundaries of the nation. There, Prince Anwar Mahwya was eager to show that he 
would like to be included in the Assyrian national identity. This desire was also coloured by 
the idea that someday an autonomous state would be established in northern Iraq for the 
Assyrians and that the wish of the Yezidi was to rather be included in this political geography 
than the Kurdish or Arab geographies. During the meeting the different ideas about the umtho 
and the different uses of designation became clear and subsequently loomed large as obstacles 
in the redefinition of the umtho. 
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become a symbol of their long history which they link with the name Suryoye. 
That is the ‘time before the division of the churches,’ as the Syrianska activist 
Melek states: ‘Seven churches have their foundation in the ‘ito Suryoyto. These 
are the Syriac Orthodox, Nestorian, Chaldean, Maronite, Rum Catholic, 
Syriac Catholic, and Syriac Protestant. Therefore the roots of all these people 
are Suryoye.’ Despite having argued that the true ancestry of the Suryoye is 
Aramean earlier in his interview, later Melek largely ignored the pre-Christian 
or pagan Aramean history. He made a distinction between present-day 
Suryoye and what he imagines to be a former collective identity of Arameans 
(See also Chapter 8). It seems that in his eyes, Suryoye are Arameans, but not 
all Arameans are Suryoye. Therefore, when he defines the ‘amo Suryoyo, his 
primary focus is on national identification as Suryoye and not as Arameans: 
The Suryoye are Arameans. However, there are also other peoples who are 
Arameans, among them the Canaanites and the Amorites… Those who 
speak Aramaic in Syria are Arameans. Nevertheless, I cannot say they are 
Suryoye as we are. We should stare truth in the face. When a group of 
people splits from mine, we distance ourselves from each other. We 
become two different people. In India, there are people who were 
originally Suryoye from Urhoy [present-day Urfa in Turkey]… In 1996 I met 
one of their scholars. He said: “I am a Suryoyo, just as you.” I asked him 
for the proof. He said: “We know this because our ancestors recorded this 
and because of endogamous marriages afterwards.” Therefore we know 
that they are Suryoye by origin, but because we have been separated for 
1600 years, they are Indians and no longer Suryoye. 
It is remarkable that he uses the term ‘I’ instead of ‘we’ when he is talking 
about the split from the members of the church in India. Apparently, he 
identifies himself fully with the collective of his people. Therefore the factor 
needed above all else is uniformity; in particular, one which suits his 
perspective. This is because of the very strong bond between him as an 
individual and the collective of which he senses he is part. 
Although Melek states that all the members of the Syriac churches 
belong to the ‘amo Suryoyo, he excludes the members of the Syriac Orthodox 
Church in India. The reason seems to be the distance developed over the 
course of time and, consequently, the minimal interaction between them. 
Moreover, he rejects the strong self-identification of the members of the 
Syriac churches in India with the Suryoye. Nor does Melek attach any weight 
to the genealogical argument adduced by the Syriac Orthodox Church 
members in India who think of themselves as Suryoye. This is an important 
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difference with the Assyrier who accord great importance to self-
identification. Melek’s stand is remarkable because, when he discusses where 
the roots of the Assyrians/Syriacs lie, he strongly defends the idea that his 
people are of Aramean descent but not of Assyrian descent. In doing so, he 
places the roots of the contemporary collective identity of the Suryoye in the 
period BCE. 
The importance of the Aramean past seems to loom most significantly 
in relation to the discussion with the Assyrier, who place the roots of the 
descent of the Suryoye in an Assyrian past. As soon as Melek defines the 
boundaries of the umtho Suryoyto today, he immediately excludes those 
Arameans (practically, the non-Christian Arameans) in Syria with whom he 
does not feel any great affinity. ‘The division with them has existed too long,’ 
he says. Instead, he commences the foundation of a new definition of the 
umtho Suryoyto in the first centuries of Christianity, when the ‘ito Suryoyto had 
‘not yet divided’. Moreover, he excludes the members of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church in India from the ‘amo Suryoyo for the same reason he 
excludes the (other) Arameans in Syria. Melek uses a definition of the ‘amo 
Suryoyo which is more practical than theoretical. It could be said that his 
definition of his people is relatively ‘less imagined’ (as far as possible) than 
that of the Assyrier. The latter employ a more theoretical definition founded 
on a more political ideology, in their attempt to regain a position among 
other peoples, by expanding their chain of difference in terms of nation building. 
As far as the Syrianska Melek is concerned, the link with these Arameans is 
one of the past, which is really only relevant to the political and symbolic 
concept of the umtho. Specifically claiming not to be of Assyrian descent, he 
refers to alternative Aramean roots of the Suryoye, the foundation on which 
he builds the ideology for the Aramean nation. ‘Aramean’ is thus used as a 
way to seek legitimation for defining the ‘amo Suryoyo as an umtho, instead of 
solely as a church community. 
 
9.1.2 Self-identification 
A second major difference between members of the Assyriska and the 
Syrianska elites (already alluded to above) is the role they permit self-
identification in their definition of the ‘amo Suryoyo. The Assyriska elite give 
much more weight to self-identification. Aday, an Assyrisk university 
graduate activist says:  ‘If they have a “we” feeling, despite the fact that their 
mastery of the Suryoyo language is very poor, but they still feel part of us 
psychologically and emotionally, I shall think of them as Suryoye.’ Among the 
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Syrianer, the student Matay was among the very few who ascribed a 
significant role to self-identification:   
Neither the Suryoye nor any other people are static as I see it. Secondly, my 
principle is to accept someone as a Suryoyo if he identifies himself as a 
Suryoyo. For very objective reasons, we could also accept someone as a 
Suryoyo even if he does not identify himself as such. However, we should 
give him the freedom not to identify with us and we should not identify 
him as a Suryoyo... We should be careful with sticking ‘passports’ on the 
heads of individuals.  
The elite adduce different reasons for the importance of self-identification. 
In the first place, several, Matay for one, noted the right of individual self-
identification. It is important to recognise that this is a value which has 
developed in the Western diaspora. It is the outcome of a burgeoning 
awareness and subsequent reflection about their group identity. This aspect 
also shows that different conceptions of and variations in group 
identification have begun to emerge among Assyrians/Syriacs in the 
diaspora. This is in sharp contrast to the ‘static’ group identity and 
membership of this people in the Middle East. Former Assyriska activist 
Barsaumo, now a university graduate, has objections to the meagre attention 
the Assyrian Movement (harake Othuroyto) paid to this aspect: 
The dominant opinion of the Assyrian Movement is that the Rum are also 
Suryoye but, since they [Rum] lived among the Arabs, they developed an 
Arab identity as well as [Arab] traditions. Since we expect that others will 
accept our self-identification, we should likewise accept the identity they 
[Rum] choose for themselves.  
A second reason for the variations in self-identification is that this is 
considered to be an essential prerequisite to pave the way for a national 
identity. Therefore, the Assyriska student Yauno does not include every 
member of the Syriac Orthodox Church in his concept of ‘amo Suryoyo: 
However, those Suroye who are members of our church and believe they 
are Turks or Arabs are not Suroye in my opinion. Even if a person speaks 
Suryoyo but he thinks he is a Turk or an Arab, he is not a Suroyo… 
Among the Assyrians/Syriacs in the urban areas of Iraq, there are people 
who have begun to identify themselves as Arabs. At the Syriac Symposium 
IX (Granada), during her presentation one of the scholars from the Chaldean 
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community in Baghdad presented herself as an Arab Christian. This aroused 
strenuous disagreement among other scholars in the Assyrian/Syriac 
community. A central question this scholar was asked was: ‘Don’t you know 
you are Assyrian and that you have been arabized? Therefore how can you 
identify as an Arab’? Her reaction showed that she had not expected these 
questions and that this discussion was new to her. This indicates that 
through her self-identification as an ‘Arab Christian’ she had objectified her 
collective belonging for herself. 
 
9.1.3 Discourses of Suryoyutho 
Self-identification is certainly not perceived as something abstract and 
autonomous. The elite relate it to Suryoyutho, the third important element in 
defining the boundaries of the ‘amo Suryoyo. The term Suryoyutho refers to a 
specific ‘Suryoye way of life’. The norm is to express Suryoyutho or to live 
Suryoyutho when people identify themselves as Suryoye. Simply saying, those 
who do not do so are not included in the definition of the ‘amo Suryoyo. 
 In negotiating the collective identity of the Assyrians/Syriacs, the elite 
relate different elements to each other. Unquestionably, it is the compilation 
of elements instead of one ‘objective’ element which is decisive in their 
decisions to include or exclude someone from the definition of the ‘amo 
Suryoyo. The elite, for instance, differ in the emphasis they put on certain 
elements. Indeed, when defining the Assyrians/Syriacs as a group, each 
identity discourse has its own compilation of elements, prioritizing some of 
them above the others. It is remarkable that when elite members talk about 
Suryoyutho, they present this as something stable and immutable. At least, they 
choose not to stress the changing aspects of Suryoyutho which have occurred 
over time. A few members of the elite who are eager to encourage change in 
the ‘Suryoye way of life’ stress that certain cultural elements are alien to the 
mardutho d-Suryoye (Suryoye culture); that they are not part of Suryoyutho. The 
cultural elements concerned are those which are assumed to have been 
brought with them from the homeland. They ascribe them not to an 
Assyrian/Syriac but to a Muslim society. Consequently, one ought to 
distance oneself from them. Examples tend to preponderate on the position 
of women in society and the internal rivalry (berberiye) between individuals or 
social groups in the Assyrian/Syriac community. These elements are 
reflected upon to be backward and especially the latter is related to 
feudalism. Some elite members show that they are conscious that Suryoyutho 
undergoes changes. Nevertheless, there is still the idea of what 
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Assyrians/Syriacs at a certain time and place should live up to. This will 
always be coloured by an idea about what Suryoyutho entails. Hence, 
depending on the perspective of the elite members (Assyrier, Syrianer, old, 
young, level of education, and so forth), Suryoyutho will mean different things 
to different people. 
 For many of the Assyriska elite, it is important that Assyrians/Syriacs 
dare to express their Suryoyutho even if this means they run the risk of 
encountering hardships. Those who can meet these expectations acquire a 
symbolic heroism among the people.812 For example, for this reason the 
Assyriska young professional Martha (who has never met but only heard 
about them) excludes the Assyrians/Syriacs who live in Istanbul from her 
concept ‘amo Suryoyo: 
Those [Suryoye] who live in Istanbul – I do not consider them as Suryoye, 
because they speak Turkish [as mother tongue] and live a certain way of 
life in which they do not express their Suryoyutho.813 Perhaps this is because 
they are afraid. Here in Europe, we live much more as Suryoye than we did 
in the homeland. We can wear a crucifix around our neck in public. We 
have actually forgotten how hard it is to live in a Muslim country!  
For many elites, the Suryoyo language is an important element of Suryoyutho. 
When we take this aspect into consideration, the ‘amo Suryoyo is composed of 
the people whose mother tongue is Suryoyo. They regard Suryoyo as the 
traditional mother tongue of the Suryoye and therefore they want to preserve 
its symbolic value by urging people to continue speaking it in their daily lives 
(besides their other languages). They believe that the language expresses and 
is the vehicle of Suryoyutho. The language connects the Suryoye as a collective; 
                                                 
812 One example is Father Yusef Akbulut in Diyarbakır, who was imprisoned and sued for 
recognizing the genocide during the First World War in Ottoman Turkey. See further for a 
broader analysis of this case, Donef (2001). 
813 In reality, the Suryoye who migrated to Istanbul from such cities as Mardin, Diyarbakır and 
Adiyaman either speak only Turkish or that in combination with Arabic. Those 
Assyrians/Syriacs who moved to Istanbul from the villages of Tur ‘Abdin still do speak Suryoyo 
at home but Turkish outside. What Martha is referring to is probably their attitude that they 
do not express their appreciation of the Suryoyo language as much as Assyrians/Syriacs do in, 
for example, Europe. Generally, the Assyrians/Syriacs who established themselves in Istanbul 
tried to learn Turkish quickly, as part of the modernization process they were so eager to 
embrace. Moreover, Turkish was perceived as a means to be able to survive in Turkish society 
in Istanbul. It was a necessity to disguise their Assyrian/Syriac background to outsiders, 
avoiding the discrimination and disadvantages which were related to being non-Turkish and 
non-Muslim (See also the Chapters 3 and 4). 
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it functions as social glue between members when they communicate in it. 
Without sharing a common language, it is expected that individuals will 
become estranged from each other. The academic activist Na‘im expressed 
this aspect quite clearly:  
It is very hard for me to understand, for example, how a Mardelli814 can 
have a sense of Suryoyutho as a people, as a church and in the language... 
He cannot communicate with a Suryoyo from Tur ‘Abdin who speaks 
Suryoyo. It is as if a Suryoyo and a Swedish person [are communicating]… 
Discourses of Suryoyutho attempt to heal the split subject by aiming to preserve 
the language, culture and the sense of closeness within the community. 
Language constitutes a nodal point of the mentioned discourses. Elements of 
Suryoyutho function as a ‘condition’ for being included in the definition of the 
‘amo. In more general terms, discourses of Suryoyutho react strongly against 
the assimilation of Assyrian/Syriacs in majority societies that they live in. At 
the same time, the meaning given to Suryoyutho vary depending on the 
discourse applied. Suryoyutho has therefore a floating character. Its floating 
character allows space for the definition of different and changing 
boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. In order to expand and capture all 
differences, there should be at least some commonalities or a common 
purpose. In the absence of this, as demonstrated in my examples, my 
respondents exclude those who do not fit into the concept of Suryoyutho 
from the definition of the ‘amo. Taking these elements into consideration, it 
is possible to arrive at a relatively narrow definition of the ‘amo Suryoyo. 
 
9.2 Narrow Definition: Who Does Not Belong to the 
‘Amo? 
Very few of both the Assyrier and the Syrianer adhere to a narrower definition 
of the ‘amo Suryoyo which embraces the members of the Syriac Orthodox, 
Syriac Catholic and Syriac Protestant churches. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
affirm that the Syrianska elite members are far more likely to espouse this 
discourse than are the Assyriska elite. One central argument in forming a 
narrower definition of the ‘amo Suryoyo is that the historical differences 
between the various Syriac churches have shaped a reality which no longer 
                                                 
814 Merdalli refers to an inhabitant of the city Mardin. Here is it used for a Suryoyo from this city 
whose mother tongue is Arabic (dialect of Mardin) and not Suryoyo. 
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allows a unity to be presented among the various Syriac churches. For the 
Syrianer, another motivation for using a narrow definition is the fact that they 
dis-identify with the designation ‘Assyrian’ which has been adopted by the 
Assyrian Church of the East. They rather refer to them as Suryoye Madenhoye 
(Eastern Syriacs) or Nestorians. 
 At the same time, some Syrianska elite members tend to refer to them 
with ‘real Ashuriye’, to distinguish them from the members of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church who adhere to the Assyrian ideology. As far as they are 
concerned, the ‘real Ashuriye’ are not only a different church but also a 
different group of people. This group of Syrianer have continued to adopt a 
traditional definition of their people, remaining faithful to the definition they 
used in the Middle East, namely along denominational lines. In contrast to 
them, those Syrianer who have an idea of a shared commonality between the 
Syriac churches do include the ‘real Ashuriye’ in their definition of the ‘amo 
Suryoyo. The thirty-year-old female activist Warde says: ‘The Madenhoye 
[(Eastern) [Suryoye] are actually also Suryoye. But, at the same time, they have 
more right to call themselves Assyrians than ‘our brothers the Assyrians’.’ In 
her reference to the latter, she means the Suryoye Ma‘erboye (members of the 
Syriac Orthodox Church) who have adopted the Assyrian ideology. 
Nevertheless, these Syrianer accept and respect the self-definition of the ‘real 
Ashuriye’ when they refer to themselves as Assyrian, since they have not 
caused a division among the members of the Syriac Orthodox Church.  In 
Warde’s identity discourse, the ‘amo Suryoyo includes only the members of the 
Syriac Orthodox Church. In this context, she sees the ‘real Ashuriye’ as a 
different Syriac church and respects their decision to use a different national 
name. Meanwhile, theoretically she does include them in her concept of ‘amo 
Suryoyo. 
 Assyriska elite members who do adhere to the narrow definition of the 
‘amo Suryoyo are mostly umthonoye, who used to be active in the Assyrian 
Movement and grew disappointed in the results they realized. They have 
been confronted with the historically developed differences and the 
subsequent difficulties these caused in the Assyrian Movement in attempts to 
diminish these differences so as to create an umtho Suryoyto out of the 
different ‘Syriac churches’.815 As already mentioned, the Assyriska scholar 
Marauge (who used to play a pioneering role in the Assyrian Movement in 
                                                 
815 ‘Itotho Suryoyotho (Syriac Churches) were organized along denominational lines under the 
millet system in the Ottoman Empire. See further also Appendix 1. 
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Sweden, and who has since distanced himself from any cultural-political 
activity) thinks that the Assyrian Movement failed in its strategy of 
umthonoyutho:  
ADO was based on the ideas of Naum Faik: ett‘ir bar othur ett‘ir [Awake 
sons of Assyria, Awake!], Awake sons of Assyria you are all one! He 
nurtured an ideology, a dream. But a dream is different to reality. We have 
been separated from the [Suryoye] Madenhoye816 for 1500 years…  It is 
difficult for a people to re-unite as one people if we are so dispersed. As 
umthonoye, we took a very big step by saying that we are all Suryoye and that 
we should re-unite. If we had spent our time and energy on organizing 
ourselves [Syriac Orthodox Church members] internally, it would have 
been much more productive. We were the ones who awakened the 
[Suryoye] Madenhoye and Chaldeans to the umthonoye ideas – the Suryoye 
[Ma‘erboye]. However, instead of doing that, we could have tried to focus 
on the Suryoye Ma‘erboye.817 Had we done so, we could have transformed 
our priests into strong umthonoye. 
Marauge questions the strategy of the Assyrian Movement; blames it of not 
having reckoned with the differences between the Suryoye Madenhoye and the 
Suryoye Ma‘erboye, which has grown throughout the history of separation. He 
opts for a stronger internal focus among the members of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church (Suryoye Ma‘erboye), especially the clergy, who could be 
transformed into strong umthonoye. Implicitly, he is referring to the important 
role priests could play in the mobilization of the umthonoyutho among the 
ordinary people. Moreover, he is covertly suggesting that clergy today do not 
perform the role expected of them. 
 The Syrianska elite who prefer to accept this narrower definition of the 
‘amo Suryoyo do so from a more ‘traditional’ perspective. They show that, in 
the past, the various Syriac churches were (or may have been) part of one 
group of people, but hasten to add that the past does not play a role in their 
life today – not any longer. The Syrianska elite tend to emphasise the 
historical differences which have developed between the Syriac churches. 
This is explicable when it is remembered that the Syrianska ideology 
developed as a reaction and in opposition to the Assyrian ideology, resulting 
from an antagonistic relationship. While Assyrian ideology stresses the 
                                                 
816 Assyrians or Members of the Assyrian Church of the East. 
817 Members of the Syriac Orthodox Church. 
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commonality of these ‘churches of the same nation’; the Syrianer emphasize 
the differences which have grown up between the same churches. In both 
cases, the commonalities and differences have been developed discursively 
and are used instrumentally to feed the antagonistic ideologies. Syrianska 
elites propose continuing to live with these differences as separate ‘ame 
(people). In fact, they have no intention of mobilising towards national unity, 
except for extending some contacts with Maronites. Nevertheless, a few 
Syrianska elite do point to the requirements needed if they were to decide to 
achieve national unity among the different Syriac churches. The student 
Matay explains his argument: 
During the period that they [various Syriac churches] were separated, they 
evolved different identities for themselves… And these people grew up in 
a society which was based on religious grounds. Identity was based on 
religion… Historically, at times the Suryoye and the Nasturnoye [members of 
the Assyrian Church of the East] have declared each other heretic for 
hundreds of years...818  
Departing from the differences developed among the ‘amo Suryoyo, Matay 
concludes that, as members of the Syriac Orthodox Church, the 
Assyrians/Syriacs are a different people from the members of the Assyrian 
Church of the East (Nasturnoye). Ironically, he even used the heretical term 
Nasturnoye, which has been used by the Syriac Orthodox Church to refer to 
them historically. Matay most probably used it not because he thinks they are 
heretical but because he is eager to stress the character of their historical 
relationship and its consequences for present-day attempts to unite. When 
discussing other aspects of the Assyrian Church of the East, he referred to 
them by the more neutral term Madenhoye (Eastern [Suryoye]). From his point 
of view, the issue of developing unity is a secondary one which is open to 
discussion and which may serve as a future goal. Before they are able to deal 
with the second, Assyrians/Syriacs should be aware of the first aspect: 
acknowledging the historically developed differences between them instead 
of denying them. Note that in his approach he does not use a ‘myth of 
common ancestry,’ which is common among ideas of creating unity. Instead, 
Matay opts for developing a new commonly shared ground:  
                                                 
818 See further for the relationship between these two churches after the Islamic conquest, 
Hage (1966: 81-83) and Kawerau (1955: 70-72). 
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Indeed, we are ‘begging’ each other now to become one people… If we 
want to unite and we are well aware of the historical differences, it is of no 
interest to me at all whether we were one people three thousand years ago 
or not… Othuroye or Oromoye... Even if we were, this is unimportant to me. 
Christianity extinguished the pre-Christian history and therefore it is no 
longer visible.  
In Chapter 8, I discussed the argument of the Assyriska elite who stress the 
continuation of the pre-Christian (Assyrian) culture through the Christian 
tradition, whereas the Syrianer are convinced that the pre-Christian Assyrian 
culture was completely extinguished and that the new culture of the ‘amo 
Suryoyo was developed solely on a new Christian foundation. Only when the 
discussion concerns the pre-Christian roots, do the Syrianska elite claim that 
Suryoye had Aramean ancestry. 
 The Syrianska Father Zakay also stresses the importance of unity 
between the churches. His approach is different from that of the other 
Syrianer, since he implies the necessity of theological unity or, at least, the 
acceptance of each other as churches before unity at any national level could 
be realized: 
All seven Patriarchs should discuss this together. They should agree on 
one line in theology and adhere to this. This way the people will be re-
united... We cannot become one church and one people if the Patriarchs 
of both [all] churches do not agree on becoming one church theologically. 
Therefore, all the people should request the seven churches to unify again 
as one church: Eastern Syriacs, Chaldeans, Maronites, Syriac Catholic, 
Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Protestants and the Melkites. They all should 
meet and agree on one theology, ideology and people. Whatever 
designation they want to give to the nation [umtho], I would agree with, as 
a priest in the church of Jesus. 
In the last sentence, for a moment Father Zakay neglects the importance 
commonly given to ‘the name of the nation’, by stating that he would agree 
to ‘whatever’ name happened to be chosen. He identifies his stance with a 
reference to his position as a priest in the Church of Jesus. From this 
position he allows himself to ‘distance’ himself from the name discussion 
among his people. His adoption of this position in the interview may have 
been a ‘temporary stop’ to make a statement acceptable to me as a researcher 
who is simultaneously a member of his community – and also in the 
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assumption that his words would eventually become public, therefore 
expectations from him as a public figure should be taken into account. 
 His current stance – adhering to the Syrianska ideology – is therefore 
understandable in relation to his position as a priest in a complex discursive 
field of expectations in which he now finds himself. Since 1982 the official 
stand of the church has been that clergy should remain neutral towards both 
Assyriska and Syrianska ideologies. Nevertheless, for reasons which I 
discussed in Chapter 7, most clergy have stood at the side of the Syrianer. A 
remarkable point is that Father Zakay prioritises national unity over 
theological particularity – despite his position as a priest. This idea of his is 
unique for its theological perspective. He approaches national unity 
theologically; a new national church should be composed of the different 
Syriac Churches. This is a different concept to that held by the lay elites 
especially. They urge that national unity as a people to be constituted of the 
Syriac churches but do not assume any disappearance of these specific 
churches. It is clear that Father Zakay has not understood the use of the 
terminology of the Assyrier when they show a preference for the use of the 
designation ‘Assyrian’. He assumes that this is a reference to the Assyrian 
Church of the East (Madenhoye), which is not the case.  
 A third example of how the historical differences between the churches 
are experienced and used in shaping the national identity of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs was given by the Syrianska scholar Adam. He revealed how 
he felt distanced from the Suryoye Madenhoye (Assyrians819 and Chaldeans) in 
the Gozarto in Syria where he grew up and how he relates to them at group 
level from that perspective: 
I noticed that their traditions are also different. This is what I remembered 
from Syria. They also speak a different dialect. Moreover, our people 
[Suryoye Ma‘erboye] were also better educated than they were [Suryoye 
Madenhoye]; they were to be found in different kinds of [lower paid] jobs 
too. Education is not appreciated as much as among the Suryoye 
[Ma‘erboye]. They were less organized than we were. In our association, it 
was possible to see that there were all kinds of activities organized. 
However, they [Suryoye Madenhoye] had only the church… We called them 
Ashuriye820  and we did not feel like [making a questioning gesture with his 
hands]… They did not speak Arabic very well... They lived in the villages 
                                                 
819 Here, members of the Assyrian Church of the East. 
820 Ashuriye is Arabic for Assyrians. 
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along the Khabur [River]. Sometimes we made trips to their villages which 
were organized by our association… The Chaldeans spoke only Arabic. I 
do not consider them members of my ‘amo, although I know that, 
historically, we are one people. Today, I no longer feel close to them.  
Adam chose to indicate the cultural, social and class differences between the 
Suryoye Ma‘erboye and the Suryoye Madenhoye. To his way of thinking, this is 
reason enough to exclude them from his concept of ‘amo Suryoyo, although if 
the truth be told he would have been able to identify the same differences 
among the Suryoye Ma‘erboye. Two examples which he mentions are related to 
mastery of Arabic. He accuses the Suryoye Madenhoye of not being fluent 
enough in Arabic and the Chaldeans of knowing only Arabic and no Suryoyo 
at all. Adam himself grew up with Arabic besides speaking Suryoyo as his 
mother tongue. From his present perspective, he considers Suryoyo the 
language of his people. His citation shows the subtle and important role of 
language in sensing closeness, as well as revealing the role in status it plays 
when it is spoken well. One explanation for Adam’s discourse is most 
probably that he grew up in a family which supported the anti-Assyrian 
ideology and opted to support the Syrianer. Hence, his point of departure in 
defining the ‘amo Suryoyo becomes first and foremost the choice of a certain 
ideology. 
 Here, Adam applies the logic of difference solely to the members of the 
Syriac Orthodox Church. As I indicated in the introduction of this chapter, 
the chain of difference is the space in which commonalities between different 
sub-identities are brought together in order to create alliances based on a 
common purpose. And depending on the discourses ‘at work’ the chain of 
difference may change. For instance, in religious discourses ‘religion’ is the 
central nodal point and thus, are alliances chosen according to the religious 
affiliation. I have illustrated in Chapter 7 that this has been the main 
discourse of the Syriac Orthodox Church in its opposition to the Assyrian 
Movement. In the case of the latter, an assumed shared ethnic background 
functions as the main nodal point in the definition of a cross-denominational 
national identity. Consequently, the boundaries of the chain of difference are 
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9.3 Broad Definition: Who May Belong to the Future 
‘Amo? 
In search of a better understanding of the broader boundaries which the elite 
use in their concept of ‘amo, I asked my respondents whether they include 
the members of the Syriac Orthodox church in India and the Mhalmoye (now 
Muslims) in Tur ‘Abdin in their concept of ‘amo Suryoyo. As I stated in the first 
section, before I asked them this question, none of the respondents had 
mentioned the members of the Syriac Orthodox Church in India. In 
speaking about the Mhalmoye, only a few Assyriska respondents mentioned 
them at all in their definition, and only if the Mhalmoye personally identify as 
Suryoye.  
  
9.3.1  ‘Suryoye Noses’ in India 
In his book Cultural heritage of Knahnaya Syrian Christians, Father Joseph 
Kulathramannil (2000: 42) attempts to set out the Suryoye roots of the 
Kna‘noye in India:821 
The church in Kerala was in a state of disorder after the death of St. 
Thomas. They neither had a head nor a shepherd, to lead them. According 
to tradition, Thomas of Kana – Knai Thomman – a Syrian merchant 
visited Kerala in 345 A.D. He was disturbed by the, then pathetic, state of 
affairs of the St. Thomas Christians in Kerala. He reported this to the 
Catholicos of Seleucia. The church authorities there decided to send a 
bishop with a priest, deacons and a group of lay people, under the 
leadership of Thomas of Kana to help the St. Thomas Christians... The 
Catholicos commissioned Thomas of Kana to lead a group of people to 
settle in Kerala. He gathered a group of 400 Syrian Christians from 
Jerusalem, Baghdad and Nineveh. There were deacons, priests and the 
bishop of Urha [Urhoy, present-day Urfa in Turkey], Mor Joseph, among 
this group of settlers.        
I also encountered the idea of a shared descent with the Suryoye during my 
visit to Kerala (India) in September 2006. While attending the Syriac 
Conference at the SEERI in Kottayam, several local members of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church tried to seek contact with the Suryoye conference 
participants from different parts of the world.  The Urhoye or Kna‘noye 
                                                 
821 See for this discourse also Lukose (2002: 169). 
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especially tried to make their claim that they belong to this group explicit, 
showing they felt a kindredness and wanted to have more contact. After one 
priest had introduced himself to me as Kna‘naya, he continued our 
conversation by referring to the similarity of his ‘big nose’ with that of the 
Suryoyo Arbert Tarzi from Canada. The priest went on to say that his 
ancestors, just as Arbert Tarzi’s, were originally from Urhoy and that Albert 
Tarzi ended up in Canada and he in India. And today they continue to have 
the same ‘big noses’! This reveals how this priest and other Kna‘noye with him 
in India think.  
 
 
      Illustration 18: Two Urhoye Suryoye, one living in Canada and one in India. 
       Photo: Naures Atto. 
 
But how do the Assyrian/Syriac elites relate to these Kna‘noye in India? As 
mentioned earlier, in the first instance neither Assyrier nor Syrianer included 
members of the Syriac Orthodox Church in India in their concept of ‘amo 
Suryoyo. They identify them as Indians.822 When I explicitly asked them ‘Do 
you include the members of the Syriac Orthodox Church in India in the ‘amo 
Suryoyo?’ Only the Assyriska Martha and the Syrianska Yacob (both academic 
young professionals) answered positively. As far as these two elite members 
                                                 
822 Trigona-Harany (2009: 18-19) notes that Naum Faik and Ashur Yausef never suggested 
that the members of the Syriac Orthodox Church to be members of the same millet (here: 
people) but saw them as members of the same church. 
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are concerned, the ‘amo Suryoyo theoretically consists of the different Syriac 
churches. Hence, being a member of the Syriac Church in India means to be 
part of the ‘amo Suryoyo. In contrast to that of Martha and Yacob, the first 
reaction of the other elite members was that the members of the church in 
India are members of the same ‘ito (church), but not of the same ‘amo 
(people). Only a small group mentioned that the Urhoye or Kna‘noye among 
them are of Suryoye descent. The elite base this argument on the idea that the 
Suryoye who migrated from Edessa (Urhoy, present-day Urfa in Turkey) to 
India did not mix with the ‘non-Suryoye’ members of the Syriac Orthodox 
Church because of the dual factors of their custom of endogamous 
marriages and the caste system. Only the older generation Assyriska Eliyo 
disagrees with this argument. He thinks that it is a racist rationale to include 
the Urhoye Suryoye in India just because they are believed not to have mixed 
with other Indians and to connect them through a blood relationship with 
the Suryoye from Beth Nahrin. 
 The main difference between the Assyriska and the Syrianska elite 
members who do not include the members of the Syriac church in India in 
the definition of the ‘amo Suryoyo is the following. Almost all the Assyriska 
elite found the self-identification of the Urhoye decisive. Raising the topic of 
self-identification, a few Assyriska elite members were even willing to include 
all the members of the Syriac Orthodox Church in India in their concept of 
‘amo Suryoyo. Two academic Assyrier thought that the Assyrians/Syriacs have 
been distanced from the Urhoye for too long. Hence, they lack a sense of 
closeness with the Urhoye. They share the main idea prevalent among the 
Syrianer. 
 Contrary to the Assyriska elite, the majority of the Syrianska elite are not 
particularly bothered about whether the members of the Syriac Church in 
India include themselves in the ‘amo Suryoyo as a consequence of self-
identification or whether they really are descendants of the Assyrians/Syriacs 
from Urhoy. They categorically exclude them from the concept of ‘amo 
Suryoyo. This divergence in views is remarkable since it might have been 
expected that the Syrianska elite would include the members of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church in India to a much greater extent than the Assyrier would 
have done. As illustrated in Chapter 8, in their identity discourses Syrianer 
focus more on the CE, the period during which they converted from 
paganism to Christianity. The period BCE has developed no more than a 
symbolic political function in the identity, thinking of the activists among the 
Syrianer. The Assyrier, on the other hand, have embraced a discourse which is 
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based on a collective and continued identity traceable back to BCE. 
Therefore, they are willing to identify the members of the Syriac church in 
India as ‘amo Suryoyo if they identify themselves with this ‘amo. The 
explanation of this apparent paradox might lie in the modern approach to 
the concept of the nation. The Assyrier allow much more room for self-
identification in defining the identity of their people and they accord more 
space to the concept of the ‘imagined nation’. It is a political concept that 
gives them more flexibility in defining their umtho. From the perspective of 
the Syrianer the strong sense of everyday closeness is much more important 
than self-identification by people whom they consider to be outsiders. 
 
9.3.2 Suryoye Mhalmoye? 
The inclusion of the Mhalmoye in the concept of the ‘amo Suryoyo  is the 
consequence of a cross-denominational approach to the collective identity of 
Assyrians/Syriacs by a few members of the elite who are considered by the 
great majority to be exotic figures possessed of  ideals which are far too 
unrealistic. Commonly, both historically and today the Mhalmoye have been 
approached as a group of people with Suryoye ancestry but who are no longer 
included in the same chain of difference of their people after their conversion to 
Islam.823 
 The idea of including the Mhalmoye in the concept of the ‘amo Suryoyo 
was first propagated by the Assyriska elite who saw a potential advantage in 
developing this consciousness among the Mhalmoye who are believed to be of 
Suryoye descent.824 In terms of being a nascent nation, they believed that 
Assyrians/Syriacs should create the possibility to encompass different 
religions. It is from this perspective that Mhalmoye are occasionally included 
in the umtho Suryoyto. However, the most important requirement is that 
Mhalmoye personally begin to identify themselves with this people. The 
reasons for the elite to include specifically Mhalmoye who converted to Islam 
and not others who converted too is that they are believed to have retained a 
certain (regional) identity as Mhalmoye, and there is the belief that they have 
not mixed too much with such other Muslims as Kurds or Turks. 
Importantly, Assyrians/Syriacs identify certain rituals among the Mhalmoye as 
                                                 
823 See further also the introduction of this book and the Chapters 4 and 5. 
824A few of these respondents are active on the website www.mhalmi.com, which has been set 
up to discuss the background of what they call Süryani Muhalmiler between the Assyrian/Syriac 
and the more highly educated Mhalmoye elites. 
BOUNDARIES OF ‘OUR PEOPLE’                                       459 
 
dating back to the Assyrian/Syriac culture.825 The Mhalmoyo sociologist Ihsan 
Çetin (2006) mentions that, after their conversion to Islam, the Mhalmoye 
were forbidden to continue to observe Christian rituals. Consequently, they 
continued celebrating some of the Christian traditions under new names, as a 
cover. Therefore, the Christian Siboro826 was later celebrated by the Mhalmoye 
as Basembar827; Easter continued to be celebrated as Jumcut-ul Meryem (Mary’s 
Friday). Assyrian/Syriac activists who have had contacts with Mhalmoye say 
they sensed that many of them were conscious that their ancestors were 
Süryani (Suryoye). Çetin’s (2006) research on the identification of the Mhalmoye 
reveals that among the seventy Mhalmoye which he interviewed in the area of 
Midyad (Tur ‘Abdin), 53 per cent identified themselves as Mhalmoye, 36 per 
cent as Arabs and 11 per cent as Turks. Çetin (2006) states many Mhalmoye 
trace their roots to the Arab Beni Hilal tribe828. Explaining this identification, 
he concludes that their religious conversion to Islam led to a change in their 
collective memory about their roots. 
 Shabo, an Assyrier activist and teacher explains his main motivation for 
seeking rapprochement with the Mhalmoye: 
Our goal is not to convert them [Mhalmoye] to Christianity. That is not 
important to our concept of umthonoyutho. First and foremost, it is 
important that they become aware that they belong to these people 
[Suryoye] so they can work for them… We want to change their present 
hostile attitude to the Christians. If they can feel part of our nation they 
will not mind what religion people adhere to. This can exert a very 
positive influence, because they will work for the people as a whole. 
In this quotation, Shabo’s main reason for developing a consciousness of a 
common descent among the Mhalmoye seems to be his hope of an 
                                                 
825 Examples are the first names they give their children or the symbol of the cross which 
Mhalmoye women make with their hand on the dough when baking bread. 
826 Siboro is a ritual celebrating the annunciation to the Blessed Virgin on 25 March. After the 
Sunday Mass believers mix a red and white thread which they usually wear around the pulse in 
their wrist or around their neck until Easter Monday (Thnahto). 
827 Some Assyrians/Syriacs in Tur ‘Abdin had taken over the use of the term Basembar, 
probably from the Mhalmoye (at least if it is indeed a new term and if it was not already used in 
this form by the Suryoye themselves besides the term Siboro). For example, in the village of 
Mzizah the Assyrian/Syriac community used the term Basembar instead of Siboro. As far as I 
know, no research has been conducted about this term. 
828 It is common among people who have converted to Islam or who hold high religious 
positions (Sheikh, Seyid) to claim that they are genealogically related to the Muslim Prophet 
Muhammed’s family. 
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improvement in the position of the Assyrians/Syriacs in Turkey. He and 
other Assyriska elite members expect to encounter fewer difficulties in 
Turkish society if religion loses its dominant role. They expect that by 
cultivating umthonoyutho829 among the Mhalmoye, the latter may begin to 
identify as Assyrians/Syriacs at the national (secular) level, instead of 
continuing to identify themselves at religious level only as Muslims. The 
politician and activist Abrohom says for example, ‘I expect that they will be 
convinced to believe in secularism and that being Assyrian will be put first. 
Their Muslim religion will no longer play a major role in their identity.’830 
The elite hope that by diminishing the importance of the role of religion and 
launching a process of consciousness about their Suryoye roots among the 
Mhalmoye, the latter will eventually be able to identify as Suryoye at a national 
level, and that Suryoye will be able to include them in their concept of ‘amo 
Suryoyo.  
 Only few members of the Assyriska elite, but none among the Syrianer, 
included Mhalmoye in the ‘amo Suryoyo without having first been asked 
specifically about them. When I asked the respondents explicitly whether 
they would include the Mhalmoye in their concept of ‘amo Suryoyo, about one-
third of the Assyriska elite was indeed willing to accept them if they identify 
themselves as Suryoye. Among the Syrianska elite there were only a few who 
thought this way. Two Syrianska respondents said that they could agree with 
the idea theoretically, since the umtho is a secular concept. The main 
divergence from the way the Assyriska elite adhere to this idea is that the 
Syrianska elite do not actively propagate it, nor does it play any role in their 
daily life such as in cultural and political activities. The Syrianska elite 
consider the Mhalmoye to be a part of the past, but not of the present and the 
future. Moreover, they would prefer to keep the status quo, because they are 
unable to give this idea a place in their current lives. Even among the 
Assyriska elite, there are only a few proponents who actively propagate this 
discourse. For them, the mobilization of these shared roots is considered to 
be especially important to the future. 
                                                 
829 I have translated umthonoyutho with ‘love for the [Assyrian/Syriac] people’. See for a further 
discussion, Chapter 6. 
830 This idea is similar to that of the first Arab nationalists (Christians) who tried to develop an 
Arab identity based on the common use of the Arabic language. It was a way to change the 
focus from a religion-based ethno-national identity to a language-based one. The attempt to 
minimize the difference between them was a way to lessen the tension and play down 
dominance of the Muslim speakers of Arabic. 
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 About two-thirds of the Assyrier and almost all Syrianer exclude the 
Mhalmoye from their concept of ‘amo Suryoyo, the main reason being that the 
Mhalmoye converted to Islam. This conversion has distanced them as far as it 
possibly could from the ‘amo Suryoyo. They explain this by citing the 
important role which religion has played in the creation of boundaries 
between the people in the Middle East. The Assyriska university graduate and 
young professional, Barsaumo explains: ‘Since these people have changed 
their religious traditions, and with these their language, their identity and 
their sense of belonging to the Suryoye, I do not think that it is right to call 
them Suryoye. There is no longer anything which connects them to us.’ Father 
Zakay, an older generation Syrianer, explains that in contrast to converts to 
Islam, converts to other Christian churches will retain their Assyrian/Syriac 
ethnicity. ‘They will remain connected to our people as a ‘amo… They will 
keep their ghensoyutho (ethnicity),’ he says. Father Zakay took pains to imply 
that conversion to the Islam led directly to a change in a person’s ethnicity, 
whereas this ethnicity is retained if a person simply adheres to a different 
Christian church. He equates the Christian religion with one ethnicity. 
Effectively, religion takes over the function of ethnicity, in the way it used to 
function in the Middle East. By changing ethnicity, a person crosses the 
boundary of the ‘amo Suryoyo and is therefore excluded. Matay, a Syriansk 
student, refers to the importance of Suryoyutho: ‘Suryoyutho does have some 
meaning. It cannot be just anything. Christianity is a very important element 
of Suryoyutho.’ The boundary of the umtho Suryoyto is, therefore, that at least 
one is not Muslim.  
 Among elite members who exclude Mhalmoye from the concept of their 
people, it is no longer important what genealogical relationship they assume 
to the Mhalmoye. What weights far more heavily is how the Mhalmoye relate to 
the Suryoyutho today. The Assyriska student Yauno explains: 
I do not think that if I were to say that someone is a Suroyo, that person is 
one. I believe that someone is a Suroyo when he acts accordingly. It is the 
mardutho [culture] which is important, not the blood relationship; 
otherwise my cousins would also call themselves Suroye and not Turkish. 
My father’s aunt was kidnapped by a Turkish general at the age of twelve 
in the years after the Seyfo. I never tire of asking people like them 
questions about why they don’t feel Suroye… Nevertheless, if in the future 
a Mhalmoyo stands up and says that he is a Muslim but also a Suroyo and 
that he wants to work for his [Suroyo] culture and develop it, I shall accept 
him… Even though I would not feel happy about my daughter marrying 
his son, because I have an aversion to Islam as a religion. As a religion it is 
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backward and dictatorial. I find it hard to believe that an intellectual can 
adhere to a religion which resorts only to the sword [seyfo]. 
Yauno is quite explicit that his concept of the ‘amo Suryoyo is different from 
that of the majority of Assyrians/Syriacs, and that at two different levels. At 
the collective level, he is willing to include the Mhalmoye in the concept of 
‘amo Suryoyo if they identify themselves as Suryoye and if they are willing to 
work to build up the Suryoye culture. This is at odds with those 
Assyrians/Syriacs who generally perceive anyone born to Assyrian/Syriac 
parents as a Suryoyo. Yauno’s disagreement with them fits into the approach 
of those activists who expect a certain way of life (Suryoyutho) from the ‘amo 
Suryoyo. This positive judgement can be heard when Assyrians/Syriacs refer 
to someone as an umthonoyo, implying that the person concerned makes 
efforts to promote the cause of the ‘amo Suryoyo. At a personal level, Yauno 
has no desire to develop a closer relationship with Muslims. He says for 
example ‘I would not like a Muslim to marry my daughter.’ This is striking 
since (as some elite members have proposed) he accepts the change to a 
broader and secularly based definition of the ‘amo Suryoyo, even though he 
does not identify personally with the Mhalmoye. When defining the 
Assyrians/Syriacs as a ‘future’ collective group of people, Yauno seems to 
prioritize the collective goal of the people above his personal goals. To 
increase the chance of preserving the ‘Suryoyo culture’, he is willing to include 
the Mhalmoye Muslims, bearing in mind that a nation consisting of a large 
number of people has the power to develop the means to maintain ‘its 
culture’ and with that its survival. 
Yauno’s example shows how remembering can be used in different 
ways. The concept of the ‘future in the past’ can draw individuals and groups 
closer to one another but it can also drive them asunder. At the collective 
level, Yauno displayed openness by including the Mhalmoye in his concept of 
‘amo Suryoyo if they fit into the future goal of his people. Nonetheless, he 
could also reject them as a collective should they not identify with 
Assyrians/Syriacs and/or if they did not want to invest in the future of this 
people. In a nutshell, the same past can be construed differently. Usually, the 
few Assyriska elite who actively work on developing a consciousness of their 
Suryoye roots among the Mhalmoye deliberately choose not to focus on the 
role of the Mhalmoye (after they had converted to the Islam) in the 
persecution (especially during the Seyfo) of the Assyrians/Syriacs. Their 
reason may be the priority they give to the evolution of an umtho Suryoyto. 
Historical events which could obtrude as a hindrance to this goal are shoved 
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into the background. The historical fact that the Mhalmoyo Sheikh Fathulla 
played a pivotal role in negotiating the raising of the siege of the 
Assyrian/Syriac village of ‘Iwardo at the time of the Seyfo is seized upon as a 
positive example of the relationship between the two groups.831 At a 
personal level, Yauno also used the past to preserve the created historical 
distance. Indubitably, as far as he is concerned, the past with the Muslims 
symbolises a Seyfo (sword), referring to the collective memory of 
Assyrians/Syriacs of the Muslim persecutions. The way he used it here also 
refers to his perception that Islam is an uncivilized religion and hence he 
feels no closeness to or identification with it at a personal level. Although the 
past can be used in two different directions, in both cases the goal in mind is 
to develop a better future for the Assyrian/Syriac people. 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
As I have illustrated in earlier chapters, the Assyriska ideology assumes an 
ethno-national collective identity of their people, constructed on a putative 
Assyrian ancestry. In the discursive process of arguing with the Assyrier and 
outsiders about the name, the Syrianer have also gradually begun to adopt the 
concept of the ‘amo Suryoyo which is close to that of the Assyrier but based on 
a different ancestry: Aramean. Hence, although formally they are part of the 
same group of people today, theoretically they now partially define the 
boundaries of their people differently. 
 I have distinguished a narrow and a broad definition of the boundaries 
of the ‘amo Suryoyo. Together these two definitions fit into a broader circle. 
The components of this circle are based on specific nodal points. To a certain 
extent, both (narrow and broad) definitions are to be found in the discourses 
of both elite groups but for partly different reasons. Quite clearly, the broad 
definition tends to be used more often by the Assyriska elite, whereas the 
narrow definition occurs most frequently in the discourse of the Syrianska 
elite. Taking the discursive and the non-discursive elements into 
consideration, both definitions can be used simultaneously by the same 
individuals in a complementary way. Nevertheless, elites may compete in 
favouring or marketing the one more than the other, depending on their 
ideology at a certain moment. This indicates both the negotiable character of 
                                                 
831  See further Gaunt (2006) for the role which Sheikh Fathulla played. See for a source in 
Suryoyo (Latin script) Beth Sawoce (2006). 
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the definition of their people and the absence of a hegemonic definition with 
clear-cut boundaries for both insiders and outsiders. 
 The ‘narrowest’ (theoretical) definition to be found in the discourses 
includes the people who are seen to be closest to the core of the collective 
identity of their people: Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholic and Syriac 
Protestant church members. In everyday life, the first group takes the central 
position, perhaps also because it is by far the largest group in Europe. 
Remarkably, but not surprisingly, ex-activists among the Assyrier tend to 
share this discourse on boundary use with the Syrianska elite. Both elite 
groups believe that the differences that have historically developed between 
the members of the Syriac churches in daily life are too big to ignore. It is 
important to remember that the Syrianer developed this discourse because of 
their exclusivist ideology, whereas the narrow definition of the Assyrier has 
resulted from a degree of disillusionment in achieving their ideology of a 
broader definition of their people by bridging denominational boundaries. 
The point of departure for the broader (theoretical) definition is that all 
seven Syriac churches are included in the concept of ‘amo Suryoyo, focusing on 
the commonalities between them and ignoring the differences. Although 
among both groups, the ‘broader definition’ functions especially at the 
imagined, theoretical or politicized level, this is the case to a far greater 
extent among the Syrianska elite members. Unquestionably, the Assyrier have 
made more attempts to live up to the ‘broader definition’ of the ‘amo Suryoyo. 
Their principal energy has been invested in developing greater co-operation 
with the members of the Assyrian Church of the East. This decision is 
unsurprising since activists in both groups share the same ideology: of being 
of the same descent, although today they are followers of different 
denominations. 
 The fact that the definition of the ‘amo Suryoyo which the Assyrier use 
often tends to be broader and more inclusive can be explained in the light of 
the discourse of the Assyriska elite which allows them more flexibility than 
the Syrianer in defining the boundaries of the ‘amo Suryoyo. Assyrier are more 
open to negotiations with people who have a potential for future inclusion in 
the concept of ‘amo Suryoyo. Therefore, their discourse tends to increase the 
variation in closeness to and distance from these ‘potential members’: the 
Rum (who generally do not identify themselves with the Suryoye today, but 
might in the future), the members of the Syriac Church in India, the 
Mhalmoye Muslims, and also the Yezidi (Çalkoye) (although in the case of the 
Yezidi, inclusion is advocated by only a very few political activists). Flexibility 
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in defining boundaries also means that all the denominational groups which 
are considered to be part of this people, or potentially part of them, are 
positioned closer or farther away from the core collective of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs. In contrast to this, the discourse of the Syrianska elite 
leads to a stagnant definition of ‘amo Suryoyo. Except for the Syriac Catholics 
and the Syriac Protestants (who split from the Syriac Orthodox Church after 
the sixteenth century), who are considered to be closer to the national 
identity of the members of the Syriac Orthodox Church, any member of the 
other churches is considered to be at the same distance. 
 In line with the discourses they employ, elites use the concepts of 
Suryoyutho (Assyrian/Syriac culture, language and more – a ‘Suryoye way of 
life’) and self-identification by ‘outsiders’ in processes of their inclusion and 
exclusion of people from the definition of the ‘amo Suryoyo. The starting 
point is that the umtho Suryoyto is dispersed all over the world. Consequently, 
the existing concepts of Suryoyutho are made explicable by this dispersion and 
the concomitant context of different ways of life. From this point of view, 
the more specific the definition of Suryoyutho is, the narrower the chain of 
difference of the ‘amo Suryoyo becomes. The Syrianska elite are more stringent in 
their requirements. What Suryoyutho entails is less negotiable and the 
traditional boundaries of the ‘self’ are well guarded. The members of the 
Assyriska elite are more disposed towards negotiating a broader concept of 
Suryoyutho which fits into the political discourse which they espouse, 
especially at a discursive level. 
 The core characteristics of Suryoyutho are considered to be Christianity 
and the ability to speak the mother tongue, Suryoyo. The great majority of the 
Assyrian/Syriac elite members continue to perceive Christianity (especially in 
relation to Islam) as a central nodal point around which their collective identity 
is built. This is clearly expressed in their discourses about the Mhalmoye; not 
sharing Christianity as part of this core identity means that Mhalmoye Muslims 
lack a great part of what being Suryoyutho entails. In the discourses of the 
elites, the putative Assyrian/Syriac past of the Mhalmoye as former members 
of the Syriac church has to be disregarded in the present-day situation of the 
Suryoye. This is where the future comes into play: the few elite members who 
were willing to include the Mhalmoye in the concept of ‘amo Suryoyo (on 
condition that they identified themselves with the Suryoye) did so with the 
idea that with this larger scope the Assyrians/Syriacs will be able to gain a 
better political position in the Middle East. This idea is negotiated 
discursively in relation to the modern idea of the secular concept of nation: 
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in the future it should be possible for Suryoyutho to undergo a substantial 
change from what is embraced by the current (narrow) concept. For 
instance, theoretically it could mean that Muslims could be included in the 
future definition of their people. Consequently, it is possible to distinguish 
between the present boundaries used for the definition of the ‘amo Suryoyo 
and those which might replace them in the future. This reveals how future 
prospects also influence the present delineation of a group of people. 
Importantly, it also admits a potential for identity change or the 
interpretation of a people’s identity over time. The importance of the Suryoyo 
language as the mother tongue is expressed in the harsh judgement meted 
out to Assyrians/Syriacs who no longer speak it, including people who grew 
up in urban areas (Istanbul, Baghdad, Hasake) and under particular political 
circumstances.832 This indicates the importance they accord language in their 
collective identity. 
 Self-identification has been demonstrated to be an important factor in 
defining the collective boundaries of the ‘amo Suryoyo. Although I had not 
asked the elite about it; it was raised, mainly by the Assyriska elite. Some of 
the more exigent of the Assyrier even required self-identification from the 
current members (within the traditional boundaries) of the ‘amo Suryoyo 
before considering them to be part of the group. This should be seen at a 
symbolic level. It might be on a par with natularization or citizenship exams, 
functioning as rituals before being allowed to enter a collective group. No 
one will ask each person who is considered to be a member today whether or 
not he or she identifies as an Assyrian/Syriac. Therefore, the pertinence of 
the remark about self-identification indicates the importance of this element 
to the group cohesion. This discourse is especially strong among political 
activists and university graduates. The importance of self-identification in the 
discourse of the Assyrier has not come as a bolt from the blue. First and 
foremost is the fact that the Assyriska elite have taken an active stand in 
declaring that Assyrians/Syriacs are a nation. From a modern Western 
perspective, the idea of being a nation also implies secularism. This would 
automatically entail a change in the traditional denominational boundaries of 
the ‘amo Suryoyo. In order to apply this new concept to a people who refer to 
a Christian past dating back 2000 years and traditionally organized along 
denominational lines, it is necessary to find means which can help mobilize 
the ideas which will eventually lead towards the birth of an Assyrian/Syriac 
                                                 
832 In this thesis, I have written relatively little about the role of language. 
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nation. Self-identification is one of these means; it implies a sense of closeness 
and cohesion, solidarity and it might lead to a shared future goal. If self-
identification can develop closeness, it can become the glue which will bind 
the dispersed ‘imagined umtho Suryoyto’. The dispersed aspect is very 
important, since defining the boundaries of a formal group will not make it 
effective if there is no self-identification among its formal members. 
 From the perspective of the Syrianska elite members, self-identification 
has a different role. They do not stress the importance of the self-
identification of those who are considered ‘outsiders’, because Syrianska elite 
members have a clear idea of whom they include and exclude. If they do not 
first identify themselves with those ‘outsiders’, they do not permit such 
‘outsiders’ the right of self-identification with the ‘amo Suryoyo. Therefore, 
self-identification by outsiders alone does not affect the boundaries. Syrianska 
activists also have no active intention of changing the current effective 
boundaries of the ‘amo Suryoyo, which they are convinced are founded on the 
Syriac Church. It is possible to assert – with some additional ethnic-
mobilized awareness and secular idea of their collective group – that they 
have continued to uphold the boundaries used in the Middle East. A few 
Syrianska elite members (mainly university graduates who are non-activists) 
who do find self-identification important use the narrower definition of the 
‘amo Suryoyo. The role the Assyriska and Syrianska elite respectively assign to 
self-identification allows the members of the Syriac Church in India to be 
closer to the ‘amo Suryoyo in the discourse of the Assyrier than in that of the 
Syrianer. This is paradoxical because the starting point in the discourse of the 
Syrianer is usually to share a common foundation in the Syriac Orthodox 
church. In the eyes of the Syrianska elite, the apparent missing link is the 
lived sense of kindredship and interaction with the same church members in 
India. This aspect is less important to the Assyriska elite because, in their 
more politicized discourse of ‘amo Suryoyo, they allow the use of theoretical 
boundaries alongside the effective boundaries applied by the ordinary people 
more space. Effective boundaries are sustained through a strong sense of 






10 A FLOCK WITHOUT A SHEPHERD 
 
Hawina khed qat‘o dlo ru‘yo833 (We have become as a flock without a shepherd) 
is a phrase which the Assyrians/Syriacs commonly use when they want to 
express their sense of being leaderless. The elderly end this phrase by making 
the gesture of holding their arms out and looking upwards, focusing their 
hope on God and then bringing the hands together again to a passive gesture 
of submission, expressing that they are not able to solve the problem 
personally. The phrase also presumes that, in the past, they used to have a 
shepherd (ru‘yo). Apparently they do not feel that their ru‘yo ruhonoyo (religious 
leader834), who is the Patriarch of the Syriac Orthodox Church, meets their 
current expectations of what a ru‘yo should be. Be that as it may, there is a 
second interpretation of the phrase qat‘o dlo ru‘yo which is related to the 
negative judgement passed by Assyrians/Syriacs on any leadership position: 
‘Our leaders are incompetent’ (a rishonaydan lo kothen bker) is a sentence which 
readily crops up when Assyrians/Syriacs discuss their leadership. This 
judgement encompasses their feeling that they are forlorn, being a people 
bereft of leaders. Both religious and secular leaders do not seem to meet 
their present-day needs. Retrospectively, the era they experienced strong 
leadership was long time ago. After that they were subjected to the rules of 
other peoples and finally scattered ‘to the four corners of the World’ – to 
‘foreign countries’. They have become as an ‘orphaned flock’ which has lost 
its way home and cannot retrieve their unity. The leadership vacuum which 
developed and which is palpably felt by Assyrians/Syriacs is inextricably 
linked to their past and present sorrows. 
 The desire for effective leadership (as I shall illustrate in this chapter) 
also expresses the ideal of unity among the Assyrian/Syriac people at a time 
which they lament exclaiming: ‘ma hul lema i flighuthathe!?’ (How long must we 
live in this disunity!?). The vacuum in the leadership is a breeding-ground for 
dissensions and offers an appropriate space for the development of a social 
structure riddled with traditional factionalism (‘ashirto). In their situation of 
                                                 
833 This actually refers to Jesus as the Good Shepherd. In the case of the Assyrians/Syriacs, 
the lack of such a shepherd is sorely missing and is implicitly assumed to be needed. 
834 Literally, ru‘yo ruhonoyo means ‘spiritual shepherd’. 
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worldwide dispersion, this sense of the need for unity is probably also most 
urgent because they find themselves in a position in which they want to be 
represented to the many new ‘others’ they come across in their dispersion. 
Only few respondents mentioned potential individuals who might possibly 
assume the leadership of their people in order to unite and empower them.  
The Assyriska activist Zakay mentioned as an ideal, a charismatic figure 
resembling Jesus: ‘I believe that when Jesus came – when this people 
[Suryoye] lived as tribes – He came as a charismatic person and collected these 
people together. I believe that such a thing could happen.’ Zakay is implying 
that there was unity in the past and that there is no unity now. However, this 
unity is seen as vital to his ‘amo. Father Aday assumes that priests should 
participate in this political process instead of fighting its aims: 
...I like it very much when priests have a political understanding. Clergy 
should understand that Jesus did political work. Jesus changed through his 
attitude the religion of the area. People converted to Christianity; this is 
politics. If Jesus is God who came to earth and who managed to change 
the world, so why then is a priest not allowed to have a political ideology? 
This portrayal of Jesus as an activist is quite regularly heard among clergy and 
umthonoye who gained their education within the church. By analogy, knowing 
the central position which Jesus gained among Assyrians/Syriacs (whether 
religious or secular) they imply to say that their own activism is not 
something bad. By referring to Jesus as an activist, they legitimate their own 
activism. Especially in relation to the stand of the clergy regarding the 
national needs of their people, they imply in this example of Jesus the central 
role which they would rather give to clergy. This seems to be paradoxical 
because on the one hand, Assyriska activists (and since 1983 also the 
Syrianska activists) take the stand that the clergy should only get involved in 
religious matters. This latter stand can be explained with their discontent 
about the way in which clergy fulfil their role at the moment when they get 
involved in non-religious affairs.  
 The ideal typical character which elites require of the ‘Good Shepherd’ 
has messianic features. By merging moral virtues and personal authority, the 
Good Shepherd is portrayed as a ‘saviour’ who can overcome the vitiating 
inner dissensions and who is endowed with the ability to empower the 
Assyrians/Syriacs as a people. The different qualities the elite enumerated 
with which a leader in charge should be endowed, are: 1) competence in 
winning the broad acceptance of his leadership; 2) a charismatic person 
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willing to shoulder the ‘struggle of this people’; 3) possessed of the ability to 
defend and sustain Assyrian/Syriac traditions and language; 4) humble, 
learned, a skilled diplomat, fair, open to criticism, possessing integrity and 
able to unify the people. Interestingly, unity as the main feature of the 
leadership was mentioned by most of the Assyriska respondents, but not by any 
of the Syrianska. The explanation for this discrepancy is to be found in the 
basic idea on which the Assyrian Movement had been founded at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, namely the unity of the different Syriac 
churches under one national umbrella name ‘Assyrian’. Therefore, they 
consider the ability of a leader to unite ‘the people’ essential. In contrast to 
them, the Syrianska elite members have opposed this ideology of the Assyrier 
strongly (see further especially Chapter 7).  
 The qualities of an ‘ideal leader’ have a relational and contextual 
character and are therefore not static. They are formulated in relation to the 
present-day situation. The desired qualities are those which are absent in the 
present context. For instance, the experienced ineffectiveness of the current 
leaders has resulted in the desire for ‘effective leadership’, or the state of 
berberiye has increased the strong desire for a leadership that can provide unity. 
The qualities are contextual because these leadership discourses are formed 
in a European context in which secular and democratic leadership are 
considered to be important criteria. Contextual changes have influenced the 
image of the ‘ideal leader’. People have begun to compare their leaders with 
Western politicians.  Leadership discourses may therefore also change over 
time. 
 Following DT’s premises, the need for identification with something 
(‘hegemonic projects’, ‘leadership discourses’) is the result of the ‘permanent’ 
lack within the structure, that is, the lack of a ‘full identity’ (Laclau 1996d: 
92). This is the discursive terrain which necessitates leadership discourses 
within identity discourses. There is a dialectical relationship between the 
‘representative’ and the ‘represented’. Representation is a necessary moment 
in the identification process in order to achieve a partial meaning. As Laclau 
(1996d: 99-100) puts it, ‘…the discourse of the representative must fill the 
gap in the identity of the represented’. This explains also the articulated need 
for leadership in the identity discourses of Assyrians/Syriacs after their 
emigration to Western countries. 
 The problems which occur at the representation level of a discourse can 
be studied within the frame of the concept of the split subject.  As I have 
illustrated in other chapters, emigration to the Western countries led to the 
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state of the split subject among Assyrians/Syriacs in which the implications of 
the experienced dislocation have resulted in the crisis of identification. This 
crisis can also be studied as a leadership crisis and thus, a crisis of hegemony. 
From the view of DT, hegemony implies the presence of ‘political and 
moral-intellectual leadership’ (Torfing 2005: 11). Discourses aim to realize 
hegemonic leadership for ideological totalization. Through hegemonic 
leadership the split subject aims to find a solution to its crisis. Competition for 
hegemony means also competition for leadership and representation. 
Nevertheless, as Laclau (1996d: 103) indicates, ‘total representability is 
impossible’. Therefore we can only speak of ‘partial representations’. 
In this chapter, I shall give an account of the current leadership discourses 
among the Assyrian/Syriac elite members by pursuing a discussion of the 
following: 1) We have no leaders; 2) We need a leader; 3) Conditions required to 
realize secular leadership; 4) Who is the leader? 
 
10.1  ‘We Have No Leaders’ 
Asking questions in order to reach an understanding of the elite’s discourses 
about the current leadership in charge, many replied flatly: ‘We have no 
leader.’ This statement was generally followed by a critical tirade against the 
present community leaders who are dismissed as not being competent to 
handle the situation. The sense of a leadership vacuum can often be traced 
back to a retrospective perspective on Assyrian/Syriac history, ascribing it to 
dislocatory events. Na‘im, an Assyrisk academic and activist, illustrates the 
implicit parallelism he makes between what he perceives to be the past 
failure of the traditional community leaders and their present inability to lead 
their people effectively in the worldwide diaspora:  
I believe that our people were burdened with a severe trauma at a time at 
which they were not prepared for this [calamity]: the roots of our people 
were hacked away [qshi‘enne]! The killing of our people between 1914 and 
1918 produced a situation in which they no longer were able to derive 
pride from being the ‘amo Suryoyo [Assyrian/Syriac people]... The Seyfo was 
the reason for the abandonment of hope… The Suryoye had not been able 
to defend themselves; the ‘amo were on the point of being severed from 
their shirsho [roots]... As victims of the Seyfo, our people lost their faith, not 
least in our leaders. They question why their leaders had not been 
prepared for just such a day on which the Muslims would attack us. Even 
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if they did not put this question into words at that time, instinctively they 
probably asked it in their minds… Their instinct for survival prompted 
them to ask such questions. They lived through this trauma for five years; 
every second and every minute they were forced to live in danger and with 
the fear that they could be attacked and killed any moment. This trauma – 
after its wounds had healed a little – led the people to pose the question of 
why this had happened... Therefore, indirectly the trust in their leaders 
ebbed... 
Often, as Na‘im does, the elite attribute the present-day weak leadership to 
the annihilation of their emerging secular leadership during the Seyfo (1914-
18), mentioning the intellectuals Ashur Yausef and Freydon Aturaya. 
Moreover, they claim that since then, especially in the aftermath of the Seyfo, 
the Assyrians/Syriacs have not had the chance to develop a secular 
leadership. Nevertheless, sometimes, the great trauma caused by the Seyfo is 
imputed to the historical failure of the Assyrian/Syriac leaders to defend 
their people at that juncture. Na‘im has also not overcome his lack of trust in 
the leadership of his people. 
 
 
       Illustration 19: Drawing by the autodidact artist Sharro Malke, expressing  the 
 incapability of the church leader as the ‘ill man in bed’, while people keep  coming 
 to him with their problems to be solved. Photo: Naures Atto 
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Following Na‘im’s line of thought, we see that his personal reflections on the 
disappointing quality of the leaders in charge also encompass the leaders of 
the Assyrians/Syriacs from the times before and during the Seyfo. This 
catastrophic event is perceived as the point of departure for their collective 
exile from the homeland. Na‘im’s retrospective reading of Assyrian/Syriac 
history helps him to extend the failure of the clergy (in their position as 
‘leaders in charge’) to the present context. They are castigated for their 
choice of accommodation with the political regimes of the Middle East. 
Broadly speaking, the elite members tend to use this argument when they 
construct their grounds for the separation between religious and secular 
leadership. They judge the religious leaders to have failed to take strategic 
precautions to save their people from persecution in their home territories 
and also for having been unprepared to face the challenges confronting them 
in the diaspora. Bereft of strong leadership in a time when collective 
empowerment was required in the diaspora, Na‘im wants to see the 
emergence of new secular figures to lead his people. The development of 
stronger legitimacy for these leaders would enable them to inspire a greater 
unity among the Assyrians/Syriacs. Among the ordinary people, unity 
implicitly assumes strength as a people. I want to elabourate on an example 
that is related to conversion and which is used as a more direct consequence 
of the functioning of Syriac Orthodox clergy. A Syriansk activist explains 
about the choice of his son who converted to the Baptist Church835 due to 
dissatisfaction within the management of his own church: 
…Today we cannot observe that the priests and archbishops have 
developed themselves. There is emptiness in our church and therefore 
there is a trend that hundreds of young people have started going to the 
Swedish churches, most of the time the Protestant church… The [Syriac 
Orthodox] church has stayed very conservative…  
Another example which expresses the shortcoming of today’s clergy at 
secular level is from Father Aday, himself a priest with an activist 
background who accuses the clergy for the commonly lack of umthonoyutho: 
...They only preach about the Bible and not about umthonoyutho. It draws 
the attention that when Father Akbulut836 was imprisoned, the church did 
                                                 
835 A respondent mentioned that about eighty Assyrian/Syriac families joined this church in 
Södertälje since 1995. 
836 See further for the case of Father Yusef Akbulut, Donef (2001). 
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not protest publicly. They blame us [activists] that we do not like the 
church! If we did not like the church then we would not have protested 
against his imprisonment. We do not mind [being blamed]; it all falls 
within our umthonoyutho; it is all our umtho. Our clergy in Sweden did not do 
anything. They did not join us in demonstrations and they did not write 
anything against the imprisonment of Father Akbulut and against Turkey... 
But, the Archbishop in Tur ‘Abdin stood besides the priest in his stand. 
Father Akbulut is a soldier of the church; they should have taken care of 
him. 
When I asked elite members: ‘Who is the leader of the ‘amo Suryoyo today?’ 
Their reaction was different to that with which they responded to other 
questions. They smiled cynically or laughed regretfully. Eventually, I did 
receive some answers implying deep disappointment in the Assyrian/Syriac 
leadership. ‘The situation of today looks like a soup – well, thank the Lord! 
[Shkur mine d Aloh]: we do not have one [political] leader but we have leaders 
of different gabe [parties],’ says the Assyriska scholar Gabriel, expressing a 
sentiment general among the Assyriska and Syrianska elites. The middle-aged 
teacher of Syriac, Shabo, says his grandfather drew a metaphor between the 
situation of the ‘amo Suryoyo and that of a ‘chicken without feathers on its 
wings’ (gdaito da gefayda mpartene). To have many leaders but to be deprived of 
a ‘shepherd’ leaves a huge yawning waiting to be filled. They would all prefer 
secular leadership by one individual (representing the Good Shepherd) or by 
a parliament, expressing the hope that one day they can have a leader as do 
any other people.  
 On the point of secular leadership, both Assyriska and Syrianska elite 
members agree. Several said: ‘Perhaps you expect me to say that the 
Patriarch is the leader of the Suryoye, but he is not!’ Even the symbolic power 
of the Patriarchate is perceived as being very weak. Given his established 
position, it is remarkable that such individuals as a member of the older 
generation Syrianska Shem‘un, a deacon and former teacher of the Syriac 
language in church schools (madrashyotho), also shares this opinion: 
What leaders? Do we have leaders? The archbishop is a religious person 
who does his best to run his monastery. He is neither a king nor the leader 
of a country. He is not a secular but a religious person who is responsible 
for the church. Since all our secular people [leaders] died, we all focus on 
the archbishop. We see him, a living person, and say this is the one who is 
alive. But this should not be the case… The Turkish authorities maintain 
the archbishop as a communications partner because they do not want to 
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talk to anyone else. They know that, when and if the going gets rough, 
they can request him to talk about religious matters only. I have never 
heard that we have had any secular leaders for the last 2000 years… 
Shem‘un is referring to the situation in which an archbishop functioned as a 
mediator between the Turkish State and the Assyrian/Syriac people and to 
the way in which the archbishop has been used as a channel in order to steer 
his community members in the direction as the Turkish authorities’ wish. 
Therefore, he implies that the archbishop would never be able to defend the 
collective interests of his community. This statement also implies the need 
for secular leadership alongside ecclesiastical leaders. 
 Highly remarkable is the distinction that the female Assyriska activist 
Qetso (in her fifties) makes between the leadership of the Syrianer and that of 
the Assyrier:   
We [Assyrier] do not have a leader at the moment. In the past the church 
had the leadership. We thank them [religious leaders] [for the work they 
have done], since otherwise our language or culture would have 
disappeared. In the last forty years in which we have lived in Europe, we 
have learned about our past and about where we are from... Therefore the 
gabo [party] of Assyriska does not yet have a leadership. But the gabo of 
Syrianska is represented by the church. As far as I am concerned, the 
church is part of my identity and not my [whole] identity... 
Qetso touches upon many issues in this citation. First, she makes a 
distinction between the leadership of the Syrianer and that of the Assyrier. She 
claims that the first mentioned is ruled by the church.837 Implicitly, she is 
expressing the idea common among the Assyrier (also discussed in Chapter 7) 
that the Syrianer are conservative, backward in political matters and that they 
empower the church more than they should. Second, she already notes a 
change from religious to secular leadership among the Assyrier; she does not 
recognize the leadership of the church as representing her at the secular 
level. Third, by acknowledging the efforts of the church in the areas of 
                                                 
837 The common idea among Assyrians/Syriacs is that the Syrianer have had a closer link to the 
church than have the Assyrier. From the beginning of their settlement in Europe, the Assyrier 
have adopted a critical stance regarding the church – no longer accepting any failure made. 
This is also a facet of their idea that the religious and secular leadership among 
Assyrians/Syriacs should be separated. Although these ideas are still present today among the 
masses and, therefore also among the Syrianer, at that time they were considered too 
‘revolutionary’ and unacceptable. As discussed in Chapter 7, this allowed space for the church 
to punish the adherents of the Assyrian ideology. 
 A  FLOCK WITHOUT A ‘SHEPHERD’                                   477 
 
culture and language, Qetso is simultaneously asserting that the church lacks 
the political aspect of her people’s representation. She personally would 
prefer this to be in the hands of secular leadership. 
 My respondents spontaneously mentioned the reasons for being bereft 
of (competent) leaders. A common idea is that the Assyrians/Syriacs are 
individualists (internally) and that each of them likes to be in charge, 
metaphorically expressed in the phrase ‘each of us wants to sit on a chair’ 
(kul ha minan grohem dyotu ‘al kursi).838 The upshot is that this individualistic 
attitude is now assumed to be the stumbling block preventing them from 
accepting one leader. ‘We have not developed a system in which we deal with 
each other democratically,’ says the Syrianska businessman and activist Nahir. 
He thinks that the Assyrians/Syriacs are used to and well able to take care of 
themselves as individuals, but not at the collective level. The Assyriska 
student Yauno has a different and rather positive explanation for rejecting 
one leadership. Yauno values this individualist attitude as something positive; 
in contrast to the collective attitude which he ascribes to other peoples in the 
Middle East whom, he implies are ‘blind followers of dictators’. 
We do not have a leader. You have noticed that also in Sweden we are 
individualists. We do not like to follow one leader, as do the Kurds with 
Öcalan and the Turks with Atatürk. The Suroye accept only God as sole 
leader in authority above them. We are rebellious; we do not want to 
surrender and submit to others by accepting a certain leadership... It 
would be good if we could establish a board to discuss our issues. 
Therefore, I believe that we can get somewhere. But, since we live under a 
dictatorial regime in the Middle East, it is hard to make progress… 
Yauno’s reflection is a rationalization of the situation. He ascribes positive 
characteristics to his people to allow himself to accept the situation. 
Interestingly, despite the fact that the majority of his people live in the 
diaspora, and that he has been in Sweden for about twenty-five years, he still 
ascribes the negative evaluation of the situation to the regimes in the Middle 
East. Perhaps it is because he identifies the core foundation or roots of his 
people to be in the Middle East. Moreover, his reflections may concern the 
past more than the present, although he is talking in the present and in 
                                                 
838  Already in the 1980s the poet and activist Ninos Aho wrote the poem Dukano l-Umthonoye 
(Shop for Umthonoye), criticizing the fact that Assyrians/Syriacs had founded so many 
associations within a short period. The criticism is based on the idea that the number of 
institutions was based on internal competition rather than cooperation. 
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relation to the future of his people. Throughout this thesis, I have presented 
the strong collectivist approach of Assyrians/Syriacs. The element of 
individualism which Yauno raises is an interesting one. What makes Yauno 
think his people are rather individualistic? An answer might steer us in the 
direction of the topic of this chapter ‘a flock without a shepherd.’ The 
absence of a leader or a ‘Good Shepherd’ allows individuals space to take 
initiatives and move in different directions within ‘their collectivist culture’. 
One can speak therefore of different dimensions of the same discursive field. 
Moreover, individuals and families will have to manage their own affairs in 
their position as a minority anywhere in the world. 
 Another external reason which (only a few Assyriska) elites mentioned 
for being bereft of leaders, is that because Assyrians/Syriacs have not ruled 
their own country due to their dispersion throughout different countries, 
they have been deprived of the opportunity to develop a secular leadership. 
Perhaps it is enough to say that these are emotional reflections engendered 
by a situation of distress. People imbue their situation with meaning in order 
to form an opinion or to explain it. 
 In short, in the leadership discourses, the critique of the current leaders 
is a necessary moment for the construction of the myth for an ‘ideal’ and 
‘desired’ leader. Through and in critical discourses, the leadership vacuum is 
constructed in order to formulate the need for new and alternative 
leadership. This is the moment where different discourses aim to fix the 
meaning of the ‘desired’ leadership. 
 
10.2  ‘We Need A Leader’ 
Quite independently of the question of whether Assyrians/Syriacs will 
someday have their own state, both the Assyriska and Syrianska elite members 
do find it necessary to be represented by secular leadership. However, their 
negotiations to achieve this are prompted by different reasons. The main 
reason given by both is based on the argument that they are a ‘amo; here: an 
ethnie, distinct from other groups and bearing a secular connotation as that 
of other national groups; a situation which implicitly requires secular 
leadership. As Father Aday puts it, ‘We are a ‘amo and we should have a 
leader.’ This unequivocally suggests a division between the secular and 
religious spheres. Certainly, the sense of a need for the division of religious 
and secular responsibilities of clergy and secular leaders is high. Gabriel says: 
‘Throughout the entire world the church and the secular world are divided. 
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The priest has a function to perform in the church and the political 
organizations should deal with the secular issues and represent our people.’ 
The Assyriska academic activist Barsaumo relates secular leadership to being 
an umtho (nation) as follows: 
We should have a secular leader. As I see it, the church and the umtho 
[nation] are two different things. I could be Christian and keep this in my 
heart; I do not have to show it to the outside world. However, the umtho is 
something compulsory. I shall have to say that I am a ‘amo, a person with a 
history, that I have an athro [homeland] where I am from and many other 
matters. My whole identity is based on the umtho… We are not noqes [less 
(implying ‘less developed’)] then other people, so why could we not have 
one [nation]? … In any of the countries to which we have migrated, we 
have been able to comply with the laws of that country. If we had our 
own country, our leaders would be chosen democratically without creating 
any problems.  
The last statement expresses the belief that Assyrians/Syriacs are competent 
for self-government and assumes the wish for doing so. Although the 
concept of self-government is related to territorial autonomy, they apply this 
concept to their situation in the diaspora. Without implying territorial self-
government in the European diaspora, apparently they do wish to develop 
some kind of secularly based collective representation. This intimates the 
depth of their wish to continue to retain their distinctiveness as a people 
among majority populations. 
 This secularization argument has a rhetorical dimension and can be 
understood as part of the modern dimension of living in secularly based 
societies in European countries – denouncing religious hegemony – in which 
they seek accommodation as a group of people. At this stage, it could be said 
that the reason for this argument is not heavily based on their highly 
developed secular values. The evidence of this is that it is still common 
among lay elites to win influence among the people through the role the 
clergy can play by backing their organizations. Instead, the call for a division 
between the spheres of religious and secular influence can also be perceived 
as a disagreement of the secular elites about the handling of certain issues by 
the clergy. And by using the ‘secularization’ argument the lay elite have an 
instrument available to develop their influence spheres in a European 
context. Although the elites are scathing in their judgement of the 
capabilities of their present leaders, when focusing on the future needs of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs, they express themselves more positively when putting 
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their reflections about the possibility of an Assyrian/Syriac leadership into 
words, perhaps an indication of their hope that one day they will indeed be 
represented by such a secular leadership. The realization of such leadership 
could mean a sudden radical, positive and historical shift for them. This can 
be seen in relation to an imagined better future. 
 The Assyriska elite members adduce a more elabourate argumentation in 
favour of secular leadership than do their counterparts, the Syrianska elite 
members. For example, the former argue that secular leadership will assist 
the development of an ethno-national collective identity for the 
Assyrians/Syriacs, thereby preventing them from assimilating in Europe and 
the eventual vanishing of the Assyrians/Syriacs as a distinct group. An 
identity based on the inclusion of all various Syriac churches to which 
Assyrians/Syriacs belong in the ethno-national concept is perceived as a 
means to prevent their disappearance as a people. Consequently, the 
Assyriska elite members accord any future secular leader a strong role, 
expecting him to work towards the goal of the development of a secularly 
based ‘Assyrian/Syriac way of life’. This assertion has a strong rhetorical 
dimension. They are highly critical of the fact that many Assyrians/Syriacs 
give the clergy unquestioned authority. The Assyriska activist Melke explains 
his argument for a cross-denominational approach as follows: 
If we do not have secular leadership, we shall become extinct. If we have 
only religious leadership, we shall be organized into different churches and 
disappear as a people… In Sweden, Suryoye have begun to adhere to 
different new religions. Should they join non-Suryoye churches, the number 
of [ethnically organized] Suryoye will decrease drastically. However, if we 
are composed of all the members of the different churches, people will 
remain [ethnically] Suryoye – no matter what religion people have. 
The starting point is that – in a secularized Europe – anyone leaving the 
church is traditionally839 no longer considered a Suryoyo. Theoretically, this 
could include many people, since there are already quite a number among the 
younger generations Assyrians/Syriacs in the diaspora who give the religious 
aspect merely a cultural meaning in their life. In an effort to overcome this 
‘problem’, Melke’s argument might be helpful as an instrument to stem the 
fast pace of extinction through assimilation in the diaspora. Although Melke 
                                                 
839 In the Middle East, anyone who converted to a different religion automatically became a 
member of the ethnic or national group of that religion. Often this was accompanied by 
starting to speak a different language. 
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does not specifically mention cases of becoming a ‘non-believer,’ in his 
example he implies that he is also including them in a secularly based 
collective identity of his people. It could be expected, that depending on the 
success of the secular leadership, the concept of the collective group of 
Assyrians/Syriacs might be used in a broader or narrower way. Melke’s ideas 
can therefore be understood in relation to the current traditional concept of 
‘amo Suryoyo.840 Another argument which the Assyrier adduce is that, through 
the vehicle of a new secular leadership institution, Assyrians/Syriacs may 
eventually accept the different institutions of their people, rather than simply 
and blindly opposing the diversity of institutions which is what they do 
today. They hope that by adopting this attitude they can stimulate national 
unity among the Assyrians/Syriacs. 
 Two main alternatives are suggested for the organization of a secular 
leadership: a si‘tho mdabronitho (board of representatives) or a Parliament-in-
exile with its own president. The first option implies the second, for the 
obvious reason that the first option would not have any political legitimacy 
in the countries of the Middle East. The Parliament-in-exile would be 
expected to assume the function of representing the Assyrians/Syriacs in 
external collective affairs. The primary focus would be to accept the role of 
protecting the rights of Assyrians/Syriacs in relation to the regimes under 
which the Assyrians/Syriacs live. Proponents of this secular model assume 
that, as a people, the Assyrians/Syriacs would encounter fewer problems and 
that they would manage themselves better than they do today. The Assyriska 
priest Aday shares this idea: ‘Then the conflict [about the right designation] 
among the people would stop too. The Synod would turn its attention to 
discussing theological, church and the language matters.’ The Parliament-in-
exile is expected to assume the task of representing the Assyrians/Syriacs in 
external civic and political affairs. The emphasis here is that its principal role 
would be protecting the rights of the Assyrians/Syriacs in relation to the 
regimes under which they live: 
Our organizations work well as groups but what they miss is the ability to 
work collectively together… Not one party of the ‘amo has the right to 
speak on behalf of the people. The people [Suryoye] are not prepared to 
accept this any longer. In our [future] parliament, we [Suryoye] should 
decide what to request from Turkey as a people before negotiating with 
                                                 
840 See Chapter 9 for the discourses regarding the boundaries of the ‘amo Suryoyo. 
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Turkey… In our external affairs, we should adopt one approach. 
Internally we can continue disagreeing with each other; that is fine. 
The Syrianska priest David asserts a more strategic need of his people: 
secular leadership is essential to the creation of a trans-national nation. He 
uses the term daule (which means state or land) in the sense of ‘nation’, 
thereby implying that a ‘country’ and a ‘nation’ somehow bear a relation to 
each other. In the case of the Assyrians/Syriacs, ‘their nation’ is not 
circumscribed by any boundaries since they are a nation at trans-national 
level. Although Father David does affirm that there is need of secular 
leadership, he also believes that the Patriarch should retain the supreme 
leadership. Possibly Father David feels obliged to represent the discourse of 
the church as a means to negotiate a path towards a change in leadership 
from his position as a priest: 
...I believe that it is good to have a secular leader too… Even without a 
country, we can achieve many things; we can develop a daule [here: nation; 
he uses the term for country with the meaning of ‘nation’]. This should be 
with the consent of the Patriarch and the archbishops. The church has its 
law. It should not be subjected to the law of civil organizations. This 
would be deleterious, since they [secular leadership] could destroy what 
our church has built up over a period of 2000 years... If the Patriarch is 
not the leader, I personally shall not accept the rule of anyone else, since 
we do not have a country in which we might have different parties and 
work towards the welfare of the people from the point of view of 
different ideologies. 
Shem‘un, a Syriansk teacher, relates the need of secular leadership to 
umthonoyutho841 (love for the people). He does not believe in secular 
leadership alone. Instead, he stresses and implies the importance of a 
patriotic attitude among the ordinary people:  
I do not believe in one secular leader for our people. I believe instead in a 
situation in which each individual member of our people is imbued with 
that ruho842 [umthonoyto] for our people. In that case, each of us becomes a 
leader. If we lack this ruho, one leader alone will never succeed, no matter 
how hard he tries… The discussion between the hudre [associations] about 
                                                 
841 See Chapter 6 for a further discussion of umthonoyutho. 
842 Ruho means literally ‘spirit’.  In its use here, it is intertwined with ‘attitude’ because 
umthonoyutho assumes a certain devoted attitude to the people. 
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the name is merely the outcome of their berberiye [rivalry] between one 
another; nothing more. It was not because this ruho is a reality. I have not 
seen any trace of umthonoyutho in practice among either of the groups 
[Assyrier and Syrianer]. If they were imbued with umthonoye, they would have 
co-operated. They know they are both the sons of the same people. Is it 
possible that my cousin belongs to a different people? No! Therefore I 
conclude that their activities are not for the people.  
In this citation, Shem‘un criticizes the activities of the secular 
Assyrian/Syriac organizations in Sweden and states explicitly what he expects 
from secular organizations while expressing his disappointment. In the first 
place, it is anticipated that they should articulate umthonoye principles 
(principles expressing love for their own people) and favour co-operation 
instead of rivalry with each other. Co-operation implies unity rather than 
rivalry.  
 
10.3  Conditions for Secular Leadership 
Elite members speak about secular leadership at a very hypothetical level. 
When asking the Assyriska academic activist Na‘im whether he believes in 
secular leadership for the Assyrians/Syriacs and whether they would accept 
it, he argues that by promoting this process of umthonoyutho the Assyrian 
Movement has been trying to run before it can walk: 
They [ordinary people] do not understand the concept of secular 
leadership. This is the mistake the Assyrian Democratic Organization 
[ADO] made. It wanted to develop a secular identity too quickly. It should 
have waited a bit longer... Therefore the Mtakasto [ADO] lost members 
and stirred the antagonism of the people... 
The Assyriska academic activist Barsaumo expands on Na‘im’s idea when he 
outlines the difficulty in the structural diversity and dispersion of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs today: 
Today it would be very hard to become the leader of our people. We are 
very much dispersed over different countries, speak different languages 
and have different interests. I do not believe that at this moment in time 
one layperson could actually emerge as the leader. Perhaps one religious 
leader might be able to encourage the renye umthonoye [patriotic ideas], to 
bring the other [Syriac] churches closer… This could present the 
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opportunity for an initial attempt to unify on the basis of a national 
identity… 
Barsaumo’s assumption is that it is still the religious leaders who exert most 
of the influence on the people. He believes in developing unity within the 
church. As the statements of Na‘im and Barsaumo reveal, many 
Assyrian/Syriac elite members think that it is essential to achieve certain 
conditions in the present situation before it will be possible to appoint 
secular leadership for the people. Accordingly, Na‘im thinks that ‘secular 
organizations should have developed a stronger strategy for themselves in 
order to be able to assume responsibility for the people and instigate a 
change from religious to secular power.’ No matter how eager 
Assyrian/Syriac elite members are to see the ascendancy of a secular leader, 
not many see opportunities for achieving that goal now. Aday, an academic 
activist has a very jaundiced view and raises objections to secular leadership 
in the current situation. The crux of Aday’s objection to secular leadership is 
that such a role implies more power than religious leadership would. His fear 
is that the misuse of secular power could damage the people as much as an 
over-reliance on religious power could: 
I do not want a leader who cannot be replaced… I know that the people 
live in different countries. In such a situation, it is not possible to have one 
leader for our people. But, if all our people lived in one geographical area 
and the people were in a position to choose a board and a leader who 
could be replaced as in other countries, it would be fine to have secular 
leadership.  
Father Abrohom relates to this idea of fear for not being able to replace a 
leader and more specifically to the role of the ‘ashirto and the absence of a 
democratic system: 
...We will not be able to have this Parliament [in exile] if we remain in the 
state we are in today; until the illiterate people are in charge, – the people 
who cannot sign with a pen but use their fingerprint to sign a paper, 
instead of a real signature, – and the church helps them, then we will not 
have an athro, or a parliament in the athro or outside the athro. The day we 
loose all backward ideas, and the day we start thinking that each individual 
is a full individual, and the day of instead of asking “whose son or 
daughter this is” but to ask “what has he studied or what potential does he 
have”, the day we accept one another’s ideas, and the day we accept one 
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another as equal, that day we will be able to select a neutral person. The 
day we loose the ‘ashirto… – else we will not get anywhere. 
Another precondition the Assyriska elite members mention as one which 
would make a strong secular leadership possible is the unity of the Syriac 
Churches under one national name. Allied to church unity, they find it 
important to live in one particular geographical area or preferably to have 
their own country, instead of ‘living dispersed’ (mbarbeze) all over the world. 
They reason that secular leadership would automatically follow after the 
Assyrians/Syriacs had achieved their own country. 
 
10.4  Who is the Leader? 
In this section I shall discuss the ideas of elite members about the question 
of who they think the leaders in charge of their people are. Their answers 
illustrate the difficulty of identifying the leader(s) of the ‘people’ and with 
that, the crisis of leadership among Assyrians/Syriacs. 
 
10.4.1 Church Invested with Leadership 
As just demonstrated, not all Assyrian/Syriac elite members who define their 
people in terms of an ethnie or a nation and who believe that they should 
have a secular leader were able to identify a secular leader to represent them 
at this very minute. Among them there are also those who have continued to 
identify the Patriarch of the Syriac Orthodox Church as the leader of the 
people. This is probably because in the cold light of day they know that the 
‘nation’ they hope for and anticipate they will become in the future, and by 
extension a secular leader of this ‘nation’, both have still to be attained. None 
of the secular leaders has yet been able to acquire enough legitimate power 
and attract followers among the grass roots. Endeavouring to explain this 
anomaly, some have argued that it is still the decisions of the Patriarch which 
are largely adhered to by most of the people, who also tend to ignore the 
decisions of secular leaders. 
 A few Assyrier in particular insisted on reiterating that the five Patriarchs 
of the Syriac churches are the leaders of the ‘amo Suryoyo. They stated that the 
Suryoye are a nation of different churches and, hence, the different patriarchs 
as the leaders in charge should share the leadership of their people. Eliyo, an 
Assyrisk activist, rationalizes this leadership by referring to the ethnic 
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character of the Syriac church, which means that the Patriarchs represent the 
people both religiously and ethnically. He believes that Suryoye means more 
than being Christian. Eliyo is also convinced that Assyrians/Syriacs should 
have a secular leader. Yacob, a Syriansk academic activist, has a similar idea 
but formulates it differently. Yacob thinks that the clergy should still remain 
in charge since he finds the core of his identity in the church. Despite this 
avowal, he refuses to accept their edicts on how to organize his life in a 
broad sense. This position is an intermediate station moving towards the 
antithetical idea that the leadership of the Assyrians/Syriacs should be wholly 
secular, which I shall discuss a little later. Formally, Yacob regarded the 
archbishop as the leader in Sweden but practically he acknowledges only the 
leadership of the secular Syrianska organizations in the external (non-
Assyrian/Syriac) environment: 
The leader is the Patriarch. Nevertheless, his position does not give him 
the right to decide about how they [the Suryoye] should live. This is the 
responsibility of the federations... I mean the Syrianska federation [in 
Sweden]. The Assyriska riksförbundet stands for something different, 
although it is composed of the same people… To some extent a kind of 
secular leadership already exists. Here in Sweden, it is personified by the 
president of the Syriac Federation. To the outside world, the youth is 
represented by the president of the Youth Federation. However, were they 
to ask me and other Syrianska young people who the leader of the Suryoye 
is, we would not say that it is the president of the Federation, but the 
archbishop. Perhaps this is because we draw our core identity from the 
church and the logical consequence is that we perceive the archbishop as 
the leader of the people... Nevertheless, the archbishop does not represent 
us to the outside world. The people who do this are the president of the 
Federation and of the Youth Federation. Should the media supply 
incorrect information, it is the responsibility of these Federations to react 
to this misapprehension…  
Yacob’s citation connects to the next section about secular organization’s 
leadership. 
 
10.4.2 Secular Organizations Invested with Leadership 
As has just been said, in the absence of a secular leader, some members of 
the elite identify the Patriarch as the leader of the Assyrians/Syriacs. This 
idea is by no means unanimous among either the Assyriska or the Syrianska 
elite members as there are those who explicitly state that they do not accept 
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the Patriarch as the leader of the ‘amo Suryoyo. Eliyo, teacher of Syriac, 
repudiated this idea by stating that the people are the employers of the clergy 
and that therefore: ‘The clergy should not tell the people what to do. It 
should be the other way around.’ Among both these elite groups there are 
those who are adamant that they feel unable to accept the Patriarch as the 
leader of the ‘amo Suryoyo. Some of them specifically criticize the current 
Patriarch for his ‘weak’ leadership. The political activists and intellectuals are 
particularly vehement in their criticism, accusing him of not taking an explicit 
stand on the human rights of the Assyrians/Syriacs in the Middle East. 
Moreover, as the activist Danho explains, the ordinary people do not look 
upon him as a secular leader: 
Since he [the Patriarch] does not participate in the knushyo Suryoyo 
[Assyrian/Syriac society], he is no longer thought of as a leader. A Suryoyo 
leader should be someone who is known to all Suryoye, who is prepared to 
take up the struggle on behalf of this people, and be a person who none of 
the people would have no qualms about following. 
Although they might be united in their dissension, they cannot agree on the 
present legitimate secular leadership of their people. Central to the argument 
of those Assyrier who identify their organizations as those with the most 
legitimate claim to represent the people is that they believe they are able to 
achieve the separation of religious and secular leadership. Their trump card is 
that they focus on their ability to take up the struggle for their human rights 
in the Middle East, a task which they believe the clergy have neglected. 
 Cogently, those among the Assyriska elite members who do perceive 
secular organizations as representatives of the Assyrians/Syriacs often fail to 
mention any specific name. There are two reasons which may be adduced for 
this reticence. The most salient is that from their elite position they do not 
deign to identify the secular Assyrian/Syriac organizations which represent 
the ordinary people. Secondly, it should also be born in mind that they might 
have been speaking purely theoretically and that they may have merely 
mentioned secular organizations to give some idea about how matters should 
evolve in the future. As the Assyriska Eliyo said: ‘Today, those secular 
organizations which pursue the goal of the development and awakening 
(teqimo) of the people are, in my view, the leaders of the people. They throw 
themselves into developing the language, establishing associations and 
building churches to ensure the future existence of the people.’ Only a few 
Assyriska elite members (who are deeply involved in secular Assyrisk 
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organizational life at the moment), actually name specific organizations such 
as ZOWAA and ADO, as representatives of the Assyrians/Syriacs. An 
example is Gebro, an academic and activist, who mentions local and national 
organizations representing the Assyrians/Syriacs in the countries concerned. 
His choice of these organizations is based on the idea that individuals or 
organizations have to espouse a certain ideology which will serve the ‘goal of 
the people (u nisho du ‘amo): 
In Sweden it is the Assyrian Federation. In Iraq it is ZOWAA, in Syria 
ADO, in Istanbul the association843 and in the Turo [Tur ‘Abdin] it is Mor 
Gabriel [the monastery]. We do not have one leader yet, nor do we have a 
parliament yet… I do not consider the current people844 in charge [of the 
church board] in Istanbul to be the representatives of the Suryoye there, 
since they do not share the Suryoye ideology845. They assume that Suryoyutho 
means Christianity and nothing more… The Syrianska federation does not 
represent our people in Sweden either, because, under the terms of its 
ideology, we are Suryoye in the sense that we are members of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church only. The Madenhoye [Assyrian Church of the East] and 
Chaldeans are excluded from their concept of Suryoyutho. Last week they 
organized the commemoration of the Seyfo in Brussels, but they did not 
invite any of the other Federations of our people to attend. By contrast, 
the Assyrian Federation includes all the churches of our people.  
The Syrianska elite members, especially those individuals who are personally 
active in Syrianska secular organizations, tend to think of the president of the 
Syriac Universal Alliance (SUA) as the person in charge of the ‘amo Suryoyo. 
Consequently, at the local level they identify with Syrianska organizations 
which are organized under the hierarchy of SUA. This attitude implies the 
exclusion of the Assyriska organizations from the representational stage. In 
contrast to the Assyriska elite members, the Syrianska activists did not give 
any specific reasons for their choice. Female activist Warde puts the 
legitimate power of the president of SUA into perspective by distinguishing 
on the one hand between the Assyrier and the Syrianer. And on the other 
hand between two groups of Syrianer. Those Syrianer who are very much 
                                                 
843 He means the Mezopotamya Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği (Mesopotamian Culture and 
Solidarity Association) which was founded by Assyrians/Syriacs in 2004. 
844 He mentioned specific names which I want to keep anonymous for privacy reasons. 
845 Here he implies the Assyrian ideology for the Assyrian/Syriac people, which he assumes to 
be the ultimate solution for his people. 
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connected to the church and those who tend to profile themselves in secular 
organizations and less through the church: 
Theoretically, he [the president of SUA] is the leader of the Suryoye, but at 
the practical level he will probably not be accepted by all the people. The 
Assyrier and the older people will probably not acknowledge the president 
of SUA as their leader. For example, my grandmother shall not know him. 
She assumes that the Patriarch is the leader of the Suryoye…  
Hobel, a Syriansk politician who is well aware of the different opinions about 
secular leadership among the people and who is conscious that this may 
result in a new division among Assyrians/Syriacs, says: 
If the Assyrier do have secular leadership, it does not represent me. 
[Interviewer: Have the Assyrier and Syrianer really diverged too greatly?] 
Actually that is as it is… Certainly, if nothing is done, we shall reach that 
point. If we do not accept each other’s designation of choice – this could 
be the pattern in the future. People could work under two different names 
and on certain issues which we share – such as the Seyfo… we could work 
together. 
 Assyriska ex-activists who are somewhat removed from the institutional life 
of their people explicitly state that they are not convinced of the strength 
which secular Assyrian/Syriac organizations ascribe to themselves today. 
They are critical of what they call the ‘empty rhetoric’ (mamlo khalyo) of these 
organizations and their failure to build up a large platform of members and 
activities. These ex-activists tend to believe that these secular organizations 
have continued to exist simply for the purpose of personal gain more than 
anything else. In relation to the character of today’s secular organizations it is 
important to say something about the expectations from umthonoye about the 
involvement of the higher educated and especially of university graduates in 
both secular and religious institutions. Initially umthonoye had high 
expectations of the educated among them (often looking forward to see the 
educated growing up and increasing in number). Today, a common 
complaint heard about umthonoye is the low level of interest, involvement and 
dedication to ‘their community’ from this group.846 The activist Malkuno 
                                                 
846 And the question is indeed how the interest, involvement and dedication of second and 
third generations is going to be in relation to their people and its future. This question is also 
related as to whether ‘their people’ will still be visible in Western countries and whether they 
will find the need to organize themselves as a distinct group. 
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says: 
The university graduates of our people do not play an important role 
among our people. But we can notice a high increase in students the last 
years. Unfortunately they study subjects for their future profession and 
not subjects they can do something for the people… Until today, those 
who play an important role in the life of the Suryoye people are those that 
have not studied. 
Also Shabo indicates that secular institutions have not been successful in 
attracting many higher educated to manage the institutions of their people. 
In his reflection, the activist Shabo explains this little interest through the 
people who manage the present-day institutions: 
Today there is a gap between my generation and the generation that grows 
up in Europe. The young people who have grown up here, have a very 
good idea of the situation of our people, but they do not want to enter our 
institutions which are classical and based on old structures, ruled by 
illiterate powerful people. And they do not have the self-confidence that 
they can enter these boards and change things. They keep themselves 
distanced from these institutions. We, both associations and the church 
failed to get them involved... If we do not succeed in giving responsibility 
to the younger generation, then this is a big mistake. Tomorrow, during 
the General Members Meeting we want to push the idea that the people in 
the board should be youngsters. They asked me to become the president 
again... Besides, if they want me to become it again, then it means that we 
have failed. Thirty years ago I was among those that established the 
institutions and until now they cannot find someone else?... 
A similar critical attitude prevails among Syrianska elite members who are not 
active in secular Syrianska organizations. They are not prepared to accept 
these as their representatives and question the legitimacy of the leadership 
among the Syrianska ordinary people. A clear example of this attitude is 
Matay, a student who was very much involved in the Syrianska organizations 
until the mid 1990s: 
Some people say: “We hope that our organizations will commence 
working together.” But, what organizations are they talking about!?... 
None of these organizations is strong enough to develop a monopoly on 
representing the people.  They all say the same. And the people really do 
hope that they will all pull together. However, I for one am not convinced 
that we do have any real leaders, especially any secular leaders… Indeed I 
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think that it is misleading when any of our secular organizations say that 
they are representing the people. They do not have the legitimacy to adopt 
such a stance. They represent only their members, but not the ‘amo 
[Suryoyo].  
Matay exemplifies the belief that secular organizations represent their own 
members more than they do the whole collective of Assyrians/Syriacs in 
Sweden. The fact that different secular organizations present themselves as 
the institutions in charge of the ‘amo Suryoyo shows that there is still plenty of 
room in the field for leadership to be occupied and it is for this space, this 
field of tension, in which the different Assyrian/Syriac secular organizations 
are competing right now. It is important to note that the context is not 
strictly secular and that the church continues to take part in this competition 
for leadership. 
 
10.5  Conclusion 
As I have illustrated in this chapter, the myth of an ‘ideal leader’ is 
constructed in and through discourses. The emergence of the myth is related 
to the absence of a leader that can provide solutions to their experienced 
problems. That is why in the construction of the ideal leadership, one can see 
a high level of expectations.   The ‘ideal leader’ is defined as the one who will 
provide in the needs of the split subject, foremost in the unity of the people. 
 The leadership discourses of Assyrians/Syriacs should be understood 
against the backdrop of migration, – which has lead them away from being a 
society in the Middle East where they were characterized principally by 
church affiliation, religious organization and leadership. The strong shift in 
the discourse about their identity, from ethno-religious to ethno-national, has 
altered the tenor of the discourse about the leadership of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs, moving it in the direction of the slow institutionalization 
of secular national leadership to represent the different Syriac churches at 
global level. 
 Although both Assyrier and Syrianer fail to identify one sole leader of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs, there is still a small group of the elite members who 
identify the Patriarch as the leader. In their eyes, he still holds the most 
legitimate power among the ordinary people. Nevertheless, all elite members 
emphasized that there should be a separation between religious and secular 
leadership, responsibilities and spheres of influence. 
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 The main difference in the leadership discourses of the Assyrier and the 
Syrianer is revealed when they attempt to identify the present-day secular 
leadership of Assyrians/Syriacs. While the majority notes that, as a ‘amo, the 
Assyrians/Syriacs are not yet represented by any secular leadership, there is 
still a minority, mainly political activists, who identify either with the ideology 
of the Assyrier or with that of the Syrianer. Elite members of both ideologies 
are conscious that this adherence to two different leadership discourses can 
result in the danger of an internal separation of the Assyrians/Syriacs. The 
risk of division lies in the fact that each political discourse does not accept 
the leadership of the other one. Consequently, what unites both ideologies 
continues to be some authority exerted under the leadership of the 
Patriarchate of the Syriac Orthodox Church. Even so, among both 
ideologies, there are voices opting for a board of representatives or a 
Parliament-in-exile representing the various Syriac churches. If this latter 
model gains majority support, it means that a new step in the history of the 
Assyrians/Syriacs will have been taken; an advance in the process towards 
secular representation and leadership. 
 The leadership vacuum which Assyrians/Syriacs experience reflects the 
actual difficulties that they encounter at institutional level in their present 
state of dispersion. The conceptions and ideas they nurture of their actual 
and their ideal leadership are heavily related to other discourses forging their 
collective identity. The ideas about what might be effective leadership for 
Assyrians/Syriacs shed light on the way elite members understand their 
dispersion today, how they interpret their history and how they connect their 
past and future as a people. Here, the symbolic role of leadership betrays a 
great deal about how Assyrians/Syriacs reflect on their collective identity and 
how they would like to be perceived by the outsiders. Identifying a leader for 
their people who can represent them enshrines the possibility that outsiders 
might identify them as ‘a people’. The absence of leadership is what makes 
them absent as a people from the perspective in which they would like to be 
positioned among other peoples. 
 
 
11 CONCLUSION:           
Challenging the Hostages’ and Orphans’ Dilemma 
 
The boy approached her, gazing at the ground with suffering and grief; 
The unity of the Assyrian nation written on his forehead; 
He saw the girl and his breast heaved with sighs; 
He wanted to talk but the words were choked in his throat by groans. 
Fawlos Gabriel847 
 
Undoubtedly, during the last four decades the topic which has aroused the 
most heated discussion in the Assyrian/Syriac community in Europe has 
been: What is the ‘correct name’ of this people which should be used in 
Western languages? While outsiders have posed questions about why the 
same group of people uses two different names and what the difference 
between them is, the insiders especially have experienced the consequences 
of the dissension about this use as problematic. They have experienced it as 
flighutho (split) within the community and associated this with the weakening 
of their people in relation to outsiders. I have shown that this flighutho and 
the subsequent competition between elite groups have permeated almost 
every aspect of Assyrian/Syriac society and, as people are very aware of this, 
they are highly critical of it.   
 Given this situation, the central aim of this research has been the 
identification of the present-day identity discourses among Assyrian/Syriac 
elites in the European diaspora and an attempt to find an explanation for the 
emergence of these political discourses and their antagonistic relationship in 
the discursive field. In the light of my research, I have related the emergence 
of new identity discourses to the settlement of Assyrians/Syriacs in Western 
countries. Unquestionably, emigration engendered an identity crisis among 
Assyrians/Syriacs and transformed them into a split subject. In the 1970s, 
                                                 
847 My translation of the original in Syriac. This stanza is taken from Fawlos Gabriel’s poem 
Huyodo d-Umtho Othuroyto (Unity of the Assyrian Nation) which he wrote on 21 July 1930 and 
published in I. Hackwerdi (Ed.), 1 September 1930, No. 74, 4th year. 
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Assyrians/Syriacs already disagreed with being grouped into the categories of 
the national groups (for instance, Turks or Arabs) in the countries from 
which they emigrated in the Middle East. Following from this initial 
objection to being categorized into (what they considered alien) national 
identities, in the subsequent process of searching for a name to represent 
their people in the Western diaspora, competing political discourses 
culminated in a ‘name debate’ among themselves about the ‘correct name’ 
for their people in Western languages. The far-reaching consequences at 
institutional level – both secularly and religiously – raise the question of how 
such a situation could have occurred. To attempt to find an answer to this 
question, I formulated the following research questions: 
 
1) What are the discourses of identity among the Assyrian/Syriac elites in the European 
diaspora?  
2) How can we contextualize these discourses historically? More specifically, what is the 
relationship between the emigration of Assyrians/Syriacs to Europe and the 
articulation of identity discourses?  
3) How can we explain the hegemonic struggle between Assyrian/Syriac elites? 
 
To find an answer to the first question – identifying the identity discourses – 
it has been necessary to study the emergence of identity discourses so as to 
be able to contextualize their formation. My starting point has been that such 
aspects as hegemony and power relations between different elite groups 
constitute important factors in the formation of identity discourses and in 
the ‘name debate’. As I have illustrated, this starting point has made it 
necessary to consider subject positions outside Sweden, as a consequence of 
the inherent transnational character of the Assyrian/Syriac ‘Imagined 
Community’ and its interconnectedness. Nevertheless, I have limited myself 
to the main institutionalized discourses in the Swedish public sphere because 
of my research focus. 
 
Contextualizing Identity Discourses 
For an explanation of the present-day identity discourses, I have studied the 
conditions of their emergence from a historical perspective. Characteristic of 
the position of Assyrians/Syriacs in the homeland is that they had a religious 
status and that they have actively been denied the status of an ethno-national 
group. This also explains their organization along religious lines and makes 
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plain their subordinated position in a majority Muslim society; politically, the 
majority religion in society took precedence. In this context, it was usual for 
the ordinary people among Assyrians/Syriacs to consider their Christianity as 
the main nodal point around which their collective identity was organized. The 
fact that their non-Muslim identity was decisive to their position 
strengthened the central role which religion assumed in their identity. 
Consequently, the chain of difference (‘us’) and the chain of equivalence (‘others’) 
were based on a person’s religious affiliation. These two main categories 
functioned as the starting point for the organization of social life, which was 
lived by Assyrians/Syriacs as a given situation resulting from a policy of 
assimilation into the majority groups living in the Middle East. This policy 
meant that in the modern nation states which were created in the post-
Ottoman period, they have been considered as ‘Christian Turks’, ‘Christian 
Arabs’ and, since the increase of the political power of the Kurds in Turkey 
and Iraq, they have also been considered as ‘Christian Kurds’ by these 
respective majority groups. Alongside this category, it has therefore been 
expected of them that they live by such an identity thereby strengthening the 
collective identity of the respective majority groups. Naturally such a 
situation meant that they lived a subordinated life in relation to the majority 
groups. This offers a partial explanation of their strong urge which they have 
later displayed in Europe to be recognized as distinct from these groups. 
 With their en-masse emigration to Western countries, – which they 
identified as ‘Christian’ and hence as countries which could provide them 
with a potential new ‘home’ – their identification along religious lines 
became dislocated. Overall, the context of emigration has resulted in a 
situation in which about 300,000 Assyrians/Syriacs have settled in Europe, 
and this exodus has meant that their numbers in the homeland have 
decreased enormously, especially in Tur ‘Abdin, where they now remain as a 
population of about only 2500 people. In this regard, I have analysed the 
mass emigration of Assyrians/Syriacs as an exodus from their subordinated 
position but also as a flight bearing with them a mythical idea about their 
future expectations of Western countries. The essential emptiness of this myth 
has allowed space for a great diversity of expectations from their new places 
of settlement. This myth about their future prospects in a new country 
contrasts strongly with their subordinated position in the Middle East. The 
myth which they created with their migration is related to identification with 
an assumed Christian West and consequently the positive image which they 
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developed of the West. This is the moment at which they changed their 
orientation in life and the myth about their new home emerged. 
 Their settlement in specific geographies of Europe has made it possible 
for them to remain closely connected at both family and collective level. 
From the very beginning, they have perceived Sweden as their ‘new home’ 
and orientated themselves as permanent settlers there. In other words, after 
their exodus, they burned their bridges behind them. The Swedish integration 
policy, which is based on equality, partnership and freedom of choice, has offered 
Assyrians/Syriacs considerable space in which to organize and establish 
themselves relatively quickly. The community life which they have 
established in Sweden, specifically the ‘ethnic enclaves’ such as is the case in 
Södertälje, have exerted positive effects on the group’s development or 
mobility within broader society in many respects; above all in the educational 
and economic fields they have managed to capture a strong position. The 
Swedish context has also offered them space to engage in society politically 
and to speak about the rights of their people in the Middle East. The fact 
that the Swedish Parliament approved a resolution (11 March 2010) which 
recognized the Seyfo as a genocide is only one example of the results of their 
political involvement in Swedish society. Not all has been plain sailing. The 
negative consequences which ethnic enclaves bring in their train are related 
to social control, but first and foremost to the problems to do with the 
young people. In such a context, individual criminality becomes a collective 
stigma. 
 Another point which should be mentioned in the context of their 
settlement and the reflection on the myth about their new home, their 
expectations and their disappointments, is bound up in their experience of 
the ‘Hostages’ and Orphans’ Dilemma’. I have explained that, as a new 
home, Sweden is also the concrete symbol of their eternal rupture from the 
historical athro (homeland). This traumatic break actuates a sense of having 
become yatume (orphans). Although their situation is unfortunate, in the 
historical athro, they experienced their position as being that of yasire 
(hostages). This raises the question of which horn of their dilemmas should 
they favour? In two minds, their future is therefore negotiated in a process of 
reflecting on the past, the present and the future destination of their people 
from the present-day context. 
 In the process of over four decades of settlement in Sweden, they have 
negotiated their identity with the means available in the context of living. 
What they were not prepared for was a confrontation with a Western 
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(secular) society in which religion plays a different or less central role in the 
organization of public life; religion is a private matter. This situation has 
dislocated their earlier concept of identity, which developed in societies 
where people were organized along religious lines. I have therefore explained 
the consequences of their emigration to and settlement in Western countries 
in terms of the ‘dislocation’ of their collective identity.  They could no longer 
distinguish themselves from other groups (for example, Turks and Arabs) 
who migrated from the same countries on the basis of their former collective 
identity categorization along religious lines. The identity crisis in which they 
found themselves manifested itself in the emergence of a split subject. A split 
subject occurs when the subject can no longer identify itself with hegemonic 
projects or frameworks. In the case of Assyrians/Syriacs, the effect of 
dislocation resulting from their mass emigration has engendered the need for 
a re-definition of the collective identity of their people – both conceptually 
and in the representation of a name. In such a situation, an empty space for 
the articulation of new or previously weak identity discourses has emerged. 
 In an attempt to heal the split subject, Assyriska activists have 
endeavoured to answer the requirements of the new society of which they 
have become part, in order to distinguish themselves from other groups and 
be recognized as a distinct national group. As the first group to 
institutionalize their identity discourse, Assyriska activists have based their 
ideology on the early ideas of Assyrian/Syriac umthonoye (patriots) who were 
active at the beginning of the twentieth century in the Middle East and on 
that of the Assyrian Democratic Organization (1957) in Syria. I have 
identified several central nodal points around which the identity discourse of 
the Assyrier has been built. They have promoted a national cross-
denominational identity which incorporates the different Syriac Churches 
under one national umbrella name ‘Assyrian’ (in Swedish Assyrier). It is 
believed that such a cross-denominational approach will strengthen the 
position of their people among other peoples. This organization seems 
preferable to their (former) traditional organization along denominational 
lines which is assumed to keep them weak and dependent on others – 
assuming a subordinated position. The use of the designation ‘Assyrian’ has 
also been thought necessary in order to avoid confusion with the name 
‘Syrian’ (formerly used to translate their emic name Suryoye), which is 
commonly used in the contemporary context to refer to an inhabitant of 
Syria and assumes an Arab national identity. The Assyriska ideology has also 
assumed that there is a separation between secular and religious spheres and 
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responsibilities. In the group, ‘Christianity’ is an assumed and unquestioned 
nodal point. Therefore their Christianity is not articulated very explicitly. 
 To build a picture of the relationship between present-day identity 
discourses and those of Assyrian/Syriac elites at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, I have also studied the discourses of umthonoyutho from a 
historical perspective.848 I have abstracted early ideas of umthonoyutho among 
the Assyrian/Syriac elite of the early twentieth century in the Middle East on 
which present-day elite members have based their umthonoyutho. My findings 
have led me to argue that the link between present-day identity discourses 
and this early stage umthonoyutho was the Assyrian Democratic Organization 
(ADO), founded after the political changes in Syria in 1957. ADO built on 
earlier ideas of unity and national identity of such umthonoye as Naum Faik 
and Ashur Yausef. As a reaction to the rise of Pan-Arabization politics and 
the effect of dislocation it had on Assyrians/Syriacs, ADO aimed at healing 
the damage caused as a consequence of their no longer being able to live 
with a distinct identity, different to an Arab one which was imposed by the 
ruling regime. The ADO members who settled in Europe in the 1960s 
continued to propagate the ideology of their organization. Simultaneously, 
the first group of Assyrians/Syriacs from Lebanon which was invited to 
Sweden by the Swedish authorities in 1967 was presented to Swedish society 
as Assyrier. Linguistically the Swedish term Assyrier for ‘Assyrians’ already 
existed in the language and therefore it could be used without major 
obstacles up to 1975. 
 During this period, in the tolerant atmosphere created by the liberal 
Swedish Integration Policy, the first Assyrian/Syriac organizations were 
founded. As the first secular institution of Assyrians/Syriacs in Europe, the 
Assyriska föreningen i Södertälje (1971) has had a pioneering function in relation 
to other secular community institutions. ADO members played an active role 
in the formulation of its initial policy and that of similar organizations which 
ADO founded in the first decade of its existence. These organizations 
became seedbeds for the further development of an Assyrian ideology, but 
this time in a European context; an empty space to be filled with new 
meaning.  By making good use of their institutions, Assyriska activists have 
                                                 
848 Here I give my explanation and definition of umthonoyutho, which I understand in the first 
place as a form of patriotism: ‘To sense and express love (hubo) for the Assyrian/Syriac people 
and to dedicate one’s life to their care in a broad sense (language, culture, history, homeland 
and church.’ 
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propagated the Assyrian ideology, introduced new national symbols, 
reinterpreted former symbolism and have set their sights on building a 
national cultural tradition by paying specific attention to their language (both 
classical Syriac and the spoken Suryoyo), secular music and folklore, literature, 
national figures and national days.Although this form of present-day 
umthonoyutho builds on early ideas of umthonoyutho (from the beginning of the 
twentieth century), it has developed an exclusivist approach in relation to the 
‘name of the people’ and, to a certain extent also to the people’s heritage. In 
their attempt to achieve national unity, early umthonoye elite members used 
(predominantly) the designation ‘Assyrian’ as a national name to represent 
the collective of the different Syriac Churches, but without rejecting any of 
the other names in use among the members of these churches. In contrast, 
in the process of negotiating the collective identity of their people, present-
day identity discourses tend to be rather particularistic and focus especially 
on the discussion about what is the ‘correct name’ of their people (especially 
in Western languages). In this regard, the ‘correct name’ of their people has 
become a self-perpetuating aim in itself and has therefore distanced from its 
initial function which was as a means by which to achieve unity. 
 The difference between early and modern approaches to umthonoyutho 
can be explained by the different stages through which the umthonoyutho 
passed in response to the contextual dislocations experienced. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, ideas of umthonoyutho were limited to 
intellectuals who wrote about their perceived ideals of their people. This left 
an empty space in society for the emergence of a national identity and for an 
ideology to articulate it in a new discursive field. However, pertinently there 
was not yet any space to disseminate this ideology among the ordinary 
people and to implement it in society. I have discussed how this form of 
umthonoyutho was expressed especially in the magazines which were published 
by intellectual elites at the beginning of the twentieth century. On only a few 
occasions did these ideas materialize in institutions, of which the Assyrian 
Orphanage in Adana was just one example. After the Seyfo during The First 
World War, those elite members who survived were forced to disperse and 
settled in different parts of the world. The upshot of this dislocation was that 
they had to deal with the new contexts in which to live and the particular 
challenges these posed. In the discursive field of the Western diaspora, elites 
encountered an empty space for the reinterpretation and the implementation 
of their ideals. Changing or shifting ideas of umthonoyutho can be explained by 
these dislocatory events. As a consequence of the dislocation they 
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experienced, nodal points (such as the ‘name of the people’) were imbued with 
different meanings and transformed into floating signifiers. At this stage of the 
implementation process, the myth of the ‘unity of the people’ as a vehicle to 
survive as a people and the goal of being recognized as a distinct national 
group shifted into the background, while internally the focal point of the 
‘identity question’ emerged as the ‘correct name’ of the ‘amo Suryoyo in 
Western languages. An important reason for this shift was that the name of 
their people in Western languages was the first subject to be disputed by 
oppositional elite groups at the beginning of the hegemonic struggle. This 
dispute has therefore had an epoch-making function in relation to the 
continued struggle and it has become the nodal point around which the 
struggle for hegemony has been built. 
 The subsequent ‘name debate’ can be seen as a consequence of the aim 
of different elite groups to solve the ‘identity crisis’ they experienced in their 
efforts to heal the split subject while they were competing with each other for 
hegemonic power. This debate has been dominated by the struggle between 
three main groups: the Assyrier, the clergymen and a third group which came 
to be known as the Syrianer. Its internal struggle disputing the ‘correct name’ 
by which the ‘amo Suryoyo should be known in Western languages has resulted 
in the institutionalization of the Assyrian/Syriac community along two main 
identity discourses. In order to give an idea of the extent of this struggle, I 
have analysed the conditions of the emergence of the ‘name debate’ and the 
institutionalization of the identity discourses which have resulted from this 
struggle from a historical perspective in Sweden. In my analysis I begin by 
clarifying in the storyline of the split – the main logics behind the formation 
of competing political discourses about hegemony in the socio-political 
vacuum which they encountered. From a discourse theoretical perspective, 
identification processes are the result of hegemonic struggles between elite 
groups with different political discourses. I have illustrated how the identity 
discourses were formed in a triangle of relationships between two lay elite 
groups and the clergy (as representatives of the Syriac Orthodox Church, the 
main leading institution of the people) in their attempt to heal the split subject 
which resulted from the identification crisis. 
 In this process of negotiating the identity of their people in the 
discursive field, the Syriac Orthodox Church, represented by the Patriarch in 
Damascus, strongly opposed the cross-denominational identity discourse of 
the Assyriska Movement. In this context it is important to remember that, at 
that time (1970s and 1980s), the church still enjoyed enormous legitimacy 
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among the ordinary people and the clergy were in the position to exert 
considerable influence on the people. The great influence of the clergy 
explains, for instance, why in their attempts to seek legitimacy for a particular 
identity discourse both the Assyriska and the Syrianska elite have continued to 
refer to statements which clergy have made in the course of their careers 
about the ‘correct naming’ of the ‘amo Suryoyo. 
 In their opposition to the Assyrier, the clergy was supported by lay elite 
members who were also opposed to the ideology of the Assyrier. As an 
alternative, both the clergy and these oppositional laymen promoted a 
denominational identity, advocating the discursive argument that 
Assyrians/Syriacs are a religious community which includes members of 
different nations. They assert that both church and people should be referred 
to by the name Syrian (as the English translation for Suryoye). Thereafter, this 
dual opposition has attempted to establish an alternative truth regime, a new 
objectivity. Despite its historically strong hegemonic position, the church 
representation did not succeed in institutionalizing this denominational 
discourse among the community members in the diaspora. But it managed to 
break down the hegemonic use of the designation Assyrier and identification 
as Assyrians among the ordinary people. In the long term, it has shown that 
the main aim of the church has not been to propagate a denominational 
identity in the first place, but to break down the emerging ideology of the 
Assyrier, because these new ideas were thought of as threatening and did not 
fit its discourse in relation to the position of Assyrians/Syriacs in the Middle 
East. 
 In explaining the extent of the antagonism between the Assyrier and the 
Syrianer, I have also argued that Middle Eastern regimes have played a 
considerable role in the ‘name debate’ through their mobilization of some 
clergymen and laymen (still living in those countries or in the diaspora) who 
have ‘co-operated’ with these regimes, in whatever form. Middle Eastern 
regimes have perceived the cross-denominational identity approach as a 
‘threat’ to their national identity. Consequently, the church opposition to the 
Assyrian Movement explains many of the activities which followed. 
 I have illustrated that the stand of the church simultaneously offered 
more space and hegemony to lay elites who also opposed to the Assyriska 
Movement and whose position resulted in the emergence of a counter 
ideology which has come to be represented by what I have called the 
Syrianska Movement, whose ideology would not be perceived as threatening 
by Middle Eastern regimes. In its formation process, the Assyriska 
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Movement was placed at the core of their constitutive outside. Hence, the 
Assyrier became the main group in relation to which the Syrianska Movement 
developed its ideology and identity discourse. Distancing itself from and 
refusing to identify with the Assyrier, this group introduced the designation 
Syrianer (in English, first Syrian and later Syriac) as an alternative to represent 
its people. Besides their divergence in their name choice, the ideology of the 
Syrianska activists assumes Aramean ancestry. I have argued that the choice 
not to use the designation Araméer (Swedish for ‘Aramean’) is probably tied 
up with the first phase in the emergence of the Syrianska Movement. Overall, 
in other European countries, the opposition to the Assyriska Movement has 
predominantly used the designation Aramean instead of Syriac, especially in 
the last two decades. The focus of these lay elite members was fighting a 
secularly based cross-national identity. On the basis of this starting point, 
their approach to the name Suryoye has been denominational and they have 
translated it as Syrianer. The most essential move at that point they thought 
was to make a statement to the Assyrier, who had been presented as those 
who ‘falsified’ the history and ‘misrepresented’ the identity of their people. 
 Although the Syrianska elite fought the cross-denominational approach 
of the Assyrier in the first phase of opposition, this attitude gradually changed 
thereafter. Over time, – in their antagonistic relationship with the Assyrier – 
the denominational approach of the Syrianer has made space for a cross-
denominational national identity. Simultaneously, in this process or shift the 
already assumed Aramean ancestry has become more pronounced and 
articulated in relation to the oppositional identification with an Assyrian 
ancestry. This has been a very marked change in a period of only three 
decades. In this shift, the Syrianska Movement has also propagated a division 
between the secular and the religious sphere and a division along these lines 
between the responsibilities of lay- and clergymen. This separation began to 
take shape after the hegemony of the Assyriska Movement was broken by the 
dual-opposition alluded to above. In the process which followed, Syrianska 
elite members began to compete with clergymen for hegemony in the sphere 
of influence in the community and have consequently achieved the present-
day status quo. 
 The role of the Syriac Orthodox Church in the triangular relationship 
with the Assyriska and the Syrianska elites must not be overlooked. Although 
the representatives of the church said that they opposed identification both 
as Assyrian and as Aramean, in reality they have promoted identification with 
an Aramean ancestry. Consequently, their tendency has been to ally 
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themselves more closely with the ideology of the Syrianska Movement. This 
aspect is important to understanding the support which the identity 
discourse of the Syrianer has enjoyed among the clergymen and the ordinary 
people. In its stand, the Church has provided the Syrianska Movement space 
to make use of clergymen to preach against the ideology of the Assyrier. 
Considering the hegemonic position of the church historically, its stand has 
had a great impact on the hegemonic space which the Assyriska Movement 
lost to the oppositional Syrianska Movement. Hence it must be stressed that 
the church has played a major role in the ‘name debate’ among 
Assyrians/Syriacs. It is possible that its influence would have increased if the 
Swedish authorities had not engaged in the ‘name question’ and requested 
the Patriarch not to excommunicate those who identified themselves as 
‘Assyrian’. On account of the intervention of the Swedish authorities, the 
Synod of the Syriac Orthodox Church made less harsh or perhaps more 
‘compromising’ decisions in relation to the Assyriska activists. In a different 
dimension, – by introducing the compound name Assyrier/Syrianer – the 
Swedish authorities have played a unique role in developing space for 
bringing representatives of both discourses closer and have therefore had a 
unifying role in the name conflict. 
 The identity crisis has built itself around the nodal point ‘the name of the 
people’ and it has transformed both the name and the collective identity of 
Assyrians/Syriacs into a floating signifier. Hence, their traditional identity 
discourses have become dislocated and begun a process of transformation. 
At the surface level, the main difference between the Assyrier and the Syrianer 
has remained their disagreement about the ‘correct name’ to be used to 
represent their people and the ancestry which this name assumes. They have 
been challenging each other’s institutionalized identity discourses and, by 
taking this step, they have both recognized and challenged each other’s 
hegemony over the people. This competition for hegemony has been 
organized around the attempt to hegemonize any further influence on the 
‘naming’ of their people in Western languages and to institutionalize the 
identity discourses to which they each adhere. In their competition for 
hegemony, they have also aimed to fix the meaning of such elements as 
symbolic and cultural capital around particular nodal points (such as the 
Assyriska or Syrianska culture and the Assyriska or Syrianska history). The 
upshot has been that identity discourses are organized around particular nodal 
points and are used to draw political frontiers between the inside (chain of 
difference) and the constitutive outside (chain of equivalence). Their non-
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adherence to a certain identity discourse places individuals in the chain of 
equivalence and results in splits within the community. Consequently, 
hegemony exercised over the influence on the ‘naming’ stretches far beyond 
this question. The struggle over the ‘correct name’ has become symbolic of 
the struggle between elite groups over hegemony within the Assyrian/Syriac 
community. 
 Discourse institutionalization indicates the sedimentation process of 
discourses in which institutional norms and hegemonic ways of thinking are 
presented as objectivity. Although they have come to institutionalize 
separately and antagonistically, the study has also shown the inter-
connectedness of antagonistic subject positions and their identity discourses. 
Nevertheless, the institutionalization of discourses has strengthened the 
antagonistic relationships between elite groups. This process has also created 
space for communication between both groups at institutional level; a new 
modus vivendi. Therefore, institutionalization does not mean simply that their 
differences have increased; instead the reverse is true. Although disagreeing 
with each other, they have begun to use similar strategies, arguments and 
means, but those which fit their own discourse and challenge the discourse 
of the main antagonistic other in this respect. 
 
Diversity within Particularity 
To illustrate the diversity in the two main competing institutionalized 
discourses, I have analysed the discourses of individual elite members in 
relation to the naming of the ‘amo Suryoyo in Western languages, the 
boundaries of this people and their leadership. The naming, the boundaries 
and the leadership of the ‘amo Suryoyo can also be seen as three nodal points 
around which identity discourses have been built and disputed internally. 
The fact that they are disputed indicates their floating character. 
Consequently, this allows space for different interpretations and diverse 
meanings both within each of these discourses and between them. 
Depending on the context, the nodal points around which a specific discourse 
has been built can change. This open character of identity allows space for 
changes in identities and simultaneously explains their occurrence. 
 The analysis of the individual discourses disputing the ‘correct naming’ 
of the ‘amo Suryoyo is based on a categorization of both the primordial and 
situational arguments which are employed in it. I have shown how, in the 
discursive field, both Assyrier and Syrianer struggle for hegemony in order to 
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fix the ‘correct name’ of their people and to imbue it with the meaning which 
lies at the core of their particular ideology. Generally speaking, both groups 
approach identity as a pre-given, natural phenomenon and the formulated 
arguments largely assume a primordial understanding of identity. This 
approach ignores and denies the changeable and relational character of 
identity. Even the situational arguments employed assume a primordial 
essence. The goal of the elite members is to seek justification for their 
arguments by referring to historical sources as if the ‘truth’ was formulated 
thousands or at least hundreds of years ago and consequently the task of the 
present-day elites is to ‘discover’ this truth and to show this to those who 
have not yet made this discovery. The main difference between those using 
the primordial and those who opt for the situational arguments lies in the 
fact that the latter recognize the situational use and relativization of 
arguments and, by doing so, betray an indirect recognition of the contextual 
use of arguments and change in identities. Although the aim of both groups 
is the objectification of the collective identity discourse, to a certain extent 
the situationalists do not deny its constructed character. 
 Primordial arguments are used more frequently by the Syrianska elite 
than by the Assyriska elite. There are two main explanations for this. 
Unquestionably, from the beginning the Assyriska elite have worked 
consciously on the construction of a national project for the future survival 
of their people; their approach to ‘identity’ has been overwhelmingly 
political, a project in which they have employed a top-down strategy. The 
disillusionment which has befallen pioneering Assyriska elite members has 
shown that they have been far less successful than achieving the initial goal 
they set themselves. The second difference between them can be explained 
by the process in which the identity discourse of the Syrianer developed in 
relation to that of the Assyrier. Initially, the focus of the Syrianer was on the 
rejection of the primordial arguments of the Assyrier. Instead, they identified 
at denominational level as members of the Syriac Orthodox Church. Later, 
they developed alternative primordial arguments – basing themselves on 
Aramean ancestry – and specifically in relation to those already used by the 
Assyrier. Not surprisingly, the line of argumentation follows the same 
structure as that of the broader Syrianska discourse. I have illustrated that 
primordial arguments in favour of an Aramean ancestry play a role at 
symbolic level, especially in the competing relationship with the Assyrier. In 
daily life, this assumed ancestry plays a less central role. In the last decade, 
after the introduction of situational arguments by the Assyrier and the 
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relativization of earlier used primordial arguments, in order to ‘de-freeze’ the 
relationship between the representatives of the two main competing 
discourses, Syrianska elite members have also begun to relativize their more 
static approach to the naming of their people. Hence this shift in both 
groups can be explained in processual and relational terms. 
 I have also illustrated the diversity within the two main institutionalized 
discourses in relation to the construction of the boundaries of the ‘amo 
Suryoyo – fluctuating between a narrow and a broader definition. In the 
process of boundary construction, both the chain of difference (‘us’) and the 
chain of equivalence (‘others’) are formed. The narrow definition of the ‘amo 
Suryoyo assumes the inclusion of the members of the Syriac Orthodox, Syriac 
Catholic and the Syriac Protestant Churches. The broader definition includes 
seven Syriac Churches, at least at theoretical level. Depending on the 
context, both definitions might be used by the same individuals 
interchangeably and simultaneously for different purposes. Whereas the 
narrow definition assumes a more traditional approach, the broader 
definition results from a political discourse and functions as a myth waiting to 
be transfigured into a social imaginary (and consequently collectively shared) in 
need of being realized. 
 I have shown that the narrow definition assumes a much more central 
place in the discourses of the Syrianska elite and among those Assyrier who 
have been disillusioned in their ideal of realizing a broader definition of the 
‘amo Suryoyo or of turning the myth of a broad definition into a social imaginary. 
The Syrianska elite defend the narrow definition because of its exclusive or 
more traditional approach to the boundaries of their people. In contrast, the 
disillusioned Assyrier assume that their ideology of the national unity of their 
people has failed and that they will have to revert to reality, believing that the 
historical differences between the Syriac Churches are not yet easy to 
overcome. Nevertheless, the majority of the Assyrier continue to adhere to a 
broader definition of the ‘amo Suryoyo. This definition functions as one of the 
main nodal points in their ideology; if this definition cannot be lived up to 
now, the aim is still to realize this in the future. Simultaneously, this assumes 
the hope of regaining the unity of their people, which would also be 
tantamount to be the unity of the different Syriac Churches under one 
national umbrella. This aim explains their relatively open approach to 
negotiating with potential future members about being included in the future 
definition of their people. In contrast, the Syrianska elite display far less 
willingness to adopt a broader definition. 
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 The negotiational character of the boundaries of the ‘amo Suryoyo is 
based on the concepts of Suryoyutho (Assyrian/Syriac way of life) and self-
identification. The narrower the concept of Suryoyutho used, the narrower the 
definition of the ‘amo Suryoyo becomes. In this case, the Assyrier also use a 
broader and a more negotiable concept of Suryoyutho, adjusting their political 
discourse in an attempt to create a broader platform for national unity. As 
far as the Syrianer are concerned, the concept of Suryoyutho is less negotiable 
but is instead considered a means to defend the present-day boundaries of 
the people. In the eyes of both groups, the core characteristics of Suryoyutho 
are considered to be Christianity and their mother tongue, Suryoyo. Self-
identification also functions as a central factor in fixing boundaries and, in 
this capacity, in the inclusion of individuals and groups in the definition of 
their people. But, while in the first place the Assyrier stress the importance of 
self-identification by potential future members, the Syrianer stress the need of 
their own self-identification in connection with outsiders before allowing 
them space to identify themselves with the ‘amo Suryoyo. Therefore it is the 
latter discourse which maintains the traditional boundaries. Theoretically, the 
approach of the Assyrier can be explained as a way to create cohesion among 
the members of the future (inherently broader) umtho Suryoyto, and therefore 
to make this broader definition effective. As a whole, the diversity of the 
boundaries used illustrates their negotiable character and the absence of a 
hegemonic definition with clear-cut boundaries for the ‘amo Suryoyo. This 
indicates that Assyrians/Syriacs find themselves in the stage after the 
dislocation of traditional boundaries and continue to negotiate and objectify 
new boundaries. 
 In the last empirical chapter, I investigated the relationship between 
identity discourses and leadership discourses against the backdrop of their 
emigration and the subsequent transformation in their identity discourses. I 
have argued that the change from an ethno-religious identity discourse to an 
ethno-national one has resulted in the emergence of the myth about the need 
for secular leadership. So far, Assyrians/Syriacs have failed to identify one 
(secular) leader of their people. This indecisiveness has created a leadership 
crisis and a vacuum. This leadership vacuum has consequently constituted a 
mythical space in which the characteristics of the ‘ideal leader’ have been 
defined. Moreover, the leadership vacuum has resulted in a competition 
between elite groups for hegemony. In the absence of a secular leader, a very 
small minority continues to identify the Patriarch of the Syriac Orthodox 
Church as the leader in overall charge. In this situation, the experience of the 
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need for leadership is the main source plumbed for the construction of the 
myth about an ‘ideal leader’ who is supposed to play a ‘messianic’ role in the 
unification of the split and dispersed Assyrian/Syriac people. As might be 
expected, the myth about the ‘ideal leader’ who is expected to heal the split 
subject is defined differently in the leadership discourses of the Assyrier and 
the Syrianer. Each group tends to recognize the leadership of their secular 
institutions as those in charge of the people, denying the importance of the 
representatives of the other group. This approach again creates a situation in 
which both groups remain connected solely through the leadership of the 
Patriarch, whether they want to be or not. Simultaneously, those who adhere 
to the discourse which seeks to effectuate the unity of Assyrians/Syriacs 
propose a ‘Parliament in Exile’ or a ‘Board of Representatives’, composed of 
representatives of the various Syriac churches. 
 
The Myth about the Need for Unity 
Internal attempts to bring the representatives of both groups closer did not 
commence until about the mid-1990s. However, at an institutional level 
these have so far not been realized by a long chalk; indeed they have grown 
farther apart. Representatives of the sedimented discourses continue to make 
attempts to hegemonize their influence in the process of imbuing nodal points 
in the identity of their people with meaning. From the perspective of both 
elite groups, a future unity assumes a specific particularistic discourse. 
Despite the continuity of this antagonism at institutional level, the majority 
of the ordinary people have distanced themselves from this and have begun 
to relativize the importance of the ‘name debate’, because of the palpable 
split which it has caused in their community. 
 Throughout this thesis, I have illustrated that Assyrians/Syriacs have a 
strong sense of being dispersed and disunited. This has resulted in a situation 
in which a longing for unity has become common. Unity is understood to be 
equivalent to strength; it is associated with the future survival of their people. 
As shown in this study, this lack of unity is seen as an important reason for 
the misery in which they have lived throughout the centuries. Therefore, 
competition between elite groups for hegemony is usually considered 
something negative.  They relate it to the present status quo of ‘disunity’ at 
two different levels. On the one hand, it is a reference to the definition of 
the umtho Suryoyto in the different Syriac churches and, on the other hand, it is 
a reference to the present-day situation in which the members of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church now identify with two different national names and 
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ancestry. The latter form of disunity is considered the one in need of the 
most urgent attention, at least by the ordinary people. The political activists 
see the first form as the more strategic, but they also recognize the 
problematic situation created in relation to the use of two different names 
for the same community; the opposite of what they are aiming for. 
 Despite the strong antagonism between the two main institutionalized 
discourses, in the introduction I have illustrated that the longing for unity 
has overcome the existing split and antagonism at the most urgent moments 
experienced by Assyrians/Syriacs. The threat to existence of the Mor Gabriel 
Monastery was the theme with which I commenced this thesis. I connected 
this to the threat of extinction which Assyrians/Syriacs experience as a 
people, both in the homeland and in the diaspora.  Why is this so? Because 
the survival of Mor Gabriel is inherently connected to their own survival as a 
people, although now the majority live in the diaspora. This explains the big, 
‘united’ demonstration showing support for the continued existence of this 
monastery. Mor Gabriel Monastery symbolizes their presence in one part of 
their homeland – Tur ‘Abdin, where only 2500 Assyrians/Syriacs now remain. 
In their eyes, losing the monastery is inherently connected to the threat of 
extinction hanging over their own heads. 
 The Assyrian/Syriac diaspora can exist only through the social imaginary 
of a homeland; without a homeland, there cannot be a diaspora or an 
existence outside the homeland. Unless there is a homeland, it is impossible 
to speak of a diaspora and the dispersion of a people. Consequently, to speak 
of the dispersion of one’s people is communicating where home is. This 
mechanism re-roots all ‘imagined members’ of the community in a homeland 
in order to continue to exist as a collective – creating the myth of a united 
people, although they continue to live dispersed in the diaspora. This can be 
seen as an attempt to turn this myth into a social imaginary through the strength 
of a shared collective of ideas in order to assure survival. 
 The myth about the need of unity is built on the assumption that gaining 
this will improve and strengthen the position of Assyrians/Syriacs in the 
discursive field. Unity as a myth is an empty space in which different 
expectations or demands are inscribed. This myth functions as an elastic field 
and its purpose is to keep the different members of the group together, 
although diverging in ideas and distancing themselves from each other, they 
are simultaneously drawing closer, depending on the contextual changes. The 
‘elasticity’, which is the main characteristic of the elastic field, prevents the 
different community members from breaking away from the collective. The 
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myth of unity functions in a similar fashion; it offers hope of a better future 
for this trans-nationally based ‘imagined community’. 
 Given this set of circumstances, it is possible to conclude that the urge 
for survival as a people has resulted in the creation of a social imaginary and, as 
a consequence, in a unified action to save Mor Gabriel. The existence of Mor 
Gabriel symbolizes Assyrians/Syriacs’ existence as a people and holds out 
hope of finding the remedy which is proof against what I have termed the 
“Hostages’ and Orphans’ Dilemma” (Yasire u Yatume) – in which they see 
their position as that of hostages (yasire) in the homeland and orphans 
(yatume) in the diaspora. Unless a remedy can be found, it is believed that 
their position will deteriorate. Imbued with this urge for survival, 
representatives of competing discourses organized a united struggle for the 
cause of their people. The unity displayed during the demonstration 
therefore assumes a situation of disunity outside the context of the 
demonstration. It is this disunity (flighutho) which has been transformed into 
their greatest problem by Assyrians/Syriacs in the last four decades, and so 
far they have been unable to reach any substantial solutions. 
 To conclude, this study has contributed to the insights into the 
processes of emigration, settlement and identification of Assyrians/Syriacs in 
the European diaspora, specifically in Sweden.  Making use of the concepts 
of Discourse Theory, I have made a thorough analysis of and provided an 
explanation for the emergence and change in the identity discourses of 
Assyrians/Syriacs in the process of their emigration and settlement. The 
discourse theoretical approach has allowed me to illustrate and explain the 
contextual, relational and processual character of identities caught up in 
vicissitudes in identifications. From this perspective, I have approached 
‘identity’ as an open space which can be imbued with different meanings and 
interpretations. Consequently, I have shown how this open character has 
functioned as a condition for the emergence of the ‘name debate’ among 
Assyrians/Syriacs. 
 Although grounded in a European context, the main focus of this thesis 
has been the formation of identity discourses among Assyrians/Syriacs in the 
Swedish context. In a future study, I shall build on this initial research and 
look into the formation and changes of identity discourses of 
Assyrians/Syriacs who have settled in other Western countries. The 
comparative analysis of such an empirical study will assist in developing 
more insights into local, contextual and relational aspects of identity and the 
strategies employed by subjects in this formation process. In the long term, it 
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is hoped that this strongly empirically embedded research will contribute to 
the theoretical debate of ethnicity and identity. 
 
Awake from your slumbers; 
Observe the world, O my brother; 
Harken to the voice of a free people – How marvellous. 
The times have changed and we are far from our friends; 
We have closed our minds to the work which was once ours; 
The boat of the people is tossed back and forth on the sea of life; 
The day will come when it makes port safely; 
We have hope and trust in this people; 
They will break free their manacles and rise up this century. 849 
           
          George Shamoun 
 
  
                                                 
849 The music for the song Rghush Men Shantho by Habib Mousa (1986). My translation of the 
original in Suryoyo: 
Rghush men shantho/Wahzi britho habro rhimo/Washmah qolo d‘amo hiro men basimo/Mshahlef zabno u 
rahiqina ma haurone/Wamhalaqlan me haunayna kul ‘amlone/Sfitho d‘amo kuzza u kethyo b-yamo d-
haye/Kito yaumo dkulyo u shelyo b-femo d-maye/Ketlan sabro u haymonutho bu ‘amano/Dtower qayde u 








In contrast to a complex system of transliteration which is common among 
linguists, the transcription of non-English words has been kept simple. For 
example, I have not made a distinction between the ‘t’ (teth) as in turo 
(mountain) and the ‘t’ (tau) as in taudi (thank you). Similarly, I have used an 
‘h’ to pronounce the characters in Suryoyo ‘he’ as in haymonutho (believe) and 
‘heth’ as in hirutho (freedom). Consequently, people who do not know Suryoyo 
might therefore pronounce words in which a ‘teth’ or a ‘heth’ is used, wrongly. 
What is more important in this study is the meaning of words. For the 
spelling of place names and the names of individuals, the original spelling has 
been kept. Below I shall define only those signs which are not common in 
the English alphabet and explain the use of combinations of letters that are 
used to replace specific letters that are more commonly used among linguists 
in the field of both Surayt and Syriac. 
   
ç As in the English chamber 
i When used as an article and in a word in Suryoyo, such as in i ‘ito (the 
 church), I have used the English i (small character), which ought to be 
 pronounced as in the English been. 
j As the j in the English jar. 
g As the g in the English good. 
gh As the ğ in Turkish mağaza and ağa when used at the beginning of a 
 word, such as in the ghenso (ethnicity). 
kh As the kh in Arabic Omar Khayyam, such as in nukhroyo (foreigner). 
‘ Corresponds to the Arabic ‘ayn. 
ş As the sh in the English shall. 








Unless otherwise mentioned, the words in this glossary are in Suryoyo (Surayt). 
I have not indicated when it concerns the use of ‘loanwords’ from other 
languages.850 
 
‘Adat Traditions, customs. 
‘Ade Tradition, custom. 
Admo Blood. 
Agha Clan leader (in the context of this study, Kurdish) 
Ahuno Brother. 
Allsvenskan (Swedish) Swedish Soccer Premiere League. 
‘Amo People, ethnie. The term ‘people’ perhaps implies the 
more traditional sense of ‘amo (used in the Middle 
East); the term ‘ethnie’ can be perceived as the 
translation of ‘amo on the basis of a more modern 
concept and from a present-day perspective. I have 
used these translations interchangeably – unless it has 
shown to be necessary to make a distinction. 
‘Amo Mbarbezo A dispersed people, ethnie. 
‘Ashirto In the context of this study, ‘ashirto refers to the 
extended family. Traditionally it is a term derived from 
the Arabic ‘ashira and the Kurdish ‘ashirat for ‘clan’  
but used with a different meaning when applied to 
Assyrians/Syriacs (see further Chapter 7). 
‘Askar Soldier. 
‘Askariye Military service. 
Ashuriye ‘Assyrians’, derived from the Arabic Ashuri for 
‘Assyrians’. Sometimes Assyrians/Syriacs (here: 
members of the Syriac Orthodox Church) who 
disagree with the idea of referring to themselves as 
                                                 
850 See further for loanwords in Suryoyo, Aziz Tezel (2003) and Sina Tezel (2011). 
516                                                GLOSSARY  
 
‘Assyrians’, use it to refer to the members of the 
Assyrian Church of the East. Those who do identify 
themselves as Assyrians also use the Syriac term 
Othuroye to refer to the members of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church. In use, these two variants refer to 
the geographical area in which these terms (Ashuriye 
and Othuroye) began to be used among the ordinary 
people: Ashuriye was used in Arabic-speaking areas 
especially in Iraq and Syria; whereas Othuroye has 
become familiar to the people through the national 
movement and the ‘name debate’ in a European 
context.  
Assyrier An Assyrier (Swedish) is a Suryoyo who assumes Assyrian 
roots and/or who chooses to use the designation 
Assyrian as a national name for his people. Its adherents 
present their choice as the path which was pioneered 
by such elite members as Ashur Yausef and Naum Faik 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. This was a 
path which was adopted to promote ‘irutho 
(enlightenment) among the ‘amo Suryoyo in order to 
prevent their extinction as a group of people through 
the expedient of uniting the Syriac churches under one 
umbrella name ‘Assyrian’, a name derived from that of 
the former ancient Assyria empire.851 Today it has 
become a name steeped in deep symbolic significance 
for its adherents. 
Assyrier/Syrianer The Swedish compound name for Assyrians/Syriacs. 
Assyriska The Swedish adjective for Suryoye (see also  Syrianska). 
Athro Homeland. Athro is also used with the meaning of land, 
nation-state or country. 
‘Aybo Shame. 
Bahro Light. 
Band Kurdish for ‘party’, mainly used in the context of local 
politics in an agricultural society. 
                                                 
851 The second Assyrian Empire fell in 612 BCE. 
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Berberiye Local traditional politics. See further Chapter 7. 
Beth Nahrin        Mesopotamia. 
Britho World. 
Darbo Road. 
Daule Land, country. 
Dayro Monastery. 





Fellahi Kurdish term which was used in Tur ‘Abdin to refer to 
Christians. In this sense it was used synonymously with 
the Kurdish term Suryani to refer to the same group. 
Flighutho Disunity, split. 
Fulhono Work. In the context of this study it refers to the 
fulhono in the context of umthonoyutho, hence to the work 
to be done for the Assyrian/Syriac people. 
Furqono Salvation. 
Frikyrkoråd Free Church Council (in Sweden). 
Gabo Party, faction. 
Galwoyo Refugee. 
Gargro Threshing sledge. 
Garshuni Text produced with a Syriac script but in Ottoman 
Turkish or Arabic language, or Syriac language written 
in Ottoman Turkish script. 
Gavur Turkish term for ‘infidel’. It has been used to refer to 
non-Muslims. 
Golutho Diaspora, emigration. 
Goluyo Refugee. 
Goresto Hand mill. 
Ha b-Nison Assyrian New Year, celebrated on April 1. 
Haram Arabic for ‘unclean’ and ‘forbidden’. 







Ihtiyat Ottoman Turkish for ‘reserve forces’. 
Hubo Love. 
Hudro Association. 
Hulto Aunt (matrilineal). 
Huyodo Federation, Unity. 
‘Ito Church. 
‘Irutho  Enlightenment. 
Jarjar Threshing sledge. 
Jebbo Social aid, Social Welfare Office (both when used in 
Western context). 
Kaldoye Chaldeans. 
Katholik Roman Catholic. 
Kaymakam (Turkish) deputy-governor. 
Ghenso Ethnicity. 
Knushyo Meeting, society, community. 
Krulto Circle. In the context of this study, krulto refers to a 
committee of ADO which consisted of five people. 
Kurmanji A dialect of Kurdish language. 
‘Laymtho Girl. 
‘Layme Young people. 
Leshono Language. 
Madenhoyo Easterner. It is used in relation to Ma‘erboyo for 
‘Westerner’. In the context of this study it refers to an 
Eastern Suryoyo, or a member of the Assyrian Church 
of the East and the Chaldean Church. 
Ma‘erboyo Westerner. In the context of this study it refers to a 
member of the Syriac Orthodox Church. 
Madrashto Church school. 
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Malfono Teacher. 
Malkoye Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic church members. 
Malkutho Heaven. 
Merdalli Arabic dialect spoken in the town Mardin, Turkey. 
Merdalliye Inhabitants or people from the town Mardin. 
Mardutho Culture. 
Margonitho Diamond. 
Mashritho Camp; in the context of this study it refers to the 
cultural awareness youth camps. 
Mbarbezina We have become dispersed. 
Mhalmoye Assyrians/Syriacs consider Mhalmoye to be 
Assyrians/Syriacs who converted to Islam at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century. See further 
Chapter 9. 
Millet Originally an Ottoman Turkish word to designate a 
group of non-Muslim people in the Ottoman Empire. 
Motho Motherland. 
Mukhabarat Arabic for Intelligence Service. 
Muhtar Turkish term for ‘village head’. 
Mullah Title of a Muslim religious leader in Arabic. 
Nasturnoye Members of the Assyrian Church of the East. It is 
perceived as a derogatory term by the members of this 
church. 
Nukhrayto In the context of this study ‘foreign lands’; literally the 






Qentronutho Literally it means ‘centurionship’. In the context of this 
study it is used with the meaning of ‘federation’. 
Qritho Village. 
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Renyo                 Idea, ideology. 
Ruho Literally it means ‘spirit’. In the context of this study it 
comes close to the meaning of ‘attitude’ (as in ruho 
umthonoyto). 
Ru‘yo Shepherd. 
Sa‘a Arabic for ‘watch’. 
Seyfo Genocide perpetrated against the Christian population 
in Ottoman Turkey by the Young Turk regime in the 
First World War. Literally, Seyfo means ‘sword’. 
Sharbo Jar. 
Sho‘tho Watch. 
Surayt Spoken modern Aramaic language of Tur ‘Abdin. In 
this geography, the speakers themselves referred to it 
as Surayt. In the present-day, especially people in 
academia refer to ti as Turoyo (see also Appendix 2).  
Sureth Eastern Suryoyo spoken language, mostly spoken by the 
members of the Assyrian Church of the East and the 
Chaldean Church. 
Suroyo/e The singular Suroyo and the plural Suroye have been 
used in Tur ‘Abdin in the spoken language Surayt, to 
denote a member(s) of the Syriac Orthodox 
Community. Note that this use and understanding was 
common among the ordinary people, while elites may 
have had a different understanding of it. The first 
group used this denotation sometimes as synonymous 
for Christian(s), although it does not mean Christian 
(mshihoyo). The use and meaning of Suroyo in historical 
perspective requires more research. 
Süryani(ler) Turkish for Suryoye (plural). 
Suryoyo/e Suryoyo refers both to a member of the ‘amo Suryoyo 
(Assyrian/Syriac people), to their mother tongue of the 
Suryoye and to the (Suryoye) people. Traditionally, Suryoyo 
has been used to refer to classical Syriac. At the present 
day, people also use it to refer to the spoken mother 
tongue (which they referred to as Surayt in Tur ‘Abdin). 
Therefore, departing from an emic approach, when I 
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refer to the Suryoyo language I mean the spoken 
language, Surayt (see also Appendix 2). 
Suryoye  
Madenhoye Members of the Assyrian Church of the East or 
literally ‘Eastern Suryoye’. 
Suryoye  
Ma‘erboye Members of the Syriac Orthodox Church or ‘Western 
Suryoye’. 
Suryoyutho In the context of this study, ‘Assyrian/Syriac way of 
life’.  See further Chapter 9. 
Syriac (English) A reference to the classical Syriac Aramaic 
language. Furthermore, in the present-day it is also 
used to refer to the Suryoye as a group, as an alternative 
to the earlier term in use ‘Syrian’. 
Syrianer (Swedish) A Syrian (singular form of Syrianer) is a 
Suryoyo who rejects the designation Assyrier and, 
implicitly, any links to an Assyrian past. Individuals 
who identify as such might or might not assume 
Aramean ancestry. The  starting point espoused by the 
Syrianska elite members is that the ‘amo Suryoyo cannot 
justifiably claim Assyrian descent. They consider the 
designation Assyrian a new name for the ‘amo Suryoyo 
and substantiate their opposition  to its adoption by 
stating that such a step will eventually lead to the 
division (flighutho) of their people and subsequently to 
their rapid extinction. This is a stance in ‘defence’ of 
their name – Suryoye – which they chose to  translate by 
the Swedish term Syrianer. During the  interviews, elite 
members apparently took this translation  for granted, 
because they did not try to explain or defend  the use 
of the term Syrianer. In fact it is a new term which has 
been created in Swedish language in Sweden (in the 
second half of the 1970s) to refer to the 
Assyrians/Syriacs. 
Syrianska The Swedish adjective for Suryoye (see also Assyriska). 
Ta‘da Oppression. 
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Talaba(e) Respectively Kurdish and Turkish terms for ‘students’. 
In the context of this study the Talaba were Kurdish 
activists who launched an opposition against the 
Turkish authorities in the 1970s. 




Tyoho To flee, to be expelled. 
Turoyo  This is a reference to the spoken mother tongue of 
Assyrians/Syriacs; formerly known as Surayt (see 
further Appendix 2). 
Twiroye  Literally, ‘broken’. In the context of this study it is used 
in the sense of ‘defenceless’. 
Ummah Arabic term for denoting the Muslim community or 
nation. 
Umtho  Nation. 
Umthonoyo A person who follows the principles of umthonoyutho for 
his/her people (see umthonoyutho). 
Umthonoyutho To sense and express love (hubo) for the 
Assyrian/Syriac people and to dedicate one’s life to 
their care in a broad sense (language, culture, history, 
homeland and church).  Often, umthonoyutho is used 
with a meaning which approximates patriotism and 
sometimes to a lesser extent  It is also used with the 
meaning of nationalism. See  further Chapter 6. 
‘Utmo Darkness. 
Vali Turkish for ‘governor’. 
Varlık vergisi Turkish for ‘capital levy’. See further Chapter 3. 
Waride Roots; literally ‘veins’. 
Yasire            Hostages. 
Yatume              Orphans. 
Yaumo d-Sohde  Martyrs Day. 
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Appendix 1:  
Contextualizing the Syriac Orthodox Church within 
Christianity 
It is beyond the aim of this thesis to discuss the development of the distinct 
Christian communities after the division in the main Christian Church in the 
first centuries of the current era.852 Nevertheless, in order to contextualize 
the present-day discourses of the Assyrian/Syriac elite historically, it is 
necessary to say something more about when and why they split, and how 
they relate to each other as institutional bodies. Their relationships have 
framed the space for formal interaction between the members of the 
different churches today. This discussion will also stand as an illustration of 
the dynamics in the relationships between the various Syriac churches 
historically, allowing me to contextualize this thesis which deals with 
contemporary discourses about today, the past and the future. 
 
The Advent of Christianity 
The region of Syro-Mesopotamia from where the Assyrians/Syriacs originate 
has been the centre stage of many struggles between major powers and a 
crossroad of migrations of peoples. Throughout the course of history, this 
region has been ruled by different people and empires, among them the 
Romans/Byzantines, Persians, Arabs, Mongols and the Turks. The 
consequence of the change in hegemonic power often also gradually brought 
a change in the religious affiliation of the masses – people felt strong 
pressure to choose for one of the religions of the ruling groups. The logical 
consequence of this is that religious affiliation became an important factor 
for the position of people in society. Religion did not remain an individual 
matter but played a role in people’s collective life – as has been the case in all 
pre-modern societies. 
 At the advent of Christianity and during its propagation (until the eighth 
century), the area of the Middle East was dominated by two rival powers, the 
                                                 
852 See for a good overview of the early history of Christianity and more specifically the 
Miaphysites, Frend (1972). 
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Roman Empire853 (which later became the East Roman or the Byzantine 
Empire) and the Persian Empire854, until the beginning of the seventh 
century. Just as other powers which have dominated this region, Byzantium 
and Persia were multi-ethnic empires, enriched by a variety of cultures and 
languages. The majority of the people living in the border areas of these two 
empires in greater Syria and Mesopotamia (present-day Syria, Lebanon, 
South-East Turkey and Iraq) spoke a variety of Aramaic dialects.  Even long 
before the creation of these two empires, Aramaic had functioned as the 
lingua franca in various regions of the Middle East. It continued to fulfill this 
role until well after the rise of Islam. In the Hellenistic and Roman periods, 
Greek also had become a central language, especially in urban and 
administrative settings. This relative linguistic homogeneity is what facilitated 
the spread of Christianity in Syria and Mesopotamia. The link of Christianity 
with both of the languages was strong from the beginning. Although the first 
texts pertaining to Christianity were written in Greek, both Jesus and his first 
disciples spoke an Aramaic dialect. This trend was reflected among the first 
Christian communities, which were composed of speakers of both languages. 
As a result, the religion spread rapidly in the first and early second century, 
first through Antioch and afterwards not only to the West but also to Edessa 
(Urhoy) and Nisibin from where its dissemination steadily increased.  For a 
very long time, these two cities, on the border between the two empires, had 
been important cultural and political centers and acted as points of departure 
from which the new religion radiated throughout the Eastern Middle East. 
 
Syriac as a Literary Language 
A large number of the Aramaic-speaking people in the Roman Empire were 
among the first to convert to Christianity in the first centuries of the current 
era. Although the new Christian communities in various areas of the present-
day Middle East were interconnected through peripatetic preachers and the 
new Christian literature, they had still specific cultural characteristics (Van 
Rompay 1997). Some of the ways in which this was expressed were the 
language, liturgy and church melodies. In the area of eastern Syria and 
Mesopotamia, Christianity was characterized by the use of the Aramaic 
language. Christianity, and later the Syriac Orthodox Church, became a 
central element on which they would base their identity. By the third century, 
                                                 
853 Hereafter, for the period after Constantine I shall refer to it as the Byzantine Empire. 
854 The first two centuries it was known as the Parthian Empire. 
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the spoken dialect of Aramaic in the greater region of Edessa had already 
developed into an established language, usually referred to as Syriac. This 
‘standardized’ form of Aramaic produced an extensive literary tradition – a 
role which it has retained up to the present day. Syriac and its literary 
tradition became an important vehicle for the spread of Christianity, but it 
was also Christianity which gave the language the mass audience to become 
the focal point of a large literary tradition.  One effect of the strong 
development of the Syriac language was that it became possible to channel 
and appropriate the strong influence of Greek culture into an endemic 
regional tradition. In this respect, it can be claimed that the creation of this 
literary language and its use for educational purposes helped to develop a 
Syriac intellectual elite (often monks and priests). Although they tended to be 
learned in Greek culture and literature as well, these elite members were the 
key to the spread of the Syriac language and literature. With the 
dissemination of the language, the conversion to Christianity continued to 
make progress in upper Mesopotamia and within the boundaries of the 
Persian Empire. 
 
Christianity as State Religion and the First Schisms 
Despite persecution, notably under the rulers Decius (AD 249-51) and 
Diocletian (AD 303-11), Christianity was able to develop into a solid 
institutional structure under Constantine (d. 337) (Cameron 1993a: 10-11). 
His conversion to Christianity eventually led to the establishment of 
Christianity as the State Religion in the Roman Empire in 380. In his religious 
politics, he made great efforts to achieve unity in his heterogeneous empire.  
 As the struggles in the empire were about the ‘True Creed’, Constantine 
felt obliged to intervene in the religious affairs of the empire in order to 
achieve uniformity of Creed; a trend which eventually would result in various 
bitter inner-Christian conflicts and splits. In addition, an already existing 
church hierarchy was sanctioned at the Council of Nicea in 325.  
 Almost a hundred years later (410, Council of Mar Isaac), the first 
lasting schism from the mother church occurred among the Christians in 
Persia, who proclaimed their independence from the Patriarch of Antioch 
and the Emperor in Constantinople (Winkler and Baum 2000: 24). The 
reason for this schism was not dogmatic but political; the wars between 
Byzantium and Persia.  What prompted the church hierarchy to take such a 
step was its desire to mark an independent position in relation to the 
Byzantine Church in order to win greater acceptance from the Persian rulers. 
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Thereafter, it was fully integrated into the Persian Empire. It was given the 
name The Church of Persia or The Church of the East. The church has also been 
known under the name East Syrian Church, in juxtaposition to the West Syrian 
Church in Western Syria and in the Byzantine Empire; today it officially bears 
the name Assyrian Church of the East.  
 In the fifth century, the first priority was to resolve the internal 
Christian debate within the Byzantine Empire on how Christ’s Divinity 
relates to His Incarnation as a human being.855 Theologically, the Ecumenical 
Synods of Ephesus (431) and Chalcedon (451) were instrumental in defining 
the three main creeds856 which became the core of the three major Christian 
Movements and, eventually, the various Christian churches of the Near East 
and the Mediterranean. At the Synod of Ephesus, the ideas of Nestorius 
(Patriarch of Constantinople) regarding his Christology and the Virgin Mary 
were declared heretical. After the condemnation of Nestorius, many of his 
followers migrated to Persia and gradually gained some ascendancy in the 
Church in Persia. The Church of the East, which was already independent, 
chose to adopt a Dyophysite Christology, related to Nestorius’ position,857 
but in fact based rather on Theodore of Mopsuestia.858 
 After the Council of Chalcedon (451), it was another half century before 
the Creed became the undisputed dogma of the Byzantine State Church. 
From 518 onwards, Emperor Justin I and his successor Justinian (I) fully 
                                                 
855 See further Meyendorff (1989), Grillmeier and Hainthaler (1979-2006). 
856 These Creeds have been classified as follows: 
• Dyophysite Creed: Christ has two natures which should be distinguished, but never 
separated (Teule 2008: 41). This Creed was not accepted at the Council of Ephesus in 
431. The Assyrian Church of the East is follower of this Creed. Read further about this 
creed in Teule (2008: 40-48). 
• Miaphysite Creed: Christ has one nature out of two natures (‘one (mia) nature of the Word 
of God Incarnate’). The Council of Chalcedon in 451 did not recognize this Creed. The 
Syriac Orthodox, Armenians and Copts are followers of this Creed. 
• Chalcedonian compromise Creed: Christ is one in two natures without confusion, change, 
division, or separation. This Creed became the Creed of the Roman Empire as an 
instrument to unify its Christian citizens. In the era which followed, both friendly 
negotiations and persecutions failed to attain an agreement between the representatives 
of the different opinions and it became impossible to realize the ideal of one Creed in 
the empire. 
857 This is why the Assyrian Church of the East has also been known by the erroneous name 
Nestorian Church, after Nestorius. 
858 In 484, at the Synod of Beth Lapat this was officially adopted and at the Synod of Selukia-
Ktesiphon (486) confirmed (see further Winkler and Baum 2000: 31-34). 
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committed the empire to Chalcedon. The opponents of Chalcedon were 
perceived as dissenters, heretics and a threat to the stability of their empire. 
The church hierarchy and the monastic communities were therefore 
subjected to waves of systematic persecution.859 In response to the 
oppression, the monastic clergy of the Syriac Christians played a leading role 
in mobilizing opposition against the Byzantine church structure. One side-
effect of the oppression was the adoption of a more distanced attitude 
towards the Empire on the part of the Miaphysites. Nevertheless, believing 
their Creed to be the right one, they continued to hope that the Emperor 
would one day recognize this once again, achieving the apotheosis of one 
Empire, one Emperor and one Church. In daily life, the church hierarchy 
and monastic orders sought to escape the influence of the Emperor, mostly 
in Egypt and in rural monasteries. After the persecution had destroyed the 
original Miaphysite hierarchy (which had been part of the State Church), 
Jacob Baradaeus (Bishop of Edessa, ca. 500–578) played a fundamental role 
in the founding of a new independent, stable organizational structure for the 
Syriac Miaphysites.860 The concentration of this new structure in rural 
monasteries explains the reason why the Miaphysites also became 
geographically marginalized.861This marked an important turning point in the 
consecration of laymen as archbishops; from then onwards, almost all 
archbishops were selected from monastic circles. This practice had already 
begun in the Christian Church in the third century but only became a 
common practice for the Miaphysites from about the sixth century. Jacob 
travelled all over the empire, most notably in Syria and northern 
Mesopotamia, consecrating more than thirty bishops, many more priests and 
                                                 
859 Note that the persecution was regionalized. For example, there was no persecution in 
Egypt before 536. Persecuted Miaphysite individuals became the martyrs and heroes of the 
‘True Religion’ in the historiography of the sixth century, and they became the foundation of a 
tradition which evolved into a new formal hierarchy in the Christian church in the second part 
of the sixth century (see further Van Ginkel 1999). 
860 For further reading see Van Rompay (1997). 
861 The congregations were connected through priests and deacons (as had also been the case 
in the State church). They were more tightly interrelated through the building of structural 
networks which were presided over by bishops. The Archbishop, a bishop of a big city, had 
both religious and political rule over the smaller villages in the area. The congregations of the 
West Syriac Christians in the Persian Empire also established their own church organization 
with its own Maferyono, who held a formal position below the Syriac (Orthodox) Patriarch. 
However, in Persia he functioned as the supreme leader for the West Syriac Christians. 
Maferyono is derived from the term firee (fruits). Hence, a maferyono is a person who enables fruit 
to grow. In practical terms, it meant that he was allowed to consecrate clergy. The round, 
black head cover worn by the priests takes its name firo from this. 
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two Patriarchs.862 Historically, Jacob left his mark on the name of the Syriac 
Miaphysites, who have been called Jacobites, usually by outsiders.863 The 
foundation of this new hierarchy introduced a more organized life to its 
Syriac and Greek-speaking members.864 
 Among Christians in Syria and Mesopotamia, there were also groups 
which accepted the Creed as defined at the Council of Chalcedon. Those 
who remained dogmatically loyal to the Byzantine Church were known as 
Melkites.865 From the seventh and eighth century, they were re-organized 
into their own church, which became increasingly more independent, but 
continued to maintain its close association with the Byzantine Church. Today 
they are predominantly Arabic or Greek speaking. Another group retained a 
seventh century compromise formula, from which the Byzantine Church 
later withdrew. This group eventually became concentrated in Lebanon 
around the monastic circles of Maron and became known as Maronites. 
They evolved into an official church in the eighth century and became a 
Uniate church with the Roman Catholic Church (acknowledging papal 
supremacy but retaining its own hierarchy and liturgy) at the time of the 
Crusades (Abouzayd 1999: 305).  
 Retrospectively, it is possible to see that the divisions in the church were 
also heavy influenced by non-theological struggles: political (mainly between 
Byzantium and Persia), ethnic, social, and personal matters between the 
clergy (Van Rompay 1997).866 Syriac-speaking Christians gradually began to 
express their own traditional cultural identity with their own Christian 
literature. From the late sixth or the beginning of the seventh century, they 
loosened their ties to the Byzantine Empire and its ideology. Hence, a form 
                                                 
862 Although these two patriarchs bore the title ‘Patriarch of Antioch’, they could not have 
their see in Antioch. They were forced – as have been the Patriarchs after them – to move 
around between different places and monasteries. 
863 The term Jacobites is commonly perceived as a heretical name by the Syriac Orthodox 
Church, because it ascribes the foundation of this Church to Bishop Jacob Baradaeus only, 
although it is believed that the church had already existed before him. Jacob Baradaeus was 
only responsible for ordaining many clergymen for his church which was persecuted by the 
Byzantines for its anti-Chalcedonian Theological stand in the sixth century. 
864 See further Honigman (1951), Van Ginkel (1995). 
865 The name ‘Melkites’ (Malkoye in Syriac) means ‘followers of the King.’ They were (and are) 
to be found in Greater Syria, Palestine and Egypt. They are now locally known as ‘Rum 
Orthodox’, the name ‘Melkites’ being used chiefly by the Greek Catholic Church. 
866 For a warning against the over-interpretation of these non-religious elements, see further 
Jones (1959: 280-298), Van Ginkel (1995: 103-217), Iricinschi and Zellentin (eds. 2008) and 
Ter Haar Romeny et al. (2009). 
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of Christianity was established among them characterized by a dominant 
element of Syriac, instead of Greek. Eventually this assisted in the evolution 
of a vigorous Syriac literary culture. 
 At this point, a few words should be said about the Syriac church in 
India. According to some, from the first century of the current era, but 
definitely since the fourth century, there has also been Syriac Christianity in 
India (see further Chapter 10). Tradition traces this back to the Apostle 
Thomas who would have made the first converts among the people in South 
India. Thereafter, several small groups of Christians from Persia, Syria and 
Mesopotamia travelled to India which injected new impulses into the Syriac 
Christian communities there. 
 
Syriac Christianity and Orthodoxy 
Syriac Christianity has often been presented by its hierarchy as a more 
genuine and authentic tradition, in which the Hellenic (here ‘pagan’) 
influences are fewest (Cameron 1993a: 183). It is important to draw attention 
to the fact that the conversion to Christianity in the Byzantine Empire led to 
a strong break with what converts saw as their ancestral culture (Cameron 
1993a: 80). This often led to an idealization of Syriac Christianity and Syriac 
spirituality, which was favourably contrasted with mainstream ‘Greek culture’ 
(Cameron 1993b: 183). The Greek term Orthodox (the ‘true creed’, Trisat 
Shubho in Syriac) has been used in the title of the church to express this 
‘genuine’ aspect of the Syriac Orthodox Church of Antioch. It was a way of 
challenging the genuineness of the other Christian Churches at the time. 
Believing themselves to be the true Christians, the Miaphysites continued to 
refer to themselves as ‘the Orthodox’, and used such pejoratives as heretics 
or ‘Nestorians’ for the Chalcedonians and the East Syriacs. Likewise, other 
Churches applied the term Orthodox to their institution. John of Ephesus (ca. 
508-ca. 588) already used to refer to his own group as the ‘Orthodox’, while 
all the others were generally disparaged as heretics or were referred to by the 
name of the person who had had a dominant influence in that specific 
church (as in the case of Nestorius and Jacob). The earliest attestation so far 
of the phrase Syriac Orthodox, used by a member to designate his own 
community, can be found in an unpublished hagiography – on Theodota of 
Amid (d. 698) – in a Syriac manuscript from the early eighth century by 
Symeon of Samosata, at the dictation of Father Joseph, Theodota’s 
532                                       APPENDIXES 
 
disciple.867 Archival material from the early twentieth century shows that 
there was no uniformity in the use of the term Orthodox in the formal title of 
the Syriac Orthodox Church until at least the 1930s.868 In an unpublished 
survey of some works in his archive, George Kiraz ascribes the use of 
Orthodox in a formalized manner to the beginning of the twentieth century, 
when church representatives began to use formal letterheads.869 Before that, 
as shown in the Patriarchal Archive in the Zafaran Monastery, varieties of 
                                                 
867 The use of ‘Syriac Orthodox’ in the early eighth century might indicate that too many 
churches were already referring to themselves as Orthodox. Consequently, Father Joseph (who 
dictated the text) found the need to use Syriac in combination with Orthodox. I defer a more 
elabourate study to historians. 
There is also a Garshuni translation by Brother Bishara of the Zafaran Monastery 
which dates from the eighteenth century. A publication of the translation of the Garshuni by 
Jack Tannous is on its way. Interestingly, whereas in the initial text in Syriac the author 
Symeon of Samosata in the same paragraph used first the reference Syriac Orthodox (Suryoye 
Orthodox) and the second time only Syriacs (Suryoye), in the Garshuni translation of the Syriac 
by Jack Tannous, Brother Bishara twice uses the phrase Syriac Orthodox:  
‘Then Mar Theodota went out to go to the region of the fortresses (al-ḥuṣūn) and 
passed by Bīlū and Pīlīn and the rest of the districts that are there.  So he said to his 
disciple, ‘Joseph, my Son, let us go and visit those Syrian Orthodox [my emphasis] 
who are in flight because of neediness and the great number of the Arabs.  We will 
pray for them and encourage them in the hope of faith, for I know that the Romans 
are driving them out so they will change their faith.’ … The two of them rose up 
and went along and they arrived at the little lake called ‘Hūrē.’  He found the Syrian 
Orthodox [my emphasis] gathered, all of them, at the fortresses, for they had heard 
about the Arabs seeking to enter into that region.  They therefore wanted to flee 
and enter into the islands of that lake and to the fortresses and they were in difficult 
miseries.’ 
I would like to thank Jack Tannous for providing me with this translation before its 
publication. 
The fact that Bishara translated Suryoye in his eighteenth-century manuscript with Suryoye 
Orthodox might indicate that by then the term Suryoye had come to be used synonymously with 
Suryoye Orthodox.  
It draws attention to the fact that the Greek term Orthodox is not translated by the 
Syriac Trisat Shubho. Besides the fact that this exhibits the strong influence of the Greek 
language, it might also be an indication that no Syriac terminology yet existed to denote the 
idea of Orthodoxy at that time. A follow-up question is: When did the Syriac phrase Trisat 
shubho begin to be used? 
868 Examples of the use of Orthodox are to be found back in 1) ‘The Constitution of the Syrian 
Orthodox Patriarchate’ (Al Hikma, 1913, No. 10, pp. 143); 2) Al-Hikma 1927, issued by St. 
Mark’s Syrian Orthodox Convent in Jerusalem; 3) in the 1928 constitution of the Beirut-based 
Knushto d-Kawkbo (Star Association); and 4) in Dolabani (1929). Another example showing that 
until at least 1930 there is still no uniform usage of Orthodox in the name of the Syriac 
Orthodox Church is an encyclical issued by Patriarch Elias III in 1930 which does not 
mention Orthodox. 
869 Private correspondence with George Kiraz, 2009. 
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phraseology were used by the Patriarchs in their correspondence. The first to 
have a printed letterhead imitating the Western tradition was Patriarch 
Ephrem Barsaum when he was a bishop in Syria. It might be argued that 
Orthodoxy was introduced in the past, but by the twentieth century it could 
also be communicated through the new discursive means available and with 
partly new purposes. 
 In a church document with legal status from 1914 in the Ottoman 
Empire, it was sometimes used as an adjective and sometimes as a 
substantive part of the name of the church.870 Although today the term 
Orthodox has assumed a formal position in the title of the Church, it has less 
of a functional role. Whereas once the churches, as discussed above, 
competed for authenticity, today they have reached an agreement that the 
divisions were about other matters (see, for example, the citation of Patriarch 
Zakka I Iwas, later in this text). 
 
The Uniate Churches 
In continuing the story of the mosaic of Syriac Churches, it is important to 
mention the several churches which have united with the Roman Catholic 
Church since about the sixteenth century:871 1) Members of the Church of 
the East united with Rome in 1553, with the consecration of the first 
Chaldean Patriarch (Patriarch Shim‘un VIII ‘of the Chaldeans’), ordained by 
the Pope. 2) Under the influence of the Franciscans, the Syriac Orthodox in 
                                                 
870 See, for example, the regulations of the Syriac Orthodox Patriarchate to the Ottoman State 
in the article Süryani Kadim Ortodoks Kilisesi Patrikhane Nizamnamesi by the sociologist Mehmet 
Simsek (Ancient Syriac Patriarchate regulations, September 2005, No. 6: 725-742).  In 1914, a 
committee of the Syriac Orthodox Church was requested by the Ottoman State to set up a 
document regulating what its formal status in the Empire had been in 1913. Although it was 
already a millet, this formal document did not exist until 1914. This ‘regulation document’ 
(Nizamname) was compiled by a representative committee consisting of laymen and clergy and 
signed on 18 March 1914. On 24 June 1914, it was published in the Patriarchal magazine (No.  
21: 36). The original document is to be found in the archive of the Forty Martyrs Church in 
Mardin. It is possible to draw the conclusion that in these regulations the term Orthodox was 
used in two principal but different ways: as the name in the title of the church by the members 
of this church committee and as an adjective. In the text of the regulations, the term Orthodox 
is used as an adjective. Hence, as an adjective Orthodox is here used in relation to those Syriacs 
who are not Orthodox; for example, in Article 1, ‘Orthodox Syriac Ancient Patriarchate’ 
(Ortodoks Süryani Kadim Patrikliği). But, in other articles it is also possible to find Orthodox in the 
title of the Church, such as in Article 15, which states: ‘The Syriac Orthodox Churches in 
India’ (Hindistan’daki Süryani Ortodoks Kiliseleri). 
871 See further about the Uniate churches, Brock (2004: 44-65), Murre-van den Berg (2007: 
249-268), Galadza (2007: 291-318). See for the history of the different Catholic churches in 
Turkey after the Second World War, Teule (2010: 35-52). 
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Aleppo accepted a Roman Catholic Bishop (Andreas Ahijan), consecrated 
him in 1656, and in 1662 he became the first Syriac Catholic Patriarch. They 
continued to use the West Syriac rite. 3) After the arrival of European 
missionaries in India, the East Syriac Church in India fragmented into at 
least eight different churches (Brock 1999: 468). 4) The Melkite Catholic 
Church was founded in 1724. Although more churches could be mentioned 
(such as Syriac Protestant Churches), there is no need to delve any farther 
into the matter in this study. 
 
Changing Historical Relationships between the Syriac Churches 
The diversity of Creeds used in the Church since the fifth century led to 
partially different collective identifications and group boundaries. Especially 
after Nestorius’ ideas were declared heretical at the Council of Ephesus and 
the Church of the East in Persia became ever more influenced by Nestorius’ 
ideas, the distance and enmity between the so-called Nestorians (East 
Syriacs) and Jacobites (West Syriacs) increased. From that period, two 
separate Syriac church communities continued their separate ways mainly in 
the current states Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran.872 Historically, their relations 
after the division have been far from peaceful. Up to the eighth century, for 
example, the Syriac Orthodox seemed to have felt a greater affiliation with 
other Miaphysites,873 such as the Armenians, than with the Dyophysite East 
Syriac Church (Witakowski 1987: 48). It is important to note that these 
relations were dominated almost completely by religious elites who set the 
path for hegemonic discourses among their communities. 
 Despite the schism, in later centuries this antagonism ameliorated and 
the interchange between the two traditions increased. This is especially 
visible between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries; the period of the 
so-called Syriac Renaissance.874 The Syriac churches have always continued 
to share such aspects as a common liturgical language, use of the Eastern 
liturgy, historical sources, mystic literature, apocalyptic texts and other 
genres, and the veneration of the same saints. New processes show that 
Syriac churches which united with Rome a few centuries ago and had 
                                                 
872 See further for the relationship between these two churches after the Islamic conquest, 
Hage (1966: 81-83), Kawerau (1955: 70-72), Murre-van den Berg (2007). 
873 Witakowski refers to them as Monophysites in his publication of 1987. 
874 The Mongol invasions (the second invasion by Timur Lenk was the most severe) were the 
main reason for the end of this period, leading to more isolated communities. See further 
about the Syriac Renaissance, Teule (2009). 
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consequently latinized their liturgy (at least partly), have begun to reverse that 
process by re-introducing their former Syriac liturgy. This is happening 
among the Maronites875 in Lebanon and the Melkites in America, who are 
working on recovering their Eastern heritage (Abouzayd 1999: 305, Melling 
1999: 313). Especially among the West and the East Syriacs, besides Syriac as 
liturgical language, their mother tongues (different modern forms of 
Aramaic) continue to play a central role in their collective identity. This is 
different among the urbanized Syriac Christians especially in Iraq, who 
adopted Arabic as their mother tongue; sometimes as long ago as the eighth 
and ninth centuries. 
 Since the mid-twentieth century, the Syriac Churches have commenced 
dialogues about theological and ecclesiastical matters with other churches.876 
One example is the meeting at the Pro Oriente Foundation in 1971, in which 
the Chalcedonian and the non-Chalcedonian churches reached a new 
agreement on the Christology of Christ. In 1984, in a joint declaration issued 
by Pope John Paul II and the Syriac Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch and All 
the East, Ignatius Zakka I Iwas, they declared that (O’Mahony 2006: 532):  
The schisms that arose in the fifth century in no way affect or touch the 
substance of their faith, since these arose only because of differences in 
terminology and culture and in the various formulae adopted by different 
theological schools to express the same matter. 
In the 1990s, meetings between the Syriac Orthodox, the Assyrian Church of 
the East and the Chaldean churches also developed greater affinity between 
these churches. For everyday life, this new attitude means that the members 
of the different churches are free to participate in the service of other 
churches. The church institutions allow space for developing closeness 
among its members. This was a process which the lay (and at informal basis 
also clerical) intellectuals had already begun around the end of the nineteenth 
century (see further Chapter 7). 
                                                 
875 To stress the Syriac tradition of this church, the contemporary official name of the church 
is Antiochian Syriac Maronite Church. 
876 The Syriac Orthodox Church became a member of the World Council of Churches in 








Appendix 2:  
The naming of the language Surayt and Turoyo 
At present, especially in the diaspora, the majority of Assyrians/Syriacs refer 
to Surayt as Suryoyo (in everyday language) and as Turoyo (in linguistic and 
especially academic contexts). Traditionally, the term Suryoyo has been used 
to refer to classical Syriac. In the present-day, when Assyrians/Syriacs want 
to distinguish Surayt from classical Syriac, they refer to the latter with Suryoyo 
kthobonoyo (‘written Suryoyo’ – as traditionally the spoken language was not 
written). Since the mid-1980s, some individuals have attempted to develop a 
system for writing the spoken language Surayt in both Syriac877 Aramaic 
script and Latin878 characters. 
 In a recent study, Sina Tezel (2011) refers to this language on the cover 
of her book as Ṣu ̄rayt/T ̣ūro ̄yo and in the book itself as T ̣ūro ̄yo, because it has 
become the most commonly used term in academia. As she mentions, the 
increase in the use of the term Turoyo among the ordinary Assyrians/Syriacs 
can be explained by the fact that Western scholars refer to it as such. Many 
of these scholars are not even aware of the fact that what they have referred 
to as Turoyo was called Surayt by its speakers in Tur ‘Abdin, the geography in 
which it had been traditionally spoken. How did this shift in reference take 
place? The linguist Aziz Tezel (private correspondence, 2011) thinks the 
term T ̣ūro ̄yo was formed after the Arabic term Ṭo ̄ra ̄ni ̄. He observes that the 
term Turoyo is not found in any early dictionary of Syriac and that it is also 
missing from Prym and Socin’s (1881) Der Neu-Aramäische Dialekt des Tur 
‘Abdin, who used a Surayt-speaking informant from Midyad (although they do 
mention the Arabic term T ̣o ̄ra ̄ni ̄). Furthermore, Eduard Sachau who made a 
journey through Tur ‘Abdin and Mardin in 1879-1880 writes ‘In Midyad they 
speak a dialect of modern Syriac, called T ̣ōra ̄ni ̄ (1883: 412, see for this 
reference also Ibid: 420, 429). If the term Turoyo had been used by the Surayt-
speaking informants of these linguists it might have been expected to have 
                                                 
877 See for instance the Little Prince of Antoine de Saint-Exupéry which has been translated 
into Surayt by Kreis aramäischer Studierender Heidelberg (2005). 
878 Most of the publications by Jan Beth Sawoce are written in Surayt with Latin characters. 
See also Diyarbakerli (2009). 
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been used by that time. Aziz Tezel’s hypothesis is that during the twentieth 
century, Surayt speakers in Syria, Lebanon and some of the speakers in 
Midyad who were familiar with the term Torani and therefore used it, 
transposed the meaning of the Arabic term T ̣ōra ̄ni ̄ into T ̣ūro ̄yo. Similarly, 
Assyrians/Syriacs in the Gozarto (Jezire) in Syria used to refer to 
Assyrians/Syriacs in Tur ‘Abdin or who had come from Tur ‘Abdin in Arabic 
as Torani (Arabic for Turoyo, ‘[someone] from the mountain’) and to their 
language as Torani ‘[language] of the mountain’. And when they spoke in 
Suryoyo, they referred to the people as Turoye and to the language as Turoyo. 
The use of the last two designations can also be explained in terms of social 
and geographical boundaries and perceptions between and about the urban 
people on the one hand and agriculturalists on the other hand. Departing 
from this idea, it might even have been possible that those who did not 
speak Surayt, referred to it in Arabic as Torani and that those Surayt speakers 
who lived in Arabic-language dominated areas began to use the term Turoyo 
instead of the term Surayt. The upshot would have been that the term Turoyo 
began to be used in an Arabic-speaking dominated geography, therefore 
mainly outside Tur ‘Abdin. The reference to this language as T ̣ūro ̄yo by 
linguists such as Ritter and Jastrow and their students therefore says 
something about the use of terminology specifically by their informants 
when describing the language. 
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Naum Faik about the Use of the Name of His People in 
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Appendix 4:  
Memorandum Presented by Archbishop Ephrem 
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Assyro-Chaldean Map: Requested geography for autonomy by Archbishop 
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Appendix 6:  
The Letter of Patriarch Ignatius Elias III to the 
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Appendix 7:  
Communication between UNHCR Officials and 
the Swedish Authorities about the Settlement of 
Assyrians from Lebanon in Sweden 
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Appendix 8:  




IN THE NAME OF THE ETERNAL, DIVINE AND ALMIGHTY 
BEING 
 
IGNATIUS ZAKKA I IWAS PATRIARCH OF THE APOSTOLIC 
SEE OF ANTIOCH AND ALL THE EAST, SUPREME HEAD OF 
THE UNIVERSAL SYRIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH 
 
 
We extend our apostolic benediction, best wishes and greetings to 
our venerable brothers, His Beatitude Mor Baselius Paulos II, 
Catholicos of the East, and Their Eminencies the Metropolitans; to 
our spiritual children: the honorable archdiocesan vicars, chor-
episcopii, monks, priests and deacons; and to all our esteemed 
Syrian Orthodox people. May the divine providence of the Lord be 
bestowed upon them through the intercession of the Blessed Virgin 
Mary, Mother of God, and all the martyrs and saints. Amen. 
After inquiring about your well being... It is our pleasure to inform you 
that we held our Syrian Orthodox Holy Synod of Antioch between the 
                                                 
879 Source: Syriac Orthodox Resources: 
 http://sor.cua.edu/Personage/PZakka1/19811129Name.html 
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third and fifteenth day of Second Tishrin (November) 1981 at the 
headquarters of our Apostolic See in Damascus, Syria, where we placed 
the benefit of our Church and its advancement as our main concern, 
regardless of the efforts which it may require or the sacrifices which may 
have to be endured to achieve this, following the footsteps of our blessed 
predecessors. In order for the outcome of the Synod to be at the level of 
our spiritual aspiration, and in order for the Holy Synod to become a 
milestone in the modern history of our Church, each of its members took 
on his behalf his historical duties. Starting with our pastoral 
responsibilities, the salvation of souls, the maintenance of the true 
Orthodox faith and tradition, the revival of our Holy Syriac language, and 
the resurrection of our glorious Syrian Antiochean tradition, we studied a 
condensed agenda which included various matters: The budget of the 
Patriarchate, its internal organization, its endowments and institutions, 
and all what relates to its affairs. We looked into the case of St. Ephrem's 
Seminary in Atshane, Lebanon, and the importance of advancing it 
spiritually and educationally in order to bring it to a good academic level; 
for this, we appointed a bishopric committee under our chairmanship. We 
also studied the affairs of our Church in India and its relation to our 
Apostolic See of Antioch in the presence of His Beatitude, the Catholicos, 
and our bishops in India during a General Synod which we held in the 
headquarters of our Apostolic See from the seventeenth day of Second 
Tishrin (November) till the twenty seventh of the same month, during 
which we wrote a constitution for our Church in India, stating its relation 
with our Apostolic See. Further, we discussed the relation of our Church 
with sister Orthodox Churches and other Churches and communities, as 
well as the role of our Church in the ecumenical movement. The Synod 
then looked into the issue of the date of Easter and decided to keep it 
according to the tradition of our Church, raising no objections against 
changing it once all the Churches in the Middle East agree on a specific 
Sunday in the month of Nisan (April). The Synod then made the final 
touches to the Constitution of our Holy Church and the Canons of 
Personal Affairs, taking into consideration the requirements of the 
modern age. It also examined the affairs of the archdioceses in general, 
pointing out the role of the priest in the Church and the importance of 
the individual; in this respect, it declared that the Sunday of Priests of 
every year is to be dedicated for supplications for priests. It also declared 
the Sunday which follows the Feast of the Cross, the anniversary of our 
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installation, to be the Patriarchal Day. The Holy Synod insisted on the 
importance of preparing a new generation filled with faith, as well as 
spiritual, humanitarian and patriotic values, where individuals learn 
religion at religious centers and Sunday schools which are associated with 
the leadership of each archdiocese. The Synod also found it appropriated 
to reexamine the liturgical texts and to publish them; for this purpose, it 
appointed a special committee. Here, we take the opportunity to order 
our children, the priests, to perform the Church rites in dignity, to observe 
fasting and perform prayers at the designated times according to the 
traditions of the Church, and to visit the faithful continuously creating a 
spiritual atmosphere in each family during such visits. We also urge our 
children, the deacons, to master the rites, practicing them with faith, piety 
and obedience, and to be committed to serving the house of God 
according to their spiritual mission. 
The Holy Synod paid special attention to the issue of the true name of our 
Church. The Synod is of the following opinion: it is well established that 
from the very dawn of Christianity, and since St. Peter, Head of the 
Apostles, established its See in Antioch-Syria until this day, our Church is 
known as the Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch (`idto suryoyto 
orthodoxoyto dantiokh), and its language is known as the Syriac language; 
(leshono suryoyo), and its people by the Syrian people (`amo suryoyo). By this 
name of noble origin, which stems from our ancient history, our 
Apostolic faith, and our proud civilization, we are known as a Church, our 
language is known, and we are known as people [the original reads: 
] amongst all religious, educational and social circles, locally 
and internationally. We do not accept any other name.  
What appeared and appears contrary to this name is not only alien and 
foreign, but also a distortion, falsification and forgery of the historical 
truth. We, in our Apostolic power, declare our distress and disapproval to 
the new names which have appeared lately and which have been attached 
to our Church and our people such as 'Assyrian', 'Aramaean' and the like. 
These names aim at distracting the existence of our Church, dividing its 
children, destroying the landmarks of its glories, and annihilating its 
civilization and its spiritual and humanitarian traditions. But Christ is in its 
midst and she is unshakable; its shepherds are vigilant and awake, 
protecting its walls, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. 
Therefore, we warn all the faithful of our Church, especially priests and 
deacons, regardless of their hierarchical offices, against adopting these 
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ideologies which are in opposition to the Holy Church and its faith, and 
which are disgraceful to its reputation. We notify you that our Holy Synod 
granted power to the heads of archdioceses to take the appropriate 
ecclesiastical actions to deter those who entice so that they return to the 
path of truth, especially in archdioceses in which these ideologies have 
started to appear and have become dreadful, turning into grave danger for 
the Church.  
Our dear spiritual children: In the endeavor to maintain the unity of our 
Church, vigilantly caring for our children, and out of our fatherly love to 
you, we appeal to you all, clergy and people, to care of your spiritual and 
social responsibilities, and to appreciate the sacrifices which your blessed 
forefathers endured to keep the jewels of faith which were entrusted unto 
us, and to maintain the sacred things which our Church prides itself with. 
We also appeal to you to distinguish the voices of the true shepherds and 
to stay away from the wolves which aims at ravaging you, you the blessed 
flock of Christ. And we advice, for the second time, those who entice and 
have gone astray from the Church to return to its bosom and to live side 
by side with their brothers in love and trust as members of one Syrian 
[Orthodox; the original reads: suryaaniyya ] family.  
And the Grace of the Lord be with you all the time. Amen.  
 
Issued from our Patriarchal Residence in Damascus, Syria, 
on the 29th day of Second Tishrin (November) 1981, the second year of 
our Patriarchate.  
Translated from the original published in the Patriarchal Journal (1981) 
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Appendix 10:  
Joint Letter of Archbishop Timotheos Aphram 
Aboodi and the Suryoyo Riksförbundet to the 
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Appendix 11:  
Introduction by Archbishop J. J. Çiçek to Ephrem 
Barsaum’s Book The Syrian Church of Antioch: Its 
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Dit onderzoek is uitgevoerd in het kader van het PIONIER project The 
Formation of a Communal Identity among West Syrian Christians, onder leiding van 
Prof. Bas ter Haar Romeny aan de Universiteit Leiden.880 Mijn vier collega’s 
hebben zich bezig gehouden met de identiteitsformatie van de Syrische 
Christenen vanuit theologisch, historisch en kunsthistorisch perspectief in de 
periode tussen de vijfde en dertiende eeuw.881 Ik heb mij als antropoloog 
binnen dit project gericht op de moderne tijd. 
 De aanleiding voor mijn historisch antropologische studie is het 
wereldwijde debat over de ‘juiste naam’ van de ‘amo 
Suryoyo882(Assyrische/Syrische bevolkingsgroep) in Westerse talen geweest. 
Hoewel ik het debat in een transnationale context heb geplaatst, is deze 
studie vooral gebaseerd op de situatie in Europa en specifiek toegespitst op 
de situatie in Zweden. Ik heb mij gericht op de discoursen van verschillende 
‘elite’ groepen binnen de Suryoye gemeenschap. De elite bestaat uit individuen 
die een invloedrijke rol hebben binnen de groep. Het gaat hierbij onder 
andere om geestelijken, hoogopgeleiden, activisten en de oudere generatie 
(mannen) die vanuit de traditionele rol invloed weten uit te oefenen binnen 
de groep waar zij deel van uitmaken. De wijze waarop ik het concept ‘elite’ 
heb gebruikt is derhalve relatief.  
 
                                                 
880 Zie verder over dit project, Ter Haar Romeny et al. 2009. 
881 Zie verder voor hun resultaten, Immerzeel (2009), Snelders (2010), Ter Haar Romeny 
(forthcoming) ‘The Commentary of the Monk Severus with the Additions of Simeon of Hisn 
Mansur: Genesis’, Van Ginkel (forthcoming) ‘Creating an Umta: Michael the Great, His 
Sources and the Development of an Ethnic Awareness in Syrian Orthodox Historiography’. 
882 Hoewel ik in dit boek in het Engels de dubbele benaming Assyrians/Syriacs heb gebruikt, zal 
ik voor de Nederlandse samenvatting de benaming Suryoye (Assyriërs/Syriërs) en ‘amo Suryoyo 
(Assyrische/Syrische bevolkingsgroep) gebruiken omdat dit in de Nederlandse context vrij 
gebruikelijk is en het de leesbaarheid van de tekst vergemakkelijkt. 
 Binnen de context van deze studie zijn de Suryoye gedefinieerd als de leden van de 
Syrisch Orthodoxe Kerk. Hierin ben ik uitgegaan van de definitie zoals gehanteerd in het 
PIONIER Project Syriac Christianity, waar dit onderzoek deel uitmaakt van een breder 
onderzoeksproject. Zoals ik heb laten zien in deze studie, kan de definitie Suryoye ook een 
bredere groep impliceren, afhankelijk van individuele verschillen in identiteitsdiscoursen. 
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In dit werk laat ik zien hoe het ‘naamdebat’ is ontstaan, welke groepen hierin 
een centrale rol hebben gespeeld en hoe ditzelfde debat heeft geleid tot een 
splitsing binnen de gemeenschap. De splitsing komt tot uitdrukking in de 
institutionalisering van de groep binnen twee verschillende dominante 
organisatiestructuren – zowel op nationaal als internationaal niveau. Ter 
illustratie van zowel de dominante ideeën als de diversiteit binnen beide 
discoursen heb ik in de laatste drie hoofdstukken individuele discoursen 
geanalyseerd ten aanzien van drie aspecten: a) de ‘juiste naam’ van de ‘amo 
Suryoyo in Westerse talen; b) de grenzen van de ‘amo Suryoyo, oftewel: ‘wie zijn 
de insiders?’ en c) het leiderschap van de ‘amo Suryoyo. Voor een verklaring 
van de genoemde splitsing en de geïnstitutionaliseerde identiteitsdiscoursen, 
heb ik de volgende onderzoeksvragen centraal gesteld: 
 
1) Wat zijn de identiteitsdiscoursen van de Suryoye-elite in de Europese 
diaspora? 
2) Hoe kunnen wij deze discoursen in een historisch perspectief 
plaatsen? Nog specifieker, wat is de relatie tussen de emigratie van 
the Suryoye naar Europa en de gearticuleerde identiteitsdiscoursen? 
3) Hoe kan de strijd tussen de Suryoye-elites onderling verklaard 
worden? 
 
Voor het beantwoorden van deze vragen heb ik de huidige discoursen over 
de eigen collectieve identiteit in een sociaal-historisch perspectief geplaatst. 
Daarnaast heb ik gebruik gemaakt van de concepten van de Discourse Theory, 
welke mij hebben geholpen bij het verklaren van processen die hebben 
plaatsgevonden. Het uitgangspunt van de Discourse Theory is dat identiteiten 
niet gegeven (pre-given) zijn, maar een relationeel en daarom open en 
dynamisch karakter hebben dat verandering van identiteiten mogelijk maakt 
en deze verklaart. Dit alles is inherent antagonistisch. Daarom is het 
vertrekpunt van de Discourse Theory dat groepsformaties het gevolg zijn van 
antagonistische relaties binnen een sociaal veld en schrijft zij een belangrijke 
rol toe aan machtsrelaties en hegemonie. 
 De eerste historische hoofdstukken behandelen de positie van de Suryoye 
in de athro (het vaderland) en hun emigratie in de afgelopen eeuw, met een 
sterke focus op de emigratie naar Europa. Ik heb gesteld dat hun emigratie 
bezien moet worden tegen de achtergrond van hun gemarginaliseerde en 
onderdrukte positie in de athro. In de periode na de Eerste Wereldoorlog zijn 
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zij in Turkije niet erkend als een niet-Islamitische minderheid, een status die 
wel aan Armeniërs, Grieken en Joden is toegekend. Dit betekent dat zij niet 
beschermd zijn door enig internationaal verdrag of door de Turkse 
constituties (1923, 1961 en 1980). Er kan dan ook gesteld worden dat hun 
positie in de Turkse Republiek ten opzichte van die in het Ottomaanse Rijk 
is verslechterd, wat er mede toe geleid heeft dat zij bijna volledig verdwenen 
zijn in hun voormalige athro, zoals in Tur ‘Abdin (Zuidoost Turkije). 
 Een ander aspect dat een belangrijke rol heeft gespeeld in hun emigratie 
is dat de Suryoye zich als christenen sterk met het christelijke Westen 
identificeerden en op grond hiervan allerlei hoopvolle verwachtingen 
koesterden. Hun veronderstelling was dat zij van harte welkom zouden 
worden geheten. Zowel tijdens de emigratie als bij het vestigingsproces 
werden zij hierin echter teleurgesteld. Hun verwachting dat Westerse 
autoriteiten op de hoogte zouden zijn van hun positie in het Midden Oosten 
en daarom hun asielverzoeken als vanzelfsprekend zouden inwilligen kwam 
niet uit. Hoewel zij als collectief nergens als politieke vluchtelingen zijn 
toegelaten (behalve in Zweden tot halverwege jaren 1970) maar enkel om 
humanitaire redenen, bleven zij standvastig in het idee als groep recht te 
hebben op politiek asiel vanwege hun politiek gemarginaliseerde en 
onderdrukte positie in de landen van herkomst. In de sterke emigratiegolf die 
vooral na de eerste helft van de jaren zeventig volgde, hebben leden van de 
gemeenschap zowel legale als illegale manieren gevonden om op de plek van 
bestemming te komen. Familiebanden hebben hier een belangrijke rol in 
gespeeld. Families waren verspreid over verschillende landen in het Midden-
Oosten. Het vertrek van familieleden heeft daarom mede een transnationale 
kettingreactie teweeggebracht. Dit verklaart de grote aantallen en de snelheid 
waarmee de emigratie plaatsvond – iets waar Westerse overheden niet op 
voorbereid waren en hetgeen ze, overigens tevergeefs, lange tijd hebben 
tegengewerkt. Uiteindelijk is de grote meerderheid van de Suryoye asielzoekers 
erin geslaagd om zich in het Westen te vestigen en zich op een toekomst in 
het nieuwe thuisland te richten.  
 Een blik op hun vestigingsproces in Zweden laat zien dat dit gepaard is 
gegaan met uitdagingen. Maar ondanks de grote verschillen met de 
emigratielanden hebben zij zich relatief snel weten te wortelen in de Zweedse 
samenleving. Dit heb ik uitgelegd als het gevolg van een process van 
interactie tussen de Suryoye als emigranten en de Zweedse overheid als 
ontvanger in het nieuwe vestigingsland. Enerzijds hebben Suryoye zich vanaf 
het begin erop gericht om in Zweden te blijven en anderzijds heeft de 
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Zweedse overheid een beleid ontwikkeld dat gericht is op de actieve 
participatie van immigranten in de Zweedse maatschappij. Ankerpunten in 
dit beleid zijn geweest: gelijkheid, partnerschap en keuzevrijheid. Suryoye 
hebben hier actief gebruik van gemaakt, wat de ontwikkeling binnen de 
groep en hun mobiliteit in de maatschappij mede verklaart. 
 De vestiging in Zweden heeft ook tot nieuwe vragen geleid waar zij niet 
op voorbereid waren, zoals de vraag naar hun collectieve identiteit. Dit heb 
ik uitgelegd als het gevolg van wat Laclau (1990) dislocation (ontwrichting) 
noemt van hun voormalige collectieve identiteit welke in de context van het 
Midden Oosten was gevormd. In een maatschappij waar religie nog steeds de 
meest centrale rol speelde in de identiteit van mensen, gold dit ook voor de 
Suryoye. Hun identiteit was sterk gebaseerd op het christen-zijn en meer 
specifiek op een Syrisch Orthodoxe en dus een confessionele identiteit.  
 Hun identiteit raakte echter ontwricht omdat zij in het Westen een 
confessionele identiteit niet langer als uitgangspunt konden hanteren om zich 
te onderscheiden van andere nationale groepen uit het het Midden-Oosten. 
De Suryoye hadden als burgers van de verschillende landen in het Midden-
Oosten, dezelfde nationaliteit als de betreffende nationale groepen. De 
Westerse autoriteiten deelden de Suryoye naar de nationaliteit van het land van 
herkomst in en classificeerden ze derhalve als Turken, Syriërs, Irakezen of 
Libanezen. Het feit dat al deze categorieën in het Westen vaak met een 
islamitische identiteit worden geassocieerd was één van de redenen (maar 
niet de enige) waarom Suryoye naar een alternatieve categorisering op zoek 
zijn gegaan. Hun gemarginaliseerde positie onder de meeste regimes in the 
Midden Oosten heeft ook tot een distantie ten opzichte van deze categorieën 
geleid waardoor zij zich in sterke mate gebruik hebben gemaakt van een 
alternatieve sub-identiteit. Hun ervaring met uitsluitingsmechanismen ten 
gevolge van hun marginalisatie heeft er mede toe bijgedragen dat zij zich 
sterk hebben afgezet tegen de benamingen die Westerse instellingen hanteren 
om de ‘amo Suryoyo aan te duiden. 
 Door hun vestiging in Europa werd het noodzakelijk dat de Suryoye 
vanuit de nieuwe context naar de eigen identiteit gingen kijken. In Europa 
speelt religie niet meer een centrale rol in het publieke leven maar is het deel 
gaan uitmaken van de privésfeer. Daarom werd het noodzakelijk om niet 
meer het geloof maar andere elementen in de eigen identiteit een centrale 
plaats te geven. Het feit dat de meerderheid in het Westen als christen werd 
gezien en dat zij zichzelf wilden blijven onderscheiden van de christelijke 
meerderheid, speelde ook een rol. Hun eigen christelijke identiteit bleef van 
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belang maar kreeg een andere rol. Zo zouden zij zich kunnen blijven 
onderscheiden van zowel de voormalige buitenstaanders (meerderheid 
islamitisch) als van de nieuwe buitenstaanders (meerderheid christelijk). Dit 
verklaart mede de verandering in hun identificatie van een etnisch-religieuze 
naar een etnisch-nationale. 
 De ontwrichting van hun identiteit betekende voor de Suryoye dat het 
noodzakelijk werd om de eigen identiteit zowel in een nieuw concept te 
gieten als in nieuwe termen uit te drukken. Suryoye-activisten die de 
Assyrische ideologie aanhingen, zagen heil in het gebruik van de benaming 
‘Assyriërs’ in Westerse talen. Het voormalige concept van een confessionele 
identiteit werd hiermee verruild voor een cross-conventionele benaming die 
de verschillende Suryoye kerken onder één benaming kon herenigen. Deze 
benadering gaat terug tot ten minste het begin van de twintigste eeuw in het 
Ottomaanse Rijk. De umthonoyutho (patriottisme) die destijds onder een kleine 
elite heerste, werd abrupt onderbroken door de Seyfo, en bijna twee decennia 
daarna, door de Simele Massacre (1933) in Irak. In de jaren vijftig van de vorige 
eeuw kwam er weer een opleving van umthonoyutho onder invloed van de 
Assyrische Democratische Organisatie (ADO) in Syrië, waar het opkomende 
Pan-Arabisme zowel een belemmering als een oorzaak was voor het ontstaan 
van een nieuwe impuls en een meer politiek georiënteerde vorm van 
umthonoyutho. 
 Onenigheid over de naam van de gemeenschap in Westerse talen in de 
diaspora ontstond voor het eerst in Amerika en Canada, nadat Patriarch 
Ephrem Barsaum in 1952 het besluit bekend had maakt dat de juiste naam 
van zijn gemeenschap niet ‘Assyrisch’ maar ‘Syrisch’ was, hetgeen een 
Aramees erfgoed en geen Assyrisch erfgoed veronderstelde. Dit besluit 
leidde in Amerika en Canada tot grote onenigheid binnen de 
kerkgemeenschap en ging gepaard met het uit de kerk treden van leden. In 
Europa ontstonden onenigheden in een vrij vroeg stadium na de eerste grote 
emigratie-golf naar Zweden, vanaf de tweede helft van de zeventiger jaren. 
Het conflict begon met de weerstand van geestelijken en leken tegen het 
gebruik van de naam Assyrier (Zweeds voor ‘Assyriërs’) en de ideologie van 
Assyrische activisten. Karakteristiek voor deze eerste oppositie van de kant 
van de geestelijken is dat zij identificatie op confessioneel niveau 
voorstonden. Ondanks de historisch sterke positie van de Syrisch-Orthodoxe 
Kerk zijn de geestelijken er niet in geslaagd om hun identiteitsdiscours op 
confessioneel niveau geïnstitutionaliseerd te krijgen. De rol die de kerk heeft 
gespeeld heeft er echter wel toe geleid dat er een einde kwam aan het 
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dominante gebruik van de naam Assyrier in Zweden, wat uiteindelijk het 
primaire doel van de kerkelijke oppositie bleek te zijn. Ik heb het laatste 
toegeschreven aan het feit, dat de Assyrische ideologie als een bedreiging 
voor de nationale identiteit werd ervaren door de regimes in het Midden-
Oosten. Onder de Suryoye heeft de Assyrische Beweging als eerste de 
cultureel-politieke rechten van de eigen bevolkingsgroep opgeëist. Daarom is 
die vanaf het begin de groep met de meest bedreigende ideologie binnen de 
Suryoye gemeenschap ervaren. 
 De oppositie van de kerk heeft tegelijkertijd ook ruimte gecreëerd voor 
een ideologie die zich ook de bestrijding van de Assyriska-beweging ten doel 
stelde. Dit verklaart voor een groot deel waarom geestelijken en de 
meerderheid van de gewone burgers sterke tegenstand boden tegen de 
ideologie van de Assyrier. De rol van de kerk zou ongetwijfeld nog grotere 
gevolgen hebben gehad als de Zweedse autoriteiten niet hadden ingegrepen 
en de Patriarch van de Syrisch Orthodoxe Kerk hadden verzocht om de 
Assyriska-activisten niet te excommuniceren. Als gevolg hiervan heeft de 
Synode van de Syrisch-Orthodoxe Kerk vanaf begin jaren tachtig minder 
harde besluiten tegen de Assyrier genomen.  
 Hoewel de oppositie in de beginjaren verschillende namen als alternatief 
en tegenhanger van de naam Assyrier heeft gebruikt, is uiteindelijk de naam 
Syrianer (in het Zweeds) de algemeen geaccepteerde naam van de oppositie 
geworden. Vanuit deze positie heeft de Syrianska-beweging een eigen 
ideologie ontwikkeld in relatie tot de Assyriska-beweging en zich tot een 
tegenbeweging ontwikkeld met een discours over de eigen identiteit. Het 
uitgangspunt is dat de ‘amo Suryoyo geen relatie heeft met een Assyrisch maar 
met een Aramees erfgoed. Daarnaast bood de Syrianska-beweging in de 
beginperiode hevige tegenstand tegen de cross-confessionele benadering van 
de Assyriska elite, die zich inzetten voor het ontwikkelen van een nationale 
identiteit. Echter, in dit proces van tegenwerking heeft ook de Syrianska-
beweging na verloop van tijd een alternatieve cross-conventionele ideologie 
ontwikkeld die teruggrijpt op een ver historisch verleden: het Aramese 
erfgoed. Dit proces is gepaard gegaan met het maken van onderscheid tussen 
de religieuze en seculiere invloedssferen binnen de gemeenschap en de taken 
die hiermee te verdelen zijn onder de religieuze en seculiere elite. Het streven 
naar een bruikbaar onderscheid werd tevens een basis voor de competitie 
tussen de religieuze en seculiere Syrianska elite. 
 Op de lange termijn heeft de ‘identiteitscrisis’ in Zweden geresulteerd in 
de institutionalisering van twee dominante identiteitsdiscoursen  – Assyriska 
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en Syrianska – in een proces van onderlinge rivaliteit. Beide groepen hebben 
elkaars macht bestreden om de eigen invloed in het ‘naamdebat’ maar ook in 
brede zin te vergroten. Dit proces betekent niet dat de onderlinge verschillen 
alleen maar zijn toegenomen. Hoewel beide groepen het oneens zijn met 
elkaars ideologie en deze bestrijden, maken zij tevens gebruik van 
soortgelijke strategieën en argumenten, maar gearticuleerd vanuit een kader 
dat binnen het eigen discours past, zodat het discours van de tegenpartij 
alsnog bestreden kan worden. De strijd om de hegemonie tussen de 
betrokken groepen is daarom een belangrijk kenmerk van het formatieproces 
van de identiteitsdiscoursen. 
 
Deze studie heeft bijgedragen aan de inzichten in processen van emigratie, 
vestiging en identificatie van de Suryoye in Europa en meer specifiek in 
Zweden. De discours-theoretische benadering heeft mij in staat gesteld om 
het contextuele, relationele en processuele karakter van verandering in 
identiteiten te illustreren. Vanuit dit perspectief heb ik identiteit als een ‘open 
concept’ benaderd waaraan verschillende betekenissen gegeven kunnen 
worden. En ik heb aangetoond hoe dit open karakter van identiteit een 
voorwaarde is geweest voor het ontstaan van het ‘naamdebat’ en laten zien 
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